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   The past three decades have seen increasing interest in the integration of Muslims 
as the most visible ethno-religious minority group in Britain. Previous research 
reported that Muslims in northern parts of England, for instance, had developed 
separate rather than integrated lives (Cantle 2001: 9). Though more recent surveys 
have reported an emerging change in such trends (Simpson 2012), Muslims in the 
Scottish context established a more mixed and integra d way of living with the 
majority from the outset, (Hussain and Miller 2006: 19) which was associated partly 
with the smaller population of Muslims in Scotland (Penrose and Howard 2008: 95). 
This qualitative research looks at the different identity negotiation and integration 
strategies of Muslims, and introduces the idea of ‘Halal integration’ which entails 
fitting into society while maintaining religious identity. This refers to the life of 
many Scottish Muslims, Halal Scots, who integrated into many aspects of Scottish 
society whilst maintaining their religious identity and practices. One example of such 
integration was the construction of hybrid or multiple social identities that constitute 
both Scottish and Muslim identity (Saeed et. al. 1999: 836; Hussain and Miller 2006: 
150; Hopkins 2008: 121). Other examples were adopting alternative ways of 
socialising such as meeting at cafés, running family and social events in non-
alcoholic environments, and taking part in voluntary nd charitable work. This study, 
thus, explains important barriers and pathways to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. 
The research involved 43 semi-structured interviews ith Muslims who were 
differentiated by generation and gender. Most existing studies of Muslims in 
Scotland have focused on major urban areas such as Edinburgh and Glasgow 
(Hopkins 2004; Hussain and Miller 2006; Virdee t. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 
2009). My study will therefore extend such research by comparing the experiences of 
Muslims across Scottish major cities and small towns. It will thus deepen our 
understanding of Muslims in Scotland. This thesis suggests that even though religion 
played an important role in their integration and identity negotiation, other factors 
such as nationality, ethnicity, racism and Islamophobia also played a significant part. 
It also suggests an emerging shift in the second generation Muslims’ economic, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
   The 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London, have placed 
Muslims’ integration in the UK under intense scrutiny. Muslim integration, however, 
has long been a matter of debate in Britain (Modood 2005, 2007; Parekh 2008; 
Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Hopkins 2011). This debate has revolved around the 
maintenance of Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice. Recently, for instance, 
David Cameron (British Government 2011), Britain’s Prime Minister, announced at 
the Munich Security Conference that ‘under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, 
we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other 
and apart from the mainstream.’ Critics of multiculturalism (including Cameron) 
mainly refer to Muslims - the most visible faith minority in the UK - as being less 
integrated into the wider society than people from ther minority groups. As both 
Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) and Parekh (2008) argue, most critics of 
multiculturalism support their arguments by giving examples which refer to 
Muslims, who are shown to be disloyal. Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice 
has sometimes even been perceived as a national idetity threat and this has resulted 
in discrimination and harassment of Muslims (Goodhart 2004; Chakraborti and 
Garland 2009: 45). These concerns are not new; research rs point to concerns about 
Muslim identity that date back to the 1970s (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985: 307; 
Modood 1994). It is since 9/11, however, that question  of loyalty to Britain have 
moved beyond ‘which cricket team you support’ (Ghosh 2013) to seeing Muslims as 
potential enemies within (see Ahmad 2003). Such narratives present a homogenous 
picture of Muslims in Britain, but their identity strategies and practices are complex 
and complicated; varying in relation to different factors (such as ethnicity, religion 
and nationality). The Scottish context, for instance, ounters such accounts and 
provides an interesting case of Muslims’ integration; Halal1 integration. This 
                                                                 
1 This is a very important Islamic term which means ‘permitted; that has been prepared in a ritually 
appropriate way’ (Esposito 2011: 243) according to Islamic rules. Even though this term may be used 
in the context of Muslim majority countries to refer to permissible food and drinks, however, in the 
context of western countries, Muslims (as it was evid nt in this research) use the term to refer to all 
matters in their daily life such as Halal dating and Halal music (Esposito 2011). The term ‘Halal 
integration’ was used by one of the participants in this research for the first time to refer to his 
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peculiar type of integration refers to practicing Muslims’ main strategy of 
integration: which was fitting into the society within Islamic boundaries. This thesis 
argues that many Scottish Muslims can also be referred to as Halal Scots because 
they have integrated into many aspects of Scottish society while maintaining their 
religious identity and practice. Although many practicing and devoted Muslims in 
Scotland maintain their distinctive religious identity and practice like elsewhere in 
the UK (Ameli et. al. 2004), much research indicates that they have also built a 
strong sense of identification with Scottishness (Saeed et. al. 1999; Hussain and 
Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). Highlighting the 
importance of the Scottish context, this study unpacks the complexity of Muslims’ 
identity and integration in Scotland.  
   As mentioned above, the first most publicised case of interest in Muslims’ identity 
and integration came with the rise of Muslim identity in the late 1970s. In different 
ways, events such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Salman Rushdie 
fatwa in 1989, the 1991 Gulf War, the 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 
bombings in London – both reflected and influenced the rise of Muslim identity. 
Many studies have pointed to the increasing importance of religion as a significant 
identity marker amongst Muslims in Britain (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Modood 
1994). Different explanations such as the public devaluation of Islam and the rise of 
political Islam have been associated with this increasing importance (Gardener and 
Shuker 1994; Ballard 1996; Anthias 2001; Archer 2003). The importance of 
religiosity was also highlighted in the work of some other researchers (Jacobson 
1997b; Hopkins 2007), and was seen to affect Muslims’ social identity and practice. 
Others, however, noted that even though religion plays an important part in Muslims’ 
social identity formation, religion was only one part of their multiple or hybrid 
identities (Hopkins 2007; Sarah and Kidd 2010). Other factors such as ethnicity, 
nationality, and ‘race’ can also affect Muslims’ identity formation and negotiation. 
For example, the significance of nationality was particularly highlighted in the 
Scottish context. Many studies (Saeed t. al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; 
Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011) emphasised Muslims’, especially 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
attempts to mix with others within Islamic boundaries. This was the starting point for my thinking 
about the best term to explain practicing Muslims’ integration in Scotland.  
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young Muslims’, identification with Scottishness. The above cited studies suggest 
that many Muslims in Scotland have constructed hyphenated or hybrid identities 
drawing on religion, ethnicity, nationality, and more commonly with the combination 
of religion and nationality; Scottish and Muslim. These studies also suggested that 
Muslims in the Scottish context have more affiliation and connection with 
Scottishness than Britishness. It has also been foud that Scottish Muslims’ 
identification with Scottish sub-state nationality has persisted despite Muslims’ 
tendency in England for example to identify with British, not English, identity 
(Hussain and Miller 2006). These findings highlight t e importance of the Scottish 
context in providing an inclusive idea of Scottishness to which Muslims can feel that 
they belong. However, other studies (Bond 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; 
Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010) suggest that in the everyday 
understanding of Scottishness, racial and ethnic markers are still important. For 
example Hopkins (2007: 72) suggests that Muslims may feel excluded due to the 
‘salience of race as a marker of social difference’. This is mainly due to the double 
sidedness of Islamophobia as a cultural racism, which targets Muslims’ racial and 
cultural characteristics (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer 
and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). Hopkins (2004) argues that Muslims in 
Scotland, as elsewhere, were racialised as Asians. These racialised Muslims were 
also culturally othered to the secular West (Hopkins 2004: 259). By studying the 
importance of religion, ethnicity, and nationality in Muslims’ social identity 
negotiation, this study highlights how Muslims affiliate with Scotland or distance 
themselves from Scottishness. 
   It is however important to note that the importance of the above markers - religion, 
ethnicity, and nationality - in Muslims’ identity formation is not homogeneous and 
could vary in strength and salience. Phinney (2003), for example, argues that the 
strength of minority ethnic people’s identification with their ethnic groups and/or 
their country of residence can be varied; each ident ty can either be strong or weak, 
or identification with both can be high. While studying Scottish Muslims, Hopkins 
(2007) also found that young Scottish-Muslims’ identification with their religion and 
their country of residence was varied in strength, nature, and meaning. Furthermore, 
Muslims’ self-conceptualisation can also be context dependent and subject to change 
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due to the importance of different social factors. For example, Turner and his 
colleagues (1994: 454) argue that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context 
dependent as they are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of 
reference’. Therefore, the extent and degree of identification with any identity 
marker (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion) can be varied and subject to 
difference. Little attention, however, has been paid to unpacking the different 
importance, meanings and strength of these identitis and the extent to which they 
can be changed (Hopkins 2007; 2008). This research, thus, by studying the 
importance of religion, ethnicity and nationality, discusses the different importance, 
meanings and strength of each of these markers in Muslims’ social identity 
negotiation in Scotland. Social identities can also be affected by sociological issues 
such as generational dynamics (see Ballard 1994; Jacobson 1997b). As Phinney 
(2003: 63) argues, ethnic identities are flexible and ‘subject to change along various 
dimensions; over time or across generations in a new culture, in different contexts’. 
Therefore, this research also discusses the importance of generational dynamics in 
affecting first and second Muslims’ self-conceptualisations. 
   It has been also argued that people’s identity is highly affected by the way in which 
others accept or reject that identity (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; McCrone and 
Bechhofer 2008; Hopkins et. al. 2011; Hopkins 2011; Thompson 2012) because 
identity non-recognition can have negative social consequences for those whose 
identities are denied (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; Thompson 2012). For example, 
Ballard (1996) argues that Muslims’ inter-group identification – as Muslim - is partly 
a reaction to external rejection by the white majority. This study therefore, discusses 
the importance of the feeling of being denied or reject d, and how such feelings can 
affect Scottish Muslims’ identity negotiation. 
 
Muslims in Scotland 
   The existing literature shows that Muslims, as the largest non-Christian faith group 
and the largest visible ethnic/faith minority group (Scottish Government 2005b), 
constitute around 1.4% of the population of Scotland with 77 thousand people 
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(National Records of Scotland 2013a: 32). This particularly highlights the visibility 
of the Muslim community, which can affect their exprience of racial discrimination. 
It is, however, important to note that contemporary Islam and Muslims in Scotland 
come in different forms due to differences of ethnicity, culture, denomination, and 
generation (Siddiqui 2006), thus research needs to be sensitive to the heterogeneity 
among Muslims. For example, in terms of ethnic diversity, even though the Pakistani 
community constitutes two-thirds of Muslims in Scotland (Scottish Government 
2005b: 13), there are small proportions of Muslims from Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
Turkey, Iran and the North African states (Siddiqui 2006). In regards to birth place, 
around half of Scottish Muslims were born inside thUK (Scottish Government 
2005b) and just under half of Scots who come from Pakistani families were born in 
Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). Due to the importance of birthplace as a marker, 
being born in Britain in general, and Scotland in particular, can affect these Muslims’ 
sense of identification with Britishness and Scottishness (McVie and Wiltshire 
2010). Those who were born outside of Britain may find their claims to British 
identity coming under question, and in particular, those who were born outside of 
Scotland may find their Scottishness challenged (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010). In 
terms of economic integration, they are rather poorly integrated. They suffer from the 
highest unemployment rate at 13%, which is nearly double the overall 
unemployment rate for Scotland (7%) (Scottish Government 2005b). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that Muslims’ visibility, low soci-economic status, high 
unemployment rate, and the fact that they make up the majority of the non-white and 
non-British born population, can reflect the problematic and challenging process of 
their identity negotiation and integration in Scotland. All these factors can affect and 
actually challenge Muslims’ identity negotiation, exp rience of Islamophobia, and 
social-economic integration, which will also be discu sed in this study. 
 
Integration 
   The most important aspect of this study is to explore the importance of Muslims’ 
religious identity and practice to their integration. The significance of religion in 
Muslims’ integration is, however, a matter of debat. For example, Joppke (2012) 
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argues that the religious identity of practicing Muslims creates boundaries for 
Muslims’ cultural and social integration. This can be associated with the central role 
of religion for many Muslims and the way they live in Britain (Modood 2005; see 
also Esposito 2011: 158). Some others, however, argue that Muslims’ identity 
politics can play an important part in their civic integration. For example, Choudhury 
(2007) and Meer (2010) argue that Muslims’ religious identity can be an important 
trigger for better civic integration. Furthermore, Hussain and Miller (2006) illustrate 
that Muslims’ Scottish identity was adopted as a tool f integration rather than 
separation. In this study, I discuss how Muslims’ religious identity and practice can 
limit their integration, particularly their social integration; whilst for the second 
generation on the other hand, Muslim women’s religious identity can play an 
important part in their civic integration and their challenging of patriarchal ideas. It 
is, however, important to note that other social and structural issues such as 
deprivation, generation, discrimination, and Islamoph bia can also affect integration. 
For example, Berry (1997) suggests that the experience of discrimination and 
prejudice is a major factor that makes integration potentially stressful. More 
specifically, Fekete (2008) suggests the importance of Islamophobia as a primary 
barrier to integration. This study discusses how Muslims’ experiences of 
Islamophobia and the dominance of alcohol in Scottish culture can limit Muslims’ 
socio-economic integration. 
   Highlighting the importance of generational dynamics, Phinney (2003: 63) argues 
that integration, or acculturation, can differ ‘among generations, as indicated by the 
differences that can be observed between immigrants d their children and 
grandchildren’. Taking this into consideration, this study discusses how second 
generation Muslims can be more integrated than the first generation. Such integration 
can also be affected by gender dynamics. For example, previous research pointed to a 
gendered process of exclusion in observing that Muslim women are less likely to be 
employed and to have higher education achievements (Scottish Government report 
2005; Netto et. al. 2011) due to racism and cultural pressures (Qureshi and Moores 
1999; Cassidy et. al.2006; Lewis 2007). The importance of this gendered process in 
Muslims’ economic and educational integration and the way which second 
generation Muslims deal with these issues are discussed in this study. This leads to 
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the next focus of this study that explores the importance of different factors, 
including Muslims’ religious identity and practice, on their experience of exclusion 
and/or Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust 1997). 
 
Islamophobia 
   For some writers, Islamophobia, also known as anti-Muslim racism and 
discrimination, is not only grounded in religious di crimination but actually consists 
of both colour and cultural racism (Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer 
and Modood 2009; Meer 2013). In this sense, Muslims are first racialised and then a 
certain culture –which is already vilified- is attributed to them (Modood 2005). 
Empirically, this argument is supported by research which found that both Muslims’ 
racial and religious/cultural appearance can be a basis for their discrimination 
(Hopkins 2004b; Virdee et. al. 2006; El-Nakla et. al.’s 2007; Kyriakides et. al. 
2009). The racial aspect of Islamophobia was better highlighted when some white 
British/Scottish converts experienced how their whiteness came under question when 
they wore the hijab – in the case of women - or grew a beard – in the case of men 
(Kose 1996; Franks 2000, Moosavi 2014). By highlighting the religious and cultural 
aspects of such experiences, some researchers also found that Muslims’ religious 
identity and visible appearance as a Muslim played a key part in their experience of 
Islamophobia (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014). 
Thus this research, by analysing fully practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ 
experiences of Islamophobia and racism, highlights t e importance of Muslims’ 
religious identity and practice in Islamophobia. Anti-Muslim discrimination, 
Islamophobia, can also take different forms in different contexts (Bennett 2000). For 
example, previous research (Hopkins 2004a) suggests tha  there is a feeling among 
some Muslims that anti-Muslim racism can be higher in areas where there is a high 
density of Muslim residents, such as Glasgow. In cotrast, several researchers 
suggest that ethnic minority people including Muslims – are at greater risk of racism 
in rural and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; 
Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). This study, by studying Muslims’ 
 
15 
experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in smaller Scottish cities and towns and 
then comparing them with those in Scotland’s major cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, 
highlights the major differences of experiences andperceptions and also discusses 
the importance of the low or high density of the Muslim community in the 
experience and feeling of Islamophobia.  
 
Research Questions and Method 
   This study, therefore, aims to investigate the importance of different factors - most 
specifically religion - in Muslims’ identity negotiation, integration, and experience 
of Islamophobia. In doing so, it firstly explores the importance of religion, ethnicity, 
and nationality in Muslims’ social self-conceptualis tion. Considering the 
importance of racial and cultural boundaries in defining Scottishness, this study will 
explore how they affect Muslims’ identification with Scottish national identity. Due 
to the highlighted significance of religion as an identity marker, especially amongst 
young Muslims, this study discusses different explanations for such importance. It 
also explores the importance of religious practice and identity - alongside other 
social/structural factors such as discrimination - in affecting their integration in 
Scotland. Finally, it explores how Muslims’ religious expression and practice can 
affect their experience of Islamophobia and social exclusion. These objectives, thus, 
lead to three main questions in this research:  
• What are the barriers and path-ways to Muslim integration? 
• How do Muslims negotiate their social identities inScotland? 
• What have been Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia? 
 
   Most studies of Muslims in Scotland tend to view Muslims as a homogenous 
community without taking any of their internal differences into account (e.g. Hussain 
and Miller 2006) or focus on particular sub-categories, such as young Muslims (e.g. 
Saeed et. al. 1999; Hopkins 2004; 2007). Additionally, most studies have only been 
carried out in a small number of areas, and predominantly in major urban areas such 
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as Edinburgh and Glasgow (e.g. Saeed t. al. 1999; Hopkins 2004a, 2004b, 2007; 
Hussain and Miller 2006; Virdee t. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009). Other 
research (de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Plastow 2012) instead only focused on rural 
areas. Considering the heterogeneity of Muslims in Scotland and the importance of 
geographical, generational, and gender dynamics among Muslims1, this study will 
particularly investigate the importance of each of these factors in Muslims’ social 
self-identification, experiences of Islamophobia, and socio-economic integration in 
turn. My research, therefore, encompasses different Muslims (based on generation 
and gender differences) in different geographical contexts in order to capture the 
diversity of their experiences. Although Muslim populations in Scotland are to some 
degree concentrated in the largest cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, it is important to 
note that a large minority of Muslims do not live in those places and so this study 
will give voice to these groups. 
   This study, therefore, contributes to the understanding and explanation of the 
complex relationship between religion, nation, and ethnicity in Muslims’ social self-
conceptualisation in Scotland. By highlighting the impacts of majorities’ 
inclusionary/exclusionary attitudes towards Muslims’ self-conceptualisation, it will 
offer further insights into the concept of non-recognition and its social impacts on 
Muslims’ social inclusion/exclusion, which is less tudied. It will also shed light on 
the understanding of everyday racism and Islamophobia in Scotland. By taking 
geographical, generational, and gender issues into consideration, this study also 
contributes to the literature that highlights the diversity and heterogeneity of 
Muslims. Putting these all together, this study makes a contribution to a deeper 
understanding of Muslims’ everyday lived experiences in Scotland, especially to 
their experiences of social integration. Concerning more practical and policy-making 
areas, this study’s findings can, generally, offer urther insights into how to build an 
inclusive national identity and promote equality (esp cially in relation to Muslims 
                                                                 
1 Other differences among Muslims, such as ethnicity, age, or sect/school of thought, are not taken 
into consideration because the existing studies of Muslims did not find any important differences in 
the above issues. Additionally, the findings of my research did not show any significant difference 
associated with those factors. This study, however, continued recruiting Muslims from different 
backgrounds, but the main focus of selective sampling and data analysis was based upon geographical, 
generational, and gender dynamics [this is explained further in the methodology chapter].  
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and other ethno-religious minorities), which is one of the Scottish Government’s 
main policy concerns (Scottish Government 2005a). 
 
The Structure of the Research 
   Outlining the structure of this study, Chapter Two begins by laying out the 
theoretical dimensions of the study and looks at the key conceptions of identity, 
Islamophobia, and integration. This chapter will begin with theoretical debates about 
the social self-identification of minority ethnic/faith people and then review the 
importance of religion and nationality in Muslims’ identity negotiation. Second, it 
will conceptualise how the conception of ‘race’ can be rearticulated in the wake of 
the emergence of cultural racism and Islamophobia. Then, it will review major 
multicultural accounts of the discussion of integration and conceptualise the 
importance of religion and religious identities in Muslims’ integrational strategies. 
Chapter Three, drawing on the existing literature, brings out the Scottish dimension 
of the above issues and reviews Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of 
Islamophobia, and integration in Scotland. To locate these issues in the Scottish 
context, this chapter will also review the literature in order to outline Scottish 
nationalism, racism, and multiculturalism. To this end, this chapter firstly provides a 
brief historical outline of Muslims’ presence in Scotland and highlights the key 
demographic features of Scottish Muslims. Then, it will review the discussion of 
Scottish national identity and review the existing literature on its inclusive or 
exclusive nature. Thirdly, it offers a discussion on Muslims’ social self-identification 
and discusses the importance of Muslims’ national ad religious identities. Then, it 
reviews different accounts of the presence of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland 
and discusses Muslims’ experiences in relation to this issue. Finally, it outlines 
Scottish multicultural approaches to different minor ty groups and reviews the 
important factors that affect Muslims’ integration in Scotland. 
   Chapter Four describes the design, synthesis, chara terization and evaluation of 
research methods in this study. This chapter discusses and explains the 
methodological approach and perspective of this study o studying Muslims’ social 
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self-conceptualisation, experience of Islamophobia and integration. Then it outlines 
research questions and interview topic guides. This chapter also charts data 
collection and sampling methods and discusses the importance of key variables in 
this study; generation, gender, and location. Finally, it explains the method of data 
analysis, and also discusses ethics, access, and positionality. To start presenting and 
discussing empirical data, Chapter Five discusses th  importance, meaning, and 
strength of nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity negotiation 
in Scotland. To this end, it firstly examines the importance of nationality in first 
generation participants’ social identity negotiation n Scotland. Then the significance 
of ethnicity and ethnic identities is explained. It will also discuss the importance and 
strength of religion. Moving onto second generation participants’ identity 
negotiation, it discusses the importance of nation, ‘race’, ethnicity, and religion in 
turn and finally it comes to a conclusion by comparing the importance of these 
markers in each generation. Chapter Six explores Muslims’ experiences of 
Islamophobia and discusses the importance of different factors influencing their 
experiences. This chapter firstly details and discus es different experiences of 
Islamophobia among Muslims in Scottish major cities. Secondly, individual and 
institutional Islamophobia is discussed, and finally, the conclusion is made that 
socio-economic factors are more important than the density of the Muslim 
population. The next chapter, by studying Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in 
Scottish towns and small cities and comparing that with those in Scottish major 
cities, highlights the major differences of experienc s and discusses the importance 
of low or high minority population density in the experience of Islamophobia. This 
chapter firstly details and discusses different experiences of Islamophobia among 
Muslims in Scottish towns and small cities. This chapter will also chart key 
differences relating to each participant and compare individual and institutional 
Islamophobia across Scottish cities and towns before c ncluding.  
   Chapter Eight discusses the importance of different barriers and pathways, 
including Islamophobia, to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. It will first detail and 
discuss barriers into Muslim integration which can be characterised as 
structural/social and cultural barriers. This chapter will then discuss how issues of 
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cultural understanding and respect, expressed as the main pathway to integration, 
could aid Muslims’ integration.  
   Chapter Nine discusses Muslims’ main strategy, namely Halal integration, to 
socialise and interact with the mainstream society while maintaining their religious 
identity. This chapter begins by exploring participants’ economic and employment 
integration in Scotland. Second, this chapter details participants’ educational 
achievements. In this section, the importance of second generation Muslim women’s 
religious identity in challenging cultural barriers for their greater educational 
integration is highlighted. Finally, participants’ ocial integration through social 
friendship and shared and sporting activities is outlined. The last chapter provides a 
conclusion and presents the major findings on the key variables concerning Muslims’ 
identity, experience of Islamophobia, and integration. It will reflect on the limitations 
of the study, suggest avenues for further research, nd offer some recommendations. 
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   This chapter will provide a critical review of the existing literature and introduce 
the key conceptual issues of integration, Islamophobia and identity. The major task 
of this chapter is to conceptualise the possible relationship between Muslim identity 
and experiencing Islamophobia and integration. To this end, this chapter will review 
major multicultural accounts of the discussion of integration and conceptualise the 
importance of religion and religious identities in Muslims’ integrational strategies. 
Second, it will conceptualise how racism can be understood in light of the emergence 
of cultural racism and Islamophobia. It will then discuss how ethnic/faith people, 
mainly Muslims in this study, negotiate their social dentities and review the 
importance of religion and nationality in their identity negotiation. These theoretical 
debates and arguments are used to inform the analysis of my findings in later 
chapters. 
 
Integration and Fitting in: Social and Cultural Barriers  
   The importance of integration lies in the diverse population of many countries that 
have to deal with different ethnic or cultural minority groups. As Kelly (2002) states 
cultural diversity or multi-cultural society refers to societies with more than one 
religious, national or ethnic culture. Britain has become a multi-cultural society via 
the immigration of people from different cultures, more visibly non-white and from 
outside Europe (Modood 2007). The growth of immigration from former colonies 
since the 1960s created the need to reconcile the conflicting demands between wider 
society and immigrants’ newly established communities. The new minorities often 
sought to maintain their own ways of life and also to teach such ways of life to their 
children, while the host country sought to maintain  sense of common national 
identity and cultural continuity. The problem was seen as a matter of finding a way 
for a society to incorporate its minorities so that it could both satisfy their aspirations 
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to maintain cherished ways of life and at the same time maintain itself as a 
(historical) community of common belonging. Therefo, incorporation of these new 
members into society was a question of growing importance. Different scholars’ 
responses to this question mainly revolved around the concepts of assimilation and 
integration. Assimilation was defined as a process in which the newcomers become 
similar to their host society (Brubaker 2001) whereas the term integration, mainly 
proposed by multiculturalists, was defined as a state of recognition and respect 
(Kymlicka 1995; Hall 2000; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007). 
   Integration is contested as a term and there is no ingle definition or theory of 
immigrants’ or minorities’ integration (Castles t. al. 2002; Phillimore and Goodson 
2008). However, as mentioned above, one common theoretical approach to 
integration was distinguishing integration from assimilation (Kymlicka 2001; Parekh 
2006; Modood 2007; Pfeffer 2014) or parallelising them (Brubaker 2001). The main 
intellectual debate on how to approach newcomers was also between assimilationists 
and multiculturalists. As Parekh (2006) notes the response of different governments 
might be in one of two ways, multiculturalist or assimilationist (monoculturalist); 
each in turn capable of taking several forms. Governm nts that take a multiculturalist 
approach might ‘welcome and cherish [cultural diversity], make it central to its self-
understanding, and respect the cultural demands of it constituent communities’ but 
those governments that take an assimilationist response might ‘seek to assimilate 
these [different] communities into its mainstream culture either wholly or 
substantially’ (Parekh 2006: 6). Park and Burgess famously (1969: 735) define 
assimilation as ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and 
groups, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a 
common cultural life’. In contrast, the conception of integration from the 
multicultural perspective means a state of ‘recognitio  and respect’ in which both the 
majority and the minority have to make an effort to achieve greater integration and 
respect one another’s culture (Ameli and Merali 2004, Modood 2007). As Modood 
(2007:48) argues, integration ‘is where processes of ocial interaction are seen as 
two-way, and where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and 
ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed 
for failing (or not trying) to integrate’. It is, however, important to note that the 
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interpretation of integration was not the same even amongst multiculturalists. For 
example, the state of recognition and respect was conditional amongst liberal 
multiculturalists. Crucially, the important condition for liberals is the insistence of 
individual rights (Kymlicka 1995; Kennedy 2013). From their perspective, 
minorities’ cultures are recognised and respected as long as they are consistent with 
individual rights (the main difference between liberal and communitarian 
multiculturalists is discussed in more detail later in this chapter). Fekete (2008: 1) 
argues that ‘the problem of integration, in other words, lies in the interpretation of 
integration itself’. By highlighting the stand of different types of multiculturalist 
theories on the issue of integration and assimilation, Hall (2000: 210) describes how, 
for instance, ‘conservative multiculturalism insists on assimilation of difference into 
the tradition of the majority whereas the liberal multiculturalism seeks to integrate 
different cultural groups into the mainstream and pluralist multiculturalism formally 
enfranchises the difference between groups along cultural lines and accords different 
group-rights to different communities within a more communal or communitarian 
political order’. 
   Distinguishing assimilation from integration, Pfeffer (2014) suggests an important 
account which worth quoting at length. He (2014) proposes three main distinctions; 
first, ‘there is a fundamental normative difference b tween a host society that 
invokes laws to incorporate its immigrants in a way that is respectful of, and is 
willing to celebrate their diverse practices (which s indicative of integration) and a 
host society that seeks to attenuate differences between minorities and the host 
society’. Second, ‘assimilation is often a unidirectional process insofar as it places 
most of the expectations on immigrants. … Conversely; integration ought to be 
viewed as a dialogical process meaning that it should be achieved through the 
cooperation and deliberation of both actors’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354). Finally, ‘integration 
can be defined on the basis of participation in, as opposed to degree of similarity 
with, the host society. … However, just because intgration requires convergence on 
liberal democratic values does not mean that cultural g oups need to give up 
traditional practices’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354). 
 
23 
   From a more normative perspective, in their theoretical approach to cultural 
diversity, most multiculturalists refer to multicult ralism as equal recognition 
(Kymlicka 1995; Kelly 2002) and respect (Taylor 1992; Parekh 2006; Modood 
2007) of different cultures. In this perspective, which is commonly accepted by both 
communitarians and individualists, culture has an important and significant role to 
play. For example, Taylor (1992: 42) as a communitarian multiculturalist, argues 
that ‘the potential for forming and defining one’s own identity, as an individual, and 
also as a culture […] must be respected equally in everyone’. In general, 
multiculturalists believe that culture has a significant role in the formation of 
individuals’ identity and self-understanding. Hence, different cultures and group 
differentiated rights in multicultural societies should be recognised and 
accommodated in order to achieve individuals’ freedom and equality as they are two 
of the most basic commitments of liberal democracies (Kymlicka 1995). It is in 
defining the conception of self and the impact of culture on a person’s identity and
self-understanding that the debate and distinction between communitarian and 
individualist multiculturalists takes place.  
   Kelly (2002: 6) points out that communitarians such as Charles Taylor (1985), 
Michael Sandel (1982) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), criticised the narrowly 
‘atomistic’ and ‘asocial’ nature of the person which John Rawls’ (1971) liberalism 
represents. These communitarians, in contrast to Rawlsian and contractualist 
liberalism, argue that the conception of the person in Rawls’s liberalism 
‘presupposes that the person or self can be detached from all the contingent aspects 
of personality provided by society, history, culture and family without undermining 
its capacity to choose its ends or the rules that sould govern its interactions with 
others’ (Kelly 2002: 6). Communitarians further argue that individuals and their 
identities are attached to and shaped by their culture and social context (Parekh 
2006; Young 1990). Communitarians also see culture as a significant identity-
conferring association and consider group membership to be prior to individual 
identities (Kelly 2002). It is however, important to note that this is a complicated 
issue and even some liberals such as Kymlicka agree with the important role of 
culture and group membership in affecting one’s identity (Kymlicka 1995).    
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   Liberals, in contrast, criticised communitarians for overstating the role of culture 
and social context in individuals’ self-understandings, and thus for seeing the person 
as unable to revise his/her ends (Kymlicka 1995). Liberalism, and consequently 
liberal multiculturalists, provides an ideology whic  is based on individual rights 
(Kennedy 2013). Even among liberals there are differences in how group 
differentiated rights and individual rights are approached. Some, such as John Stuart 
Mill, insist on a homogenous culture, and others such as David Miller, insist on the 
conception of a shared national identity (Kennedy 2013). As Kymlicka (ibid.: 74) 
points out, some individualists go further and reject multiculturalism or group 
differentiated rights on the grounds of abstract individualism, where the individual’s 
freedom and autonomy are valued over and above the group’s. However, Kymlicka 
(1995: 75) argues that ‘minority rights are not only consistent with individual 
freedom, but can actually promote it’. He (Kymlicka 1995: 83) further supports the 
importance of culture on the grounds of individual freedom and autonomy, and 
points out that ‘freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our 
societal culture1 not only provides these options, but also makes thm meaningful to 
us’. Therefore access to a societal culture is essential for individual freedom, and 
because most people have a deep bond to their own culture, they have a legitimate 
interest in maintaining this bond (Kymlicka 1995). Nonetheless, Kymlicka (1995) 
makes apparent his distance from communitarians and their assertion that the person 
cannot revise his/her ends, when he states that ‘people can stand back and assess 
moral values and traditional ways of life, and should be given not only the legal right 
to do so, but also the social conditions which enhance this capacity’ (Kymlicka 
1995: 92). The important implication of these theoretical arguments is that the role 
of culture in the person’s identity formation, eithr as a factor that shapes the 
person’s identity (communitarians) or as a factor that provides meaningful choices 
and supports the person’s identity (liberals), is undeniable and should therefore be 
recognised and accommodated by the government and public institutions. The core 
difference between liberals and communitarians concerns the notion of whether the 
                                                                 
1. Kymlicka (1995:75) believes that the modern world is divided into “societal cultures whose 




person can revise or contest his/her own culture or own ends. Communitarians 
believe that the person is attached to his/her own ends and culture, while liberals 
insist that each person can and should have the rigt to revise and contest his/her 
culture and ends (Kymlicka 1995). Considering the importance of culture in the 
formation of one’s identity, Chapters 4 and 7 discuss how the public devaluation of 
Islam and Muslims - in the form of Islamophobia- can contribute to the strength of 
Muslims’ religious identity and inter-group relationships in Scotland. 
Immigrants’ and ethnic/faith minorities’ integration is also debated and theorized 
from more practical and functional aspects that highlight the interaction between the 
social and functional dimensions and the influence of the state (Korac 2003). In 
Britain, Ager and Strang (2008: 179) argue that integration has been considered to be 
part of the discussion of social inclusion/exclusion and race relations. From this 
perspective, the importance of social and structural barriers to integration was 
highlighted. As Ager and Strang (2008: 181) argue, th  conceptions of inclusion and 
exclusion were associated with ‘policy measures that use the metaphor of removing 
barriers to integration.’ The Refugee Council (1997: 15), for example, described 
integration as ‘a process which prevents or counterac s the social marginalisation of 
refugees, by removing legal, cultural and language obstacles and ensuring that 
refugees are empowered to make positive decisions on their future …’. The 
importance of structural barriers to minority ethnic/faith groups was supported by 
empirical research. Berry (1997), for instance, suggested that experience of 
discrimination and prejudice are major factors that made integration potentially 
stressful. Hale (2000) observed that certain factors such as language, employment 
and housing hindered Vietnamese migrants’ economic and social participation in 
mainstream society and acted as barriers to effective integration. Hickman et. al. 
(2008: 190) found that fundamental issues such as deprivation, disadvantage and 
discrimination are central to ensure the cohesion of the social fabric of British 
society. Trevor Phillips (2011), the chair of Equality Rights Committee, also argues 
that minorities’ integration is affected by discrimination and economic policies and 
that integration mostly happens in the workplace. Thus, those immigrants and 
ethnic/faith minorities who suffer from racism and i equality in different aspects of 
society or are unemployed will be less likely to integrate because they have no 
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opportunity to do so. More specifically, Fekete (2008) suggests the importance of 
Islamophobia as a primary barrier to Muslims’ integration. Taking the importance of 
social and structural factors into consideration, Ager and Strang (2004) proposed a 
working definition of integration – mainly in relation to refugees - which was well 
attended and adopted in many empirical studies. They define an individual or group 
to be integrated within a society:  
when they achieve public outcomes within employment, housing education, health 
etc: which are equivalent to those achieved within e wider host communities, and 
are in active relationship with members of their ethnic or national community, wider 
host communities and relevant services and functions f the state, in a manner 
consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship in that society (Ager 
and Strang 2004: 9). 
 
   This working definition of integration was used by Ager and Strang (2004) to 
develop a working framework in order to study the indicators of integration in the 
UK. This framework is structured around ten key domains that were found to be 
central to the integration of refugees. Employment, housing, education, and health 
are four domains, grouped as markers and means, which presented the major areas of 
attainment that are recognised as critical factors in the integration process (Ager and 
Strang 2004: 3). Social bridges, social bonds, and social links, - grouped as social 
connections - stressed the importance of relationshps to the understanding of the 
integration process (Ager and Strang 2004: 3). Language and cultural knowledge 
alongside safety and stability presented key facilitating factors for the process of 
integration (Ager and Strang 2004: 4). Rights and citizenship is the final domain 
under the heading ‘foundation’ which presented the ‘basis upon which expectations 
and obligations for the process of integration are established’ (Ager and Strang 2004: 
4). It is important to note that the housing and health domains of this definition were 
not examined in this research due to practical issue  and its lack of relevance to the 
main focus of this research; the importance of religion. This comprehensive 
definition of integration encompasses functional and social factors that inform my 
investigation of the importance of structural and social barriers to Muslims’ 
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integration in Chapter 8. However, it is important to note that this policy-focused 
definition does not include the importance of ‘relationships with the host 
community, the importance of retaining one’s own cultural connections, shared 
values and the need to ensure safety and security’ (Phillimore and Goodson 2008: 
309). This leads to another approach to integration that highlights the importance of 
relational and cultural issues. 
   In contrast to the above authors who highlighted the importance of social and 
structural barriers, others highlight the significan e of some religious boundaries and 
cultural barriers that affect Muslims’ integration. As mentioned earlier, religion and 
religious identity for many Muslims is central to their sense of who they are and how 
their behaviour in all spheres of life should be (Jacobson 1997b). Similarly, Modood 
(2005) argues that religion is central to many Muslim  and that therefore any new 
ways of living in Britain and becoming a part of British society have to ultimately be 
justified in terms of compatibility with the Muslim faith and the welfare of Muslims. 
The centrality and significance of the religion of Islam in observant Muslims’ life is 
related to the crucial emphasis of teachings of Islam upon rightful and correct action 
(Jacobson 1997b; Esposito 2011). Esposito (2011: 158) argues that ‘throughout 
history Islamic law has remained central to Muslim identity and practice, for it 
constitutes the ideal social blueprint for the believer who asks, “What should I do?”’ 
The teachings of Islam, as a complete system of guiding beliefs, has comprehensive 
coverage that includes ‘regulations ranging from religious rituals to marriage, 
divorce and inheritance to setting standards for penal and international law, provided 
a common code of behaviour and connection for all Muslim societies’ (Esposito 
2011: 158). It is, however, important to note that Islamic laws were always subject to 
different integration, and sociologically, Muslims’ religious practices were never 
uniform. The important of beliefs and religious practice can be conceptualised by 
Park’s (2007: 320) argument that for individuals for whom religion is important, 
religion ‘forms a core part of their meaning system, influencing their global beliefs, 
goals and sense of meaning in life’. In this sense, religious social identities function 
as ‘guiding beliefs’ (Ysseldyk et. al. 2010: 67) which shapes devoted people’s lives. 
As mentioned earlier, the comprehensive coverage of the teachings of Islam 
provided pervasive and clear religious boundaries that can contribute to the strength 
 
28 
and coherence of expressions of religious identities (Jacobson 1997b). Such 
pervasive religious boundaries can also affect Muslims’ social integration, affecting 
their wider social relations with non-Muslims - the majority - and their daily life 
(Jacobson 1997b). Joppke (2012) also argues that the religious identity of practicing 
Muslims creates boundaries for Muslims’ cultural and social integration. For 
example, there are a set of regular and formal practices through which the majority 
of practicing Muslims make a commitment to such as reading daily prayers, fasting 
during Ramadan, and attending Friday prayers at the local mosques (Jacobson 
1997b). The practice of such rituals, especially by devoted Muslims, can make Islam 
a significant element of daily life and thus ‘directly impinge upon relationships with 
non-Muslims’ (Jacobson 1997b: 250). Jacobson (1997b) argues that the necessity of 
eating a Halal diet and abstinence from alcohol are the religious prescriptions that 
inevitably have an effect upon a large number of Muslims in Britain. For illustration, 
Jacobson (1997b) highlights the differences in socialising patterns between Muslims 
and non-Muslims and suggests that the dominance of drinking alcohol in the social 
lives of most young Britons can result in the isolati n of Muslims. 
   Taking the impact of social and cultural factors n immigrants’ or minorities’ 
integration into consideration, several diverse forms of integration have been 
proposed. Parekh (2008:85), for example, argues that integration can be partial, 
limited, or thin, as society is multilevel (political, economic, social, moral, and 
cultural), and that immigrants or ethnic/faith minorities might integrate at some of 
these levels, but not all. For instance, immigrants or ethnic/faith minorities might 
integrate fully into economic and political life but prefer to maintain the separation 
of some aspect of their cultural and communal lives. Some integrationists reject 
limited integration; but Parekh stresses that ‘immigrants might wish to, and indeed 
have a right to, retain parts of their cultural identity, and integration could and should 
be thin, limited mainly to society’s common institutions’ (Parekh 2008:86). The way 
in which immigrants and/or ethnic/faith minorities integrate into the wider society 
can differ from each other as well. As Modood (2007) argues, a single sociological 
model for a multi-ethnic or multicultural society is not possible because minority 
groups are likely to vary not just by dimensions such as differential cultures, 
identities, economic and skill profiles, racism, and political targeting, but also the 
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extent to which they are even groups. Some groups may be more mixed in terms of 
relationships and joint activities with non-group me bers and may exercise 
relatively little effort to reproduce the group culturally or politically, but for other 
groups who may not be at all ‘separatist’ or eschew civic participation, the 
transmission of a community or a diasporic or faith identity at least into the next 
generation may be very important (Modood 2007: 45-6). In sum, no minority group 
can be a model for all others, and there is no right to insist that some minorities’ 
lifestyle, behaviour, and manner should be the form f integration to which other 
groups should adapt themselves. ‘So, the ultimate meaning of multi is that specific 
policies, complexes of policies and multicultural institutional arrangements have to 
be customized to meet diverse (as well as common) vulnerabilities, needs and 
priorities’ (Modood 2007:46). This study, in Chapters 8 and 9, therefore, examines 
Muslims’ integrational strategies and will discuss the importance of different 
structural and cultural barriers to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Muslims’ 
distinctive practices and identities may lead to their discrimination, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Cultural Racism and Islamophobia 
   Muslims’ experiences of exclusion as the most viible ethnic/faith minority group 
can be conceptualised in the discussion of cultural racism and Islamophobia. I start 
with the former; the issue of racism has been viewed and studied from different 
levels and perspectives such as scientific (Rex 1986), historical (Mama 1995; Miles 
1989), political/structural/institutional (Rex 1986; Miles 1982), psychological 
(Allport 1979; Brown 2010) and sociological (Gilroy 1987; Miles 1989). From a 
scientific perspective, racism was related to biology: genetics and phenotypes. Miles 
(1989: 79) defined racism as a process of racialisation where there is ‘signification of 
some biological characteristic(s) as the criterion by which a collectivity may be 
identified . . . as having a natural, unchanging ori in and status, and therefore as 
being inherently different.’ Historical perspectives place a similar emphasis on 
biological characteristics; and both scientific and historical racism have been 
categorised as old racism. The old racism was more biological and also related to the 
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colonial discourse which regarded black ‘races’ and skin colours as inferior racial 
groups and the white ‘race’ and skin colour as the superior racial group. For example, 
according to Banton (2000: 62), early nineteenth century accounts of ‘race’ were 
based on the erroneous assumption of distinct and biologically ordered hierarchies 
where ‘those with black or brown skin were thought to be at a lower stage in the 
evolutionary process than white people’. These scientific and biological accounts of 
‘race’ and ‘racial’ differences have been contested an  discredited over time by 
many scientists and sociologists alike. For example, Montagu (1997) argued that 
holding such beliefs in racial differences was a trgic myth that led to many 
oppressive, destructive and inhuman actions. Racial differences cannot be embedded 
in or represent any innate predispositions of different groups, and as Miles (1982) 
proposes, the conception of ‘race’ is simply a descriptive term which can only cover 
phenotypic variations such as differences in skin colour. As a result of such 
comprehensive discrediting of scientific racism, Modo d (2005: 27) argues that we 
have seen the emergence of ‘a racism based on cultural differences, on the natural 
differences preference of human beings for their own cultural group, and on the 
incompatibility between different cultures - the mixing or coexistence of which in 
one country, it was alleged, was bound to lead to violent social conflict and the 
dissolution of social bonds’. The biological approach to ‘race’ has declined but, as 
Bilton et. al. (1996: 237) argue, ‘race’ is still used ‘as a basis for inequality and it 
also remains a potent basis for our identity formation; it shapes our sense of 
sameness and difference’. 
   The ‘new’ racism, in contrast to ld or colour racism is more related to cultural 
differences. For example, in highlighting the emergence of ‘new racism,’ Martin 
Barker (1981) describes it as a phenomenon which defines groups not as biological 
types but as cultural communities, talks of the incompatibility of cultures, and based 
its arguments on notions of difference rather than superiority. For Modood (2005) 
cultural or new racism means a characterization of a racial group and disadvantages 
of that group based on their culture, not on their biology. He further argues that such 
cultural racism ‘directed to a racialised or racially marked group may involve an 
antipathy to the group because it is perceived to be an alien culture rather than 
merely an inferior one’ (ibid.). Culture and difference, thus, are key issues in cultural 
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or new racism; cultural racism stigmatises and others people with d fferent cultural 
characteristics such as name, dress, and religious practices. For Balibar (1991: 21), 
‘new racism’ presents a ‘need to purify the social body to preserve one’s own or our 
identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion.’ Such representations 
are articulated around the stigmatising of otherness (Balibar 1991).  
   Although culture and difference are central in the discussion of new racism, the 
older marker of ‘race’ has not faded in this new era of cultural racism. Malik (1996), 
thus suggests that elements of culture and/or ethnicity have just been taken to act as 
homologues of ‘race’. Within this discourse, racial and ‘natural determinacy finds its 
homologue in signifiers of trans-historical bonds which preclude the national 
membership of individuals construed as ‘ethnically fixed’ and thus their ‘ethnicity’, 
as identified by names and/or religious practices, dictates that they have no choice 
but to remain within their ‘ethnic’ group, and thus outside/inside ‘the nation’ in 
question’ (Kyriakides et. al. 2009: 292). Further to this interlink between racial and 
cultural elements in new racism, Modood (1994: 4) also notes that cultural racism 
builds upon colour racism by using cultural differences such as religion constructed 
‘from an alleged British or civilized norm to vilify or marginalize or demand cultural 
assimilation from groups who also suffer colour-racism’. For Modood (2005:11), 
cultural racism is not ‘a proxy for racism but a form of racism’ and suggests that 
‘race’ is not just about colour, and racialisation has to be based on some features of 
people related to physical appearance and ancestry; otherwise racism cannot be 
distinguished from other forms of groupism. Modood (2005:11) concludes that 
‘physical appearance is central to race, but, as in the case of cultural racism, it can be 
a marker only and not necessarily denote a form of determinism’. Therefore, cultural 
racism ‘draws on physical appearance as one marker mong others, but is not solely 
premised on conceptions of biology in a way that ignores religion, culture and so 
forth’ (Meer and Modood 2009: 344). South Asians, who are predominately Muslims 
and the most visible non-white group, are ‘a principal object of racist victimisation’ 
and cultural racism as a ‘certain culture is attributed to them, is vilified, and is even 
the ground for discrimination’ (Modood 2005: 7). Therefore, Modood (2005: 7) 
argues that researching discrimination or harassment against Asians, particularly 
Muslims, requires ‘a conceptualization of racism that includes cultural racism as 
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well as colour racism and an understanding that Asians suffer a double or a 
compound racism.’ This leads to the discussion of a more specific and particular 
form of cultural racism, Islamophobia, which first racialises Muslims and then 
vilifies their culture and religion.  
 
Islamophobia as a Cultural Racism 
   In recent years, Islamophobia has been the defining example of cultural racism, 
targeting Muslims as an ethno-religious minority group. Previously, it was mostly 
anti-Semitism, targeting Jews (Modood 2005; Werbner 2005; Meer and Noorani 
2008; Meer 2013). There has been a considerable scholarly attempt to draw an 
analogy between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the discussion of racialisation of 
ethno-religious minorities (Werbner 2005, 2013; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and 
Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Weaver 2013). The most publicized definition of 
Islamophobia is provided by the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI), which describes Islamophobia as ‘an unfounded 
hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims,’ and 
further elaborated the proposal of eight possible Islamophobic mindsets (Runnymede 
Trust 1997). More specifically, it equates Islamophbia with closed views which are 
itemized in eight main features; the first feature of Islamophobia is seeing Islam or 
Muslims as ‘undifferentiated, static and monolithic and as intolerant of internal 
pluralism and deliberation’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 5). The second view is seeing 
Islam as other and separate and have nothing in common with other cultures; and the 
third item is seeing Islam or Muslims (‘them’) as inferior to non-Muslims (‘us’) 
(Runnymede Trust 1997: 6). The fourth item is seeing Islam as an aggressive enemy; 
the next is seeing Muslims as manipulative; after that is rejecting criticism made by 
Islam of ‘the West’ rather than debating it; seventh is defending discrimination 
against Muslims; and finally, the last is accepting anti-Muslim hostility as natural 
and normal (Runnymede Trust 1997).  
   Despite positive attention and use of this definitio , it also received some critiques. 
For example, it was said that the term Islamophobia ‘re nforces a monolithic concept 
of the complex of Islam, Islamic cultures, Muslims and Islamism, involving ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, historical and doctrinal differences’ (Ozanne 2006: 283, see also 
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Halliday 1999). The most important critique was proposed by Halliday (1999: 898), 
who claimed that Islamophobia attacks Muslims as people, not the religion of Islam 
as a culture and faith, thus the more accurate termis not Islamophobia but ‘anti-
Muslimism.’ He pointed out that the term Islamophobia ‘misses the point about what 
it is that is being attacked; Islam as a religion was the enemy in the past in the 
crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now … The attack now is not against 
Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, 
especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term’ (Halliday 1999: 898). In 
response, Meer and Modood (2009: 341-2) argue that Halliday’s critique ignores the 
fact that ‘the majority of Muslims who report experiencing street-level 
discrimination recount … that they do so when they appear conspicuously Muslim 
more than when they do not’. Meer and Modood (2009: 342) highlight the 
overlapping and interacting nature of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, by 
writing that since hostility can result from wearing Islamic dress, it ‘becomes 
irrelevant - if it is even possible - to separate th impact of appearing Muslim from 
the impact of appearing to follow Islam. ’The argument proposed by Meer and 
Modood (2009) was supported by empirical findings (Allen 2010; Lambert and 
Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014), suggesting a significant relationship 
between being visible as a Muslim and experiences of Islamophobia. More 
specifically, the study by Lambert and Githens (2010: 35) that examines anti-Muslim 
hate crime in the UK, suggests that such crimes ‘often take place in the vicinity of a 
mosque or against Muslims wearing Islamic clothes and, in the case of men, Islamic 
beards or, in the case of women, hijabs, niqabs or burkas.’ Taking the importance of 
interlink between the anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice into consideration, 
Moosavi (2014: 1) rightly defines Islamophobia as ‘stereotypical generalisations 
about Islam and/or Muslims that can result in Muslim  being discriminated against or 
harassed’.  
   For many writers, Islamophobia is a form of racism and is more specifically a 
result of racilisation of Muslims that contains cultural/religious hatred (CBMI 2004; 
Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 
2013). Cultural prejudice against Muslims and/or Islam mainly revolves around the 
issue of the so-called West-Islam dichotomy. As Kundnani (2007:100) notes, the 
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public aspect of ‘anti-Muslim’ racism is embedded within the state response to the 
so-called ‘war on terror.’ In this sense, cultural racism or Islamophobia is mainly 
based on the association of Muslims with terrorism and on the perception of 
detrimental and alien properties in Muslim culture and religion. For writers such as 
Bulmer and Solomos (2004), the new racism has focused on the rise of identity 
politics in which racialised subjects are effectively othered due to social or cultural 
characteristics assigned to them. Identity politics is central here, thus racialised 
subjects - such as Muslims - are viewed as ‘belonging’ or ‘not belonging’ to a 
particular society based on a certain characteristics, such as skin colour or the 
assumed detrimental alien properties of items of tradi ional dress such as the Hijab or 
the Jilbab (Bulmer and Solomos 2004). Other research rs such as Chakraborti and 
Garland (2009: 45) similarly found that religiously motivated hate crimes in the UK 
are often based on the ‘alien characteristics of the Islamic faith and its perceived 
threat to secular, and often mono-culturalist images of national identity.’  
   What links Islamophobia to racism is seeing all Muslims as a racial group and 
assigning stereotypical religious/cultural characteris ics to all, regardless of their real 
racial/ethnic and religious background. Modood (2005: 11), by providing some 
examples of anti-Semitism, argues that ‘religion cabe the basis of racialisation as 
long as the religion of a group can be linked to physical ancestry and descent.’ One 
illustration of racialisation of Muslims was through the reconstruction of the ‘Asian.’ 
Brah (1996: 169) notes how the discourse of ‘the Asian’ was reconstituted through 
the foregrounding of ‘the Muslim.’ More recently, the racialisation of Muslims has 
occurred through the construction of discourses based around the ‘Paki’ (Modood 
2005: 35) or being ‘Pakistanised’ (Kose 1996: 135), in which the Pakistani 
background is ascribed to all Muslims. Even the white British/Scottish converts are 
sometimes called Paki (Kose 1996; Franks 2000; Moosavi 2014) because they have 
Muslim identity markers such as wearing hijab [headsc rves], in the case of women, 
and having beard, in the case of men. Since the majority of British Muslims in 
general, and two-thirds (67%) of Muslims (Scottish Government 2005b) in Scotland 
are Pakistani, and also because South Asian culture has had a large impact on the 
development of Islam in Britain (Meer 2010), Muslims in Britain are often racialised 
as ‘Asian’ or ‘Pakistani,’ and in a more offensive way than ‘Paki.’ For Brah (1996: 
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9), the discourse of ‘Paki’ is a post-colonial discourse which ‘signified the 
inferiorised other right here at the core of the fountain head of Britishness.’ Moosavi 
(2014: 4) argues that calling all Muslims - even the white British converts - 
regardless of their real ethnic or racial background, Paki or Pakistani, is to a 
stereotypical extent ‘where Islam is thought of as a ‘Pakistani religion’ or part of 
South Asian culture.’ The racialisation of Muslims was more explicit in the case of 
the white British/Scottish converts who ‘lose their whiteness’ once they convert to 
Islam (Moosavi 2014: 3). For Franks (2000: 922-3), name calling and racial abuse 
against white Muslims is a ‘kind of racism by proxy, but further [developed], 
because of the identification of Islam with South Asian or Arab ethnicity, the white 
Muslims are perceived to be race-traitors by white supremacists.’ Franks (2000: 926) 
considers such abuse as a ‘re-manifestation of an already existent kind of racism.’ 
Racialisation is a central element in facilitating the emergence and appearance of 
Islamophobia because as Moosavi (2014: 3) argues, ‘without this process of 
(re)racialisation, Islamophobia would not have any basis to develop since ‘white’ 
converts, like Muslims in general, would not be marked out as having an inherent 
difference that leaves them vulnerable to being tareted with a specific prejudice 
which we term Islamophobia.’ The importance of Muslim ’ religious identity and 
appearance in their experience of Islamophobia is discussed in Chapters 6 & 7. The 
importance of religion and religious identity is not limited to Islamophobia, and as 
mentioned earlier, it can play a significant part in Muslims’ everyday life and in 
social interaction with majority group members. In the following section, I 
conceptualise the importance of different factors in the construction of Muslims’ 
social identities.  
 
Social Identity and self-Identification: Hybrid and Context Dependent 
   Ethnic/faith minority people’s self-identification or identity negotiation has mostly 
been conceptualized (see also Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et. al. 1999; Phinney 2003; 
Ysseldyk et. al. 2010) within the framework of social identity theory, which theorises 
‘the relationship between the individual and the group’ (Hogg and Abrams 1998: 6). 
The founders of this theory, Tajfel and Turner (1986), define social identity in terms 
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of group membership and one’s sense of belonging to a s cial group. Tajfel (1972: 
31) puts forward the argument that social identity is ‘the individual’s knowledge that 
he belongs to certain social groups with some emotional and value significance to 
him of the group membership.’ In this sense, self-conceptualisation is based on both 
an individual’s knowledge of group membership and the emotional or value-related 
aspects of such membership (Tajfel 1972; 1981). Within his framework, ‘social 
identity and group belongingness are inextricably linked in the sense that one’s 
conception or definition of who one is, is largely composed of self-descriptions in 
terms of the defining characteristics of social groups to which one belongs’ (Hogg 
and Abrams 1998: 7). In this sense, self-conceptualisation ‘comprises the totality of 
self-descriptions and self-evaluations subjectively available to the individuals’ which 
is relatively distinct constellations called self-identifications (Hogg and Abrams 
1998: 22). Self-identifications, however, can be mutually inclusive and may even 
contain some self-descriptions that are contradictory (Hogg and Abrams 1998). 
   Saeed et. al. (1999) and Robinson (2009) argue that previously se f-identification 
of ethnic minority groups has usually been conceptualised in the literature mainly in 
terms of ethnic identity or as an option between two identities, thus tending not to 
accommodate the possibility of bi-cultural identification. However, there were some 
authors who argue that people, including ethnic minority people, can identify with 
two or more groups (Hutnik 1991, Verkuyten 1992, Saeed et. al. 1999; Phinney 
2003) and thus, their identity strategies can be related to identification with both 
majority and minority groups (Hutnik 1991). For example, Phinney (2003) argues 
that ethnic minority people can identify with both t eir ethnic groups and their 
country of residence. Such identification can be either strong or weak, or equally 
high in relation to both identities (Phinney 2003). Hall (1992: 309) argues that these 
new identities are more plural and diverse because individuals have access to ‘a 
variety of possibilities and new positions of identification…making identities more 
positional, more political, more plural and diverse.’ Accordingly, most minority 
groups in the context of a multicultural society may construct multiple, hyphenated 
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or sometimes nested identities1. Consequently, for example in the case of Britain or 
Scotland, a unitary British or Scottish identity - especially in relation to immigrants 
and ethnic and religious minorities - is unlikely (Modood 2005). It is also important 
to note that for Scots in Britain, national identity has always been a complicated 
issue and there is no unitary identity (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009:1). Discussing 
minorities’ different approaches, Saeed t al (1999: 825) propose four possible 
strategy outcomes for ethnic minority people’s identification with the majority and 
minority groups: a) ‘dissociation - high for their ethnic minority group, low for the 
majority group; b) assimilation - high for the majority group, low for their minority 
group; c) acculturation - high for both the ethnic and the majority group; d) 
marginality - low for both their minority and the majority groups’. Ethnicity and 
nationality, however, are not the only identity markers to which migrants feel that 
they can belong. Some studies (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed 
et. al. 1999; Archer 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Hopkins 2007; Change Institute 
2009) particularly highlighted the importance of religion as a significant identity 
marker amongst minority ethnic people, particularly young Muslims. For example, 
while surveying British Muslims’ self-reported identities, Hutnik (1985: 307) found 
that 63% of South Asians, and more significantly 80% of South Asian Muslims, 
asserted their religion as an important identity marker (different explanations for the 
rise of religion as a significant identity marker are presented later in this chapter). 
Chapter Five discusses the importance of different identity markers - mainly ethnic, 
national and religious - in Muslims’ self-identification, and charts discourses of 
exclusion and belonging in contemporary Scotland. 
   Further to the inclusiveness of social identities, Turner and his colleagues’ (1994: 
454) argue that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context dependent as they are 
social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference.’ Therefore, the 
extent and degree of identification with any identity markers (such as country of 
origin, country of residence and religion) can be varied and subject to difference. 
                                                                 
1 According to Hussain and Miller (2006: 147) ‘hyphenated identities link two quite different elements 
and dimensions of identity; often two unrelated nationalities or culture and nationality’ whereas the 
‘nested identities, on the other hand, link two or more levels of the same concept, such as territory 
when it includes Scottish & British or Glaswegian & Scottish & British & European. 
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Additionally, Saeed et. al. (1999: 824) listed a variety of authors (Gilroy 1987; 
Bhaba 1990; Schlesinger 1991; Hall 1992b; Frable 1997) who argue that ‘identity is 
not something that is fixed and static but that is continually evolving and changing.’ 
McCrone (2002: 316) likewise argues that ‘identity is not to be understood as a 
badge or label that is pinned on us at birth or at school [but] as a complex set of 
cultural markers [for] a game of identification and identity construction’. Ameli and 
Merali (2004: 20) also point out that ‘identity is a matter of choice. It is not an issue 
of what one has to be or does not have to be.’ All these accounts insist that identities 
are self-chosen and can be used as a tool for particular purposes, such as social and 
national inclusion. Understanding the meanings or strength or salience of any form 
of group memberships - such as ethnic, national or religious - has mostly been 
conceptualized in the discussion of social identity theory proposed by Tajfel (1972) 
and Turner (1986) (see also Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et al 1999; Phinney 2003; 
Ysseldyk et. al. 2010). For example, Phinney (2003: 68) argues that‘t e most 
fundamental aspect of ethnic identity is its strength and valence, or how strongly and 
positively individuals feel about their group membership.’ Within this framework, 
this study discusses the different strength of Muslims’ identification with their 
ethnic, national, and religious identities. In the following section, I discuss two 
theoretical explanations in the literature for the significance of religious identities 
amongst Muslims in Scotland in particular, and in the UK in general. 
 
Religious Identities: Reactive or Internal? 
   In conceptualising the rise of religion as a signif cant identity marker for ethnic 
minorities, (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Modood 1994) complex and diverse 
reasons have been proposed (Hussain and Choudhury 2007). For example, Ballard 
(1996) argues that identification with religion is a reaction to external rejection by 
the white majority. In this sense, the growing identification with religion was 
because Muslims felt the religious aspect of their identity was under attack and 
denied by the white majority. In this research, the importance of the religion of Islam 
as a ‘useful vehicle for political mobilisation’ is highlighted (Hussain and Choudhury 
2007: 18). Gardner and Shukur (1994: 164) also findthat ‘Islam provides both a 
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positive identity, in which solidarity can be found, together with an escape from the 
oppressive tedium of being constantly identified in negative terms.’ This theory, 
which I call the reactive hypothesis, has also been used or supported by other writers. 
For example, Saeed et. al. (1999), by utilising social identity theory and the reactive 
hypothesis, explained the significance of religion amongst young Scottish Pakistanis. 
In highlighting the importance of public devaluation f Muslims and Islam, Saeed t 
al (1999: 26) cited Turner’s (1985) hypothesis that ‘majority group public 
devaluation of a personally important social identity results in more intergroup 
solidarity on the part of the minority/devalued group, and that this is a mechanism 
which allows the minority group to increase intergroup differentiation and to 
maintain its self-esteem’ (cited in Saeed t. al. 1999: 26). Saeed et. al. (1999: 26) 
argue that ‘reactions to threat or perceived notions f threat are affected by the 
importance of social identity to the individuals involved.’ In this regard, the 
significance of religion (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Modood 1994) was linked to 
the rise of political Islam, especially after political events such as the Salman 
Rushdie fatwa in 1989 and the 7/7 bombings in London, and international matters 
such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the 1991 Gulf War (Saeed et. al. 
1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007), and the 9/11 bombings n New York. This led 
some young British-born Muslims to reinvent the concept of the Ummah, the global 
community of Muslims, as global victims (Modood 2005).  
   From this perspective, all of the above events led many to think of themselves for 
the first time as Muslims in a public way, and to think that this choice was important 
in their relation to other Muslims and to wider British (and international) society 
(Modood 2007). Those initially termed Pakistani (mainly living in England) were re-
categorised first as Asian and then as Muslim (Modood 2005). Anthias (2001: 626) 
also argues that new British Muslim identity ‘is not c nfined to an ethnic group, but 
is an amalgam, neither purely religious nor specifically ethnic, that may be linked to 
forging identity as a culture of resistance.’ Archer (2001: 87), in her study of young 
Muslim men’s identity negotiation in four schools in England, suggests that 
constructing Muslim identities ‘rather than just being a reaction to white racism’ can 
be actively ‘engaging with white society, rejecting whiteness and British identity 
through identification with a strong religion that unifies young Muslims from 
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different Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds.’ She also relates strong religious 
identification with resisting ‘popular stereotypes of weak and passive Asian’ (Archer 
2003: 50). Strong identification with religion could ‘provide a source of pride, 
solidarity and status among Muslims’ (Archer 2003: 5 ). Archer also argues that 
Muslim identity supersedes national identities such as Bangladeshi, Pak stani (2003: 
49) and British identity (2001: 87). Even though it is he most applied, the r active or 
resistant interpretation of Muslim identity is not the only explanation for the rise of 
religion as a significant identity marker. 
   By dismissing the importance of religiosity or the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, 
Samad (2004: 17 - cited in Hussain and Choudhury 2007: 17) argues that religious 
identity becomes ‘prominent as people, particularly second generations, become 
British.’ Samad (2004: 17 - cited in Hussain and Choudhury 2007: 17) suggests that 
the loss of linguistic skills of South Asians makes identification with their parents’ 
country (such as Pakistan) less significant and thus M slim identity becomes more 
important. In contrast to Samad and the above writers who highlight more the 
reactive aspects of Muslim identity, other authors point to a more positive and 
internal role for religion in forming people’s social identities (Jacobson 1997b; 
Ysseldyk et. al. 2010; Park 2007). For these writers, religion as a system of meaning 
or a system of guiding beliefs, can frame social identities ‘through the increasing 
importance of the relevant group membership to the self-concept’ (Ysseldyk et. al. 
2010: 61; see also Park 2007).  
   For example, Ysseldyk et. al. (2010: 60) writes that ‘as a social identity anchored 
in a system of guiding beliefs, religious affiliation should serve a uniquely powerful 
function in shaping psychological and social processes.’ Ysseldyk et. al. (2010: 60), , 
proposes within the social identity theory framework that ‘the unique characteristics 
of a group membership inextricably linked to a religious belief system (even 
compared with other ideological belief systems) may be essential to explain why 
religiosity is often embraced with such tenacity.’ Highlighting the importance of a 
comprehensive system of meaning provided by a religion, Park (2007: 320) also 
argues that religiosity can provide ‘a comprehensive framework for perceiving, 
understanding and evaluating their experience as well as organising and directing 
their behaviour.’ For Ysseldyk et al (2010: 61), the significance of religious social 
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identities lies in the unique characteristics of religion - compelling affective 
experiences and a moral authority that cannot be empirically disputed - which can 
‘lend this particular social identity a personal significance exceeding that of 
membership in other groups.’  
   From a more empirical perspective, Archer (2001) highlighted some positive 
internal characteristics of Islam that could result in a stronger association with 
Muslim identity. She argues that ‘the association of Islam as strong and Muslims as 
all one could imply conversely that the boys were challenging British white culture 
as weak and divided’ (Archer 2001: 87-8). For example, in her study, the more 
cohesive Muslim families were distinguished from unstable and constantly 
reconstituted white families (Archer 2001: 88). In this sense, the increasing 
association with Muslim identity was not only a matter of rejecting racism (in the 
form of resisting British or Asian identities) because it also highlighted the 
importance of religion which could provide a source of pride, solidarity and status 
for Muslims (Archer 2003: 53). Jacobson (1997b: 238) also argues that ‘the special 
significance of religion lies in the fact that Islam, by and large, is central to their 
sense of who they are: they affirm their belief in its teachings and regard it as 
something in relation to which they should orient their behaviour in all spheres of life 
and which therefore demands of them a self-consciou and explicit commitment.’ 
Jacobson (1997b: 239) argues that the importance of religion for young British 
Pakistanis is manifested in the ‘universal relevance and applicability’ of Islam and its 
clear-cut ‘social boundaries’ compared to the importance of ethnicity, which is 
related to particular places and has increasingly permeable boundaries. The process 
of boundary construction amongst Muslims is related to the teachings of Islam which 
places special emphasis on ‘correct action’ (Esposito 2011: 159). This emphasis on 
correct and rightful actions means that ‘to be a devout Muslim one must behave in 
certain, explicitly defined ways; and therefore a Muslim is obliged to express his or 
her belonging to the Muslim community, and detachment from non-Muslim society, 
in an especially concrete and unequivocal manner’(Jacobson 1997b: 248). The 
crucial emphasis on rightful actions in Islam, which overs all aspects of life, can 
create social differences that ‘distinguish observant Muslims from non-Muslims’ on 
a daily basis (Jacobson 1997b: 248). Jacobson (1997b: 248) suggests that Muslims’ 
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commitment to many religious actions ‘contribute to the collective construction and 
maintenance of religious boundaries which act to prese ve and enhance the integrity 
of the religious community and the internal logic of expressions of religious 
identity.’ In this explication of the significance of this relation, special weight is 
placed on religiosity and the notion of practicing and observing religion. In this 
sense, the rise of religion as an identity marker can be associated with the rise of 
religiosity or becoming a more practicing Muslim, esp cially amongst second 
generation Muslims. From this perspective, Islam offers not just a sense of belonging 
but a code of practice as well. As I mentioned earli r, one important part of 
ethnic/faith minority people’s self-identification or identity strategy is identification 
with the majority group or the country of residence. In the next section, I 
conceptualise the importance of national identities and the significance that can be 
attributed to such identities. 
 
National Identities: Non-Recognition and its Impacts 
   National identity can play a significant role ina multicultural society as it 
cultivates a common sense of belonging among diverse communities, binds 
individuals and generations, and makes a united community (Parekh 2006; Miller 
1989). On the other hand, multiculturalism, either as a theory or policy, is intended 
to promote ethnic or religious minorities’ integration into wider society (Kymlicka 
1995; Modood 2007) alongside accommodating their cultural rights and respecting 
their cultural identities. Minority groups may also wish to integrate into the larger 
society in order to be accepted as full members of it (Kymlicka 1995). To associate 
with a national identity, people need to base their identities upon national identity 
markers: ‘any characteristics associated with an individual th t they might choose to 
present to others, in order to support a national identity claim’ (Kiely et. al. 2001: 
35-6). These characteristics are very important in the construction of national 
identity. From a sociological perspective, identification processes can be considered 
either as a being process that uses identity markers such as birth and ancestry, or as a 
choosing process that uses identity markers such as residence and citizenship 
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(Hussain and Miller 2006: 12). The former process of identification is mainly 
associated with ethnic or racial identities, while th latter process is associated with 
civic or liberal identities. Bond (2006: 611) points out that residence, birth, and 
ancestry are the three most prominent markers of national ident ty; however, the 
salience of these identity markers in the formation of national citizenship varies in 
different countries. At the social and individual level, it is mainly indigenous people 
who use birth and ancestry markers for their identity claims, while ethno-religious 
minorities and immigrants may instead use residential markers (Hussain and Miller 
2006: 12). The birth identity marker, however, is not exclusively used by indigenous 
people because those ethnic/faith minorities who were born in a host country, for 
example in the case of second generation minorities, can also use birthplace to 
reinforce their identity claims. Minorities’ claims for national belonging may not be 
accepted by the majority unless they see such claims and markers as genuine. As 
Bond (2006: 610-11) argues, ‘the claims to national belonging of those characterised 
by difference (not least with respect to national and ethnic origin) may be 
problematised by the beliefs which the majority hold about the validity of such 
claims.’ As Jacobson (1997) argues, the exclusion of ethno-religious minorities may 
be due to the persistence of ethnic or racial boundaries that socially constrain 
national belonging to categories such as Britishness, Englishness, or Scottishness.  
   Non-recognition (Taylor 1992) can happen in different forms and levels such as 
political, institutional, and social. To conceptualise the notion of non-recognition, it 
is essential to start with the conception of recognitio  and its importance for one’s 
identity formation. For Honneth (1995: 92), ‘practical identity-formation 
presupposes inter-subjective recognition.’ In other wo ds, developing a sense of self 
requires that one is recognized by others. Honneth (1995: 92) argues that ‘one can 
develop a practical relation to-oneself only when one has learned to view oneself, 
from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social 
addressee.’ Similarly, Taylor (1992: 64) argues that our sense of self is ‘formed by 
recognition’ and that this is the recognition that forges identity. He (1995: 231) 
further claims that ‘my own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations 
with others.’ Thus, ‘individuals can only have positive attitudes to themselves if 
those with whom they interact value them in specific ways’ (Thompson 2012: 225). 
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These communitarian multiculturalists argue that if any society (in its institutional 
meaning) or others (as individual fellows) do not recognise such identities, one’s 
‘positive understanding of self that they have acquired inter-subjectively’ (Honneth 
1995: 131), may be destroyed or distorted. Furthermore, Taylor (1992: 25) also 
points out that non-recognition of a person’s identity or culture by others ‘can inflict 
harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and 
reduced mode of being.’ Taylor (1995: 226) further argues that non-recognition ‘can 
inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred.’ In the 
worst case, non-recognition can lead to serious psychological problems such as self-
hatred and may lead people of difference towards alternative identities in less intense 
cases. This is what I found in the case of those Muslims who find their Scottish or 
British national identities questioned, challenged, or denied.  
   At a more social level, for Honneth (1995: 134), the ‘denigration of individual or 
collective ways of life…robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to 
attribute social values to their own abilities.’ Those who have their identity claims 
ridiculed or questioned, for instance, will find it harder than others, whose collective 
identity is taken for granted - namely the majority - to have their social existence and 
social identity widely valued by society. It is here that the importance of 
Islamophobia and racism, as I conceptualized it earlier, come to interplay with the 
conception of non-recognition. People who experience or fear violent attack, because 
of their racial or cultural differences, ‘will lose the sense that their identity is stable 
and continuous over time, and that the environment in which they find themselves is 
safe and secure’ (Thompson 2012: 227). Goodall (2007: 96) suggests that ‘[e]xtreme 
racism denigrates people and represents them as inferior: they ... become targets of 
hatred or contempt.’ Further to such physical and violent abuse, verbal and speech 
abuse and harassment can also lead to the marginalisation of racial or ethno-religious 
minorities. As Parekh (2006: 214) argues, ‘hate speech stigmatises its target by 
ascribing to it a set of constitutive qualities that are widely viewed as highly 
undesirable’ thus victims can be ‘degraded’ and even ‘demonised.’ Thus, non-
recognition, in all its possible practiced forms such as verbal and physical abuse, can 
undermine the self-confidence that is the ‘vital prerequisite’ (Honneth 2003: 138) of 
all positive attitudes to one’s self-understanding.  
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   To sum up, according to multiculturalists such as Taylor (1992; 1995), Honneth 
(1992; 1995; 2003), and Parekh (2006), non-recognition is a form of denial and 
disrespect of one’s identity and social and cultura being that can affect their self-
image and self-realisation, and may also result in their social exclusion. As McCrone 
and Bechhofer (2008) argue, one’s national identity is greatly affected by how one’s 
claims are regarded by others and if one’s identity claim is rejected, this may lead to 
social exclusion. Hence, Honneth (2003: 174) argues that ‘[t]he justice or wellbeing 
of a society is proportionate to its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition 
under which personal identity-formation, hence individual self-realization, can 
proceed adequately.’ Due to the importance of the recognition of ethno-religious 
minorities’ identity and culture, we return to the key concept of the nation. 
Considering the importance of civic bases and the recognition of hybrid identities, 
Chapter 5 examines how and on what bases Muslims negotiate their national 
identities and explores if their Scottish or British identities are regarded as valid 
claims in the society. This leads to the conclusion of this chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
   This chapter, by highlighting the notion of hybridity and context-dependence in 
ethnic/faith minority groups’ social self-identification, presented that their hybrid 
identities can be varied in strength and valence. It also conceptualised that Muslims’ 
religion, particularly among practicing Muslims, can play an important part in their 
social self-identification. This chapter argued that the significance of religion as an 
identity marker amongst Muslims – especially practicing and second generation - can 
be either due to the public devaluation of Muslims as Islamophobia, or due to the 
significance of the religion of Islam as a system of guiding beliefs which provides 
clear social boundaries that are distinctive from  ainstream society. This chapter 
also argued that Muslims’ religious identity and practice can be a ground for 
Islamophobia. It was discussed that as a result of a process of racialisation, all 
Muslims, regardless of their ethnic background, canbe associated with a specific 
ethnicity and religious practice and thus be discriminated against and/or harassed. 
This chapter also presented the theoretical debates between multiculturalists and 
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assimilationists on the question of how to incorporate immigrants and/or ethnic/faith 
minorities into a host society. It was identified that multiculturalists highlight the 
importance of recognition and respect of ethnic/faith minorities’ culture and identity, 
whereas assimilationists emphasis the need to blend in with the majority. This study 
also presented theoretical accounts about the practical and functional aspects of 
integration and highlighted the importance of social and structural factors on 
ethnic/minorities’ integration. Considering the major task of this study, this chapter 
highlighted some of the literature that conceptualises the importance of religious and 
relational issues on Muslims’ integration. It was asserted that Muslims’ religious 
identity and practice, particularly in the case of practicing Muslims, can provide 
religious boundaries for their social integration. To conclude, these theoretical 
accounts conceptualise the importance of religion in Muslims’ social self-
identification, experience of Islamophobia, and limited social integration. These 
concepts will inform the findings of this study on the above issues. This leads to the 
next chapter, where I highlight the Scottish context within which these issues are 
presented and provide an overview of Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of 








   In the last chapter, I conceptualised the importance of different social and cultural 
factors - with a specific focus on religion - in the discussion of social self-
identification, Islamophobia, and integration. In this chapter, drawing on the existing 
literature, I highlight the Scottish context of these issues and review Muslims’ 
identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and integration in Scotland. To 
locate these issues in the Scottish context, this capter will focus specifically on 
Scottish nationalism, multiculturalism, and racism. More specifically, this chapter 
firstly provides a brief historical outline of Muslims’ presence in Scotland and 
highlights the key demographic features of Muslims. Then, I will review the 
discussion of Scottish national identity and review the existing literature on its 
inclusive or exclusive nature. Thirdly, this chapter discusses Muslims’ social self-
identification and discusses the importance of Muslims’ national and religious 
identities. Then, I review different accounts on the presence of racism and 
Islamophobia in Scotland and discuss Muslims’ experience of Islamophobia. Finally, 
it outlines Scottish multicultural approaches to ethnic/faith minorities and reviews 
the important factors that affect Muslims’ integration in Scotland. 
 
Muslims in Scotland: Historical and Social Presence 
   At the beginning of the twentieth century, many colonies introduced legislation to 
restrict immigration, although immigration to the UK remained relatively free (Maan 
1992). Even though Muslims’ migration to Britain dates back to a century before the 
twentieth (Ansari 2004), the main wave of Muslim immigrants came to the UK after 
1945 in the post-Second World War era (Gilliat-Ray 2010). Indians and Pakistanis 
made up the first major wave of immigration to Britain in the twentieth century, 
bringing Hinduism and Sikhism as well as Islam (Siddiqui 2006). It is, however, 
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important to note that Britain has seen in previous decades, for example, Irish and 
Caribbean migration. The first Muslim immigration to Scotland occurred in the 
1920s, which set the trend and laid down the foundations for the settlement of the 
present Asian community (Maan 1992). From the 1920s, Indians, a sizeable 
proportion of whom were Muslim, began to settle in Scottish industrial towns such as 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee (Siddiqui 2006). The economic prosperity of 
Britain during the 1950s brought a greater number of Muslims from Pakistan to 
Scotland, and this led to subsequent immigration over the years for both economical 
and family reasons (Siddiqui 2006). By the 1950s, there were about 600 Asians in 
Scotland. However, increasing Muslim immigration saw this number rise to around 
4,000 by the end of 1960 (Siddiqui 20066). Most Muslim  came to Scotland after the 
partition of Pakistan and India. The first wave of Muslim immigrants from Pakistan 
and India came primarily to act as cheap and unskilled abour for Britain’s 
manufacturing industries. However, there were some professionals and students, 
particularly in medicine, who came to develop their field or continue their studies 
(Siddiqui 2006). Apart from the large number of Indo-Pakistani Muslims (National 
Records of Scotland 2013a: 11), Scottish Muslim society is composed of other 
newcomers - mainly from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Turkey, Iran, and the North African 
states (Siddiqui 2006) - who constitute a very small proportion of Scotland’s Muslim 
population. Therefore, the Scottish Muslim communities are newly established 
communities whose first members mostly came to Scotland as cheap labour and later 
joined the Scottish working class. This length of residence, however, can enable 
Muslims to possess a residential marker for supporting heir Scottish national 
identity.  
   Turning to the key demographic features of Muslim communities, it is important to 
note that much data in this review is drawn from the findings of the 2001 census, 
which was the first large-scale source of data avail ble on ethnic/faith minority 
groups in Scotland since 1991 (de Lima 2005). Some general statistics have been 
drawn from the 2011 census findings, which are the lat st features on ethnic/faith 
minority people, but as more focused analysis of the 2011 census findings is pending, 
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I draw on other available sources1. In terms of population and ethnicity, Islam is the 
most common faith in Scotland after Christianity, with around 77 thousand people 
describing their religion as Muslim (National Records of Scotland 2013a: 32). 
Muslims constitute around 1.4% of the population of Scotland (National Records of 
Scotland 2013a: 32) and constitute the largest non-Christian religious community 
with more than half (56%) of the non-Christian religious population (National 
Records of Scotland 2013b: 3). According to the analysis of ethnicity in the 2001 
Census, over 70% of the visible ethnic minority population in Scotland was Asian 
(Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese or Other South Asian). The Pakistani 
community is the largest BME (Black Minority Ethnic) group in Scotland at 0.63%, 
representing just under one third of the visible ethnic minority population in Scotland 
and two-thirds (67%) of Muslims (Scottish Government 2005b). These statistics 
reflect the visibility of Muslims in Scotland. The importance of Muslims’ visibility 
was highlighted in previous research (Allen 2010; Meer 20102; Moosavi 2014), 
suggesting a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and 
experiencing Islamophobia. This consideration will be examined in Muslims’ 
experience of racism and Islamophobia in Chapters 6 and 7.  
   Another significant statistical point on Muslims’ population is with regard to their 
geographical distribution. Around 79% of Scotland’s Muslims live in large urban 
areas and 13% in other urban areas; more specifically, 42% live in Glasgow, 16% in 
Edinburgh, 7% in Dundee and the rest in other parts of Scotland (Scottish 
Government 2005b). These statistics reflect the fact that only a small number of 
Muslims are living in Scottish small towns which are predominantly white majority 
areas. Some research suggests that ethnic minority people, including Muslims are at 
greater risk of racism in small towns and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de 
Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). Living in such 
areas may affect their social and national inclusion/exclusion, thus the importance of 
Muslim population density is discussed in Chapter 6 and 7. 
                                                                 
1




   In relation to birth place, around 50% of Muslims were born inside the UK 
(Scottish Government 2005b: 13). More specifically just under half (47) of 
Pakistanis – which constitute the majority of Muslims in Scotland - were born in 
Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). In relation to ethnic group, only around 7% of 
Muslims are white and the rest are non-white (Scottish Government 2005b). More 
specifically, two-thirds (67%) of non-white Muslims are of Pakistani origin, around 
12% are other South Asian, 3% Caribbean and African, and 10% are of mixed 
background and from other ethnic groups (Scottish Government 2005b). These 
statistics show that around half of the Muslim population were born inside the UK, 
which may affect their sense of belonging to Britishness. In particular, due to the 
significance of the birthplace marker to everyday understandings of Scottishness, 
being born in Scotland can affect the sense of Scottishness among those Muslims 
who were born there (McVie and Wiltshire 2010). The other side of this coin is that 
the other half of Muslims were born outside of Britain, thus lacking the most 
important marker to be seen as British, birthplace. These people and even those who 
were born elsewhere in the UK, such as England or Nrthern Ireland, may find 
identifying with Britishness and Scottishness to be challenging (McCrone and 
Bechhofer 2010). In this study, those Muslims who were born outside of the UK will 
be considered to be first generation Muslims and those who were born inside the UK 
will be considered to be second generation Muslims [the rationale for this 
categorisation is discussed in the next chapter]. This research explores which identity 
markers that the first generation and the second geeration Muslims utilize to support 
their Scottish identity claims, and whether such claims were accepted by the majority 
or not; if not why not.  
   In terms of socio-economic position, according to the Scottish Government 
analysis of the 2001 UK Census in the Scottish context, he Muslim community has 
the youngest age profile, with around 90% of the population being under 50. 
Approximately 60% of Muslims are in the age range of 16-49 (Scottish Government 
2005b). Almost 78% are of the working age population (defined by the 2001 Census 
as people aged 16-74) and they have the highest unemployment rate at 13%, which is 
nearly double the overall unemployment rate for Scotland (7%) (Scottish 
Government 2005b). Similarly, the most recent report (Poverty by Ethnicity and 
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Country 1999-2008) by Netto et. al. (2011) found that employment rates are 
particularly low among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, especially among Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women in Scotland (the importance of gendered process of exclusion is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter). This report also found that the highest 
rate of poverty (income, before housing costs, below 60% of median) in Scotland for 
Pakistanis/Bangladeshis was 50%, followed by Blacks with around 40%, Mixed with 
25%, Whites with 20%, and Indians and Other Asians with around 15% (Netto et. al. 
2011: 16). Muslims also have the highest level of sel -employment after Sikhs 
(33%), at 29% (Scottish Government 2005c). This was compared to other 
ethnic/faith minority groups such as Jews with 27%, Buddhists with 20%, Hindus 
with 14%, and Christians with 13% (Scottish governme t 2005c). The report of 
Netto et. al. (2011) also notes the high level of self-employment amongst visible 
ethnic minority communities more generally. This was consistent with the wider 
report (European Monitoring Centre – EUMC - 2006), which shows that Muslims are 
often disproportionately represented in areas with poor housing, their unemployment 
rates are higher than average, and they are often employed in jobs that require lower 
qualifications and are in low-paying sectors. This was despite the fact that 
unemployment and self-employment rates were particularly low amongst other white 
minority groups in Scotland such as A8 migrants1 (Netto et. al. 2011). This may 
suggest racial discrimination against visible ethnic minority groups, predominantly 
Muslims, which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
   In terms of educational attainments and achievemnts, the European Monitoring 
Centre (EUMC) (2006) reported that Muslims’ educational achievements across 
European countries, including the UK, falls below aver ge. It is, however, important 
to note that more nationally-focused reports (such as the Scottish Funding Council) 
suggested that Asian Pakistanis, predominantly Muslims, had the second highest 
number of full time students amongst the ethnic/faith minority groups in the Pupil 
Census in 2012 (Scottish Government 2013b). This report also showed that ‘in 
further education, the proportion of ethnic minority students in 2010/11 was 4.8%, 
                                                                 
1 This abbreviation stands for ‘the eight Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004’ Netto 
et. al. 2011: 6).   
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with African and Pakistani students being the largest ethnic minority groups (Scottish 
Government 2013b: 17). This is in line with accounts that conceptualise Asian young 
men, predominantly Muslims, as academic (Hopkins 2009: 300) and ‘behavers and 
achievers’ in school (Archer 2001: 81).  
   These statistics, therefore, indicate that the Muslim community have a low socio-
economic status. It is, however, important to note that some authors considered 
Asians to be more middle-class (cited in Archer 2001: 81- Cohen, 1988; Connolly, 
1998; Gillborn, 1990; Gilroy and Lawrence, 1988; Mac and Ghaill, 1994; Rattansi, 
1992). This suggests that the category of ‘Asian’ is not a homogenous category and 
need to be clarified and unpacked (see for example Ba lard 1994). Hopkins (2009: 
301) further argues that ‘many ethnic minority groups in Scotland do not experience 
the poverty and disadvantage that is often associated with the circumstances of such 
groups in some cities in England.’ This is a comparative context, thus the findings of 
this research can contribute to the understanding of potential similarities and 
differences. Hopkins found that the majority of participants in his project1 were 
relatively middle class (Hopkins 2009). Although the large scale surveys point to the 
lower socio-economic status of Muslims, Hopkins’ and Archer’s accounts illustrate 
the fact that Muslims in Scotland, like elsewhere in the UK, constitute a 
heterogeneous category. As Modood (2003) and Meer (2012) argue, the Muslim 
category is an internally diverse category. To sum up this section, the above statistics 
point to factors that can affect and actually challenge Muslims’ self-identification 
with Scottishness and their social-economic integration. This leads to the discussion 
of Scottish national identity features and how Muslim  identify with Scottishness.  
 
Scottishness: Inclusive or Exclusive 
   Scottish governments (including the current administration) have tried to build an 
inclusive sense of Scottish nationhood. One way of pr moting this inclusive sense of 
Scottishness has been to launch multicultural campaigns such as ‘New Scot’, ‘One 
                                                                 
1 This is from 11 focus groups and 22 interviews with young Muslim men living in the cities of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
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Scotland, Many Cultures’  and ‘Scotland Performs’ (Scottish Government 2004; 
2005a; 2007). The importance of these campaigns is discussed later in Chapter 6. 
The more celebrated form of Scottish national identity is also strongly affected by 
Scottish elite nationalism, which has been described as civic and benign in form 
(Hussain and Miller 2006: 27). Hussain and Miller (2006: 27) purport that ‘in the 
1990s, Scottish nationalist and devolutionist elites were united and consistent in 
proclaiming their vision of an inclusive Scotland.’ After devolution in 1999, Scottish 
multicultural programmes have explicitly attempted o promote an inclusive sense of 
Scottishness. Nationalist and devolutionist elites, who were very sensitive to the dark 
side of nationalism, ensured that post-devolution plitics were not racialised and 
determined to define a new inclusive nationalism (Hussain and Miller 2006). For 
whatever reasons, ‘as the most dominant voice of nationalism in Scotland, the SNP 
tends to promote a version of nationalism which sees everyone living in Scotland as 
having a valued contribution to make, regardless of ‘race’, ethnicity or place of birth’ 
(Hopkins 2008: 120)1. In this sense, Scotland provides a good instance of a civic and 
residential basis for being Scottish (Kiely et. al. 2005). However, evidence (Hussain 
and Miller 2006; Bond 2006) suggests that the majority f the population is not as 
multicultural or inclusive in its perspective as the nationalist elites. As Bond (2006: 
610) argues, ‘even those who enjoy full formal citizenship may still, in the eyes of 
the majority, be excluded from belonging to the nation in which they reside.’ 
Citizenship, thus, could give people a sense of belonging even as this belonging 
could be challenged or misrecognised. Previous resea ch (Runnymede Trust 1998; 
Bond 2006; Meer et al 2012; Blackwood et al 2012) suggests that ethnic minorities’ 
sense of belonging to the host country could be questioned based upon their 
differences, despite their formal citizenship status. Such exclusion may be based 
upon differences in birthplace, origin, ancestry, culture, religion, and/or language. 
Similarly, Jacobson (1997a; 1997b) highlights the persistence of three ‘boundaries of 
Britishness’ - the civic, the racial, and the cultural - and shows how, for example, 
British Pakistanis can be excluded on these grounds. 
                                                                 
1 Two possible reasons are to assert Scottish moral superiority over the English and to gain the widest 
possible consensus to achieve independence (Hussain and Miller 2006: 27). 
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   Even though the new sense of Scottishness – at its state and elite levels is based on 
civic and inclusive markers, at the street level, racial and ethnic markers such as 
birth and ancestry markers have still been used by people as primary markers of 
Scottish identity. By analysing the result of a survey (Criteria for being Scottish) in 
1997, Bechhofer and McCrone (2009: 74) show that 65% of Scots see the residence 
marker as very or fairly important, 73% the ancestry marker, and 82% the birthplace 
marker. A recent Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2009) showed the same result as 
1997, with 82% of Scots seeing birthplace, 73% ancestry, and 65% residence as very 
or fairly important determinants of Scottishness (Reicher et al 2010: 15). Bond 
(2006), in his analysis of the findings of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2003), 
argues that although ancestry and ethnicity are generally considered to be less 
fundamental to national identity, ‘these more ethnic criteria are widely regarded as 
relevant and important, and thus those who lack these markers may have their 
Scottishness called into question’ (Bond 2006: 623).  
   On the one hand, minorities - especially those who ere born outside of Scotland - 
use residential markers to include themselves within Scottish society. For instance, 
Hussain and Miller’s (2006: 155) study revealed that more than four fifths (83%) of 
Pakistanis assert that residence regardless of birthplace and ancestry is the necessary 
criterion for being ‘Scottish’. On the other hand, two thirds (64%) of majority Scots 
regard birthplace as a necessary criterion for being ‘Scottish’ (ibid.) All of these 
findings confirm that although various Scottish governments have attempted to build 
a new sense of Scottishness based upon civic and inclusive bases, for a majority of 
Scots, birthplace and ancestry are still the most important determinants of being 
‘Scottish.’ It is important to note that second generation Muslims acquire the 
birthplace marker by being born in Scotland. Thus this can imply a potential 
inclusion for second generation Muslims, but nevertheless, the importance of other 
issues such as the continuation of racial markers or eligious differences may affect 
their claims to identity, which are discussed in Chapter 5. Accordingly, it seems that 
Scottish multicultural policies may have had little or perhaps no impact on changing 
majorities’ perceptions of the bases of Scottish natio l identity. However, as 
Reicher et al (2010) argue, a fairer and more inclusive Scottish reality will only be 
achieved by changing people’s conceptions of their national identity. This study will 
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build upon existing studies of Scots’ perceptions of Scottishness by exploring the 
reasons for Muslims’ social and national exclusion. Consequently, it will explore 
what identity markers they use to belong to Scottish society. In the next section, I 
review the existing literature on Muslims’ social self-identification processes and 
discuss in particular the importance of religion and ationality in their identity 
negotiation. 
 
Muslims’ Social Identity in Scotland: Muslim and Scottish 
   Different studies suggested that Muslims’ social self-identification in Scotland is 
hyphenated or hybrid; drawing on religion, ethnicity, and nationality (Saeed et al 
1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). The 
above cited studies particularly suggest that identfica ion with Scottishness and 
Muslim identity is more common than identification with other identity markers such 
as ethnicity. For example, in the early study by Saeed et al (1999: 836) of 
sixty‐three school children from Pakistani background, they found that ‘Scottish-
Muslim’ was the most popular identity. In their study of 759 ethnic Pakistanis living 
in Scotland, Hussain and Miller (2006: 150) offered spondents four ‘hyphenated’ 
identities from which to choose. They found that 44% of respondents chose Scottish 
Muslim, 23% British Muslim, 15% British Pakistani, and 12% Scottish Pakistani. 
This means that more than a third chose British and more than half of them chose 
Scottish. Hussain and Miller (2006) also found that Muslims in Scotland tended to 
identify with a Scottish sub-state national identity, despite Muslims’ tendency in 
England to identify with a British and not an English identity. Similarly in his 
qualitative research of 11 focus groups and 22 interviews with young Muslim men in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, Hopkins (2008) found that the vast majority of his 
respondents self-identified as Scottish Muslims and drew upon a range of markers of 
Scottishness in making such claims. Hopkins (2007), however, argues that Muslims’ 
affiliation with religious and national identities varies in strength, nature, and 
meaning, and that little attention has been paid to unpack the different importance, 
meanings and strength of these identities. 
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   Unpacking these multiple or hybrid identities, the importance of different issues 
such as ethnicity, ‘race’ and religion come into play (Hopkins 2007: 78). One of the 
most significant factors was the importance of religion in forming Muslims social 
self-identification (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et al 1999; 
Archer 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Hopkins 2007; Change Institute 2009; Kidd 
and Jamieson 2011). For example, in the study of Saeed et. al. (1999: 830) for the 
majority of respondents, religion was the most important marker of their identity 
because 97% chose Muslim identity which was ‘more than double those choosing 
Pakistani identity.’ It has also been argued that commitment to religion and religious 
identities can affect identification with other identities such as ethnic and national 
identity. For example, Hopkins (2004: 265) showed that some young Scottish 
Muslims simultaneously ‘include themselves in the perimeters of Scottishness, whilst 
also excluding themselves from belonging completely within boundaries of 
Scottishness.’ Distancing from complete belonging within the boundaries of 
Scottishness was mainly due to having different ancestry, a different religion, and not 
drinking alcohol in pubs (Hopkins 2004). Hopkins (2004: 266) argues that, as a 
result, ‘many young Muslim men possess fragile Scottish national identities.’  
   As mentioned in the last chapter, different theories and explanations have been 
proposed to explicate the significance of Muslim identity, which can be summarized 
in relation to two main explanations; reactive identities and the rise of religiosity. 
Explaining the significance of religion in the Scottish context, Saeed et al (1999: 26), 
for example, associated the significance of Muslim identity with the reactive 
identities (proposed by Gardner and Shukur 1994; Ballard 1996; Anthias 2001; 
Archer 2003) that highlight the importance of both the public devaluation of 
Muslims and political events. The latter explanation, the rise of religiosity, was 
highlighted in the study of Jacobson (1997b) that pointed to the more internal role of 
the religion of Islam as a meaning system and guiding belief system in forming 
Muslims’ social identities. In this explanation, religiosity and commitment to religion 
was very much crucial. In line with this explanation, Hopkins (2007: 78) found in his 
qualitative research that young Muslims’ narratives of their religious identities 
tended to focus on ‘doing Islam and being Islamic’ and ‘being a proper Muslim.’ It is 
important to note that Hopkins (2007) also highlighted the relevance of the first 
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explanation; reactive religious identities formed as a result of the public devaluation 
of Islam and/or Muslims. He found that young Muslims’ narratives about their 
religious identity were also focused on ‘the clarification of what the young men see 
as the true meaning of their religious faith counteri g the constant 
(mis)representation of their religion’ (Hopkins 2007: 78). This may suggest that there 
can be a combination of reasons underlying the significa ce of religion in Muslims’ 
social self-identification. For example, it can suggest that the public devaluation of 
Islam as well as the internal characteristics of Islam itself go hand in hand in making 
Muslim identity a significant identity marker. This association, however, needs to be 
examined; this is the task of Chapter 5.  
   Religion was not the only factor that could affect Muslims’ social self-
identification. Other issues such as racism and Islamophobia were also highlighted in 
the literature as contributing to the strengthening of Muslims’ inter-group identities 
or weakening their sense of belonging to their host c untries (Hopkins 2004). It was 
also discussed that religious identity and practice can play a part in discrimination 
against Muslims (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 
2014). It is to this that I now turn. 
 
Racism and Islamophobia in Scotland 
   For many people, Scotland seems to be free from acism and any ethnic 
discrimination. However, it seems that the idea that Scotland is free from racism is 
actually a myth, resulting from factors other than the absence of racism per se. As 
Penrose and Howard (2008) argue, the idea that Scotland is free from racism stems 
from two assumptions: that the presence of visible minorities is a prerequisite to 
racism, and that the degree of racism in any given society is directly proportional to 
the size of its non-white community. Accordingly, as Scotland’s minorities were 
largely invisible and formed a very small proportion f the society prior to the 1980s, 
it was ‘relatively easy to maintain the illusion tha  racism did not feature in Scottish 
society’ (Penrose and Howard 2008: 95-6). Therefore, racism was a hidden 
phenomenon in Scotland until the early 1980s, when t  number of visible ethnic 
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minorities increased from 38,000 to almost 52,000 people, which represented around 
1.0 per cent of Scotland’s population at the time (P nrose and Howard 2008: 96).  
   During the 1980s, racism appeared gradually. For instance in 1987, a report 
revealed that over 80 per cent of Indian and Pakistni people interviewed in Glasgow 
had experienced racist abuse, while 20 per cent had been victims of physical attacks 
(Walsh 1987 cited in Penrose and Howard 2008: 96). There has also been evidence 
of institutional racism in the legal system and thepolice force (Weston 2005). 
Penrose and Howard (2008) argue that the new attitude and response to racism 
shifted after a coincidence of some factors including: the election of New Labour in 
1997, which had liberal attitudes towards immigrants and paid attention to cultural 
diversity; racial equality and social inclusion; media coverage of the growing 
number of racial attacks in Scotland; and finally, the changing political context in 
Scotland. The Scottish Government recognises that racism today is experienced by 
many communities - including both visible and non-visible minorities - and that it 
can take different forms, including direct, indirect, and institutional (Scottish 
Government, One Scotland). Illustrating this, Reichr et. al. (2010) pointed out that 
the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2006) shows that Scots’ attitudes towards the 
government’s policies to improve opportunities for ethnic minorities is not inclusive, 
and that Scots ‘may not value fairness and inclusiveness to the extent that they 
themselves often like to think’ (Reicher t. al. 2010: 14). Furthermore, government 
evaluations of the ‘One Scotland’ campaign suggest tha there has been limited 
success in changing attitudes and that exposure to racism actually increased over the 
campaign’s duration (TNS System 3 2006). Ethnic minority people in Scotland 
continue to report high levels of racially motivated crime (Clark and Moody 2002; 
Moody and Clark 2004; Scottish Government Statistical Bulletin 2010). From a 
more sociological perspective, many studies also highlighted the development of 
racial exclusion in Scotland (Bond 2006; Virdee t. al. 2006; Bechhofer and 
McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010). The launch of the One 
Scotland, New Scot and Scotland Performs programmes itself betrays an awareness 
that many ordinary Scots might not be as multicultura ist as the government and the 
Parliament (Hussain and Miller 2006). In the following section, I specifically review 




Muslims’ Experiences of Islamophobia: Less Islamophobia in Scotland?  
   As mentioned above, various researchers have studied racism against ethnic 
minority people in Scotland (Miles and Dunlop 1987; Bowes, McCluskey and Sim 
1990; Bailey, Bowes and Sim 1995; Arshad 1999, 2003a; Kelly 2000, 2002, 2003; 
Bond 2006; Virdee et. al. 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et. al. 
2009; Reicher et al 2010). Some research, more specifically, studied anti-Muslim 
racism (Hopkins 2004; Virdee t. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009). Little research, 
however, has specifically studied Islamophobia in Scotland, except the research 
carried out by Hussain and Miller (2006) and, partly, he Scottish Social Attitudes 
Surveys (2003; 2006; 2010) and El-Nakla et. al.(2007). This may suggest a low or 
small presence of Islamophobia in Scotland, as indicated by Hussain and Miller’s 
(2006) research. Even though it was found to be less Islamophobic than the majority 
of England, however, Hussain and Miller (2006: 55-6) found that half of the majority 
of Scots feel that ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to 
live in Scotland; half doubt Muslims’ commitment to Scotland; and four-fifths1 feel 
that Muslims’ first loyalty lies outside of Scotland.’ They also found that ‘a third feel 
“some economic resentment towards Muslims and express socially exclusive 
attitudes towards them.”’ These opinions suggest considerable rates of (perhaps 
latent) Islamophobia in Scotland. They also highlight that Islamophobic attitudes 
have been more focused on national distrust towards Muslims (with 79%) and fears 
for national identity (with 52%) than economic resentment (with 30%) and social 
exclusion (with 32%) (Hussain and Miller 2006: 56). 
   An analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010), in parallel to the 
findings of Hussain and Miller (2006), suggests that ‘despite the recession, concerns 
about national identity [with 49%] remain potentially a more important source of 
discriminatory attitudes than do concerns about the economic consequences of 
immigration [with 31%]’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 78). For example, only 15% of 
                                                                 
1 53% of majority Scots felt that ‘Muslims could never be really committed to Scotland’ and 79% felt 
that Muslims are ‘more loyal to other Muslims around the world than to other people in this country’ 
(Hussain and Miller 2006: 54-6). 
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respondents believed that ‘a Muslim is very/fairly unsuitable to be a primary school 
teacher’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 30) and only 23% ‘would be unhappy if a close 
relative were to form a relationship with a Muslim,’ whilst just under half (49%) 
agree that ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in 
Scotland’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 72). Therefore, by highlighting the importance of 
identity concerns, the analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) 
suggests that ‘there has been no significant change i  discriminatory attitudes 
towards Muslims since 2006, which thus remain somewhat more prevalent than they 
were in 2003’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 72). 
   The importance of identity concerns or national mistrust towards Muslims may lie 
in Muslims’ visibility and constant display of distinctive religious identity and 
practice. For example, Hopkins (2004b: 268) pointed out that the most intense form 
of exclusion that Scottish Muslims experience is racism and discrimination, which is 
‘often down to their race and physical appearance, and is therefore something ey 
have little control over’ (Hopkins 2004b: 268). El-Nakla et al’s (2007) study that 
examined Scottish Muslim women’s experience of discrimination and Islamophobia, 
found that many Muslim women experienced discrimination on the ground of their 
skin colour. However, racial differences were not the only basis for discrimination 
and/or harassment of Muslims. For example, by highlighting the importance of 
Muslims’ religious visibility (in Islamophobia), Hopkins (2004b: 263) suggests that 
‘Muslims who openly display markers of their religious identity [such as wearing 
hijab in the case of women and maintaining a beard in the case of men] are more 
likely to experience exclusion than Muslims who restrict displaying markers of 
Muslimness.’ El-Nakla et. al. (2007) also found that Muslim women felt that their 
religious appearance, especially when wearing a headscarf or face veil, was 
responsible for their abuse and discrimination. As mentioned in the last chapter, the 
importance of visibility and display of Muslim religious markers was highlighted by 
other studies across the UK (Hopkins et. al. 2007; Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 
2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014). Thus Muslim experiences of exclusion and 
racism, more accurately Islamophobia, are not limited to racial or religious 
appearance, and so the importance of cultural difference is also highlighted.  
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   In their qualitative study of looking at the relationship between ‘race’ and nation in 
a multi-ethnic neighborhood of Glasgow, Virdee t. al. (2006) highlighted the 
importance of some cultural factors such as accent, dress, and mannerisms in 
defining Scottishness (see also Kyriakides et. al. 2009). In this study, which was 
focused on both Muslims and non-Muslims’ views, they found that these cultural 
signifiers contest the historically founded racialised referent of Scottishness. They 
also, however, found ‘negative ascriptions such as terrorist and extremist which 
reinforce…the original racialised referent of Scottishness as whiteness’ (Virdee t. 
al. 2006). For example, the white respondents did not see religious beliefs as 
incompatible with Scottishness, but asserted that wearing a hijab or a burqa, which 
represent or symbolize values like fundamentalism and oppression, are incompatible 
with Scottishness (Virdee t. al. 2006). Therefore, Virdee t. al. (2006) argue that 
even though the racialised foundations of Scottishne s are culturally hybridized by 
new markers such as accent and name, other cultural codes serve to place Muslims 
outside of the Scottish identity.  
   In sum, the reviewed accounts of Islamophobia and Muslims’ experience of 
exclusion in this section suggest the persistence of racial and cultural boundaries in 
defining Scottishness, which can exclude Muslims who may be perceived as 
foreigners, others, or significations of fundamentalism. In Chapters 6 and 7, this 
study will discuss the importance of these boundaries in the lived experiences of 
Scottish Muslims. Muslims’ experience of exclusion a d/or maintaining distinctive 
cultural and religious practice can affect their integration in Scotland. In the next 
section, I review the discussion of Scottish multicuralism and present Muslims’ 
integration in Scotland.  
 
Scottish Multiculturalism and Muslims’ Integration 
   Modood (2007) argues that Britain has become a multicultural society through the 
immigration of people from different cultures into Britain, most obviously those who 
are non-white and from outside Europe. The growth of immigration from former 
colonies since the 1960s created the need to reconcile the conflicting demands 
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between the wider society and immigrants’ newly established communities. The new 
minorities often sought to maintain their own ways of life and to teach such ways of 
life to their children, while the host country sought to maintain a sense of common 
national identity and cultural continuity. The problem was seen as a matter of finding 
a way for the society to integrate its minorities so that it could both satisfy their 
aspirations to maintain cherished ways of life and t the same time maintain itself as 
a historical community of common belonging. Multiculturalism appeared to many 
people to be one of the main ideologies that took minority equality seriously. For 
example, Kymlicka (1995) developed his theory of Multic lturalism on the basis of 
equality and autonomy, and others emphasised equality and respect of different 
cultures (Taylor 1992; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007). It guided the attempt to promote 
the equality of different cultural, ethnic, and religious groups by promoting the 
values and cultures of ethnic minorities. Thereby multiculturalism became a 
politically and ideologically significant movement in the 1960s by its rejection 
(especially amongst South Asians and Afro-Caribbeans) of the assimilationist 
demand of the wider society (Parekh 2006). 
   Scotland has also followed a path of multiculturalism. Hussain and Miller (2006) 
argue that Scotland has historically experienced two kinds of multiculturalism: old 
multiculturalism and new multiculturalism. Old multiculturalism, which was 
separatist and institutional, mainly applied to Irish Catholics and Jews (Hussain and 
Miller 2006). It was primarily Irish immigration that led Scotland to establish 
multicultural state institutions in which a faith-based and state-funded education 
system was set up by the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918 (Hussain and Miller 
2006: 32). Old multiculturalism was always a controversial issue b cause it 
highlighted separatism and difference rather than integration. Despite its 
controversy, faith-based education still applies to the Catholic, Episcopal, and Jewish 
communities1. The then future first Minister and Scottish National Party (SNP) 
leader Alex Salmond (The Herald 21 April 2005) attempted to justify old 
                                                                 
1 Scotland has more than 400 publicly funded Roman Ctholic schools as well as three state-
supported Scottish Episcopalian schools and a publicly funded Jewish school (MacLeod 2008). 
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multiculturalism, by stating that ‘it would be wrong to end an agreement which was 
entered into in 1918 to bring Catholic schools into the public school system, without 
the full consent of the Catholic community.’ The separatist and old multiculturalism 
has not in practice applied to Muslims because theydid not show a great deal of 
enthusiasm for state-funded faith schools. Although there are more than 400 state-
funded faith schools in Scotland, to this day, Muslim  do not have any state-funded 
faith schools (MacLeod 2008). Salmond and local coun ils (particularly in Glasgow) 
have declared that they will support the establishment of a Muslim state-funded faith 
school if there is a sustainable demand by the Muslim population (ibid). However, 
Muslim parents have never demonstrated enough of a demand for a separate school. 
Most Scottish Muslims support the teaching of all major religions in state schools 
(Hussain and Miller 2006) rather than the establishment of separate schools. It seems 
that although many Scottish Muslims seek to maintain heir own culture, they mix 
with the mainstream majority and reject the idea of separate life or establishing an 
area where they form a local majority. 
   With regard to new state multiculturalism, as Hussain and Miller (2006) point out, 
Scotland is far less separatist oday than it was in the early twentieth century. 
Multicultural policies in Scotland have attempted to recognise and accommodate the 
cultural and religious priorities of ethnic minority groups within a wider collectivity, 
and thereby make “an important contribution to stimulating positive interaction 
between them and the wider population, and challenging exclusionary practices’ 
(Audrey 2000: 238). Since 1999, Scottish governments (4 administrations) have 
implemented multicultural policies with two importan  purposes: building an 
inclusive national identity, and promoting equality and the fight against racism. The 
Racial Relation (Amendment) Act of 20001 (RRAA) was passed soon after the 
Scottish Parliament and its Executive2 took power. To promote it, they 
                                                                 
1 Immigration and equal-opportunities legislation are reserved for the UK parliament, but Scotland’s 
parliament can promote its visions; RRAA was passed by the UK parliament in November 2000 
(Penrose and Howard 2008: 98). 
2 After devolution in 1999, the new government was established with the name of Scottish Executive, 
and after the Scottish election in 2007, the new administration (SNP minority government) rebranded 
itself as ‘The Scottish Government’ (Scottish Government 2011). 
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enthusiastically monitored equal-opportunities provision and launched a programme 
centered on an explicitly multiculturalist slogan: One Scotland, Many Cultures. The 
main goals of this campaign were to promote the idea of cultural diversity and to 
challenge racist language, behaviour, and attitudes in Scotland (Penrose and Howard 
2008). The campaign began in September 2002 by raising awareness of racism and 
promoting understanding of the contribution that other cultures have made to 
Scotland in the past and present (Scottish Government 2005a). Campaign materials 
included signs on public transportation and billboards, as well as messages 
communicated via radio, television, and cinema (Scottish Government 2005a) with 
the aim of mainstreaming the idea of diversity and equality in Scotland. The more 
recent broadcast campaign that was begun in 2005, also referred to as Wave 5, aimed 
to expand the definition of Scotland and Scottishnes (Scottish Government 2005a). 
   Another initiative was the New Scots or Fresh Talent Scheme, which focused on 
retaining new immigrants to meet the challenge of long-term population decline in 
Scotland by creating conditions whereby more people from outside Scotland would 
be attracted to work and live there (Scottish Government 2004). This initiative 
attempted to foster an inclusive sense of Scottishne s and to promote equality. As the 
Scottish Government declared, ‘we will strive to make Scotland a tolerant, open and 
diverse country, one where all Scots, regardless of their background or origin, feel at 
home’ (Scottish Government 2004: 22). In keeping with these programmes and 
initiatives (particularly ‘One Scotland’), the current SNP government launched 
another programme called ‘Scotland Performs.’ This started in May 2007 and was 
intended to measure and report on the progress of the Scottish Government in 
‘creating a more successful country, with opportunities for all to flourish through 
increasing sustainable economic growth’ (Scottish Government 2007). The 
implication of these programmes is that Scottish multiculturalism and equality 
policies, in parallel to the Scottish elite’s nationalism, follow the same path of 
promoting the idea of cultural diversity and challenging racism in Scotland. In the 




Muslims’ integration in Scotland: Limited Integration 
   Muslim integration - especially their social integration - has been less studied by 
scholars, with the exceptions of the British Council Scotland Survey (2010) and in 
part the study of Kidd and Jamieson (2011). There were two studies (Masud 2005; 
El-Nakla et. al. 2007) that particularly focused on Muslim women’s integration in 
Scotland. Drawing on the findings of these studies, I outline different proposed 
barriers and path-ways to Muslims’ integration. The qualitative part1 of the British 
Council Scotland Survey (2010:30) explores how both Muslims and non-Muslims 
had a similar conception of integration, defining it as a policy of acceptance, respect, 
and also contribution to society, but they found it more difficult to describe what 
integration meant in practical terms. Highlighting the importance of the distinction 
between integration and assimilation, this survey showed that Muslims felt that; ‘if 
integration was defined as complete assimilation then they could never be fully 
integrated because alcohol was seen as a key part of the Scottish way of life and 
Muslims are forbidden to drink alcohol’ (British Council Scotland Survey 2010:30). 
This can suggest the importance of Muslims’ religious considerations in integration 
and thus suggests that the dominance of alcohol in Scottish culture can function as an 
important barrier to Muslims’ further integration. This research also revealed that 
Muslim respondents asserted that if the term integration means taking part in most 
aspects of Scottish life, living and interacting with non-Muslims, and contributing to 
society ‘while still being free to observe their beliefs and customs,’ integration would 
be a more acceptable concept for Muslims (British Council Scotland Survey 
2010:30). Similarly, Hussain and Miller’s (2006:146) study showed that Pakistanis 
were willing to integrate to Scottish society but not to assimilate, and were eager to 
contribute to the culture of the new Scotland but not to adopt the culture of the old 
Scotland. However in her study of Muslim women’s voices, Masud (2005) found 
that Scottish Muslim women felt that they were being forced to change their 
behaviour as a consequence of the London bombings to avoid being labelled as 
‘terrorist’ (Masud 2005). This was supported by thefindings of the British Council 
                                                                 
1 This research consisted of a quantitative large scale telephone survey with 1006 respondents, and a 
qualitative study of 7 focus groups involving Muslims and non-Muslims across Scotland. 
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Scotland Survey (2010) which showed that Scottish Muslims have a very strong 
feeling that integration in Scotland is largely a one-way process, and ‘they were the 
only ones making the effort to adapt to Scottish life’ while it should be a two-way 
process (2010:30).  
   Highlighting path-ways into integration, the British Council Scotland Survey 
(2010:31-2) discovered the importance of a range of different social issues that 
revolve around improving mutual understanding and interaction. These issues were: 
developing a better understanding of each other’s respective beliefs; customs and 
cultures by education: close friendships developed by children; providing 
opportunities for non-Muslims to visit and learn more about Islamic customs and 
rituals; having more opportunities to interact; providing alternative activities such as 
sport and interfaith groups; and the reporting and portraying of Islam and the Muslim 
way of life in a more positive or balanced way by the media (British Council 
Scotland Survey 2010:31-2). It is important to note that the central role of mutual 
understanding and increasing awareness in eliminating barriers was highlighted in 
other research. For example, Hussain and Miller (2006: 59) showed that those 
Scottish people who knew ‘quite a lot’ about Muslims were 25 per cent less 
Islamophobic compared to those who knew ‘nothing at all.’ The results of the 
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) also lend support to the importance of 
familiarity with Muslims in the context of personal relationships. This research 
showed that the percentage of people who would be unhappy with a Muslim forming 
a long-term relationship with a close relative (29%) dropped almost by half (16%) 
just because they knew a Muslim person (Ormston e . al. 2011: 27). With more focus 
on Muslim women’s integration, El-Nakla et. al. (2007) suggested that despite 
Muslim women’s willingness to work, they are much less likely to be employed and 
face further barriers than other women. They found that Scotland’s Muslim women’s 
reduced participation in the labour market was due to various barriers such as: 
limited appropriate childcare; a lack of understanding of Islamic requirements by 
employers; poor English language skills; and the women’s lack of confidence, 
interview skills, and experience of CV writing (El-Nakla et. al. 2007). Pointing to the 
importance of sociological factors, the British Council Scotland Survey (2010), for 
example, highlighted the significance of generational differences. The quantitative 
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part of this survey (2010: 24) found that more than lf (58%) of its respondents1 
agreed that most Muslims in Scotland are integrated into everyday Scottish life and 
that just over a quarter (27%) disagree with this. In qualitative data from the British 
Council Scotland Survey (2010:31), both Muslims andnon-Muslims strongly agreed 
that younger generations of Muslims were more integrat d than previous generations 
and that this was perceived to be a natural process, which was attributed to the fact 
that more and more Muslim and non-Muslim children have grown up together and 
this therefore increased exposure to one another’s culture encouraged understanding 
and respect. This data indicates the importance of generational differences in 
Muslims’ integration. I will take this point that younger generation Muslims are more 
integrated into consideration during the research and will try to explore to what 
extent this is the case. To sum up, the existing literature suggests that Muslims in 
Scotland are willing to integrate; however, their integration can be affected by 
different religious and social factors. Taking this into consideration, I will discuss the 
importance of these barriers in Muslims’ educational, economic and social 
integration in Chapters 8 and 9. 
 
Conclusion  
   In this chapter, I discussed how the existing literature pointed to the combination of 
both nationality and religion in many Muslims’ social self-identification as Scottish 
Muslims. Particularly, the significance of Muslims’ religion as an identity marker 
was highlighted by some authors. Reviewing different accounts of the significance of 
religion, I conclude that there can be a conflation of reasons in the significance of 
religion in Muslims’ social self-identification. For example, it can be suggested that 
the public devaluation of (see e.g. Gardner and Shukur 1994; Shaw 1994; Ballard 
1996; Saeed et. al. 1997; Anthias 200; Archer 2003) and the internal characteristics 
of Islam as a complete way of life and a guiding belief system (see e.g. Jacobson 
1997b; Hopkins 2007), can go hand in hand in making reli ion a significant identity 
                                                                 
1 In the quantitative survey, 1,006 respondents were interviewed between 18th and 21st February 2010. 
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marker. It was also discussed that religion was not the only factor that can affect 
Muslims’ social self-identification. Racism and Islamophobia were also highlighted 
in the literature as contributing to the strength of Muslims’ inter-group identities 
and/or weakening of their identification with their host countries (Hopkins 2004). 
The importance of Muslims’ visibility was also highlighted and it was suggested that 
religious identity and practice can play an important part in Islamophobia and 
exclusion of Muslims (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 
2014). The continuation of racial and cultural boundaries in defining Scottishness 
was specifically highlighted as contributing to theexclusion of Muslims who may be 
perceived as others. Experience of exclusion and/or maintaining distinctive cultural 
and religious practices can also affect Muslims’ socio-economic integration in 
Scotland. The existing literature suggests that Muslims in Scotland were willing to 
integrate rather than to assimilate. It was also highlighted that their integration can be 
affected by different religious and social factors such as lack of alcohol consumption, 
discrimination, and low qualifications and skills. This contextual framework 




Chapter 4: Methodology 
  
   This qualitative research aims to explore different factors - such as religion, 
ethnicity and nationality – that affect Muslims’ social self-identification, experience 
of Islamophobia, and integration in Scotland. To this end, this research has adopted 
an abductive research strategy, a qualitative approch, and the Grounded Theory 
method for data collection and data analysis. I will deal with these issues in turn in 
this chapter.  
 
Research Design: Strategy and Approach 
   A coherent research strategy should follow the best procedure and approach for 
answering the research questions and for dealing with the research objectives (Blaikie 
2000) whilst fitting the researcher’s epistemological and ontological viewpoint. 
Therefore I adopted an abductive strategy, which has the ability to deal with both 
descriptive and explanatory questions (Blaikie 2000) that this research addresses (in 
describing Muslims’ social identity negotiation and explaining its influences). Blaikie 
(2000: 115-6) argues that an abductive strategy ‘entails ontological assumptions that 
view social reality as the social construction of scial actors and its epistemological 
assumptions regard social scientific knowledge as being derived from everyday 
concepts and meanings, from socially constructed mutual knowledge.’ As this study 
is designed to understand the different meanings of Muslims’ social identities, the 
abductive strategy enabled me to understand the in-d pth meanings of their different 
identity markers such as religion, ethnicity, and nationality. This strategy will be also 
useful in relation to the explanation and understanding of the impact of different 
factors on Muslims’ identity negotiation and integration, because it seeks ‘to discover 
why people do what they do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual knowledge, the 
symbolic meanings, motives and rules, which provide th  orientations for their 
actions’ (Blaikie 2000: 115). As this study’s questions and objectives require a more 
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in-depth understanding of Muslims’ experiences and ccounts rather than merely 
providing quantities, this study took a qualitative approach to data collection and 
analysis. A qualitative approach is better associated with the abductive strategy and 
enabled me to understand the social interaction of research subjects in context as well 
as the significance of Muslims’ perceptions of majority attitudes, in order to 
understand how these perceptions impact their sense of b longing to Scottish society. 
The explanation of Muslims’ national identity construction and negotiation within a 
multilevel social interaction (majority group members, institutional practices and 
minorities themselves) can be best achieved through detailed, complex, and rounded 
data, rather than the kind of broad surveys and standardised questionnaires that have 
tended to be used in the literature referred to in the literature review (see for example 
Saeed et. al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006). As Punch (1998) states, by looking at 
social realities holistically - comprehensively and regarding their complexity - 
qualitative research can place social issues in ther proper context. 
   Such qualitative data was derived from qualitative, semi-structured, interviews in 
which individual’s experiences, perceptions, and attitudes will be the main source of 
data gathered (Blaikie 2000). Qualitative interviewing usually involves in-depth, and 
semi-structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing and is also one of the 
most commonly recognised forms of qualitative research method (Mason 1996). To 
study Muslims’ identity negotiation and lived experiences, qualitative interviewing is 
a well-known method and is used by many researchers in the field (Jacobson 1997a, 
1997b; Hopkins 2004b, 2007; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). For example, Jacobson 
(1997b: 239) argues that ‘a great deal can be learnt about the question of identity by 
paying close attention to the details of individuals’ definitions of their own 
situations.’ In this regard, Muslims in this research were asked to report their views, 
perceptions, attitudes, experiences, and motives concerning their social identity 
negotiation, experience of racism and discrimination, and integration and interaction 
with mainstream society. As Rubin and Rubin (1995) point out, qualitative 
interviewing is a way of finding out about others’ feelings, views, experiences, and 
reconstructions of events in which the researcher did not participate. This method was 
chosen because it enabled me to explore more in-depth views and attitudes through 
interactive interviewing and probing. As mentioned in previous chapters, Muslims’ 
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social identities are context dependent and subjected to change in different social 
contexts; so exploring such flexible identity negotiation through qualitative 
interviewing helped me to discover deeper aspects of their social identities. Although 
ethnographic or observational methods would normally be complementary to 
qualitative interviewing, I was not able to use such methods for different reasons. For 
example, language issues (as English is not my first language) and lack of access 
affected my decision to choose qualitative interviewing rather than ethnography 
because language barriers could have negatively affected my effective 
communication with people under study, and effectiv communication  is important 
for ‘good ethnographic research’ (Fife 2005: 72). The nature of my research 
questions, which were more explanatory, did not requir  me to gain a ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz 1973) or to make a close engagement with Muslim communities. 
Additionally, there were also practical reasons. Doing ethnographic and observational 
research can be very time and resource consuming (Mason 1996). As Fetterman 
(1989: 45) points out, ‘the ethnographer lives and works in the community for six 
months to a year or more, learning and seeing patterns of behaviour over time.’ 
However, my time and resources were limited. Moreover, I was not experienced in 
ethnographic and cultural anthropological research methods, thus considering all of 
these issues, it was not advisable to use these techniques (Creswell 2007). 
   I conducted 43 in-depth and semi-structured qualitative interviews with different 
Muslim individuals. Being semi-structured, they offered the interviewees time and 
space to reflect on the topic discussed and to offer th ir own input concerning 
particular events or situations. Being in-depth, they enabled me to get close to the 
Muslims’ meanings, interpretations, and accounts of the social inclusion and 
integration in which they have been involved (Blaikie 2000). The method of semi-
structured interviewing was chosen instead of structu ed or standardised interviews or 
questionnaires because these kinds of enquiries generally force interviewees to 
choose from pre-existing categories or positions to which they may not feel they 
belong or may not wish to belong. By increasing the level of interaction between 
researcher and researched, semi-structured interviews give more space and room for 
the interviewee to present or create his/her views, perceptions, and attitudes. For 
instance, as cultural racism is sometimes implicit compared to explicit biological 
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racism1, investigating experiences of such racism requires th  researcher to interact 
with the interviewee and to probe deeper to discover how feelings about and 
experiences of both kinds of discrimination can affect their wider integration into the 
society. As the final point of this section, it is important to say that interviews were 
held with individuals who were willing to talk and who had different perspectives in 
order to represent a range of views on the subject under study (Rubin and Rubin 
1995:66). In the next section, I reflect on the research questions and on the 
operationalisation of research objectives via the us  of qualitative interviews.  
 
Research Questions and Interview Topic Guides  
   As mentioned in previous chapters, the main taskof this study is to explore and 
explain the importance of different factors - with a focus on religion - in Muslims’ 
identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and integration. Considering the 
first part of this objective, this thesis aimed to explore the importance of different 
factors such as nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity 
construction. It examined how the above factors can affect Muslims’ social exclusion 
or inclusion into Scottish society. To deal with the second part of the main objective, 
this study aimed to explore Muslims’ experiences of any religious or racial 
discrimination in Scotland and to explain the importance of social different factors in 
such experiences. Finally, it sought to discover th development of their integration 
and explain the importance of different barriers and path-ways to their socio-
economic participation in the society under question. These objectives, thus, lead to 
three main questions in this study:  
• How do Muslims negotiate their social identities inScotland? 
• What are Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia? 
• What are the barriers and path-ways to Muslims’ integration? 
 
                                                                 
1 Differences between cultural racism and biological racism were explained earlier in Chapter 2. 
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   To operationalize these research questions, a range of subsidiary and interview 
questions were developed in the form of a topic guides. To present this topic guide, I 
start with the issues concerning the first major research issue - Muslims’ social 
identities - which is the main focus of this research. This is mainly due to the 
importance of Muslims’ social identities, particularly religious identities, which were 
the most likely to affect their experience of Islamophobia (Hopkins et. al. 2007; 
Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) and their 
integration (Jacobson 1997b; Modood 2005; Joppke 2012). First, in order to capture 
participants’ sense of belonging (identification with) rather than the simple act of 
labelling (identification of) (see for example Saeed et. al. 1999), respondents – who 
all self-identified as Muslims - were asked to describe their identity as they wished to 
be identified. This acknowledged the importance of self-description in social 
identities (Tajfel 1972; Phinney 2003). As Hogg and Abrams (1998: 7) argue, ‘one’s 
conception or definition of who one is, is largely composed of self-descriptions in 
terms of the defining characteristics of social groups to which one belongs.’ They 
were then asked to clarify what made them choose those identities in order to explore 
the identity markers they used to support their social identities. Second, to explore 
different meanings and the strength of Muslims’ different social self-identifications, 
participants were asked to comment on the importance of their religion, ethnicity, 
and nationality for their identity and how these elments could relate to or co-exist 
with one another. This was an attempt to understand of the strength of one particular 
identity marker over others. This study also sought to understand the relationship 
between experiences and/or feelings of exclusion and Muslims’ national identity 
negotiation (Gardener and Shuker 1994; Ballard 1996), therefore they were also 
asked whether they think their Scottish or British dentities are widely accepted; if 
yes/no, how they felt or experienced that. This research also aimed to explore both 
subjective and structural meanings and factors in Muslims’ identity negotiations, 
therefore the importance of generational dynamics (Ballard 1994; Jacobson 1997b; 
Phinney 2003) was taken into consideration by interviewing first and second 
generation Muslims (the importance of generational dynamics is discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter). 
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   Dealing with the second main research question, his research began with an open 
ended question to see whether participants had any experience of discrimination and 
racism in Scotland. Due to the likelihood of unfamiliar ty with the term Islamophobia 
(Kidd and Jamieson 2011) and also to avoid leading participants into conflating all 
forms of discrimination as Islamophobia and religious discrimination, they were 
broadly asked to comment on any experience of discrimination and racism. Then, 
they were prompted for more explanation by asking questions like what, where, 
when, and why in order to elaborate the underlying foundations of their experiences 
of racism and/or Islamophobia. It is important to nte that the analysis of 
participants’ responses showed that they experienced both racism and Islamophobia, 
but many of their experiences of individual and personal discrimination were related 
to Islamophobia as their religiosity and cultural characteristics – specifically as 
Muslims – were targeted and othered. However, they tended to describe both 
experiences under the terms ‘racism and discriminatio ’ rather than distinguishing 
between racism and Islamophobia. In contrast, reflecting on the media’s 
misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims, the majority of respondents specifically 
referred to the term Islamophobia to explain such institutional and public 
discrimination. 
   To deal with the final research question, respondents were first asked to 
clarify/offer their views on the term ‘integration.’ This was mainly to find a common 
ground to discuss Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Then, they were asked to 
comment on the path-ways and barriers to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Given 
the importance of Muslims’ religious identity - espcially amongst practicing 
Muslims - in their social life and the importance of alcohol in Scottish culture, they 
were probed further on how they might integrate andinteract with majority Scots. 
Finally, with regard to their actual socio-economic integration, they were asked to 
comment on challenging issues such as unemployment and self-employment 
(Scottish Government 2005c; Netto et. al. 2011), and women’s employment and 
higher education (El-Nakla et. al. 2007). This leads to the next section, where I 




Data Collection and Sampling 
   As mentioned above, the main method used to carry out this research was 
qualitative interviewing. The process of data collection and data analysis in this study 
is influenced by the Grounded Theory method due to its well described, well 
organised, and systematic process of qualitative data analysis (Glaser and Strauss 
1967). In order to achieve the first milestone of Grounded Theory, theoretical 
sensitivity (Charmaz 1995), this study did not adopt any specific theory or 
hypotheses before the data collection stage because the theoretical chapter was 
mainly developed after the completion of data collection and data analysis. Thus, the 
initial literature review and theoretical chapter were only used to inform the 
development of categories and concepts that were embedded in the data. I conducted 
43 semi-structured interviews with different Muslims (based upon four key variables 
namely religiosity, generation, gender and location). These in-depth interviews 
started with a topic guide, but relied on open ended and broad questions with 
prompts and probes. The length of interviews varied (from 120 minutes to 30 
minutes) based on respondent’s time and the length of discussion, but most of the 
interviews (30 out 43) generally lasted around 40 minutes.  
   The target population of this research was Scotland’s Muslims, who currently 
define and describe themselves as Muslim, whether by religion or ethnicity, 
upbringing or culture. As this research also aimed to investigate Muslims’ sense of 
belonging to Scottish national identity, it was essential to focus on those who had a 
legal or emotional basis to make such claims. For example, having British 
citizenship (Runnymede Trust 1998; Bond 2006), being born here, or living here for 
a long time (Bond 2006; Hussain and Miller 2006) can make Muslims feel they 
belong to Britain in general and/or to Scotland in particular. Therefore, the basic 
criterion for sampling participants, after being self-d scribed as Muslim, was having 
British citizenship or permanent residence in Scotland. The latter criterion was also 
taken into consideration to exclude those temporary immigrants such as students 
who just wanted to stay for a specific time in Scotland and then return to their home 
country. It is clear that such people would be lessikely to have a sense of belonging 
to Scotland. Thus, it would be misleading to include these Muslims in the sample 
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even though they might be easy targets and more accssible than Muslim citizens. 
The former criterion, however, needs more clarification which I provide in the 
following part. 
   As mentioned in Chapter 3, the category ‘Muslim’ is ethnically, socially, and 
denominationally a diverse category. Even though this study did not adopt a 
representative sampling method, I gained access to different participants from 
different ethnic, social and denominational backgrounds in order to reflect such 
diversity. For example, in terms of ethnic background, 28 were of Pakistani origin, 5 
Iraqi, 5 Kenyan, 2 Malawian, 1 Egyptian, and 1 of Lebanese background. There was 
also one white Scottish convert woman whose father was an Iranian, but as she was 
brought up with her white Scottish mother as a non-Muslim, she considered herself 
to be a white Scot. In terms of social differences, these respondents came from 
different social positions such as employed (16), self-employed (15), students (7) 
and - in the case of women - housewives and social volunteers (5). Educationally, 
they were also different; 14 with Standard Grade, 22 with higher education degree, 
and the rest had primary education from their country of origin (only in the case of 
first generation participants). In terms of denomination, they were also from different 
backgrounds; the majority were Sunni Muslims (31) and a minority were Shia 
Muslims (12).  
   The most important characteristics of these Muslims, however, lay in their 
visibility and religiosity, which was the focus of this research. To start with the 
former; for example, previous research (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; 
Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) suggests a significant relationship between being visible 
as a Muslim and experiences of Islamophobia. This wa also evident in the study of 
Lambert and Githens (2010), in which it was shown that anti-Muslim hate crime and 
attacks often take place in the vicinity of a mosque or against Muslims wearing 
Islamic clothes and, in the case of men, Islamic beards, or in the case of women, 
hijabs, niqabs or burkas. Muslims are visualised by these visible symbols (Esposito 
2011) or signifiers and markers (Hopkins et. al. 2007), and may thus be targeted for 
Islamophobic discrimination or harassment. It is however important to note that it 
was not only religious visibility that can affect Muslims’ social exclusion. There is 
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some evidence (Hopkins 2004a, 2004b; Virdee et. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009) 
that suggests the importance of racial appearance (e.g. skin colour) in Muslims’ 
experience of discrimination and racism. It was in this way that all participants in this 
research were either racially or/and religiously visible. Such a distinction can 
contribute to the better understanding of anti-Muslim discrimination in Scotland; 
whether in the form of religious discrimination (Islamophobia) or racial 
discrimination, or a combination of both (cultural cism).   
   The second most important characteristic of Muslims that can also function as an 
important variable is religiosity and the degree of c mmitment to their religion. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Muslims’ religion plays an important part in Muslims’ 
identity and practice (Modood 2005; Esposito 2011). It is however important to note 
that the level of religiosity or commitment to religion was not the same amongst all 
Muslims. Despite self-identifying as Muslim, there might be some people who do not 
practice the religion or only practice some rules rather than making a full 
commitment. For example, in their study of social integration and religious identity 
expression among Dutch Muslims, Maliepaard and Phalet (2012) suggest a 
distinction between religious identification and religious practice (meaning 
commitment to daily worship and dietary practice). Ameli et. al. (2004: 21) also 
highlighted the diverse level of Muslims’ religiosity to reach a range of Muslims 
from ‘devout practitioners to cultural and secular Muslims’. In this regard, they 
divided Muslims into ‘highly practicing’, ‘practicing’, ‘secular’, ‘cultural’, and ‘Do 
not care about Islamic values at all’ (Ameli t. al. 2004: 26). Revealing a relationship 
between religiosity and discrimination, they (Ameli t. al. 2004: 26) found that the 
experience of discrimination amongst highly practicing Muslims (87%) and 
practicing Muslims (84%) was higher than the experience of discrimination amongst 
secular (74%) and cultural Muslims (75%). Jacobson (1997b) also highlights the 
importance of religiosity in their social identification and integration in her study of 
British Muslims. Jacobson (1997b: 251-2) suggests that he adherence to Islamic 
dietary law, for example, can be a way for most-devout Muslims to maintain a ‘sense 
of difference and distance from non-Muslims and strong solidarity with the 
minority,’ whereas for less-devout Muslims, it may be a ‘symbolic gesture of 
belonging to the group that does not (at least at this stage in their lives) translate into 
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a willingness to create a significant social distance between themselves and their 
non-Muslim peers.’ 
   In this research, with regard to the importance of religiosity, participants are 
divided into three main categories of practicing, less-practicing, and non-practicing. 
Practicing Muslims are those participants who make a full commit ent to the 
religion and observe Islamic law, especially the 5 pillars of Islam; ‘Iman (articles of 
faith), salat (daily prayer), zakat (charity), sawm (fasting during Ramadan), and hajj 
(pilgrimage)’ (Meer 2010: 59). These pillars of Islam are prescribed by the Quran 
(Muslims’ holy book) to all practicing Muslims to follow, which present ‘the core 
and common denominator that unites all Muslims’ (Esposito 2011: 18). In contrast, 
non-practicing Muslims are those people who identify themselves as Muslim in 
terms of culture, ethnicity or birth, (Ameli et. al. 2004: 21) but however do not 
practice any religious observances such as the 5 pillars of Islam or the Islamic dietary 
law. The less-practicing Muslims are those who do not fit into the first two 
categories. More specifically, it refers to those peo le who identify themselves as 
Muslim but do not practice all Islamic rules - for example, they do not read daily 
prayer or fast in Ramdan but do still practice some other rules such as foregoing 
alcohol consumption and consuming only Halal meat. These people may also name 
their children with Muslim/Arabic names and wish for them to grow up with more 
commitment to the religion of Islam (like in the case of Kathryn and Hamid in this 
research), and thus send them to Islamic centres to study Islamic teachings. This 
factor was more pronounced in relation to Muslims’ integration rather than in their 
experience of Islamophobia or identity negotiation. Based on this variable, I 
interviewed 38 practicing Muslims and 5 less-practicing participants (Kathryn, 
Hamid, Zainab, Akram and Ehsan). As the main way of contacting and reaching 
Muslims was through Islamic centres, Islamic student societies, mosques, and my 
Muslim friends, I did not have access to any non-practicing Muslims. Those with no 
commitment to Islam usually would not attend any of these places, making getting 
access to such Muslims harder than practicing or less-practicing Muslims. It is 
however important to note that even though this study could not access non-
practicing Muslims, the comparison between practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ 
experiences and attitudes highlighted the importance of religiosity and suggested the 
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importance of further research on non-practicing Muslims. There were also some 
other sociological factors such as generation, gender, and location which can affect 
Muslims’ identity and integration, and were thus taken into consideration. It is to 
these that I now turn. 
 
Key variables: Generation, Gender and Location 
Generation 
   The first important variable in the sampling was the significance of generational 
dynamics. For example, research on ethnic minority religious groups in the UK has 
highlighted the significance of generation to self-perceptions and forms of behaviour. 
Phinney (2003) argues that immigrants’ ethnic and natio al identities can change 
over time, context, and across generation. Phinney (2003: 63) also argues that 
acculturation changes can ‘occur among generations, as indicated by the differences 
that can be observed between immigrants and their children and grandchildren.’ 
Jacobson (1997b) also points to the complex ways in which young Muslims 
negotiate their identities in different contexts. The differing values associated with 
the private and public spheres may require second ge eration Muslims to develop 
different identity strategies and to switch cultural ‘codes’ (Ballard 1994: 33). 
Studying migrants’ integration by analysing political trust and satisfaction in 24 
European countries, Maxwell (2010) also found that firs generation immigrants have 
the most positive attitudes, while second generations have a similar level of political 
trust and satisfaction as native-origin individuals. These findings may suggest that as 
the second generations adopt linguistic, educational, a d social aptitudes over time, 
the process of integration would only concern the first generations. However, Pfeffer 
(2014: 355) argues that ‘questions of integration d not simply disappear once the 
second generation has grown up.’ By highlighting the long-term and 
intergenerational nature of integration, Modood (2007: 35) argues that any theory of 
integration should include the ‘status and concerns of post-immigration ethnic and 
religious minorities.’ Additionally, in studying second generation immigrants’ 
integration in the U.S, Ramakrishnan (2004) found distinctive socioeconomic 
outcomes such as educational attainments and incomes between this generation and 
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other generation immigrants. Ramakrishnan (2004: 380) argues that the second 
generation outcomes were viewed as ‘central to the understanding of immigrant 
adaptation and progress’ by many scholars. Turning back to the Scottish context, the 
result of McVie and Wiltshire’s (2010) survey of Muslim and non-Muslim youths’ 
experiences of racism, discrimination, and social mrginalisation in England and 
Scotland showed that generational dynamics can lead to inter-generational conflicts. 
For example, the significance of the birthplace marker to everyday understandings of 
Scottishness may make second generation respondents more likely to claim a 
Scottish identity. However, other factors that are relevant to both first and second 
generations such as length of residence and commitment to place have also been 
identified as leading people to feel Scottish (Bond 2006, McCrone and Bechhofer 
2008).  
   In this study, first generation Muslim refers to those participants who immigrated 
to Scotland and have non-native parents. In contrast, second generation Muslim 
refers to those participants who were born in Scotland and have non-native parents. 
Those who were born to one native and one foreign parent, the so-called ‘2.5 
generation,’ (Ramakrishnan 2004: 380) are not included in the second generation for 
two reasons. Firstly, I could not access sufficient 2.5 generation Muslims in Scotland 
(only finding one example). Secondly, mixing these two categories can be 
misleading as Ramakrishnan argues that ‘scholars should avoid lumping together the 
2.5 generation with those who have no native born parents’ (Ramakrishnan 2004: 
380) because they differ significantly in socioeconomic outcomes such as 
educational attainments and incomes. According to the 2001 Scottish Census, half of 
Scotland’s Muslim population (50%) was born inside th UK (Scottish Government 
2005b), out of whom 40% were born in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006: 20). This 
can indicate that second and succeeding generations c titute around half of 
Muslims in Scotland. Interviewing both first and second generation Muslim 
participants, therefore, allowed me to assess the importance of generational dynamics 
in Muslims’ social identities and socio-economic integration. During this research, I 
interviewed 16 first generation Muslim participants and 27 second generation 
Muslim participants. Generational dynamics, however, was not the only sociological 
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factor that can play a part in Muslims’ identity and i tegration. Gender differences 
can also have an important role in their integration.  
 
Gender Dynamics 
   While research by Hopkins has reflected the ‘marginalised voices and identities of 
Muslim men’ (Hopkins 2007: 63), some studies pointed to the discriminated position 
of Muslim women. Previous research, for example, repo ted a gendered process of 
exclusion in observing that Muslim women are less likely to be employed and to 
have higher education attainments (Scottish Governmnt report 2005). A more recent 
report (Poverty by Ethnicity and Country 1999-2008) by Netto et. al. (2011) also 
found that employment rates are particularly low among Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women, who are predominantly Muslim. Both structural factors (e.g. discrimination 
and racism) and cultural pressures (Qureshi and Moores 1999; Masud 2005; Cassidy 
et. al. 2006; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Lewis 2007) affect Muslim women’s economic 
and social integration. In terms of external pressure, previous research that reported 
Scottish Muslim women voices (Masud 2005; El-Nakla et al 2007) showed that 
Muslim women have experienced an increase in Islamophobia since 9/11, the Iraq 
war, and the London bombings. El-Nakla et. al. (2007) found that many Muslim 
women experienced discrimination as a factor that affected their employability. 
These women felt that their Muslim identity and appearance played a part in being 
discriminated against in employment and education (El-Nakla et. al. 2007). 
Concerning cultural pressures, Lewis (2007), for example, suggests that young 
Muslims, particularly young women, are often overprotected by their anxious 
families. More specifically, Lewis reports that a recurring feeling expressed by 
young Muslims was the ‘suffocating impact of community pressure exercised by the 
extended family embedded in clans’ (Lewis 2007: 41). Qureshi and Moores (1999) 
also suggested that young British Asians live betwen two sets of cultural values: on 
the one hand, the social world of family, community, and religion; and on the other 
hand, the western world as experienced through education and media. They suggest 
that ‘the Islamic tradition makes any translation between those value systems 
especially difficult for second generation girls’ (Qureshi and Moores 1999: 318). 
Lewis (2007) argues that cultural and religious practices play a part in the 
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educational underachievement among Muslim women. By addressing the 
experiences of both men and women, this study reflect d on these gendered 
processes and highlighted the importance of gender dynamics in Muslims’ socio-
economic integration in Scotland. Based upon the importance of gender dynamics, 
31 interviews were carried out with male participants and 12 with female 
participants. The fewer number of females were mainly due to issues of access. One 
issue, for example, was my gender because I was a man seeking to interview Muslim 
women and due to the religious practice of gender seg egation that prohibited the 
free mixing of genders (Hashmi 2002; Esposito 2011) (this is discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter). Another issue could be their lack of participation 
compared to Muslim men in Scottish society (Scottish Government 2005b; Hussain 
and Miller 2006) as a result of language barriers and cultural issues (Cassidy et. al. 
2006; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Lewis 2007; Netto et. al. 2011). This leads to the last 
important variable, location and geographical difference, which I will deal with now. 
 
Location 
   The last important variable taken into consideration was the importance of location 
in the experience of discrimination and Islamophobia. Bennett’s (2000) research on 
youth culture amongst South Asians in England suggests that experiences of 
discrimination can take different forms in different contexts. In the Scottish context, 
some research (Hopkins 2004a; Hopkins and Smith 2008) suggests that there is a 
perception among some Muslims that anti-Muslim racism could be higher in areas 
where there is a high density of Muslim residents, such as Glasgow. In contrast, 
Kyriakides et. al.’s (2009) research suggests that in multi-ethnic lo alities, 
racialisation is challenged through the use of hybrid codes such as accent, dress, and 
mannerism (see also Virdee et. al. 2006). Other research, however, suggests that 
ethnic minority people, including Muslims, are at greater risk of racism in rural and 
less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Masud 2005; 
Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). One possible explanation for this is that 
the low density of ethnic minority residents in such areas means that there is less 
community and police protection (de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 
2010; Plastow 2012). While much of the relevant research focuses on Muslims in 
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urban areas (Hopkins 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Hussain and Miller 2006; Virdee et. al. 
2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Kidd and Jamieson 2011) where most religious and 
ethnic minorities are concentrated (Scottish governme t 2005b), minority 
communities are also to be found in smaller urban and rural areas in Scotland. This 
study, by studying Muslims’ experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in Scottish 
major cities and comparing that with those in Scottish towns and small cities, 
highlights the major differences in experiences andfeelings in those areas. It also 
discusses the importance of the low or high density of the Muslim community and 
the significance of multi-ethnic localities in the experience of Islamophobia. To this 
end, 33 interviews in Scottish major cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and 
Dundee) and 10 interviews in Scottish towns and small cities (Falkirk, Stirling, 
Dunfermline and East Kilbride) were carried out. The significance of this distinction 
is based on the numbers of Muslims living in these areas; in the former, the numbers 
of Muslims are at least more than one per cent of the local population and in the 
latter, it is less than one per cent of the local population (National Record of Scotland 
2013). In the next section, I provide more details on each of these areas.  
 
Scottish Major Cities 
   The first site in the category of Scottish major cities, where I conducted 17 
interviews, was Edinburgh. Edinburgh is a multi-ethnic city and is the capital of 
Scotland. The 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported the 
number of Muslims living in Edinburgh City to be 12,434 people, which constitutes 
2.6 per cent of the local population. The second site was Glasgow - which like 
Edinburgh – is a multi-ethnic city. I carried out 10 interviews in Glasgow. The 
number of Muslims in the city of Glasgow was far higher than any other place in 
Scotland; 32,117 people, which constitutes 5.4 per cent of the local population 
(National Record of Scotland 2013). It is important to note that further to the multi-
ethnic make-up of these cities, Muslims in Edinburgh and Glasgow have constructed 
several mosques, Islamic centres, and other social centres that provide different 
cultural, social, and religious services to Muslims, and which can thus affect their 
integration. The next city was Dundee, where the number of Muslims was reported to 
be 3,875, which constitutes 2.6 per cent of the local population (National Record of 
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Scotland 2013). Despite not being as high in number as the above cities, Muslims in 
Dundee constructed a few mosques and Islamic centres. The final site in the Scottish 
major cities category was Aberdeen, where Muslims constitute 1.9 per cent of the 
local population with a total of 4,293 people (National Record of Scotland 2013). I 
conducted four interviews in Dundee and two in Aberde n. Even though this made 
for a small number of participants in Dundee and Aberdeen, they did provide insights 
into the Muslim experience of living in those cities and their experiences are 
contrasted with the experience of Muslims in Glasgow and Edinburgh. The fewer 
number of interviews in the last two cities were mainly due to access difficulties and 
shortage of resources as I was living in Edinburgh and had to travel to these cities for 
each interview. The significance of these cities is the fact that the larger numbers of 
Muslims that reside in these areas can result in strong Muslim communities that 
better provide social, cultural, and religious services for Muslims. The multi-ethnic 
nature of these cities can also impact on the acceptance and social inclusion of 
Muslims. This may differ in Scottish towns and small cities. 
 
Scottish Towns and Small Cities 
   The first site in Scottish towns and small cities was Falkirk, which is a town in the 
central lowland of Scotland. There were two small and local mosques in Falkirk. One 
of the mosques was for Deobandi1 Muslims and another one was dedicated to the 
Barelvis. The first mosque was established in 2000 and is the larg st one because it is 
open for daily prayers and has the capacity for 200 people (Punshon 2013), while the 
second one is smaller (with the capacity of about 150 people2) and does not 
accommodate daily prayers. There is no exact estimation of the Muslim population in 
this town, but the 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported 
that the number of Muslims living in the Falkirk council area (which constitutes 42 
towns and villages including Falkirk) to be 1,415 peo le, which forms 0.9 per cent of 
the population of the region. The establishment of these mosques (which also serve 
                                                                 
1 The Barelvi and Deobandi are two dominant Sunni sects that  form the denomination of the majority 





the surrounding towns and villages1) may imply that considerable number of these 
Muslims live in Falkirk town. Accessing Muslims in towns and small cities was 
more difficult than accessing Muslims in the major cities. This was mainly due to the 
lack of any electronic means of communication and contact such as email addresses 
or an active website, which thus required my personal presence and contact. For 
example, in Falkirk, I carried out four interviews with Deobandi Muslims. As the 
second mosque was not open and other forms of communication, such as e-mails was 
not available, I could not access any Barelvis in Falkirk2. 
   The second site was Dunfermline, a town in Fife, where there was only one 
mosque. This mosque was opened in 1996, and is run by Barelvi Muslims (although 
open to all Muslims), is open for daily prayer, and had the capacity for 500 people3. 
Even though the capacity of this mosque is larger than the mosques in Falkirk, the 
capacity and the number of mosques in this town is far maller and less than what is 
evident in the Scottish major cities. There is no accurate number of Muslims in 
Dunfermline; however, the 2011 Scottish Census (Nation l Record of Scotland 2013) 
reported the number of Muslims for the Fife council area (which constitutes 75 
villages and towns including Dunfermline) to be around 2,591 people, which 
comprises 0.8 per cent of the region’s population. In parallel to Falkirk, the 
establishment of an active mosque in this town with daily services could imply that 
the large number of Muslims in Fife council area live n Dunfermline. The launch of 
this mosque in 1996 suggests the persistence of a long but small established 
community in Dunfermline. I conducted two interviews in Dunfermline. 
   East Kilbride was another site of study, where I carried out one interview. It is a 
small ‘new town’ in South Lanarkshire, southeast of Glasgow. I could not find any 
record of a Mosque or an Islamic centre in East Kilbride by searching different 
                                                                 
1
 http://www.musalla.org/centres/Falkirk.htm  
2 However, it is important to say that I could access some Barelvis in Dunfermline which meant that I 
could also reflect their experiences and attitudes. . 
3
 http://www.dunfermlineislamiccentre.co.uk/, website accessed on 20/6/2014. 
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Mosque Directory websites1 in the UK and there were no formal or informal 
statistics on the Muslim population there. However, the 2011 Scottish Census 
(National Record of Scotland 2013) reported that the number of Muslims for South 
Lanarkshire council area (which constitutes over 60 villages and towns including 
East Kilbride) was around 2,514 people, who compose 0.8 per cent of the region’s 
population. The lack of any active mosque or Islamic centre may imply a lower 
number of Muslims and less community support in East Kilbride. 
   The final site was Stirling, which is a city in central Scotland. There was only one 
Islamic Centre, known as Central Scotland Islamic Centre, which was established in 
19922 and was the central mosque for surrounding areas such as Falkirk. It 
performed daily prayers and various community education programmes for children 
as well as adults. As the Muslim community grew ten y ars later, a larger building 
was purchased and established, which has the capacity for around 800 people.3 The 
longer establishment of this centre, its centrality for the surrounding areas, and its 
larger capacity might imply the presence of a long stabilised and large Muslim 
community in Stirling. The 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 
2013) reported the number of Muslims living in Stirling council area (which 
constitutes more than 35 villages and towns including Stirling) to be 578 people, 
which forms 0.6 per cent of the population of the region. As the numbers of Muslims 
living in all other cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) were at least 
more than one per cent of the local population, Stirling, with 0.6 per cent, is studied 
together with the other Scottish towns that all constitute less than one per cent of the 
local population. I carried out three interviews in Stirling. To sum up, these figures 
and information might suggest less ethnic and cultural diversity in Scottish small 
cities and towns, and also highlight less community support for Muslims in small 
cities and towns than in big cities. 
                                                                 
1 More common directory websites such as ‘UK Mosques Directory’, ‘Musalla.org’, ‘Mosques Map: 
Muslims in Britain’ and ‘Mosque Directory.co.uk’ were searched, however no mosque was found in 
East Kilbride. 
2 http://www.stirling.gov.uk/services/community-life-and-leisure/places-of-worship/mosques, web 
accessed on 22/06/2014. 
3 http://www.musalla.org/centres/Stirling.htm, web accessed on 22/06/2014. 
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   Other differences within Muslims, such as sect or school of thought, were not taken 
into consideration given that the existing studies on Muslims did not report any 
important differences on these issues. The findings of my research also did not show 
any significant difference associated with those factors. Additionally, due to practical 
issues such as limited time and resources, this study could not cover all of the factors 
related to Muslims’ identity and integration. I had to concentrate on the most 
important issues, which the existing literature haseither already proposed or my data 
has already suggested. As mentioned already, the collected data was analysed using 
the Grounded Theory analysis method. 
 
Data analysis 
   As mentioned, the processes of data collection and data analysis in this study were 
influenced by the Grounded Theory method. The main reason for using Grounded 
Theory analysis method was due to its emphasis on the generation of theories based 
on the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967), thus in this s udy, specific effort was used to 
let the data lead the research analysis. Coding and analysing processes were done 
based on theoretical sensitivity and concurrent data collection and analysis (Charmaz 
1995). All interviews were first fully transcribed and then coded through initial and 
axial coding process based upon Grounded Theory’s analytical guidelines. More 
specifically, the coding process started with open/initial coding, which offered initial 
categories and concepts such as racial abuse, religious discrimination, Islamophobia, 
assimilatory practice, alcohol, and identity rejection. This stage was rather 
descriptive and substantial in the way that I started to identify, label, categorise, and 
to some extent interpret, the experiences, perceptions, and meanings that stood for a 
specific concept. So working with open coding on 10 interviews allowed many 
concepts and categories to be identified. Many of these concepts and categories were 
linked and related to one another in a hierarchical order - for example, Muslim self-
conceptualisation could be associated with the importance of religion amongst 
participants. Experience of racial and religious discrimination could also be 
associated with the importance of Muslim visibility and the existence of cultural 
racism. Experience of identity non-recognition (identification with Scotland) based 
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on different skin colour and religious differences could also imply the importance of 
racial and cultural boundaries in the everyday understanding of Scottishness. I then 
moved onto the axial coding stage to identify the potential relationship between 
different concepts and categories, and then develop them into conceptual families 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990). In so doing, caution was taken not to impose any 
relationship into the data from my own prior knowledg  or existing theories. The 
identified codes were also kept active by using consta t comparison among the codes 
and seeking to keep a record (annotating in Nvivo) of the context in which the 
properties/indicators had been constructed by the respondent (Glaser 1978). 
Meanwhile, the initial analysis occurred through memo writing in order to keep a 
record of potential hypotheses and ideas that were g nerated during coding and 
initial analysis. Finally through selective coding, the relationship between different 
issues of social identity, Islamophobia, and integration were developed. The selective 
and theoretical analysis suggested that Islam can play an important part in Muslims’ - 
especially practicing Muslims’ - identity formation and integration. Such distinctive 
identities and practices can also affect their experience of exclusion and 
Islamophobia.  
   Discussing the weaknesses and critiques of Grounded Theory as an analytical 
method (such as breaking up the narrative flow of data and also losing the deeper 
meaning embedded in the context by fracturing the data, particularly via open coding 
processes), it can be said that one way to deal with this problem is memo writing and 
annotating (in a Nvivo framework), which enables the researcher to keep a record of 
the context in which these meanings have been generated. As Glaser (1978) points 
out, in order to keep the codes active, a researcher ne ds to keep asking some 
important questions during the coding process. Two of these questions (what is 
actually happening here? and; under what condition d es this happen?) draw the 
researcher’s attention to the context, which can then be recorded and considered. 
Another way, which I found quite helpful, was doing a constant comparison amongst 
different parts of the data and properties in order to find similarities and differences 
to generate more abstract categories (Strauss & Corbin 1990). This constant 
comparison kept me aware of different contexts in which different or similar 
meanings were generated during the interviews. I found that if I had started the 
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coding/analysis process in a more organised way in the framework provided by 
Nvivo from the early stage of interviewing, it would have been more helpful and 
time saving. The only obstacle to have such concurrent interviewing and 
coding/analysing was the issue of transcribing the int rview. Full transcription took a 
lot of time because I was not native to the English anguage and was not very 
familiar with the Scottish accent, as did networking and trying to find more 
participants.  
 
Access, Positionality and Ethics 
   Reflecting on the issue of access, I need to say th t as there is not an official 
sample of Muslims, the most convenient way to access Muslims was through 
university Islamic Societies, mosques, Islamic centres, Muslim organisations, and 
social groups., As a result, I started to access Mulim individuals through attending 
and emailing Islamic Societies in different universitie  such as Edinburgh, Heriot-
Watt, Napier, Dundee, and Aberdeen. I also attended some other Islamic centres 
where personal attendance was required as there werno electronic means of 
communication. In doing so, I attended Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dundee Central 
Mosques; Edinburgh and Glasgow Shiah communities, and the only mosques in 
Stirling, Dunfermline, and Falkirk. Although this research is not a comprehensive 
and representative study of Muslims, taking the diversity of Muslims into account 
and having access to different Muslims - particularly with regard to my key variables 
- means that such diversity is reflected in the data. I attended these centres several 
times, circulated my ‘Research Participant Information Sheet,1’ and also participated 
in some of their activities and programmes and talked to some of their members in 
order to identify my probable participants based on my theoretical sampling and key 
variables. While conducting the first ten interviews, I found that the best way to 
access Muslims is through personal and face to face contact because I had a poor 
response when I contacted some participants through email or Facebook, but when I 
contacted them in mosques or Islamic centres personally, they showed their interest 
most of the time and were willing to have the intervi w at the time. Therefore, I had 
                                                                 
1 This form is provided in Appendices. 
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to go to these places and make face-to-face contact, which was of course time 
consuming and costly. This was more relevant in contacting potential participants in 
Scottish towns where no electronic means of communication – such as active 
websites and emails - were available. Most of the tim , I had to travel to the targeted 
towns with no pre-arrangement or appointment and spend a full day at the mosque to 
find someone willing to participate in the study. I conducted 10 interviews using this 
sampling approach. It is however important to note that this approach can have its 
own disadvantages. For example, in four cases, participants agreed to speak but they 
had less time to spend, so these interviews might not have been as far-reaching and 
deep as had been expected.   
   Turning to the issue of positionality, I need to say that I have found that, on the one 
hand, my positionality as a Muslim insider, facilitated my access to Muslims and also 
meant that they could build trust with me through commenting on religious issues as 
we shared the same belief and religion. On the other hand, my identity as a Muslim 
could have put participants in a defensive position on religious issues or led them to 
show themselves as good Muslims or committed people. To avoid this issue, I really 
tried to explain in the beginning of the interview that this was an academic study, that 
I have interviewed different Muslims from different e hnic, social, and religious 
backgrounds, and that it is normal and usual to have different views on religious 
issues and religious identities. I also tried not to make any personal comment on 
people’s experiences during or before interviews to av id any possible influence by 
myself. Another thing that was taken into consideration was relying on participant’s 
personal experiences, which were usually freer from such influences, rather than their 
opinion unless such an opinion was necessary.  
   The most important difficulty regarding my access and positionality was assessing 
female Muslim participants. Usually it is more difficult for a male researcher than it is 
for a female to gain access to female Muslim participants. Despite being a Muslim 
and being aware of cultural and behavioural norms in communicating with Muslim 
females, in the beginning of the data collection, I had some difficulty accessing 
Muslim women. As my wife is a Muslim and was present in Scotland, I decided to 
get help from her - as an observer or mediator in some cases – and to ask her to 
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accompany me during female interviews. Mentioning this in my interview invitation 
letters was extremely helpful and I started to receive dates for interviews. All the 
interviews with Muslim women, thus, took place in the presence of my wife. Her 
presence was also helpful in making the environment friendly as they were trying to 
make a friendship and to stay in touch even after th  interviews. Creating such a 
friendly environment was helpful in making the female participants feel more relaxed 
and free to share their experiences and accounts. It is, however, important to note that 
the presence of my wife as an observer or mediator could have affected interview 
interaction, generated self-awareness (Sinding and Aronson 2003), and affected 
participants’ responses. For example, they might have tended to show that they are 
better Muslims and are more devoted to Islam. This issue was highlighted in the work 
of Hopkins (2004) by some Muslim participants in his focus group discussion who, 
for example, said that they do not drink alcohol while in fact they sometimes did. It 
was also likely that my views, as a Muslim, intervene in the course of data collection 
or analysis in the form of sympathy with religious is ues. To overcome this problem 
or at least minimise its effects, I tried to design my research questions, data collection 
and analysis in an ethical manner. By recognising my own views and perceptions, I 
tried to avoid inserting my views throughout different stages of the research (Robson 
2002; Mason 1969). Moreover, as the research was about their experiences of racism 
and identity negotiation, I tried to only report and analyse their experiences and 
attitudes in an impartial (as much as possible) and academic way. Member checking 
(presenting transcripts to respondents), peer debriefing and support (discussion with 
other researchers and students of similar status), discussion with my supervisors, and 
presentations at different conferences were also useful means of recognising and 
overcoming my probable biases during the research (Robson 2002).  
   In terms of ethical issues, this research was conducted according to the ethical 
guidelines of the University of Edinburgh and the British Sociological Association. 
The research did not involve interaction with vulnerable communities or children. 
The consent and privacy of the specific individuals ha  been respected. In accordance 
with University policy, a Level 1 assessment was undertaken with my supervisors. A 
‘Research Participant Information Sheet’ is attached (Appendices), in which I 
explained how the matter of confidentiality and anonymity will be respected 
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throughout the research and that all the recordings were done with the participants’ 
permission. For example, in this form, I explicitly explained that the interview would 
be recorded, but however, any information disclosed during the research interview 
was treated as confidential, and that their privacy nd anonymity was respected at all 
times. It was also mentioned that any data drawn upon for this study or for other 
academic articles and conference papers would also abide by strict confidentiality. At 
the outset of each interview, a consent form was provided where participants 
confirmed that they had understood that their participation is voluntary; that they 
were free to refuse to answer any question; that they could withdraw from the study 
at any time; and only then finally signed the consent form. It is also important to note 
that in order to respect their confidentiality, allparticipants’ real names have been 
changed and pseudonyms have been used in this study. Closing this methodology 
chapter leads onto to the next 5 chapters, where I pr sent and discuss my research 
findings. 
   In sum, I chose qualitative approach and semi-structured interviews to answer my 
research questions because of their capacity to offer valid and reliable information, 
insight about the subjective meanings of social phenomena, and an entry into 
networks of social relations (Sinding and Aronson 2003). More specifically, 
qualitative interviewing helped me to learn a great deal about Muslims’ social 
identity construction by paying close attention to the details of their definitions of 
their own situations (Jacobson 1997b). Therefore, this method particularly helped me 
to produce rich data on Scottish Muslims’ views, perceptions, attitudes, and motives 
concerning their social identity negotiation and integration. It also helped to gain 
insight into their lived experiences of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland. With 
unlimited time and resources, I could have done this research differently. However 
overall, I fell that this research strategy has produced sufficient data to provide 
insights into Muslims’ identity formation and integration processes in Scotland.  
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Chapter 5: Negotiating Identity: Nation, Ethnicity and Religion 
 
Introduction 
   As I mentioned in previous chapters, the existing evidence seems to indicate that 
Muslims in Scotland have constructed hyphenated or hyb id identities that draw on 
religion, ethnicity and nationality (Saeed et. al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; 
Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). More sp cifically, the above cited 
studies suggest that Muslims in Scotland see themselves much more as Scottish and 
Muslim than as British. For example, Saeed et. al. (1999: 836) found that ‘Scottish-
Muslim’ was the most popular identity amongst some young Pakistani Muslims in 
Scotland. Similarly, Hussain and Miller (2006: 150), who offered respondents four 
‘hyphenated’ identities to choose from, found that more than a half chose Scottish-
Muslim, more than a third chose British-Muslim, more than a sixth chose British-
Pakistani, and more than a eighth chose Scottish-Pakistani. This could imply that 
Muslims tended to identify with Scottish sub-state national identity despite Muslims’ 
tendency in, for example England, to identify with British not English identity 
(Hussain and Miller 2006). However, little attentio has been paid to the different 
importance, meanings, and strength of these identiti s or the significance of their 
identity markers (Hopkins 2007; 2008). As Phinney (2003) argues, ethnic minority 
people can identify with both their ethnic groups and their country of residence, and 
that each identity can be either strong or weak, or identification with both can be 
high. Turner and his colleagues (1994: 454) also argue that ‘self-categorizations are 
variable and context dependent as they are social comparative and are always relative 
to a frame of reference.’ The extent and degree of identification with any of these 
identity markers (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion) can be varied and 
subjected to difference. For example, Hopkins (2007) had previously studied the 
importance of nation and religion in young Scottish-Muslims’ identity negotiation 
and suggested that their affiliation with religious and national identities varied in 
strength, nature, and meaning.  
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   This study discusses the importance, meaning, and strength of these markers in 
Muslims’ identity negotiation in Scotland by including the importance of ethnicity 
together with religion and nation. It has been also argued that people’s identity is 
highly affected by the way in which others accept or reject that identity (Taylor 
1992; Honneth 1995; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; Hopkins et. al. 2011; Hopkins 
2011; Thompson 2012). Thus, identity non-recognitio can have negative social and 
psychological consequences for those whose identitis are denied (Taylor 1992; 
Honneth 1995; Thompson 2012). This study, therefore, se ks to explore whether 
Muslims’ national identities are accepted by the majority or not and, if not, on what 
basis Muslims are excluded. It has also been argued that social identities such as 
ethnic identity are not static and are ‘subject to change along various dimensions; 
over time or across generations in a new culture, in different contexts and with age or 
development’ (Phinney 2003: 63). By taking generational differences into 
consideration, I discuss the importance of these markers amongst first1 and second 
generation Muslims. 
   To this end, this chapter will examine firstly the importance of nationality in first 
generation participants’ social identity negotiation in Scotland. The importance of 
birthplace and citizenship is discussed in this section. Then the significance of 
ethnicity and ethnic identities are explained. More specifically, the importance of 
racial markers and maintaining cultural and social bonds with the country of origin 
are discussed in this chapter. Turning to the third aspect of participants’ identity, the 
importance and strength of religion is explored. Moving onto second generation 
participants’ identity negotiation, I discuss the importance of nation, ‘race,’ ethnicity, 
and religion in turn and then finally come to a conlusion by comparing the 
importance of these markers in each generation. 
 
                                                                 
1 As earlier discussed in Chapter 4, in this research, the first generation are those Muslims who were 
born outside the UK and immigrated to the UK, and the erm ‘second generation’ refers to those 
Muslims who were born in the UK to non-native parents.  
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Multiple and Context Dependent Social Identities 
   In line with previous research (Saeed et. al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; 
Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011), the data showed that most first and 
second generation participants, 38 out of 43, constructed multiple or hybrid social 
identities. Multiple and hybrid identities tended to consist of national (country of 
residence) and/or ethnic (country of origin) and religious (Muslim identity) identity 
markers. The overwhelming use of multiple identities amongst participants can be 
explained by the fact that in living as an ethnic/faith minority community and having 
connections to different identity sources such as ethnicity, religion, and a new home 
country, constructing a singular identity was not pssible (Modood 2005). This 
finding contributes to the issue of the multiplicity and hybridity of emerging new 
identities in multicultural societies (Hall 1992; Modood 2007). The data also 
suggested that these identities were mainly context dependent. This was more 
evident when respondents identified with one of identity markers, e.g. Scottish, but 
when further probed for identification with other identity markers such as religion or 
ethnicity, they asserted associations with those ident ties as well. This was evident 
amongst both first and second generation participants. Starting with the former; for 
example, Akbar, who was a first generation Muslim man with a Kenyan background 
that has lived in Edinburgh for 9 years, asserted that he felt Kenyan and then he said 
that he also felt Scottish:  
Question: How do you describe your identity? Akbar: Kenyan. 
Question: What about the place you are living in, do you have any sense of 
belonging to here as well?  
Akbar: Yes, definitely; you see my nationality is Kenyan. So, I am Kenyan by my 
birthplace and my passport but at the moment I live in Scotland. I consider myself 
Kenyan and Scottish. So, you can say Kenyan-Scottish.  
[Edinburgh, 27 year-old] 
 
   This quote implies that Muslims can hold different social identities and that the 
assertion of these identities can vary based on different bases and contexts. In some 
other examples, respondents explicitly mentioned that in different social contexts, 
their self-described social identities might change. For example, Shadi, who was a 
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first generation Muslim woman also of Kenyan background and has lived in 
Aberdeen, reflected on how she described herself:    
My identity is very much mixed up because I grew up in UK basically and I am 
studying in Scotland now but still my home is Kenya. I see myself Scottish as 
well or I would say I see myself Kenyan-Scottish-Muslim and British. … But 
normally when people ask about my identity I say Kenyan or Kenyan-Pakistani 
because I have got Pakistani background as well. People sometimes see me a 
Pakistani. I do not look British or Scottish so someti es it is easier to explain that 
I am Kenyan because of the way I look or even because of my accent; I do not 
sound British; I do not sound Scottish. Normally when people ask me I usually 
say I am Kenyan-Pakistani. 
[Aberdeen, 25 year-old] 
 
   In this example, Shadi highlighted that her identity assertion changes in response 
to majority Scots due to her racial appearance. The importance of ‘race’ and skin 
colour is discussed later in this chapter, but thisquote could imply that in this 
context, in response to majority Scots, Shadi’s self-id ntity is relegated in favour of 
an identity which is more acceptable and less challenging. This could imply that 
some first generation Muslims manage their self-identification and provide different 
identities in different social contexts according to what they think would be more 
acceptable. This example also highlights the importance of accent, which is 
discussed later in this chapter. In another example Asghar, who was another first 
generation Muslim man from Kenyan background, said that he is Kenyan because of 
his passport, but when further probed, he asserted that he wished to be identified as 
Scottish-Asian: 
I am waiting for my British nationality, but I am a Kenyan national [right now] or 
common wealth. 
Question: Other than the passport issue, how do you like to identify yourself?  
Asghar: In my own mind I like to be classified as Scottish-Asian. 




   This quote suggests a considerable difference between Asghar’s identity assertion 
based on his formal citizenship and passport, and the identity assertion based on his 
wish and desire. This can also suggest that on these grounds, he may assert different 
identities in different contexts – therefore in analyzing surveys and questionnaires, 
analysts should be cautious about the impact of the wording and the context in which 
questions are asked. Context dependence of social identity assertion was also evident 
amongst second generation participants. For example, Hakim, who was a second 
generation Muslim man of Pakistani background and was born and brought up in 
Edinburgh, said that his self-categorisation changes based on others’ questions or 
expectations:   
Generally, if somebody asks me where are you from, because I know that they 
are not really asking me to say I am from Scotland they are really asking 
about my heritage, so in those cases I guess I am more Pakistani than anything 
else because my appearance is like that, but if someb dy asked me what is my 
culture, I would definitely say Scottish because I t stify the Scottish morals of 
education and etc.  
[Edinburgh, 20 year-old]  
 
   In parallel to the example of Shadi who highlighted the importance of others’ 
expectations in her identity assertion, Hakim also highlighted that his self-
identification changes based on others’ perceptions r expectations. In another 
example, Adil, who was a second generation Muslim man of Pakistani background 
and was born and brought up in Falkirk, stated thatin formal questions, his self-
described identity is British, but before that he is Muslim:   
In terms of nationality, obviously we are British, but before that I am a Muslim, I 
see two different things, but as nationality I would say British. … But this can 
change depending on who is asking and where it is, as you mentioned if it is in 
academic area or a sort of formal question, and then I am just British … but 
generally they ask us to clarify anyway as Pakistan; they class us as someone 
originally from Pakistan. 




   In this quote, Adil particularly highlighted the importance of the formal context in 
which he likes to describe himself as British. However he continues that in those 
contexts he will usually be categorised as Pakistani afterwards. All this, is despite his 
primary wish to be identified as Muslim first and then British. All the above 
examples imply the importance of different social contexts for Muslims’ 
identification. These findings support Turner and his colleagues’ (1994: 454) 
argument that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context dependent as they are 
social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference.’ It was also 
highlighted that some identity assertions might not be Muslims’ primary identity or 
the identity they wish to be described with. Identification with different identities, 
this indicates, can vary and be subject to difference. This supports previous research 
by Hopkins (2007), which suggested that young Scottish Muslims’ affiliation with 
religious and national identities varied in strength, nature, and meaning. Thus, to 
seek a deeper understanding of Muslims’ identity negotiation and its different 
meanings and strengths, it is important to unpack the complexity of each of their 
identity markers. It is to this end that in the following sections, I discuss the 
importance of ethnicity, skin colour, religion, and ationality in first and second 
generation Muslims’ social identity negotiation.  
 
First Generation 
   The data showed that a majority of first generation respondents constructed 
multiple and hybrid identities composed of ethnic, liberal/civic and religious identity 
markers. This can imply the importance of ethnicity, religion, and country or 
residence in some first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation. Such association 
with ethnic markers was due to the salience of birthplace in defining national 
identity; other issues such as experience of identity, non-recognition, and 
maintaining cultural bonds with their ethnic origins were also acknowledged as 
influences. The last two factors were also likely to weakening their sense of 
belonging to their civic identities (Scottishness/Britishness).  
   More specifically among the first generation Muslim , 14 interviewees [out of 16] 
constructed multiple and hybrid national identities; out of these, 10 participants 
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chose an ethnic-national identity (such as Pakistani-British), three identified with 
hybrid identities (consisting of a religious, national, and ethnic component such as 
British-Muslim-Indian), and one identified with a religious-ethnic identity (such as 
Pakistani-Muslim). The other two participants chose a singular identity that was 
based on their ethnic/country of origin (such as Pakist ni). These figures can imply 
that the first generation of Muslims in Scotland construct different forms of identity 
and challenges the perception of Muslims as a homogeneous community. It can also 
suggest the importance of country of residence (natio lity), country of origin 
(ethnicity), and religion in first generation participants’ identity negotiation.  
 
Importance of Nationality: ‘Scotland is our New Home’ 
   The first point to note about first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation was the 
importance of residential or civic identity markers. 13 first generation participants 
[out of 16] identified with their country of residence (Scotland in particular or 
Britain in general). The identification with Scottish/British national identity was 
either in a multiple or hybrid way and such association was supported by the use of 
civic identity markers such as residence and citizenship [having a British passport]. 
Settlement, having children born and educated in Scotland, setting up business and 
investment, and marrying someone from Scotland (in one case) were more specific 
markers used by participants to support their Scottish/British national identity 
claims. To illustrate this, I start with the example of Akbar who was a first 
generation Muslim man of Kenyan background that has lived in Edinburgh for 8 
years. Akbar, who earlier described himself as Kenyan-Scottish, asserted that settling 
in Scotland and feeling at home made him feel Scottish: 
Question: What makes you feel Scottish?  
Akbar: Firstly, living in that place and calling it your home; I left behind my 
birthplace and I came to live here, I am by birth Kenyan but now by settlement I 
am Scottish.  




   This quote highlights the importance of residence as a marker in Akbar’s 
identification with Scotland and the importance of birthplace in his identification 
with his country of origin [the importance of ethnicity and ethnic identities, based on 
country of origin, is discussed in the next section]. Even though residential and 
citizenship markers were commonly used by all 13 first generation respondents to 
support their Scottish or British identity claims, the extent and strength of this 
association varied. Some of these participants considered Scotland to be their ‘new 
home’ and left aside the possibility of return to their country of origin. These 
respondents had stronger identification with their Scottish or British identities. In 
contrast, there were some other respondents (such as Sajjad, Hamid, Nazir and 
Samad) who, despite living in Scotland, kept some strong cultural, social, and 
financial ties with their country of origin and yet still kept the possibility of return 
open. Additionally there were participants who considered birthplace to be the main 
marker of determining someone’s nationality, and thus felt more belonging to their 
country of origin. My finding suggests that, for example in the cases of Sajjad and 
Emran that are quoted later in this chapter, these r pondents saw their children as 
Scottish because they were born in Scotland. These participants had a stronger 
affiliation with their ethnic identities than their Scottish or British identities. To 
begin with the former: for example, Hareb asserted that he felt more belonging with 
Scotland. Hareb is a self-employed Muslim man who owned two shops in Stirling. 
He was of Pakistani background and has lived in Stirling for 22 years. Hareb, who 
already described himself as Pakistani-Scottish, stated that after immigrating to 
Scotland it has become his home and that based on his residence, he feels Scottish:  
I was born in Pakistan but after moving here and living here; now I am Scottish. It is 
very good living here; wherever you stay is your home. Whenever we go to 
Pakistan, we just stay for two or three weeks and them we come back here because 
my work is here; my children are studying here. I feel more belong to here than to 
Pakistan. 
[Stirling, 45 year-old]  
 
   In this quote, Hareb highlights his association with Scotland as his new home while 
considering his association with his country of origin, Pakistan, to only be as a place 
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to visit in the holidays. This could imply that despite being born in Pakistan, his 
association with Scotland is stronger than his country of origin. Hareb’s example also 
highlights the importance of other issues such as working and children’s education in 
identifying with Scotland. The importance of having jobs and children was also 
highlighted in other examples. Ehsan was a self-employed Muslim man who owned a 
grocery shop in Falkirk. He was of Pakistani background and has lived in Scotland 
for 20 years. He earlier identified himself as Scottish-Pakistani and asserted that as 
his children were born in Scotland and he is settled here, he thus feels that he 
belongs to Scotland and has no plan to go back to Pakistan:  
I do think of myself as Scottish and never think of anything else … because I am 
living here and my children are here too. We tried to build our life here; I never felt 
that that I will go back to Pakistan. I know some peo le feel that way but not me 
and my all investment is here.  
[Falkirk, 42 year-old] 
 
   The examples of Hareb and Ehsan can suggest the importance of feeling settled 
because those who consider Scotland to be their home can have strong identification 
with their national identities. The importance of planning a permanent residence in 
Scotland and leaving aside the possibility of return was also highlighted in the next 
example. Asghar was a self-employed Muslim man who was working as a 
technician. He was of Kenyan background but has lived in Edinburgh for 10 years. 
Asghar, who earlier liked to be identified as Scottish-Asian, said that establishing 
connections with the place of residence and not going back to the country of origin 
made him feel Scottish: 
Basically, staying in Scotland and making family ties and connections can make 
someone feel Scottish. Like your children being born here or study or work here. 
These can make me to feel Scottish. So, if you have decided that there is no going 
back then that is the time you can say that you are Scottish. 
[Edinburgh, 56 year-old] 
 
   The examples of Hareb, Ehsan, and Asghar can sugge t that due to economic and 
social settlement, the ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 1979) was no longer a possibility 
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amongst some first generation Muslims (mainly from Pakistan), and that those who 
abandon this myth can forge meaningful identities in their new homes. This finding 
supports previous research by Brah (1996) which suggested that due to family 
reunion and financial investment, Asians from the subcontinent had to come to 
accept that their stay in the UK would be permanent. There were, however, some 
other first generation participants who, because of the salience of birthplace, kept 
strong ties with their country of origin and kept the possibility of return open. These 
participants thus had a stronger affiliation with their country of origin and ethnic 
identities, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
Importance of Ethnicity; Salience of Birthplace 
   The data showed that all first generation participants had some sense of belonging 
to their ethnic identities, namely to their country of origin such as Pakistan or Kenya. 
It is important to note that in this study, responde ts’ identification with their 
country of origin has been regarded as ethnic identity rather than national identity. 
For many people, especially in the case of majority group members, national identity 
is closely related to ethnicity but this can be someti es distinctive and differentiated, 
especially in the case of ethnic/faith minorities such as Asians or Muslims (Scottish 
Government and General Register Office for Scotland 2008). For example, my data 
suggested that many respondents, who had multiple social identities, saw their 
identification with their country of origin as their ethnic identity rather than their 
national identity, which was Scottish or British. More specifically, those respondents 
who had British citizenship differentiated between their nationality, which was 
mainly based on citizenship and passport, and their‘original’ identity, which was 
based on their birthplace and ethnic background. Therefore their sense of belonging 
to their country of residence was related more to their nationality, and their sense of 
belonging to their country of origin was related more to their ethnicity. To capture 
the different importance of each of these identities and to avoid confusion between 
their sense of belonging to their nationality and their sense of belonging to their 
ethnicity, in this chapter, respondents’ affiliation with their country of origin is 
considered to be ethnic identity unless any respondent expresses that his/her original 
identity is also his/her national identity. It was for this reason – to distinguish 
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between minorities’ national and ethnic identities - that both a national identity 
question and a ethnic group question was asked in Scotland, England, and Wales’ 
2011 Census to ensure that ethnic/faith minorities can express these aspects of their 
identities (Scottish Government and General Register Office for Scotland 2008; 
Bond 2011). As was evident in some of the above examples, one explanation for 
identification with one’s country of origin was related to the salience of birthplace in 
some first generation Muslims’ understanding of national identity. As mentioned 
earlier, such affiliation with ethnic identities based upon birthplace was evident in 
the examples of Akbar, Asghar, and Hareb, but however their identification with 
their country of residence was stronger than their id ntification with their country or 
origin. In this section, I discuss other respondents whose identification with their 
ethnic origins was stronger than identification with their country of residence. The 
first example is Emran, who was a self-employed car dealer. He was from a Kenyan 
background and has lived in Glasgow for 11 years. He said that even though he sees 
himself as British, deep down he still felt Kenyan: 
I am British by being here for all these years [11years], but if you see me deep 
down I am still Kenyan because I was born in Kenya.  
[Glasgow, 39 year-old]  
 
   In this quote, Emran emphasised the importance of birthplace in some people’s 
sense of national identity. For some first generation Muslims, being born outside of 
Scotland in particular or Britain in general, means that they are somewhat detached 
from their place of residence and may thus feel more attached to their ethnic 
identities. The significance of the birthplace marker was much more evident when 
the first generation Muslims spoke about their children who were born and brought 
up in this country. They believed that their children [second generation Muslims] 
were certainly Scottish or British because they were born and brought up in Scotland. 
It is important to note that the birthplace marker was not simply based on their place 
of birth but also referred to their country of upbringing. This was highlighted when 
some participants pointed to the importance of the education they had received or the 
cultural and social context in which their children grew up. The first example is 
Saleh, who was a first generation Muslim man of Egyptian background who has 
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lived in East Kilbride for 28 years. Saleh, who alre dy identified himself as Scottish-
British-Egyptian, said that his children are Scottish and that they should be 
considered to be Scottish because they were born and brought up in this country:  
Many of young Muslims who were born and brought up in this country … They 
are Scottish ... They have been taught that they ar Scottish. So, they should stick 
to this and should be treated as such.  
[Glasgow, 65 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Saleh particularly highlights the importance of the education that his 
children received in Scotland which made them feel Scottish. The next example is 
Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man of Pakist ni background who has 
lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. Sajjad, who earlier d scribed himself as British-
Pakistani, explained that based on birthplace and upbringing, his children have more 
right to be Scottish than their parents:  
People who were born and bred here [second generation Muslims] do not actually 
believe that they are from another country; by hundred per cent they believe that 
they are British or Scottish because they were bornhe e and they have a right here 
… they have more right than us [first generation Muslims] to call themselves as 
Scottish.  
[Edinburgh, 49 year-old]  
 
   In this quote, Sajjad highlights the importance of the birthplace marker, which can 
function as an ultimate designation of people’s natio lity. As the first generation 
Muslims lacked this important marker with regard to Scottish identity, they thus saw 
no right or at least a weaker right to claim such an identity. In contrast, their children 
who were born in Scotland are definitely presented as being Scottish. The last 
example is Tariq, who was a first generation Muslim man of Pakistani origin and has 
lived in Scotland for 7 years. Tariq, who earlier identified himself to be ‘a Muslim 
then a Pakistani’ even went further and claimed that based on the birthplace marker, 
his children have no option except to be Scottish: 
They were born here; there is no any other way around; they were born here; they 
are not anything else except Scottish.  
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[Falkirk, 28 year-old]  
 
   In this quote, Tariq highlighted the importance of birthplace, which implies that 
birthplace determines national identity. The example of Saleh, Sajjad, and Tariq 
indicates the importance of the birthplace marker amongst some first generation 
Muslims, and implies that some first generation Muslim  have the perception that 
their children have a very strong affiliation with eir Scottish sub-state national 
identity or would have no other national or social identity except for their Scottish 
identity. It is important to note that some first generation Muslims shared this 
emphasis on birthplace with many majority Scots (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; 
Reicher et. al. 2010). This may suggest that the greater identifica onal integration of 
second generation Muslims into Scottish sub-state nio al identity; however later in 
this chapter, I discuss how the second generation Muslims’ identity negotiation is 
more complicated than this and is subject to variation. Different issues such as 
ethnicity and religion are also significant in second generation Muslims’ identity 
negotiation and so is not only limited to the importance of country of birth and 
residence. Turning back to first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation, the data 
suggests that the salience of birthplace was not the only explanation for some first 
generation Muslims’ stronger identification with their country of origin and their 
weaker identification with their country of residenc . Experience of national identity 
non-recognition was also acknowledged to be one of the factors that could weaken 
the first generation participants’ identification with Scottish or British national 
identities. It is to this that I now turn. 
 
National Identity non-recognition; ‘We are still seen as Pakistani’ 
   The data showed that almost all first generation participants experienced some 
national identity non-recognition in their everyday interaction with majority Scots. In 
other words, their national identity claims to be Scottish or British were not widely 
accepted by the majority group members. It is due to this that some participants 
associated their stronger identification with ethnic identities with their experience of 
national identity non-recognition. For example, Hamid, who was a taxi driver and 
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has lived in Scotland for 8 years, said that despit having a British passport, he gets 
racial abuse almost every day. Such incidents make him feel that his British national 
identity is not recognised:  
I am more Pakistani, but I have British passport too. So, that’s why I am British-
Pakistani. But the British passport just gives me th  nationality of this country 
and it does not give me the same rights as others. In some cases yes, you do get 
the same rights as others but you still get racial abuse [such as being called as 
Paki]. As being a taxi driver, you get a lot of racial discriminations. Almost all 
the time, you can see that, even people who you think would not say those kinds 
of things, they do come up with these things; racist omments, they always pass 
some comments an you; such as calling you a Paki. …you can never be British 
… I think as long as you have a white colour, there would not be a problem.  
[Edinburgh, 28 year-old] 
 
   This quote shows that people’s sense of belonging could be challenged or 
misrecognised based on racial or ethnic differences. This quote could also imply that 
other white minorities’ British or Scottish identity claims may be less problematised. 
However, the Scottish Attitude Surveys (2006 and 2010) showed that Eastern 
Europeans, for example Poles, were also discriminated gainst in Scotland (Bromley 
et. al. 2007; Ormston et. al. 2011). The example of Hamid can also imply that 
national recognition of Muslims, i.e. getting citizenship, may not secure their 
grassroots social recognition. This finding supports previous research (Runnymede 
Trust 1998; Bond 2006; Meer t. al. 2012; Blackwood et. al. 2012), which suggested 
that ethnic minorities’ sense of belonging to the host country could be questioned 
based upon their differences, despite their formal citizenship status. National identity 
non-recognition at the grassroots level was also highlighted in other examples. 
Sajjad, who earlier described himself as British-Pakist ni and has lived in Edinburgh 
for 25 years, said that his British identity was not widely accepted by the majority. 
He said that after all these years he is recognised only as a Pakistani and not as a 
British person:  
I do not think even most of people here know that we are British; we have the 
British passport, they still look at us as Pakistanis, it does not matter how many 
hundred years you live here. 
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[Edinburgh, 49 year-old] 
 
   In parallel to the example of Hamid, in this quote, Sajjad highlightd his experience 
and perception that Muslims are recognised by their ethnic origin, such as Pakistani, 
rather than by their country of residence. Similarly, Ehsan, who earlier identified as 
Pakistani-Scottish and has lived in Scotland for 20 years, felt that his and his wife’s 
Scottish identity was not recognised by indigenous Scottish people due to their racial 
and ethnic differences: 
Mostly they [white Scottish people] say no [you arenot Scottish]; whenever you 
talk to them they say ‘when would you go back home?’ and stuff like that. They 
think that here never can be our home; that is why the always say when you are 
going back home but we think there is no chance to go back. … They [indigenous 
Scottish people] think of those who are white [to be a true Scottish] because … 
my wife is educated here and she speaks like Scottish people but she is still not 
accepted as a Scottish person. For example, whenever she speaks with Scottish 
accent over the phone that is fine but when she tells h r name or when they see 
her, they make a different treatment.  
[Falkirk, 42 year-old] 
 
   The examples of Hamid, Sajjad and Ehsan can imply that some first generation 
Muslims had a perception that ‘being white’ was a key criteria for being a true 
Scottish or British, and thus Scottishness was equat d with whiteness. This 
perception can weaken their identification with their country of residence, as Hamid 
noted: ‘you can never be British.’ It is important to note that these three participants 
(Hamid, Sajjad and Ehsan) were from those first generation participants who had 
daily experience of racism and Islamophobia (the experience of racism and 
Islamophobia is discussed in the next chapter). Thus, their experience of national 
identity non-recognition and their weaker identification with British national identity 
may be associated with their higher rates of experience of Islamophobia. However, 
there were some other participants with less experience of Islamophobia who still 
had the perception that their national identities are not widely accepted at the 
grassroots level. For example Saleh, who was a retired professor that has had  rare 
experiences of racism, stated that based upon his children’s Scottish accent, many 
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people would think that they are Scottish but once they see them, they would think of 
them differently:  
My children are born in Scotland and should be considered as Scottish. … If 
anyone hears their accent over the phone or without seeing them, they would say 
that they are Scottish. However, when they see their colour and appearance they 
would think of something else such as Pakistani or Asian.  
[East Kilbride, 65 year-old] 
 
   This quote suggests the importance of the Scottish accent as an identity marker 
may be overridden by the importance of looks and appe rance in defining Scottish 
identity, thus those who lack such markers, even thoug  they have other markers 
such as accent and birthplace, would find their natio l identity claims coming into 
question. This was consistent with Hamid’s perception hat the importance of skin 
colour and looks is more significant than British citizenship. In another example, 
Hareb, who was a self-employed Muslim man that has d rare experiences of 
Islamophobia, said that his children who were born in Scotland, are still not seen as 
Scottish or British due to their different skin colour:  
My children were born here but Scottish white peopl still say they are Pakistanis 
even though they were born here but our colour is still different.  
[Stirling, 45 year-old] 
 
   All the above quotes in this section imply the importance of racial markers in 
defining the Scottish identity based on the majority’s attitudes. This supports 
previous research (Bond’s 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et. al. 
2009; Reicher et. al. 2010) that suggests that racial and ethnic markers are still 
important to Scottish identity. Bond, in his analysis of the findings of the Scottish 
Social Attitudes Survey (2003), argues that althoug ancestry and ethnicity are 
generally considered to be less fundamental to natio l identity, ‘these more ethnic 
criteria are widely regarded as relevant and important, and thus those who lack these 
markers may have their Scottishness called into question’ (2006: 623). This trend 
was also evident in the work of McCrone and Bechhofer (2008: 1255), which, 
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despite being based on limited evidence, concluded that ‘it is harder for non-white 
people to claim to be Scottish.’ Their more recent fi dings also highlight that it is 
more challenging for people who were not born in Scotland, even though they might 
have other ‘markers’ of identity such as a Scottish accent, to claim Scottish identity 
(McCrone & Bechhofer 2010). 
   Although one respondent (Arif) reported that others’ recognition or non-
recognition of his national identity was not important, for some other first generation 
Muslims, others’ non-recognition was significant and had influence. For example, 
Shadi, who earlier identified herself to be Kenyan-Scottish/British-Muslim and was a 
Muslim woman, stated that she normally describes her elf as ‘only’ Kenyan due to 
her ‘looks’ and others’ perception that:  
Normally, I say that I am a Kenyan … because people see me like that; I do not 
look British or Scottish so sometimes it is easier to explain that I am Kenyan 
because of the way I look like.  
[Aberdeen, 25 year-old] 
 
   This can imply the importance of others’ acceptance/denial and supports the 
argument that people’s identity is highly affected by the way in which others accept 
or reject that identity (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; 
Hopkins et al 2011; Hopkins 2011; Thompson 2012). In another example, Tariq, who 
earlier identified himself as ‘a Muslim then a Pakistani’ and was a Muslim man, 
stated he did not identify with Scottish identity because he felt that he would not be 
accepted as a Scot;  
Question: Do you think of yourself as Scottish as well? 
Tariq: To be honest no, because at the end of the day we are foreigners; it does 
not matter what happens; it does not matter if we speak, walk or talk Scottish or 
English. At the end of the day, they look at you and say you are not from here but 
for me this is where I stay and this where I live; this is where I earn my money; 
this where I spend my money; this is where I belong to right now.  




   These two quotes show the importance of others’ acceptance or rejection in some 
first generation Muslims’ national identity negotiation and their resulting stronger 
identification with their ethnic identities. This supports de Lima’s (2004) suggestion 
that social exclusion can lead to ethnic minority groups maintaining their cultural 
identities. The importance of others’ acceptance or denial was also highlighted in the 
example of Hamid, who said that the experience of natio al identity non-recognition 
made him feel like a foreigner even though he liked to feel British: 
I consider myself a foreigner, I would like to think I am British, but it does not 
matter how hard I try to be British but I cannot be a British, because these people 
won’t let us to be British. … Getting the citizenship of this country would make 
you think that you are a part of the society, but when something comes up like 
this [racial comments] you think that no, we can never be a part of this society, 
you are always different, and they will not let you to become a part of this 
society.  
[Edinburgh, 28 year-old] 
 
   Previously, research by Blackwood et. al. (2012) suggested that those Muslims 
who encountered discrimination by Scottish or British authorities at airports felt that 
their valued identity, as Scottish/British, was denied and thus they did not feel part of 
the society. Consistent with this finding, the examples of Shadi and Hamid might 
suggest that individual identity non-recognition can also cause such feelings amongst 
some first generation Muslims. There are also some th r factors which could be 
important in first generation Muslims’ ethnic identification.  
 
Maintaining Cultural and Social Ties with Country of Origin: Possibility of 
Return 
   Maintaining cultural bonds and ties with one’s ethnic origins and keeping the 
possibility of return to one’s country of origin could be another factor in 
strengthening some first generation Muslims’ ethnic identities. As mentioned earlier, 
some participants (such as Hareb, Ehsan and Asghar) due to economic, social, and 
family settlement in Scotland left aside the ‘myth of return’ and built their new life 
and home in this country. However, there were some th r first-generation Muslims 
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who still thought of their country of origin as their ‘home county’ and kept the 
possibility of return open. For example, Sajjad, who earlier described himself as 
Pakistani-British, stated that the possibility of ging back to Pakistan is still valid: 
We [first generation Muslims] may still feel that we are from Pakistan and we can 
go back there.  
[Edinburgh, 49 year-old]  
 
   In another example, Hamid highlighted the importance of social exclusion and 
Islamophobia in stating that there is a possibility of being deported from Britain, thus 
it is better to have a connection with his country of origin:   
I want to feel be British, because we have got everything here, we have got life here, 
house and everything … but when these things happen [name calling (Paki) and 
saying go back home] we feel that we are not like them, we come from another 
country, probably we are not as welcome as we should have been. Because these 
people, does not matter how good they are with you,in the back of their mind they 
still are not happy with us being here. Thus, you have to think of having a property 
in your home county because if the government one day ecide to deport all 
Muslims accusing them as terrorist what would we do. 
[Edinburgh, 28 year-old] 
 
   In this example, Hamid overstates the possibility of being forced to return to the 
country of origin, but it does however indicate real f rs and concerns. These quotes 
move us away from the ‘myth of return’ as being thedr am of returning to a 
cherished homeland and suggests it to be more an option to return amongst some 
first generation Muslims due to their experience of social exclusion and 
Islamophobia and feelings of insecurity. The data also suggests that both Sajjad and 
Hamid had daily experience of Islamophobia (the experience of Islamophobia is 
discussed in the next chapter]. They had this percetion that their formal citizenship 
did not lead to them obtaining equal respect and acceptance and they could therefore 
potentially be rejected by the state on some pretext. Having such an uncertain and 
unsecure perception about British citizenship was also central to the next example. 
Nazir, who was a first generation Muslim man from a Pakistani background who has 
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lived in Stirling for 20 years, stated that his British citizenship could be rejected by 
the government at anytime and that he can be deported to his country of origin: 
I have British passport because we are living in this country but in my British 
passport it is written that this passport belongs to the government and they can take 
it off any time they want. They can phone me just now and say sorry we do not want 
you to hold a British passport anymore. 
[Stirling, 73 year-old] 
 
   In parallel to the example of Hamid, over-exaggeration is also evident in this quote. 
Nazir points to the possibility of the government wi hdrawing passports at any time, 
but however it does not necessarily mean that they would withdraw citizenship. For 
example, football hooligans have their passports confiscated before major football 
events. Nevertheless, these quotes reinforce the significance and value of 
maintaining financial, social, and emotional bonds with the country of origin in some 
first generation Muslims’ affiliation with their ethnic identities. The importance of 
maintaining ethnic culture was also highlighted in the next example. Samad, who 
earlier identified himself as Pakistani-British-Scottish and has lived in Scotland for 
30 years, asserted that his cultural identity is more Pakistani than Scottish:  
Even though when I came to Britain, I was small [10year-old] but my culture is 
still more Pakistani rather than Scottish or British but their [second generation 
Muslims’] culture is Scottish or British culture. Their culture is not anymore our 
culture. Maybe that is why we [the first generation Muslims] think of ourselves as 
more Pakistani …  
[Dunfermline, 51 year-old] 
 
   This quote implies a growing generational divide between those who feel more 
belonging to their ethnic identity and a second generation who are more at home in 
Scotland. National and ethnic identities, however, are not the only components of 
first generation Muslims’ multiple and hybrid identities. Religious identity is the 




Importance of Religion: ‘It is very important but it is not a part of my 
identity’ 
   The next important issue in first generation Muslim ’ identity negotiation is 
religion. The relationship between religion and identity amongst some first 
generation participants was more complex than their ethnicity or country of 
residence. On the one hand, most participants attributed a very important role to 
religion; on the other hand, there was less self-idntification and self-categorisation 
as Muslim. The data suggested that the use of religion as a source of identity was less 
common than the use of birthplace or residential markers amongst the first 
generation Muslims. For example, only 5 participants [out of 16] used religion as a 
part of their multiple identities. This may imply the lesser importance of religion, as 
a source of identity, compared to the importance of thnicity and residence among 
some first generation Muslims. Weak identification with religion can be associated 
with first generation Muslims’ understanding of self and national identity. As I 
discussed, for most first generation participants, birthplace and ethnicity were the 
most important factors in their identity negotiation. Other identity markers such as 
religion or culture, thus, had less importance. This should not, however, be 
interpreted as an indication of lesser practice or commitment to their religion because 
a majority of participants (14 out of 16) were practicing and visible Muslims. 
Furthermore, I discuss in later chapters that Muslims’ commitment to the religion 
plays an important role in their social integration. For some participants, religion was 
even more important than national or ethnic identity, but it was not discussed or seen 
to be part of their identity. This was highlighted in the example of Samad, who 
earlier described himself as an English-Scottish-Pakist ni: 
My religion is very important, that is the most important thing to me; more 
important than anything.  
Question: So, being Muslim is part of your identity?  
Samad: No, being Muslim is the first thing and everything just comes after that; my 
nationality is afterward. 




   This quote indicates the importance of religion in Samad’s sense of self and 
implies that the religion of Islam is part of his identity; of who he is and how he acts 
in the world. This quote, however, implies that some first generation Muslims may 
not see Islam in terms of identity even though it clearly informs their sense of self. In 
contrast to the example of Samad, there were two participants who mentioned 
religion as a part of their multiple identities, and i terestingly as the most prominent 
identity marker. For example, Tariq, who was a self-employed shop keeper and a 
Muslim man, and earlier described himself as ‘a Muslim then a Pakistani,’ stated that 
after becoming a visible Muslim, his religion became the most prominent component 
of his identity: 
When I was not a practicing Muslim my identity was Pakistani but after becoming a 
practicing Muslim, since 3 or 4 years ago, I see my identity first as a Muslim then as 
a Pakistani … So that is me Muslim and Pakistani … 
[Falkirk, 28 year-old] 
 
   In another example, Arif, who was an employed nurse and has lived in 
Dunfermline for 12 years, asserted that his religious identity comes before his 
national and ethnic identities: 
First of all, I am Muslim and then I am Scottish Pakistani … I am proud of being 
Muslim and being part of the Muslim community; so firstly I am Muslim then 
nationality wise I am Scottish which is totally different … I put the religion first 
and there is no compromise on religion. 
[Dunfermline, 39 year-old] 
 
   These last two quotes suggest the importance of r ligion for some first generation 
Muslims. More research is needed to understand why some respondents chose not 
describe their identities in religious terms even though it would seem to be central. 
The identification with religion as a source of identity was more common (or at least 






   In parallel to the first generation participants’ identity negotiation, a majority of 
second generation participants (24 out of 27) also reported having multiple and 
hybrid identities. These multiple identities were mainly categorised into three main 
forms; a third of interviewees (8 out of 24) identified with their national-ethnic 
identities (such as Scottish-Pakistani); another third felt more attached to their 
national-religious identities (such as Scottish-Muslim); and a quarter, 6 out of 24, 
claimed to have hybrid identities, which were constituted by religious-national-ethnic 
identities. Only three participants identified with singular identities; namely religious 
or ethnic identities. These figures could suggest the importance of country of 
residence (nationality), country of origin (ethnicity), and religion in second-
generation participants’ identity negotiation. In parallel to the importance of these 
markers in first generation participants’ social identity negotiation, second generation 
participants’ identity negotiation was also affected by those same markers. In the 
next section, I discuss the different meanings and strength of these markers amongst 
second generation Muslim participants. 
 
Importance of Nationality: ‘Being proud to be Scottish and British’ 
   The first important issue in second-generation participants’ identity negotiation 
was identifying with the country in which they reside. The data showed that a 
majority of respondents, 24 out of 27, identified with Scottish or British identity as a 
part of their multiple or hybrid identities. The association with Scottish or British 
identity was based upon a range of identity markers such as birthplace, residence, 
English language, Scottish accent, adopting Scottish/British culture, and Scottish 
education. For example, Azadeh, who was a Muslim woan, stated that her Scottish 
identity is based upon birthplace, residential, cultural, and linguistic markers: 
I am Scottish-Muslim because I was born here, I live here, my family is here, I 
speak the language and the local people I meet with or interact with are from 
here and just the beautiful place Scotland is to bel ng to. 




   Similarly, in another example, Sanaz highlighted the importance of British culture 
and asserted that her sense of belonging to Britishness is based on residential, 
educational, and cultural markers: 
So, we are Muslims, Asian and from Pakistani origin. All these come into play 
and then we are British too because we born and brought up here, we know the 
culture of this country; we have been brought up alongside the British people; we 
study here, we know how the British culture is for good and bad. We may not 
agree with all cultural norms but we already know what the British culture is 
about and we already took the best from British culture.  
[Edinburgh, 41 year-old] 
 
   Sanaz emphasised in this quote that she had a selectiv  approach to British culture 
but that her familiarity with it is important in associating with British national 
identity. This could imply the importance of British culture in some second-
generation Muslims’ identification with British national identity. In another 
example, the importance of the Scottish accent alongside other factors was 
highlighted. Adil, who earlier identified himself to be Scottish-British-Muslim, 
stated that his Scottish accent alongside other markers made him feel Scottish and 
British:  
I would really say being born in this country or living among people for such a 
numbers of years and speaking the language and having the Scottish accent, all 
that makes us Scottish and British. If anyone hears my Scottish accent, would 
know that I am Scottish…  
[Falkirk, 24 year-old] 
 
   In another example, Ahad, who earlier described himself as British Muslim, stated 
that his English language and Scottish accent were also factors that made him feel 
British: 
I live here and I was born here and English is my first language that is why I call 
myself British Muslim. … I have got the Scottish accent too … many people 
when they hear my accent think that I am Scottish. 




   Ahad’s stress on the Scottish accent echoes Bond’s (2006) work on national 
identity markers for second generation Muslims. To compare the importance of 
identification with country of residence between the first and second generation 
participants, the data suggests that utilising a residential marker was also common 
amongst the first generation participants; however, the majority of first generation 
participants lacked other markers such as accent, culture, and education that the 
second generation participants were more likely to have. Another important 
difference was the utilising of birthplace to support identification, which was totally 
absent amongst the first generation Muslims. The birthplace marker, which was the 
most salient identity marker amongst the majority of first generation participants, 
was only used to support their ethnic identities. The utilisation of birthplace, accent, 
culture, and education could imply that second generation Muslims have a stronger 
identification and sense of belonging to their country of residence than the first 
generation Muslims. However, the data suggests that even the second generation 
participants’ identification with Scottish or British national identities could be 
challenged by national identity non-recognition or by the importance of ethnic or 
religious affiliation, which could affect the strength of their national identities. In the 
following sections, I discuss the importance of each of these issues in turn. 
 
Challenged and Questioned Identities: ‘You cannot be Scottish!’ 
   The data showed that over half of the second generation participants (15 out of 27) 
experienced incidents where their national identity claims were questioned or 
challenged by some majority Scots. National identity challenges or non-recognitio  
involved questioning or challenging their claims to Scottish/British identity and 
labelling them mainly by their ethnic/racial backgrounds. There was a perception 
amongst some participants that despite possession of some Scottish identity markers 
(such as birth, accent, education, and culture), thy were still seen as foreigners or 
outsiders in the eyes of the majority. For example, Jafar and Fazel mentioned that in 
many incidents they were considered as or called foreigners by the majority. In 
another example, Fatima, who was a second generation Muslim woman and brought 
up in Glasgow, explained how her colleges were shocked to see a player with Asian 
 
118 
background in Highland games. She said that in their vi w, a Pakistani person is not 
seen as Scottish and thus should not play in a Scottish team:    
I just want to give you a personal story in my workplace, I have a colleague 
whose background is Asian and he took part in Highland games. My other 
colleagues, who were indigenous Scottish, were so surpri ed when they saw him 
there. They were saying that why an Asian person is taking part in Highland 
games, he is Pakistani; he is not Scottish. But he was born here, brought up here 
thus he is Scottish … so, yes some people do not take even those who were born 
or brought up here as Scottish.  
[Glasgow, 32 year-old] 
 
   These examples suggest the persistence of racial markers at the grassroots level, 
which can challenge second generation Muslims’ ident fication with Scottish sub-
state national identity. This supports previous research by Jacobson (1997a) that 
suggested that the presence of racial boundaries is crucial to Britishness. As 
mentioned earlier, all of these examples can also support previous research (Bond 
2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; Kyriakides et. 
al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010) that suggested the importance of racial and ethnic 
markers to Scottish identity. Although for some respondents (such as Adil and 
Amir), others’ attitudes to their national or sub-state national identities was not 
important, there were some participants who particularly raised the issue that their 
experience of national identity non-recognition affected their sense of belonging to 
Scottish or British national identities. The first example is Kathryn, who earlier 
stated that she is proud to be British. She pointed out that her experience of identity 
non-recognition and racial abuses made her think that it is impossible to be British: 
I am proud to be British because I was born here and I have been here for whole 
my life. However, just because of these issues [racial abuses] there is always a 
kind of thoughts that you can never be a part of this society ever, you know there 
can be always something, even walking down the street somebody could just 
turn around and say anything to you, so it is never going to be like being 
accepted as British..., even if you say I was born here and I am British, it does 
not make any difference. It is just the colour of yur skin which defines you and 
at the end of the day you would be called ‘Paki’. … I spoke to a lot of people … 
when ask them why do you call me ‘Paki’, they say that ‘you are not white’ … 
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when I say to them that ‘I was born here though’, tey say your parents are not 
from here. Basically, they want you to be white.  
[Edinburgh, 27 year-old] 
  
   Kathryn here points to the persistence of ancestry and racial markers in 
challenging second-generation Muslims’ identification with British national identity 
at the grassroots level. This supports Jacobson’s work (1997a) that emphasised the 
importance of racial boundaries to Britishness. This also supports previous research 
by Bond (2006: 623) that suggested that ancestry and ethnicity are ‘widely regarded 
as relevant and important, and thus those who lack these markers may have their 
Scottishness called into question.’ In this example, Kathryn also highlights that 
experiences of national identity non-recognition weaken her affiliation with British 
national identity. This implication of national identity non-recognition was also 
highlighted by other participants. For example, Sadiq, who described himself as only 
Iraqi, explained how categorising and labelling him by his appearance or ethnic 
background made him feel frustrated and ridiculed, and thus reluctant to keep 
identifying as Scottish:  
The inevitable question that they always would ask i  ‘where are you from 
originally?’, that is one of the first questions you will be asked, so it is has never been 
about ‘what do you do?’… Once, I said I am from Edinburgh and they laughed, then 
they said ‘no where are you really from originally?’ 
[Glasgow, 25 years old] 
 
   The examples of Kathryn and Sadiq illustrate how even those participants who 
were born, brought up, and educated in Scotland can find their national identity 
claims questioned and challenged due to racial and ethnic differences. Previously, 
research by McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) highlighted that claiming Scottish 
identity is more challenging for people who were not b rn in Scotland. As well as 
those first generation ethnic minority people, the findings of my research suggest that 
even the second generation Muslims who were born in Scotland can find their 
Scottish identity claims being questioned and challenged at the grassroots. This 
finding supports previous research by Hopkins (2007: 72) that suggested the 
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‘continuing the salience of race as a marker of social difference’ in the exclusion of 
some young Scottish Muslims. As evident in the examples of Kathryn and Sadiq, 
these participants’ national identity claims were challenged and they were instead 
labelled by their skin colour and ethnic backgrounds. This implies the importance of 
national identity non-recognition and labelling behaviour in some second-generation 
Muslims’ affiliation with their ethnic identities. The importance of national identity 
non-recognition and labelling behaviour in the affiliat on with ethnic identities was 
also highlighted in other examples. Sanaz, who was born and brought up in Scotland, 
said that she was often labelled as Pakistani rather than British because of her 
‘looks’: 
Well, I am British, but then I am not a sort of indigenous species of British and 
obviously being coloured, they would not accept me as British … then being 
coloured, obviously you are Pakistani … People still class me as non-British to be 
honest, I mean when they look at me, they think “oh’ she is Pakistani, obviously”, 
they do not really class me as British, and I know that from people’s perception of 
me. … Well to be honest, the fact that we are coloured which is very identifiable, 
so we will be considered as a Pakistani or an outsider. 
[Edinburgh, 41 year-old] 
 
   In this example, Sanaz highlighted that her apperance and others’ perception of it 
can affect her national and ethnic identification. The examples of Kathryn, Sadiq, 
and Sanaz imply that national identity non-recognitio  and labelling by ethnic and 
racial background can influence second generation Muslims’ ethnic identities. 
However, finding national identity claims to be challenged was not limited to the 
importance of racial and ethnic differences because religious and cultural differences 
were also reported to play a part. Some participants perceived that their religious 
identity (visualised mainly by lack of alcohol consumption, lack of gender mixing, 
wearing the hijab in the women’s case, and having a beard in the men’s case) was a 
challenge to the acceptance of their Scottish/British identity claims. For example, Ali 
said that, racial, religious, and cultural markers a e all important to be considered 
Scottish. He especially singled out the issue of drinking alcohol, which is a social 
norm in Scottish/British culture but is not permitted for Muslims: 
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They think to be Scottish or British the first thing is that you have to be white, but 
we are not white… Then you have to follow their culture, their way of life. The 
biggest obstacle, the biggest difference between us and British people is alcohol. 
We do not drink alcohol, they drink alcohol and this is something that I think 
sometimes is used as a metre to measure somebody’s integration, to see how 
integrated they are. If they drink alcohol with us, then you are okay, if not, so 
something is wrong with you … Because alcohol is a very big part of their 
society.  
[Edinburgh, 38 year-old] 
 
   This quote highlights how barriers to Scottishness may be cultural and social as 
well as racial. This particularly supports previous re earch by Jacobson (1997a: 181) 
that suggested that the presence of three ‘boundaries of Britishness’ - the civic, 
racial, and cultural boundaries. This also supports the finding of previous research 
(Hopkins 2004), which suggested how some Muslims distance themselves from 
complete belonging within the boundaries of Scottishness by highlighting, for 
example, lack of alcohol consumption. In another example, the importance of hijab 
as another religious and cultural challenge to natio l identity is highlighted. Arezo, 
who earlier described herself as a British-Muslim, explained how her hijab alongside 
having brown skin played a role in challenging her claim to British identity:   
Usually, if somebody looks at me in street they would not think of me as British. 
There are only a few people who would think that I m British. They obviously do 
not know my background and only because I wear hijab and I am brown they just 
immediately think that I must be Pakistani or whatever. Once a lady asked me 
where you are from and I told her that I am British but I am originally from 
Kenya and she said ‘how it can be possible; how come you can be British?’ … 
they think that only white people can be British.  
[Edinburgh, 40 year-old] 
 
   The example again points to cultural challenges to Scottishness. This supports 
previous research by Virdee et al (2006) that highlighted the persistence of cultura 
boundaries of Scottishness and showed how some cultural behaviour, such as 
wearing hijab and burqa, was perceived as oppression and fundamentalism and thus 
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considered to be incompatible with Scottishness. Associating hijab with a specific 
ethnicity or ‘race’ was highlighted more in the example of Azadeh. She explained 
how her white Scottish Muslim friends’ Scottishness and whiteness was questioned 
by her fellow Scots simply because they wore hijab:   
I have a lot of friends who are white Scottish and they are Muslims. Some of them 
wear the hijab. Once they do not wear the hijab, people would not give them a 
second look, they would not put them in any box or category but once you do 
wear the hijab, even though they are white, people say to them that you are from 
Pakistan or Tunisia. Because they wear the hijab they must be form somewhere 
else rather than Britain. 
[Edinburgh, 42 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Azadeh highlighted that even white Scots’ national identity can be 
challenged due to them wearing hijab. This supports research by Moosavi (2014) 
that suggests that once white British/Scottish people convert to Islam, they ‘lose their 
whiteness’ and become known as ‘Paki’ (Moosavi 2014: 3). This also supports 
previous research by Franks (2000: 922-3) that suggested that white Muslims with 
hijab can be associated with South Asian or Arab ethnicity and ‘perceived to be 
race-traitors by white supremacists.’ The examples of Arezo and Azadeh can also 
support the argument that through a process of racialisation of Muslims, all Muslims, 
even the white British converts, can be called Paki or Pakistani regardless of their 
real ethnic or racial background (Moosavi 2014). This process of racialisation of 
Muslims is further discussed in the next chapter. Having Islamic names was another 
example of cultural and religious barriers to being recognised and accepted as being 
Scottish/British. For example, Nader said that his Islamic name, in addition to his 
different skin colour and lack of alcohol consumption, can make others to think that 
he is not Scottish:  
I think regarding my name and my colour some people would not consider that I 
am Scottish. Other thing is whether you, for example, drink or whether you take 
part in some of these traditions. These things may also sometimes make them 
think that you are not Scottish. 




   The example of Nader implies the importance of cultural boundaries of 
Scottishness and supports previous research by Virdee et. al. (2006), which 
suggested that Muslim names can become a racialised code of cultural belonging and 
associated with terrorism, and can thus, be a basis for discrimination. The examples 
presented here highlight the multiple barriers to belonging that are based on markers 
of difference. They show how some second generation Muslims can feel othered as 
outsiders due to racial and religious differences. This reflects Kidd and Jamieson’s 
(2011) research that suggested that ‘Scottish Muslims experience feelings of 
otherness and difference that result from experiences of religious and racial 
discrimination’ (see also Hopkins 2007). Comparing the importance of national 
identity non-recognition between the first generation and second-generation 
participants, the data suggests that in some cases, national identity non-recognition 
could play a part in strengthening both generations’ affiliation with their ethnic 
identities. However, it is important to note that first generation participants’ 
affiliation with their ethnic identities was much stronger than a majority of second-
generation participants. In the next section, the importance, strength, and different 
meanings of ethnic identities amongst second generation participants is discussed. 
 
Ethnicity: Social Imposing or Cultural Identity 
   The importance of ethnicity amongst second generation participants was seen in 
their identification with their parents’ country ofrigin. 16 participants [out of 27] 
identified with their parents’ country of origin as part of their multiple and hybrid 
identities. Probing further, however, it became clear that this identification with 
ethnic background did not have the same strength and meaning amongst all second-
generation participants. For some participants, it was a matter of social imposition 
and thus not a prominent identity marker, and for some others, it was a matter of 
choice and family education and thus continued to be the most prominent identity 
marker. I start with the former. As mentioned above, for some participants, being 
labelled or considered by their racial or ethnic bakground was the most important 
reason for affiliation with their ethnic identities. In this regard, association with 
ethnic background was a matter of social imposition rather than a voluntary choice. It 
was acknowledged by many interviewees that one reason they described themselves 
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according to their ethnic background was their ‘look and skin colour’ and others’ 
labelling behaviour. Further to the examples quoted in the national identity non-
recognition section, Hakim, who earlier identified himself as a Scottish-Muslim-
Pakistani, pointed to the importance of others’ attitudes. The example of Hakim was 
already quoted above but it is quoted here for a different purpose. He was a full time 
undergraduate student and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. Hakim explained 
how others’ perception of his appearance and ethnic eritage made him identify with 
Pakistani identity despite his strong cultural tieswith Scottish identity: 
Generally, if somebody asks me where are you from, because I know that they 
are not really asking me to say I am from Scotland they are really asking 
about my heritage, so in those cases I guess I am more Pakistani than anything 
else because my appearance is like that, but if someb dy asked me what is my 
culture, I would definitely say Scottish because I t stify the Scottish morals of 
education and etc.  
[Edinburgh, 20 year-old]  
 
   This quote highlights that even those second generation participants who were 
fully integrated with Scottish education and culture and also had stronger ties with 
their Scottish or British national identities make some affiliation with their ethnic 
backgrounds due to others’ expectations. The next example is Kasim, who had an 
undergraduate degree and was working in a bank. He was brought up in Edinburgh 
and earlier identified himself to be British-Pakistani: 
Basically, I am British, that’s how I would describe myself but because of my 
Pakistani appearance, I am Pakistani too; so yes I would call myself British and 
then would say Pakistani too. That’s how I would describe myself. 
[Edinburgh, 41 year-old] 
 
   The examples of Hakim and Kasim could suggest that their affiliation with ethnic 
identities was not as strong as their affiliation with their national identities. It can be 
discussed then that the meaning of ethnic identities n these two examples was only 
skin colour, parents’ country of origin, and others’ expectations. This supports 
previous research by Jacobson (1997b: 248) that sugge ted that ‘popular, racist 
assumptions that being British is a matter of being white can be described as 
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contributing to an ethnic boundary which is imposed upon the members of the 
minority community, rather than loosely constructed by the members of the minority 
themselves.’ However, their national identities included birthplace, school and 
university, culture, work, and friends and were thus based on birth, education, and 
culture. As highlighted in the example of Hakim, Scottish identity was also his 
cultural identity, which implies stronger and deeper attachment to Scottishness than 
to ethnic identities such as Pakistani. Weaker affili tion and a sense of belonging to 
ethnic culture and identity are also evident in another example. Ali was born and 
brought up in Edinburgh, was working in a public inst tution, and had an 
undergraduate degree. He described himself as Scottish-British-Pakistani-Muslim, 
but explained that his affiliation with his ethnic background was not his prominent 
identity because he felt different from Pakistani peo le and was therefore more 
connected to the Scottish or British culture:   
The reason that I know I am not fully Pakistani is because when I speak to people 
from Pakistan, I can tell that their way of thinking, their outlook, their 
understanding of their surrounding is different to h w I look at things, and I am 
more linked with Scottishness or with Britishness than with Pakistani culture or 
identity.  
[Edinburgh, 38 year-old] 
 
   This could imply that for some second generation Muslims, who have strong 
cultural ties with Scotland or Britain, ethnic identities are less meaningful and weak. 
In contrast, in the latter form of affiliation with ethnic identities, there was stronger 
and deeper association with ethnic culture and identity. The data showed that there 
were two participants who reported that they considere  maintaining cultural bonds 
with their families’ country of origin and family education to be key factors in 
maintaining and developing their ethnic identities. The first example is Sadiq, who 
was brought up in Glasgow and was a full time undergraduate student. He, who 
earlier identified as only Iraqi, stated that through his family and community 
education, he had developed a strong connection with his ethnic culture and identity:  
My family’s whole ethos is very much attached to their country, and they have 
got no association with the British country. They brought me up as if I was an 
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Iraqi child. So I was not familiar with these sorts of ideas of being Scottish and so 
on. Later on through community education and attending our Iraqi Mosques my 
ethnic culture and identity was developed and got str nger.   
[Glasgow, 25 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Sadiq highlights the importance of family education in maintaining 
his ethnic culture and bolstering his ethnic identity. Sadiq also notes that the 
importance of ethnic culture resulted in little affiliation or sense of belonging with 
Scottish identity. Sadiq was one of those respondents who reported national identity 
non-recognition to mean that he did no longer identify as Scottish, but this quote 
underlines the significance of family education and culture to this process. The 
importance of family education and maintaining ethnic culture was also highlighted 
in the next example. Khabir was brought up in the UK and was a postgraduate 
student. He described himself as Iraqi-Scottish and sai  that, even though his mother 
was Scottish, he was brought up in an Arabic-Iraqi culture, which made him feel 
more Iraqi than British or Scottish:  
I feel more Iraqi so I tell people that I am Iraqi … as my mum is Scottish I do 
have some sense of connection with Scotland as well but in terms of culture I do 
not feel a lot of connection to this country [Scotland] because I have been brought 
up in an Arabic-Iraqi culture. So, I feel more Iraqi.  
[Aberdeen, 23 year-old] 
 
   The examples of Sadiq and Khabir imply the importance of early childhood 
socialisation in developing and maintaining some second-generation Muslims’ 
ethnic identities. This finding supports previous re earch that suggested that family 
education and up-bringing were significant in mainti ing or developing Muslims’ 
ethnic identities (Murji 2011). The examples of Sadiq and Khabir also suggest that 
due to family education and maintaining ethnic culture, these respondents had 
weaker cultural bonds with Scotland and thus have weaker (in the case of Khabir) or 
no affiliation (in the case of Sadiq) with Scottish identity. This implies that some 
second generation Muslims, despite being brought up and educated in Scotland, 
have stronger cultural ties and identity with their thnic backgrounds. Second-
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generation participants’ identity negotiation was not limited to their country of 
residence and ethnicity because the third aspect of their identity negotiation was 
religion. This leads us to the next part of second generation Muslims’ multiple and 
hybrid identities; religious identity.  
 
Importance of Religion: Central to Muslim Identity and Practice 
   Religious identity was the second most common identity marker that was utilised 
by 17 out of 27 of the second generation participants s a part of their multiple or 
hybrid national identities. The data suggests that ose who identified with their 
religion saw it as the most prominent and important component of their multiple or 
hybrid identities. For example, Azadeh was one of these 17 participants who asserted 
that her most important identity was her Muslim identity. She was a practicing 
Muslim woman and earlier identified herself to be Muslim and British:   
I think the most important thing for me is that I am a Muslim; this is something 
that I feel strongly but I am not just a Muslim. I can be Scottish, I can be British, I 
can be a part of my wider ethnic community but I think Scottish applies to my 
identity after Muslim. 
[Edinburgh, 42 year-old] 
 
   This quote implies that identification with religion amongst some second 
generation Muslims can be stronger than identificaton with ethnic or national 
identities (cf. Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et. al. 1999; 
Archer 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Change Institute 2009). Such importance was 
also evident in some other examples. Azim, who was a practicing Muslim man, 
described himself as a British-Muslim-Indian: 
My religion is very important to my identity. It isalso very important in terms of 
shaping my everyday life; for example how I should behave and what I should do 
in my workplace and in everywhere. So, it is the most important thing for me. 




   This example highlights the central role of religious identity for some second 
generation Muslims and suggests that religious ident ty can affect Muslims’ social 
and economic life. The importance of religious identity for Muslims’ social and 
economic integration is discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. One possible explanation for 
this importance of Muslim identity can be associated with the special role of religion 
of Islam, which provides the guidelines for every aspect of Muslims’ individual and 
communal lives and thus becomes central to Muslim identity and practice (Esposito 
2011). This supports the argument that religion, as a meaning system or a system of 
guiding beliefs, can function as a social identity ‘through the increasing importance 
of the relevant group membership to the self-concept’ (Ysseldyk et. al. 2010: 61; see 
also Park 2007). As I mentioned above in the example of Azadeh, the importance of 
religion could be placed higher than nationality amongst some second generation 
Muslims. This was also highlighted in the example of Adil, who is another practicing 
Muslim man who was born and brought up in Falkirk. Adil separated the role of 
nationality and religion, pointing out that his religion is the most important factor in 
his life: 
In terms of nationality, obviously I am British, but before that I am a Muslim, I see 
two different things, but as nationality I would say British. The nationality and 
religion are two separate things, for example you can be a British Muslim, and you 
can be British anything. But religion is very important to me; how I live my life and 
everything has to be according to my religion.  
[Falkirk, 24 year-old] 
 
   All these quotes stress the importance of religion n some second generation 
Muslims’ identity negotiation. These examples also suggest a stronger affiliation 
with religion over national identities amongst some second generation Muslims. The 
importance of religion as a significant marker in some second generation Muslim 
participants’ identity could also be linked to the rise of political Islam, especially 
after political events such as the Salman Rushdie fatwa in 1989, and international 
matters such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the 1991 Gulf War (Saeed et 
al 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007), the 9/11 bombings i  New York, and the 7/7 
bombings in London. The importance of religion can also go higher than ethnic 
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culture or ethnic identity. For example, some of these 17 participants reported that 
their religious identities are more important than their ethnic identities. Zahir, who 
was born and brought up in Scotland and described himself as Scottish-Muslim said 
that: 
It is very important to me to maintain my religious identity and less so I feel for my 
ethnic identity because my Pakistani cultural identity has almost become diluted 
because I grew up here and I have got more of Scottish culture than Pakistani 
culture and that goes to the fact that many Pakistanis who came here might go back 
to Pakistan quite often so they maintain that cultura  identity whereas I do not go 
back very often. I do not feel a huge affinity to my parents’ country culturally. So, 
my cultural identity [as Scottish] and my religious identity [as Muslim] are 
components of me so when it comes down to action the you have to judge those 
actions or make a decision what you can do based on your personal judgment and 
what you think is right. For me, my religious identity forms more of the framework 
of my morality or the process that I go through to decide what to do and what not to 
do. There might be some cultural things like going to the pub or going out drinking 
or clubbing where that contradicts my religious identity then I felt that I can choose 
what to do. But I am not sacrificing my cultural identity because I still consider 
myself Scottish Muslim. Being Scottish Muslim means that you try to take the good 
things of being Scottish and you keep the good things of your faith. But you make it 
clear that as a Muslim this is what we are doing. 
[Glasgow, 39 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Zahir emphasised that his cultural identity is more connected to 
Scottish culture than Pakistani culture, but whenevr there is a contradiction between 
his religious identity and Scottish culture (such as drinking alcohol), his religious 
identity determines what to do and what not to do. Adil and Zahir reinforce the 
finding that some second generation Muslims see religion, as a source of identity, as 
more important than ethnicity or nationality. This backs up other research that 
showed the importance of religion as a significant identity marker amongst the 
second generation/young Muslims (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; 
Saeed et. al. 1999; Archer 2001, 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Hopkins 2007; 
Change Institute 2009). One possible explanation for this is having no connection to 
their parents’ country of origin, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they are 
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being denied full belonging with Scottishness by the exclusive attitudes and actions 
of some majority Scots. Therefore, religion becomes one strong and positive source 
of identity that they can claim (see also Ballard 1996; The Change Institute 2009). 
This supports the theoretical argument that public devaluation of Muslims’ social 
identity by the majority can result in more intergroup solidarity on the part of the 
minority group (Saeed et. al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007). The examples of 
Azadeh and Zahir also highlight that even though their primary identity is religious, 
they still considered themselves to be Scottish. These examples demonstrate that 
there is no contradiction between being Muslim and Scottish or British, and support 
Meer’s (2012: 192) argument that Islam is not in contradiction with ‘liberal 
democratic norms and convictions.’ However, being Muslim or practicing Islam in 
secular societies may face challenges as discussed in Muslims’ integrational 
strategies in Chapters 8 and 9. 
   All participants who reported stronger identification with their religious identity 
were practicing Muslims. This suggests the importance for practicing and observant 
Muslims of having a strong Muslim identity. The example of less-practicing 
participants (Kathryn, Zainab and Akram) who did not self-identify as Muslim lends 
credence to this view. Additionally, the examples of Amir and Arezo, who used to be 
non-practicing Muslims, also supports the importance of being practicing and 
observant Muslims for having a strong identification with Muslim identity. By 
embracing Islam, some second generation participants felt more belonging to the 
Muslim identity and developed a stronger identification with Islam. A ir, who earlier 
described himself as British-Scottish-Pakistani-Muslim, is a prime example of this: 
As I was becoming a more practicing Muslim, I regarded myself more Muslim 
than other identities. Now, I see myself more Muslim; so I think my religion is 
very important to my identity. 
[Dundee, 21 year-old] 
 
   In another example, Arezo, who earlier described himself as a British-Muslim, 
stated that after becoming a practicing Muslim, her religious identity became more 
prominent than her civic identity: 
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When I was younger, I always said that I am British and that was really who I 
was. That time, my parents were not very practicing Muslims so in my household 
it was not a lot of Islam, so I was just a British person and that was it. But as I 
grown up and look more into Islam, then I became a practicing Muslim myself; I 
just started to wear the Hijab about 10 years ago, so when I started to do that, I 
have gone more towards Muslim identity rather than my British identity, so that is 
what I think of myself more. Muslim identity is more important to me than the 
British identity. 
[Edinburgh, 50 year-old] 
 
   These two quotes show that those second generation Muslims who practice and 
observe the religion of Islam can have a strong affiliation to their religious identities. 
This supports previous research by Kidd and Jamieson (2011) that suggested that for 
some Muslims, the importance of their religious identity increased as they 
increasingly practiced their religion. The importance of practicing Islamic law in 
Muslims’ religious identity (Esposito 2011) and the examples of less-practicing and 
non-practicing participants, also imply that those Muslims who do not practice the 
religion of Islam may not even self-identify as Muslims and instead construct strong 
bonds to their ethnicity or nationality. However, due to the small sample size, 
especially with less-practicing and non-practicing participants, confirming this 
association will require further research.  
 
Conclusion and Comparison 
   Comparing the differing meanings attributed to, and the strength of, identification 
with national, ethnic, and religious identities by the first and second generation 
participants, the data suggests that the importance of nationality amongst first 
generation participants was mainly based on residential and citizenship markers, and 
the importance of ethnicity and ethnic identities was mainly based on the salience of 
birthplace and maintaining social and financial ties with their country of origin. 
However, the strength of identification with national (e.g. Scottish) and ethnic 
identities (e.g. Pakistani) varied based on the idea of the myth of return. Those 
participants (Ehsan and Hareb) who set up their new home and life in Scotland and 
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did not consider going back to their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with 
their national identities than their ethnic identities. Whereas, those (Hamid and 
Nazir) who kept the possibility of return open and maintained strong cultural and 
financial ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic 
identities than their national identities. It is important to note that the ‘continuing 
salience of race’ (Hopkins 2007: 72; see also Jacobson 1997a; 1997b), the 
persistence of cultural boundaries (Jacobson 1997a; 1997b; Virdee et. al. 2006) and 
thus the experience of national identity non-recognitio , also played an important 
part in weakening these participants’ sense of belonging to Scotland or Britain, 
meaning that some wanted to keep open an option of return. In contrast, the second-
generation participants’ identification with Scottish or British national identities was 
based on a range of markers such as birthplace, education, English language, 
Scottish accent, and culture. The importance of ethnicity and ethnic identity was 
mainly related to social imposition (labelling behaviour) or family education. In 
parallel to the first generation participants’ identity negotiation, the strength and 
meaning of their identification with national and ethnic identities varied based on 
family education and ethnic culture. Those respondents (such as Sadiq and Khabir) 
who maintained strong cultural ties with their country of origin had a stronger 
affiliation with their ethnic identities than their national identities. In contrast, those 
respondents (such as Hakim, Zahir and Kasim) who had closer bonds to their 
Scottish culture had a stronger affiliation with their national identities than their 
ethnic identities. This finding suggests the importance of cultural identity and 
implies that those Muslims whose cultural identity is connected to Scottish culture 
have a stronger affiliation with Scottish identity. Muslim participants’ identity 
negotiation was not limited to ethnicity and nationality though as religion and 
religious identity also played an important part and perhaps the most important part 
in some cases.  
   The importance of religion and religious identities amongst first generation 
participants was interesting; for some, religion played the role of very important 
belief system but was not reported as being part of identity, whereas for some others, 
it was the most prominent identity and thus stronger than their identification with 
nationality and ethnicity. Religion also played a central role in the practices of the 
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second generation, and also in the observant participants’ identity and practice. For 
practicing participants, religion was a complete way of life, with which everything 
else should be in line. For these participants, ident fication with religion and religious 
identity was stronger than their identification with ethnicity and nationality. This 
supports Jacobson’s (1997b: 239) argument that ‘the special significance of religion 
lies in the fact that Islam, by and large, is central to their sense of who they are: they 
affirm their belief in its teachings and regard it as something in relation to which they 
should orient their behaviour in all spheres of life and which therefore demands of 
them a self-conscious and explicit commitment.’ This lends support to the argument 
that the special role of religion, particularly Islam, as a meaning system or a system 
of guiding beliefs, can function as a social identity, and interestingly also as the most 
important identity marker (Ysseldyk et. al. 2010; Park 2007). Salience of religion, as 
a source of identity, can also be explained for some second generation Muslims by 
the fact that they had no connection to their parents’ country of origin and that their 
Scottish identity claims had also been denied by some majority Scots, so religion 
became the one strong and positive source of identity that they can claim. This 
supports previous research (Saeed t. al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007) that 
highlighted the importance of devaluation of Islam and Islamophobia in the 
significance of religious identity amongst Muslims. There were, however, some less-
practicing participants who did not mention religion as a part of their multiple or 
hybrid identities. This implies the importance of practicing and observing the 
religion of Islam in prompting such strong identification with Muslim identity 
amongst some second generation Muslims. It can also imply the importance of 
Muslims’ religious identity for their social or econ mic integration into society. It is, 
however, important to note that as the category of ‘Muslim’ is as internally diverse as 
any other category (Modood 2003; Meer 2012), the implications of adapting such a 
strong religious identity in Muslims’ everyday life can also be varied. Muslims’ 
different strategies of integration in Scotland are discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. 
   The final point that needs to be made is that, as mentioned earlier, the importance 
of ‘race’ (mainly with reference to skin colour) was also highlighted by some first 
and second generation participants, which could imply the persistence of ‘race’ and 
skin colour as a marker of social difference (Jacobson’s 1997a; Virdee t. al. 2006; 
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Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Bond’s 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Reicher et. al. 
2010). Putting these findings together adds to the general argument that Muslims’ 
sense of being part of Scottish/British society or of being outside that society is not 
only a Muslim issue, but is also related to their pe ceptions and experiences of how 
others see them because this is how Muslims experience whether their claims to 
inclusion are accepted or refused. Interestingly, despite having widespread 
experience of identity non-recognition at the grassroots level, both first and second 
generation Muslims still had some sense of belonging to Scottish/British identity. 
This can be associated with political Scottish nationalism; in other words, with 
successive Scottish governments that promote and propagate a civic sense of Scottish 
identity, or it can be associated with the lack of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland 
(Hussain and Miller 2006). This leads us to the next chapter, where I discuss how 
Muslims’ religious identity and racial differences can be grounds for exclusion and 
being targeted in Islamophobic incidents or racial abuses. 
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Chapter 6: Islamophobia in Scottish Major Cities  
 
Introduction 
   In the previous chapter, I discussed the importance of nation, ethnicity, and religion 
in Muslims’ social identity negotiation and also pointed out that their religious 
identity and racial differences can lead to social exclusion and Islamophobia. This 
chapter takes these issues further by studying Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia 
and racism. Islamophobia, as a form of cultural racism, can take different forms in 
different contexts (Bennett 2000). For example, previous research (Hopkins 2004a; 
Hopkins and Smith 2008) suggested that there is a perce tion among some Muslims 
that anti-Muslim racism is higher in areas where thre is a high density of Muslim 
residents such as Glasgow. In contrast, some other Muslims feel that Islamophobia is 
higher in more segregated areas such Scottish small towns and rural areas. This 
chapter, by focusing on Scottish major cities where the majority of Muslims reside 
(and the next chapter by focusing on Scottish towns and small cities) highlights the 
differences in Muslims’ experiences and perceptions f Islamophobia. To this end, 
the experience and accounts of 33 Muslim participants i  Scottish major cities 
(Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee) are analysed. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the significance of these cities is the fact that the number of Muslims 
living in those areas are at least more than one per cent of the local population 
(National Record of Scotland 2013). This is in contrast to Scottish towns where the 
number of Muslims is less than one per cent of the local population (this is discussed 
in the next chapter). This chapter explores Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia 
and discusses the importance of different factors that influenced their experiences. 
As Muslims’ identity and visibility (racial and religious signifiers) is key to their 
victimisation (Hopkins et. al. 2007; Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 
2010; Moosavi 2014), all participants in this research were either racially or/and 
religiously visible/identifiable. 
   This chapter firstly details and discusses different experiences of Islamophobia 
among Muslims in Scottish major cities. These experiences were places on a 
spectrum of daily, sometimes, rare, and no experience of Islamophobia. The 
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importance of different socio-economic factors in each of these experiences is 
discussed and compared with those in other categories. Secondly, individual and 
institutional Islamophobia is discussed, and the conclusion is finally made that socio-
economic factors are more important than the density of the Muslim population.  
 
Different Experiences of Islamophobia  
   The data suggests that there were diverse xperiences and complex feelings of 
Islamophobia among participants in Scottish major cities. To begin with diverse 
experiences, respondents reported two main forms of I lamophobia; individual and 
institutional (the former was limited to employment discrimination). Second, the data 
suggests that the experience of individual Islamophobia was varied amongst 
participants; around two-thirds of participants [20 out of 33] had self-experience of 
Islamophobia - of whom more than a third [14 participants] experienced 
Islamophobia rarely/occasionally - and almost a fifth [6 respondents] expressed that 
they struggled with Islamophobia almost every day. The rest of the participants, 
more than a third of them [13 out of 33], never had any experience of Islamophobia 
or any other type of racism. Whilst the sample size was small, it offers insight 
(Richie et. al. 2003: 251) into the range of experiences of Islamophobia. Putting 
these figures together; it can be suggested that a majority of respondents (more than 
two thirds; 27 out of 33) had no r very rare experience of Islamophobia, which 
might imply less experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. However, 
dealing with Muslims’ feelings and perceptions of individual Islamophobia, the data 
was more complex and diverse. The data suggests that ome participants had feelings 
of Islamophobia in Scotland even though they never xperienced it. Others had daily 
experiences of Islamophobia and thus also had strong feelings. Another group had 
very rare experiences of it and thus felt that Scotland is free from Islamophobia, and 
some others who also had some experience in the past felt that there is Islamophobia, 
but its form had changed.  
   The data suggests that there are firstly different xperiences of Islamophobia 
amongst Muslims, which implies that different factors are involved. Second, it 
suggests that there are different perceptions of Islamophobia, which might be 
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constructed not only on the basis of actual experiences but also thanks to media and 
international events. In this section, by analysing participants’ experiences and 
perceptions, I will look for any possible explanation for the variation of experiences 
of Islamophobia and will also seek any possible explanation of any differences 
between participants’ actual experiences and their p rceptions of Islamophobia. To 
unpack this complexity of experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia and to assess 
the relationship between them, I divided experiences and perceptions of 
Islamophobia into four categories; first, daily expriences and pervasive feeling of 
Islamophobia; second, some previous experiences and feeling of a new everyday or 
subtle Islamophobia; third, rare experiences and feeling of Scotland free from 
Islamophobia; and fourth, no experience but feeling of Islamophobia. 
 
Daily Experiences and Pervasive Feelings of Islamophobia 
   I start with the most intense category, those with daily experience and pervasive 
feelings of Islamophobia. This group asserted their prevailing experience of 
Islamophobia by using terms such as ‘all the time,’ ‘always,’ and ‘everyday.’ As the 
number of these respondents was limited (6 participants) and they all had intense 
experience of Islamophobia, I will discuss all these participants’ examples to gain a 
better understanding of the daily experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. 
I begin with the example of Kasim, who was a second generation Muslim man and 
has lived in Edinburgh for 32 years. He was of Pakist ni background and was also a 
practicing Muslim with a visible religious identity marker; namely a beard. In terms 
of socio-economic status, he was employed in a bank. He stated that he experienced 
a range of racism and discrimination such as verbal abuse, employment 
discrimination, and social exclusion:  
I experienced it throughout my life… my experience of racism and discrimination 
includes many things for example racial hatred which usually takes place in the 
street. Another example is social discrimination; when you have been excluded 
from a community or a group because of your colour. For example, if in making 
policies in local councils, our views are not heard, that can be a social 
discrimination. So, that is another form of discrimination, in a way that we are not 
allowed to have our say even though we are a part of the community. Economically; 
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where for example going for promotion, I have been stopped; I know it’s because of 
firstly my name and secondly my colour… 
[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 41 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Kasim particularly highlighted his racial (skin colour) and 
cultural/religious (name) visibility as important elements in his experience of racism 
and Islamophobia. This supports the argument that Isl mophobia as a form of 
cultural racism draws upon both physical and religious/cultural markers (CBMI 
2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Mo ood 2009; Meer 2013; 
Taras 2013). The highlighted importance of both racial and cultural factors was also 
evident from other examples. The next example is Kathryn, who was a second 
generation Muslim woman and has lived in Glasgow and Edinburgh for 15 years. In 
terms of visibility, she was from a Pakistani background, had a brown skin colour, 
and she used to wear South Asian traditional dress (Shalwar Kamees1). Kathryn was 
a less-practicing Muslim2 and had no visible Muslim identity markers such as 
wearing hijab or going to mosque for daily prayers, however as I mentioned, she had 
some visible cultural and racial markers. In terms of ocio-economic status, she had 
a standard grade and was part time employed and was living in a council housing flat 
with her 4 children and her husband. Commenting on her experiences of racism and 
discrimination, she stated that there is always a possibility of being verbally 
victimised:  
There can always be something, even walking down the s reet somebody could just 
turn around and say anything [such as Paki] to you … even if you say I was born 
here and I am British it would not make any differenc . It is just the colour of your 
skin. … I spoke to a lot of these people; when they just see me they start calling me 
Paki… my real name is Jamilah, people used to call me ‘Jami the Paki’ so I got a 
                                                                 
1 It is a traditional dress of South and Central Asia, especially of Pakistan, which is worn by both men 
and women which ‘includes a long loose-fitting tunic paired with long loose-fitting pants’ (Dunkel et.
al. 2010: 57).  
2 In this research, it refers to  those participants who identify themselves as Muslim but do not practice 
all Islamic rules, for example the 5 pillars of Islam, but still practice some other rules such as not 
consuming alcohol and consuming Halal meat. This term is used to distinguish these Muslims from 
practicing and non-practicing Muslims [more explanation of each term is offered in the fourth chapter; 
methodology chapter].   
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lot of abuse with that and then changed my name to a more British name; Kathryn. 
... So, I have changed myself a lot, on the basis of changing my name and my way 
of dress too ... I used to wear Asian clothes and I used to wear a scarf when I was 
going outside but people used to tell stuff to me.  
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 27 years old] 
 
   In parallel to the example of Kasim, Kathryn emphasised the importance of her 
racial and ex-religious visibility in being targeted for verbal abuse in this quote. She 
highlights that in her former position as a practicing and visible Muslim women with 
hijab1 and an Arabic/Islamic name (Jamilah), she experienced Islamophobic abuse 
such as being called as ‘Jami the Paki.’ Kathryn’s former position implies the 
importance of religious and/or cultural visibility in the experience of Islamophobia. 
This supports previous research (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; 
Moosavi 2014) that suggested a significant relationship between being visible as a 
Muslim and experiences of Islamophobia. More specifically, the study of Lambert 
and Githens (2010: 35) which examined anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK, suggests 
that such crimes ‘often take place in the vicinity of a mosque or against Muslims 
wearing Islamic clothes and, in the case of men, Islamic beards or, in the case of 
women, hijabs, niqabs or burkas.’ The relationship between visibility (racial and 
religious/cultural) and Islamophobia can be explained by the nature of Islamophobia 
as a process of racialization of Muslims that contains both racial and 
religious/cultural prejudice against Muslims (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and 
Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). To this extent, 
those perceived as Muslims, based on some visible symbols (Esposito 2011), 
signifiers and markers (Hopkins et. al. 2007) such as hijab in the case of Muslim 
women and having a beard in the case of Muslim men, may be targeted for 
Islamophobic harassment. 
   Kathryn’s later position as a less-practicing, or in other words an invisible Muslim, 
however, can imply the importance of racial differenc  and racism. Due to daily 
experience of Islamophobia, she changed her name to ‘a more British style’ 
                                                                 
1 A visible marker of a Muslim woman identity 
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(Kathryn) and changed her way of dress (not wearing h jab anymore) to reduce the 
number of Islamophobic incidents that she used to experience. She felt that her 
religious and cultural differences were the main reason for victimisation, thus she 
decided to adopt more mainstream norms (assimilation) by changing her name and 
way of dress, and also by constructing a British identity. In this quote, she highlights 
that even taking such assimilatory steps did not stp her receiving verbal abuse. 
Considering all of the changes she has implemented, she indicated that she has still 
encountered racism on the basis of racial difference, namely skin colour. This 
implies that Muslims can suffer both colour and cultural racism due to their cultural 
and racial differences (Modood 2005). This supports previous research by El-Nakla 
et. al. (2007) that suggested that Scottish Muslim women experience both racism and 
Islamophobia on the grounds of their skin colour or headscarf (hijab). 
   Although Kathryn’s quote along with all the other r spondents’ accounts of racial 
and ethnic/religious visibility in this category hig light the significance of visibility, 
Kathryn’s socio-economic status also points towards the importance of another 
factor. Kathryn’s low socio-economic status is demonstrated by her residential place; 
council housing areas. She is living in a council housing flat, in a council housing 
neighbourhood, which is a very deprived area. Her daily experiences of 
Islamophobia can be associated with this fact. This echoes the results of the Scottish 
Social Attitudes Survey (2010), which showed that ‘those with lower levels of 
educational attainment, … and those living in more deprived areas of Scotland were 
all relatively more likely’ to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities 
(Ormston et. al. 2011: 37-38). Another participant, Hamid, was also living in council 
housing. Hamid was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Glasgow and 
Edinburgh for 8 years. He was originally from Pakistan but he had no visible 
religious markers such as having a beard or going to the mosque every day, and he 
was a less-practicing Muslim. In terms of employment status, he was a self-
employed taxi driver. He explained that he received rbal abuse ‘almost all the 
time,’ mostly by being called a Paki1:  
                                                                 
1 The term Paki refers to a stereotypical discourse which racialises and culturalises Muslims and thus 
associates all Muslims with the Pakistani background in a negative and offensive manner (Brah 1996; 
Moosavi 2014) [this was discussed already in the theoretical chapter in more detail].    
 
141 
Being a taxi driver, you get a lot of racial discrimination. Almost, all the time you 
can see that. Even people who you think would not say those kinds of things [such 
as being called Paki], they do come up with these things; racist comments. They 
always pass some comments on you. … I am a taxi driver, people come into taxi 
and talk about everything, they discuss about everything and it happened so many 
times, for example they say ‘let’s get stuff from Pakis’. That is how they call us... I 
have learned a lot as being a taxi driver, because people come in and talk about 
everything… as if they are not in taxi and they aresitting at house… they do not 
think what they are talking about, sometimes they say some stuff [such as calling us 
as Paki] in front of me without realising that I am one of them… 
[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 28 years old] 
 
   This example, like many other examples in this capter, highlights the importance 
of the discourse, the Paki, in the marginalisation and stigmatisation of Muslim . In 
this discourse of prejudice, all Muslims, regardless of their real ethnic or racial 
backgrounds, are assigned the term Paki, (Brah 1996; Kose 1996; Franks 2000; 
Modood 2005; Moosavi 2014) which refers to a ‘inferiorised other’ (Brah 1996: 9). 
As According to Runnymede Trust’s definition, seeing Muslims as others and 
inferior within the discourse of the Paki, is a form of Islamophobia. Therefore, calling 
Muslims Paki in this study will be regarded as a form of cultural racism in general, 
and of Islamophobia in particular. It is important to note that many of the 
respondents, when they were asked to reflect on their experience of any kind of 
discrimination and racism, tended to describe their different experiences of prejudice 
and discrimination (such as racism and Islamophobia) using the term ‘racism’ rather 
than distinguishing between racism and Islamophobia. This was despite the fact that 
the analysis of participants’ responses showed that they experienced both racism and 
Islamophobia, and interestingly, many of their experiences of individual and personal 
discrimination related to Islamophobia because their r ligiosity and cultural 
characteristics - as a Muslim – were targeted and othered. One possible explanation 
for this could be the use of the term racism in the qu stion, which could have affected 
their responses. Another explanation could be the likelihood of unfamiliarity with the 
term Islamophobia (Kidd and Jamieson 2011) or limiting the use of the term to a 
more political and social aspect of Islamophobia. As I will discuss in Chapter 8 
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respondents explicitly used the term ‘Islamophobia’ when pointing to the distorted 
representation of Muslims in the media. In this and the next chapter, respondents’ 
experiences based on their nature and form will fall into different categories; racism, 
Islamophobia, or a combination of both, and also int different forms of individual or 
institutional, open or implicit.  
   Turning back to the above example, Hamid himself particularly highlighted his job, 
‘being a taxi driver,’ as both an important factor in his experience of Islamophobia 
and in having a better understanding of people’s attitudes because they tended to 
speak about many things in a taxi and perhaps consider it as a private space. This 
quote, thus, can imply the importance of another factor - specific jobs - in the daily 
experience of Islamophobia. Commenting on Hamid’s job, it is important to note that 
it was a form of self-employment that required daily contact and interaction with 
many people and was considered to be a low level occupation. Other participants also 
had jobs with similar characteristics; Ali, Sajjad, and Ghader. I will discuss each of 
these examples in turn. Ali was a second generation Muslim man and was born and 
brought up in Edinburgh. In terms of racial and religious visibility, he was from a 
Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. In terms of 
employment status, he was employed in a governmental institution but as his father 
had a shop, he also used to help him in the shop in his free time. Ali stated that his 
experiences of Islamophobia - mainly being called Paki - were divided into two 
stages, the first type of experience was related to his childhood and happened 
occasionally, but the second type of his experience was in relation to the time when 
he worked in his father’s shop where he experienced frequent racial abuse:   
Yes, I had some experiences from my young age. To be fair, up until age of 17-18 
there have been some incidents, where people said something. There were more in 
school environment … other than that most people were okay … then when I left 
school into the world, because my father owned a shop I used to help him in the 
shop. When you work in a shop, you get so many people in and out, then these 
people told you that you are different by being racist, by being whatever, swearing, 
calling you a Paki, by causing problems and stuff … . So, yes there were many 
racist abuses from the time I was working in my father’s shop.  




   Ali’s example, in parallel to Hamid’s case, also highlights the importance of 
specific jobs and workplaces - in this case a shop - where he experienced many 
Islamophobic incidents. This particular job also shared the same features of self-
employment, daily contact and interaction with many people, and a low level 
occupation. Like Hamid’s quote, Ali particularly highlights the importance of 
dealing with many people in experiencing Islamophobic a uses in this example. The 
next example in this category is Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man and 
has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. In terms of visibility, he was from Pakistan but 
he had no visible markers, such as having a beard, ven though he was a practicing 
Muslim and went to mosque every day. In terms of employment status, similar to 
Hamid and Ali, he was self-employed and had a shop. He too highlighted the 
importance of workplace and the issue of economic concerns: 
I have been here for 25 years, you always have argument; when you are in business, 
you always have some hard time customers or you see other narrow minded people. 
So, yes, I did experience racism and discrimination f r a number of times. For 
example, people tell us that ‘you robbed this country; before you came here we were 
okay, since you came …’. They do not blame any other people, they only blame 
Pakistanis. Any coloured people are being called as Paki; it does not matter where 
they really are from. They can be from Egypt, India, B ngladesh, Saudi Arabia; does 
not matter where they are from, they are all called Paki.  
[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 45 years old] 
 
   The next example is Ghader, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived 
in Glasgow for 49 years. In terms of visibility, like all participants in this category, 
he was from a Pakistani background with a visible cultural identity, wearing Shalwar 
Kamees. He was also a practicing Muslim with religious identity markers; having a 
long beard and going to the mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, he 
was a retired self-employed shop owner (the same featur s present in previous 
examples). He said that he experienced Islamophobia ‘everyday’: 
Yes I did experience racism everyday and it is still happening too, some people just 
come to your shop and call you Paki and sometimes people may see you on the street 
and say that word to you… 




   These last four quotes particularly highlighted he importance of self-employment 
(featured as low level occupation and in daily contact with many people) in the daily 
experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. To further investigate this 
association, I looked through all the examples (33 participants in Scottish major 
cities), even amongst the other categories of rare or no experience of Islamophobia. 
There were 6 other self-employed respondents (in other categories), of whom two 
cases (Arezo and Emran) had some experience of Islamophobia and the rest (Asghar, 
Akbar, Akram, Hassan) had no experience at all.  
   To test the proposed association in the first category (the relationship between 
specific socio-economic status and daily experience of Islamophobia) with these odd 
cases or outliers1 (Richie et. al. 2003), I begin with the latter; looking at each of these 
cases, the data suggests that these cases lacked one or both of the features highlighted 
in this category. For instance, in the first three xamples, participants’ self-
employment jobs were technical occupations (in the case of Asghar and Akbar) or a 
high professional job such as advisory occupation (n the case of Akram), and all 
these cases also had very few contacts (such as two or three times a week) with their 
customers. Turning to the case of Hassan, it is important to note that he was working 
in a ‘Halal shop’2 which was next to a central mosque. I would suggest that his main 
customers would be less likely to be Islamophobic as they would be Muslims or 
familiar with Muslim culture and religion, otherwise they would not attend such 
shops. Turning to the former examples, Arezo was also working in a ‘family 
business’ a fabric shop, which could be matched with the features of self-
employment mentioned above. Consistent with the catgory under study - daily 
experience of Islamophobia - she also had some experi nc  of Islamophobia, but 
however, her experiences were limited rather than routine. Commenting on the 
differences of this example, it can be suggested that perhaps because she was 
                                                                 
1
 This term refers to those cases that do not fit into a pattern or into an association developed by a 
researcher; in qualitative analysis, these cases ‘should never be ignored’(Richie et. al. 2003: 252). 
2 It is a store where the Halal meat (from animals slaughtered in Islamic way) and other items and 
goods mainly from Muslim majority countries such as South Asians, Middle Eastern, African and 
Arab countries.   
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working in a fabric shop, she was less likely to have lower class customers who 
would be more likely to be racist or Islamophobic (Ormston et. al. 2011). To an 
extent, that could be one influencing factor in thel experience of less Islamophobia 
in this case. Considering the last example, it is important to say that Emran was a 
self-employed car-dealer who, as he said in the interview, only had a few customers 
during a week and thus his case does not fit with the identified features of self-
employment in the first category. Thus, the unmatched nature of these self-employed 
examples’ (Arezo, Emran, Asghar, Akbar, Akram, Hassan) jobs as low level 
occupations that involve being in daily contact with many people does not undermine 
the importance of self-employment in the daily experience of Islamophobia in 
Scottish major cities. In other words, even though these examples were also self-
employed, having professional jobs and being in contact with either fewer or more 
fluent costumers could affect the level of their exp rience of Islamophobia compared 
to other self-employed respondents who had a low level occupation and were in daily 
contact with many people.  
   To discuss the implication of these examples in the first category (daily 
experiences and pervasive feelings of Islamophobia), the data suggests that issues of 
visibility (racial, cultural and/or religious), deprived residential areas, and self-
employment in low level occupations and in daily contact with many people could 
have significant importance in the daily experience of Islamophobia in Scottish 
major cities. Reflecting on the first factor, as there were many other participants with 
racial and/religious visibility while having no or rare experience of Islamophobia, it 
can be argued that although visibility can be considered to be a prerequisite for any 
Islamophobic harassment, it was more likely to be accompanied by the other factors 
pointed to above. In other words, these examples imply that those visible Muslims 
who also work in self-employed jobs with daily contact with many people or those 
visible Muslims who live in more deprived areas could be more likely to experience 
high rates of Islamophobia.  
 
Subtle and Everyday Islamophobia 
   The second category refers to participants who had some experiences of 
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Islamophobia and had a perception that Islamophobia does exist in Scotland but it is 
now more subtle (Essed 1991; 2002, Moosavi 2014) and implicit. Some participants 
particularly mentioned that their experience of Islamophobia dated back to their 
childhood or came from children, which was more verbal and explicit, but now, as 
adults and in interaction with other adults, they still feel that Islamophobia exists but 
is now more implicit and people are not so vocal. To illustrate the experiences and 
perceptions of Islamophobia in this category, I start with the example of Hakim, who 
was a second generation Muslim who was born and brought up in Edinburgh. He was 
from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with visible Muslim 
identity markers; having a beard and going to the mosque every day. In terms of 
socio-economic status, he had no occupation because he was a full time student. 
Hakim explained that he had some experiences of Islamophobia when he was 
younger and from other children in his primary school, but although the frequency of 
verbal abuse later decreased at high school, he could still however feel an implicit 
prejudice: 
When I was younger, I had some experiences of racism such as being called as 
Paki. So, it was like in school time and getting from other young people but when it 
comes to high school I would say it dies down, however, you can sometimes see 
that in people’s eyes. 
[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 20 years old] 
 
   The next example is Zahir, who was also a second ge eration Muslim man and has 
lived in Glasgow for 21 years. Like many other participants, he was from a Pakistani 
background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. His main experiences of 
Islamophobia have been either traced back to his childhood, or that which he has 
received even now from children, but he generally asserted that Islamophobia has 
declined. Zahir also felt that Islamophobia could have become a ‘more settled’ form 
of prejudice amongst adults that is not as visible and vocal as it is amongst children:  
Yes I did have some experiences of verbal abuse; growing up and occasionally even 
now. I cannot remember the last time; it has been a while ago but people passing on 
the street may say something [such as P ki or terrorist] to you. So, occasionally you 
may get some comment. Generally, I think it is lesser now; I do not know whether it 
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was through childhood and children who tend to tease or tend to do that to other 
people but as adults you do not get it as much or it can be more settled now.   
[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 39 years old] 
 
   Zahir pointed to a new form of prejudice against Muslims in this quote by 
highlighting his feeling of a more settled form of Islamophobia. In using the term 
‘settled,’ he meant that the new form of Islamophobia is not as open and visible as it 
was in the past, but is instead embedded in people’s attitudes and prejudices. This 
can be demonstrated by examples that highlight people’s looks and stares as 
indications of new Islamophobia. The next example is Nader, who was a second 
generation Muslim man who was born and brought up in Glasgow. In terms of 
visibility, he was from a Pakistani background with a beard and went to the mosque 
every day. He stated that his experience of Islamophobia, or ‘racism’ in his wording, 
went back to his younger age but has decreased in recent years. Nader, however, felt 
that Islamophobia could have turned into a more implicit form of prejudice:  
I think certainly I did have especially when I was younger; so yes I had some 
experiences of racism such as name calling. When you are younger, I have to say it 
has some negative [impacts]… so, I have to say yes we experienced racism when 
we were younger; I think in 1980s there was more racism but not in recent years. 
Either it improved or people are not as vocal or upf ont about it as in the past. 
[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 38 years old] 
 
   These quotes raise two significant points; first, a shift in the appearance of 
Islamophobia, and second, the importance of children and schools in the 
development of open Islamophobia. The first implication is supported by previous 
research by Moosavi (2014: 8) on ‘subtle Islamophobia’ whereby ‘Muslims are 
confronted by latent hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives without it being 
obvious.’ This new form of Islamophobia can also be explained by Essed’s (1991; 
2002) conception of everyday racism in which ‘socialised racist notions are 
integrated into everyday practices and thereby actualise and reinforce underlying 
racial and ethnic relations … and become familiar, repetitive and part of the normal 
routine in everyday life’ (1991: 145). As Essed (200 : 187) puts it, these ‘racial 
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practices and meaning belong to our familiar world [everyday life] and usually 
involve routine or repetitive practices. Therefore they can be expected and 
generalised for specific relations and situations.’ Adopting Essed’s (2002: 187) 
conception of everyday racism and Moosavi’s (2014) subtle Islamophobia to explain 
the above quotes (the examples of Nader, Hakim and Z hir), it can be said that these 
participants drew upon their previous experiences and their general knowledge of 
Islamophobia to see it as a ‘continuum’ (Essed 2002: 188) that is integrated into 
everyday practices, such as day-to-day interaction, and continues to discriminate and 
prejudice against Muslims. They particularly generalised their previous experiences 
of verbal and open Islamophobia to more implicit behaviours, such as different 
‘looks’ or ‘stares’ they encounter everyday, thus perceived them as covert 
Islamophobia. Such feeling of subtle Islamophobia (Moosavi 2014) was evident in 
all of the above cases in this category, particularly when they were talking about a 
new form of Islamophobia which, for example, was not ‘v cal or upfront as in the 
past’ (in the case of Nader). In the case of Hakim, he pointed to Islamophobic 
attitudes which ‘you can sometimes see in people’s eyes’ or which are ‘more settled 
now,’ meaning that it is embedded in people’s everyday practices (in the case of 
Zahir): 
… Now it is like you get some comments from people who are walking on the street 
or someone stares at you as you are passing on the street.
[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 39 years old] 
 
   To unpack and illustrate the perception of everyday Islamophobia, I discuss another 
example which can offer more insight to the understanding of everyday Islamophobia 
in Scotland. This example is Shakila, who was a second generation Muslim woman 
and was born and brought up in Glasgow. She had a white Scottish mother and an 
Iranian father, who died when Shakila was around 8 years-old, and so she was 
brought up by a white Scottish family, thus she considered herself to be a white-
Scottish person. Shakila converted to Islam 3 years ago and, before that, she 
considered herself to be a non-Muslim Scot. Her experiences and perceptions of 
Islamophobia are interesting because she can be seen as an ex-insider and as a 
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current outsider to majority Scots. Just like other examples in this category, Shakila 
had some experiences of Islamophobia in her younger a , mainly due to her father’s 
background, but after becoming a Muslim later on, her sense of Islamophobia has 
increased, especially when concerning the issue of the hijab: 
As a child, I did get some rubbish in school and even I was told ‘go back to 
Pakistan’ but actually my mum is from Scotland and o ly my dad was from Iran, so 
several things. … Even now, every time I am thinking that I am going to wear my 
scarf, I read something in the newspaper [e.g. a report on an Islamophobic incident 
or some Islamophobic articles] then I change my mind. I cannot do it. To be honest, 
what scares me a lot is getting abuse from people in the street, I believe this is 
because I probably would be one of the people who were abusing Muslims but I 
was not a terrible person, I was never a bad person but quite a bad teenager I can 
say. So, probably I would have been nasty to people and I do not want teenagers to 
be nasty to me now, I am scared because I know that they can do it because I have 
seen that and I have done that before. So, I do not wan  to feel and experience that. 
So, to me scarf is a big issue. When you put the scarf on your head you look like a 
different person to other people. For example, my views about Islam were like 
Muslims are terrorists and women are oppressed.  
[Second generation, Female, Glasgow, 30 years old] 
 
   Shakila is interesting because she draws on both Muslim and majority perspectives 
in her perception of everyday Islamophobia in Scotland. She had a fear that wearing 
a visible Muslim identity marker, hijab, would make h r a target for Islamophobic 
attacks; as she used to experience or see before she became a Muslim. This supports 
previous research by El-Nakla et. al. (2007), which suggested that Scottish Muslim 
women’s religious appearance -wearing a headscarf or face veil - was important in 
their experiences of abuse and discrimination. The importance of Shakila’s example 
lies in her ex-position as an insider to the majority, and her current position as an 
insider to Muslims as a minority group. Her peculiar position may enable her to 
understand and interpret better attitudes and behaviour of white Scots towards 
Muslims (including herself). This peculiar position can be explained by the 
conception of double consciousness first proposed by Du Bois (1969) and then 
developed by Essed (1991; 2002: 176), which reflected Blacks’ special capability to 
understand ‘racist ideas and interpretations of reality.’ Studying British converts’ 
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experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia, Moosavi (2014: 9) suggests that such 
understandings and interpretations of racism (and Islamophobia, as a form of racism, 
too) apply to other minorities too, especially Muslim converts, because they can 
‘hypothesise about the presence of prejudice and becom  skilled at detecting’ racism 
and ‘this is why the converts’ concern over Islamoph bia is understandable, because 
it is not based on empty sentiment but is rooted in intuition and insight.’ To this 
extent, Shakila’s interpretations and perception of the new Islamophobia as being 
more subtle and implicit could be highly significant. As indicted in the above quote, 
Shakila particularly highlighted the importance of wearing hijab, and thus becoming 
a visible Muslim, in her fear of becoming a target for Islamophobic attacks. This 
supports previous research by Franks (2000: 922-3), which suggested that racial 
abuse against white Muslims, as visualised by them wearing hijab, is a ‘kind of 
racism by proxy, but further, because of the identification of Islam with South Asian 
or Arab ethnicity, the white Muslims are perceived to be race-traitors by white 
supremacists.’ The importance of the hijab lies in its function as an Islamic symbol 
(Esposito 2011) that indicates women’s ‘Muslim identity.’ Shakila, thus, shows the 
significance of visibility in the experience of Islamophobia (which I discussed in the 
first category). Shakila’s example is also important si ce she did not have any actual 
experience of Islamophobia. Her fears relate to her pr vious beliefs and to times 
when she reveals her Muslim identity by wearing hijab. However, it is important to 
note that as I discussed and illustrated in the first category, even though the visibility 
(either racial or religious) was a prerequisite to Islamophobic harassment, it was 
unlikely to be the only factor in the experience of Islamophobia because other factors 
such as socio-economic issues and confronting intoxicated people also tended to 
influence the extent of experiences of Islamophobia. 
   This example also highlights the real consequences that arise from the perception 
of everyday and subtle Islamophobia. For instance, some of these respondents had a 
strong fear of Islamophobic attack against Muslim women wearing hijab. To 
illustrate this, I refer back to the example of Hakim; based upon his general 
knowledge of Islamophobia, he stated that as his sister  were wearing hijab, he 
always had this fear that one day they might be targe ed for a violent attack: 
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All my sisters are younger than me and I am slightly protective about them. To me 
there is always a fear of being attacked because of their hijab. If they wear a hijab, 
they may be attacked or if they wear burqa1, certainly the risk of being attacked will 
increase.  
[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 20 years old] 
 
   Shakila, thus, chose not to wear a hijab most of the time, and others chose not to 
grow beards or wear traditional clothes. In another example, Azadeh also pointed to 
the social implications of such fears and perceptions. Azadeh was a second 
generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. Azadeh was 
from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim who wore the hijab. She, 
herself, did not have any experience of Islamophobia but she knew a lot of Muslim 
women who stopped wearing hijab due to the fear of Islamophobia:   
I know a lot of women who fear to go out with their h jab on; they fear what people 
would say to them and how they would react to their ijab. This was because of 
Islamophobia and the media misrepresentations of Muslim women.  
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 42 years old] 
 
   These last three quotes (Shakila, Hakim and Azadeh) highlights two important 
issues; the social implications of the fear of Islamophobia, and the significance of the 
media in shaping participants’ general knowledge of Islamophobia. To start with the 
former, these quotes highlight that the perception and fear of everyday Islamophobia 
that is perceived as a continuum (Essed 2002; Kelly 1989) affects participants’ - 
especially Muslim women’s - everyday life (such as their way of dress and social 
integration) due to concerns for their safety and security in the society. For example, 
Hakim stated that he felt ‘protective’ about his siters who wear hijab, or in the case 
of Shakila who stated that she could not overcome her fear of wearing hijab when 
going out, and finally in the example of Azadeh who stated that many women do not 
‘go out with their hijab on.’ This finding supports Kelly’s (1989) concept of a 
                                                                 
1
 Generally, it is a form of Islamic hijab but particularly it refers to a ‘garment that covers the entir  
body’ (Esposito 2011: 233) of a Muslim woman. 
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continuum of violence. In her study of sexual violence, she argues that repeated 
experiences or fears can cause a ‘loss of security and safety’ that can affect women’s 
social integration. Turning to the second issue, thse examples particularly highlight 
the importance of media in influencing these participants’ general knowledge of 
Islamophobia. For example, in the case of Hakim, he especially highlights the issue 
of wearing burqa as an important factor in increasing the risk of violent attack 
against Muslim women. As this interview was carried out in July 2011, and later on 
in the interview, Hakim raised the issue of the possibility of the ban of burqas and 
hijabs in Scotland, his feeling and fear might have been affected by the ban on 
burqas in France in 2010 and the following widespread media and press debate on 
this ban in other European countries (Esposito 2011). Similarly, Shakila also 
highlighted the importance of media when she pointed to newspaper articles which 
made her too scared to wear a hijab. In the third example, Azadeh explicitly pointed 
to the importance of media in the creation of Islamophobia. Another fact to support 
this argument is that these participants’ actual experiences of Islamophobia were 
limited to verbal abuse, but however, their general knowledge of Islamophobia as 
influenced by media and some international events, was concerned with physical 
violence. This finding supports Essed’s (2002) argument that the media and 
newspaper articles can also be part of the process of everyday racism, even though 
they do not have any direct interaction with the victims [the role of media in the 
development of Islamophobia is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8]. 
   The second significant finding in this category was the importance of school and 
children in the development or demonstration of open Islamophobia (namely in the 
form of verbal abuse). In all of the above examples (Nader, Hakim, Zahir and 
Shakila as well as in examples of other categories such as Ali and Zainab), they 
particularly highlighted their experience of Islamoph bia during their childhood and 
school time. As I discussed earlier, one possible explanation for this could be the 
shift in the appearance of Islamophobia due to politica  correctness and governmental 
policies intended to promote cultural diversity, racial equality, and social inclusion 
(Penrose and Howard 2008; Ormston et. al. 2011). This can imply that in the past 
(participants’ childhood; almost a period of 15 to 30 years ago), there was more open 
and verbal Islamophobia and racism, but in recent times due to the increase of 
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awareness of racism, the number of racial and Islamophobic incidents has decreased. 
Other examples, however, pointed to recent incidents (at the time of interviewing in 
2011) in which participants were targeted and victimized by children or faced 
discrimination in a school environment. For example, in the case of Zahir, he 
mentioned that ‘occasionally, even now’ these incidents (getting verbal abuse from 
children) happen. In another example, Azadeh, who was a second generation 
practicing Muslim woman with hijab, also stated that she recently experienced an 
incident where some teenage girls in front of a school called her a terrorist: 
When I was going to high school to drop off my kids, when I was coming back a 
couple of teenagers, a couple of girls were standing there, as I walked passed she said 
have you got a bomb in your bag, and then I thought okay she is a teenager and just 
walked further, then she made a noise like a bomb explosion, and I turned and I 
looked at them and then just passed. 
[Second generation, Edinburgh, 42 year-old] 
 
   The next example is Kathryn, who was a second generation British born Muslim 
woman. She was of Pakistani background and was a less-practicing Muslim. Kathryn 
explained that recently some young children insulted h r kids through vandalism and 
racist graffiti:  
Some people, probably some kids from school, wrote on our door that; ‘Hamid [her 
son] is a ‘Paki’ and Saffyiah [her daughter] is a ‘B’ word’. I came upstairs and I was 
like shocked and told my husband you should go downstairs and wipe it. It was 
horrible; I don’t know how somebody can write that. Somebody called him a ‘Paki’ or 
whatever while he is only 11 years old. When he came home and saw that he got so 
upset.  
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 27 years old] 
                                                                                                                                                                          
   These quotes imply that children can be more vocal about the prejudiced and 
Islamophobic attitudes that they might have. The high rate of Islamophobic incidents 
at schools can be associated with group identities and peer pressure. Confirming 
these associations, however, requires further reseach on childhood discrimination 
and racism. In addition to the examples I provided h re, the Scottish Government 
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(2009) recognized the important role of schools in promoting or denying equality and 
launched 152 Islamophobia workshops in secondary schools across Scotland to 
tackle the growth of Islamophobia. More recently, the teachers union, NASUWT, 
(2014) also noted the ‘intensification of Islamophobia in recent years’ that has 
impacted ‘all pupils/students and staff in schools and colleges,’ and who have 
provided a published advisory report, Tackling Islamophobia: Advice for Schools 
and Colleges, to tackle the growth of Islamophobia in Scotland s in elsewhere in the 
UK. The experiences of my participants reinforce th need for such programmes and 
also highlight the importance of schools and children in the development of 
Islamophobia or in its opposition. 
   As well as visibility, another recurring theme in this category was being from the 
second generation. All participants in this category (Nader, Hakim, Zahir and 
Shakila) were second generation Muslims. Considering the importance of double 
consciousness (Du Bois 1969; Essed 2002) in the understanding of ‘racist ideas and 
interpretations of reality’ in everyday racism and Islamophobia, it can be asserted 
that being integrated into Scottish society economically, educationally, and socially 
could offer a better understanding of people’s attitudes and behaviour to second 
generation Muslims. Another important and peculiar theme in the experience of 
Islamophobia in this category was receiving Islamophobic abuse from normal/typical 
white Scottish people rather than only from drunks. Therefore, they tended to 
generalise the issue of Islamophobia as a typical problem that can be associated with 
all white Scots, while this was vice versa in the next category. In contrast to the first 
and second category in which the prevailing experience and perception of 
Islamophobia was reported, the other two categories point to very rare or no 
experience of Islamophobia. It is to these that I now turn. 
 
Rare Experience of Islamophobia 
   The third category is dedicated to those who experienced Islamophobia ‘rarely’ 
and felt that Islamophobia is not a serious issue in Scotland. These participants’ 
experiences of Islamophobia were mainly limited to tw or three instances of verbal 
abuse. These participants also had a perception that Islamophobia is not an issue in 
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Scotland and that what they have experienced is in exception to the whole country. I 
called this perception; Scotland free from Islamophobia. To illustrate these 
participants’ experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia, I begin with the example 
of Emran, who was a first generation Muslim man andhas lived in Glasgow for 11 
years. He was originally from Kenya and he was a practicing Muslim with a beard. 
In terms of socio-economic status, he was a self-employed car dealer. He highlighted 
that during 11 years of living in Glasgow, he has hd just a couple of experiences of 
Islamophobia, ‘racism’ in his words, which was caused by a ‘drunk’ person. He also 
highlighted that when the incident happened, another Scottish woman came and 
supported him and apologised for the incident:  
In almost 11 years that I have been here I had just a couple of incidents. In general, 
Scottish people are very friendly. You will get one or two from those who are drunk 
or junkies. Once I was in a mall with other two Muslim  who came from Saudi 
Arabia to visit me. One of them was wearing an Islamic hat, a drunk guy came and 
said ‘you should go back to your country’ or something like that. We did not say 
anything, but there was a lady; a normal lady; a nice Scottish lady, who came and 
said ‘do not listen to him, he is drunk’. She told to that guy ‘go away’ and she 
apologised on behalf. She even did not know that person and did not know us too. 
We told her that is fine… we know that this guy has lost his sense, so it is alright. 
We are Muslim and we believe that Islam is peace so we did not it mind it that 
much. So, generally people are good and even those who do not know you come 
and defend and support you if something happens which is great. 
[First generation, male, Glasgow, 39 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Emran highlighted his perception that the majority of Scottish people 
are ‘friendly’ and only some ‘drunks and junkies’ might be Islamophobic. Another 
interesting point in his quote is that he generalises his experience and concludes that 
‘generally’ Scottish people are ‘good’ (meaning here tolerant and respectful) and 
‘supportive’ (meaning here anti-Islamophobia and anti-racist). These processes of 
distinguishing and associating were also evident in other examples in this category. 
The next example is Shadi, who was a first generation Muslim woman and has lived 
in Aberdeen for 4 years. In terms of visibility, she was from Kenya and had a visible 
Muslim identity marker, wearing hijab. She was a full time student in the University 
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of Aberdeen. She stated that she only experienced on  incident in 4 years and that 
was by a person who was drunk: 
There is not so much but there is just some hatred in Scotland. I only had once and 
it was about 3 years ago; there was a drunken man and we were walking down the 
street with my sister and we were wearing Hijab andhe just said something like 
‘terrorists’ and walked away. We thought he is drunk a d he does not understand 
what he is saying. Other than that, I had no problem.  
[First generation, Female, Aberdeen, 25 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Shadi expressed her perception of there being less Islamophobia in 
Scotland even though she was living outside the central area where most Muslims 
are based. However, it can be discussed that as she was a full time student, she might 
mainly interact with educated people in an academic environment. As I already 
mentioned, analysis from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) showed that 
educated people were less likely to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011). Previous research by Hussain and Miller (2006: 
56) also found that to a significant degree (34%); ‘those without qualifications are 
more Islamophobic than graduates.’ The possibility of having unusual or special 
experiences resulting from being in the university all of the time or interacting with 
educated people was also highlighted by Khabir. He was a second generation 
Muslim man and has lived in Dundee for 5 years and in Aberdeen for 2 years. 
Khabir, who was a full time student in both cities, stated that his experience of no 
Islamophobia in Aberdeen may relate to his neighbourh od, which is near the 
university and has more educated people: 
When I was living in Dundee I was living in a rough neighbourhood. My 
neighbourhood was not as affluent and nice as other areas; so you tended to find 
more people who when see my mum with scarf started to call her something like 
terrorist or Paki. It happened very few times but the area where you live makes 
difference as well. Here in Aberdeen, I have only been living in the area which is 
near to my university and most of people are educated nd it is quite a nice area. I 
might not go to other areas where may differ from my place. I am also quite focused 
on my studies here so I have not seen any problem. So, maybe that is why Aberdeen 
to some extent had been more positive than Dundee but I think in general they are 
similar to be honest.  
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[Aberdeen, 23 year-old] 
 
   In this example, Khabir highlights that there is more discrimination and 
Islamophobia in deprived places (such as where he used to live in Dundee), while 
there is less discrimination and Islamophobia in affluent places with better educated 
dwellers (such as the neighbourhood he is living in now in Aberdeen). Therefore the 
example of Shadi and Khabir, in parallel to the example of Kathryn that was already 
discussed, implies the importance of education and place in Islamophobia. The 
theme of ‘Islamophobic drunks’ is also evident in the next example. Sanaz was a 
second generation Muslim woman and has lived in Edinburgh for 20 years. She was 
from a Pakistani background and she wore the hijab. S naz was a housewife but she 
was engaged in voluntary work. Commenting on her experience of Islamophobia in 
Edinburgh, Sanaz stated that she had only a few experiences which were caused by 
some people who were drunk:    
Two days ago we were driving up North Bridges and there were some men; they 
were 30 or 40 year-old; they have been drinking, we had the car and windows were 
down and they just said something to us. Normally here in Edinburgh, not in 
festival time when different people come to Edinburgh, you would not get many 
comments.  
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 41 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, similar to the quote of Emran, the processes of distinguishing 
between the majority of Scots and a few minorities (drunk), and associating 
Islamophobia with the latter is again evident. Sanaz highlights that in normal 
situations, there is no Islamophobia in Edinburgh, except for the festival time when 
many different people come to Edinburgh from different countries. This implies 
more abuse during the festival time. Another interesting point in her quote, which 
was absent in other examples in this category, is generalising her perception of no 
Islamophobia to Edinburgh, not to Scotland. This limited generalisation relates back 
to her previous daily experiences of Islamophobia in Wishaw, which was a small 
town near to Glasgow. The last example in the third category is Azim, who was a 
second generation Muslim man and has lived in Dundee for 20 years. He was 
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originally from Malawi and he was also a practicing Muslim with visible identity 
markers; having a beard and going to the mosque every day. He had a college degree 
and was employed. Azim stated that he experienced some incidents in Dundee but 
generally there was not that much discrimination in Scotland:  
Yes, I had some experiences. It is just about some people who are racist and hate 
you, say for example, if you are friends with somebody and he becomes angry and 
he starts to be racist against you, and calling you something but generally majority 
of people are good and there is not that much discrimination in Scotland. 
[Second generation, male, Dundee, 24 year-old] 
 
   In the above quote, Azim generalises his experiences and concludes that there is 
less discrimination in Scotland. However, his quote can also imply that anti-racist 
views are superficial in that even friends can become racist. Discussing the recurring 
themes in this category, the data suggests that all participants’ experiences were 
caused by some abnormal or exceptional people, mainly drunks. This supports 
previous research by Hussain and Miller (2006) that showed that there is less 
Islamophobia in Scotland than in England. These quotes also suggested that the 
participants themselves, through a process of distinguishing, were able to make a 
distinction between the majority Scots and the very small racist minority. Through 
another process of ascription, Islamophobia was ascribed to abnormal people, thus 
they felt there was no or less Islamophobia in Scotland (except for the example of 
Sanaz who only generalised less Islamophobia to Edinburgh). Therefore, the 
generalisation process in the third category, based on rare and exceptional 
experiences, led to the perception that the majority f Scots are respectful or anti-
Islamophobic., In contrast, this process in the second category, based upon 
participants’ prior experiences caused by normal Scots and general knowledge of 
Islamophobia, led to the perception that there can be a subtle and everyday form of 
Islamophobia in Scotland.  
   Another factor in highlighting these processes of distinction and ascription was 
experiencing supportive attitudes from other Scottish people which influenced the 
association of the majority of Scots as respectful or even anti-racism/anti-
Islamophobia. Such views were reinforced when, as in the case of Emran, a Scottish 
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woman supported him against someone speaking racist abu e. Receiving supportive 
behaviour from other Scottish people was also evident in the case of Ali (who was 
presented in the first category), who noted that some students once supported him 
when an Islamophobic incident happened during his school time. Ali, however, did 
not have the perception that normal Scots tend to be anti-Islamophobic because he 
had many experiences of Islamophobia in his father’s shop. Thus, the experience of 
supportive attitudes by other Scottish people only made a difference when such 
experiences were not countered by negative ones.  
   Reflecting on the importance of socio-economic fa tors that influenced these 
participants’ rare experience of Islamophobia, in co trast to the first category, no 
specific pattern or factor was identified. Despite th issue of racial or/and religious 
visibility that is common amongst all participants in this study, each of the 
participants in this category were from different social and economic background. 
However, it is important to note that those participants who were living in or near to 
universities suggested that living in such areas could have affected their rare 
experiences of Islamophobia. Additionally, the absence of the factors identified in 
the first category, namely living in a deprived area or being self-employed in a low 
level occupation in daily contact with many people, v rifies the importance of these 
factors in one’s daily experience of Islamophobia and the importance of the lack of 
them in one’s rare experience of Islamophobia. The importance of these factors and 
any other possible socio-economic factors will also be examined in the next two 
categories.  
 
No Experience of Islamophobia  
   The last category concerns those participants who had some feelings of 
Islamophobia while having no actual experience of it. All of these 13 participants 
who had no personal experience of Islamophobia, mentioned that they knew that 
Islamophobia, or ‘anti-Muslim racism’ in their wording, exists and that Muslims can 
easily be targeted for such incidents. One explanatio  for such feelings was in 
relation to their general knowledge and their awareness of experiences of 
Islamophobia had by relatives and/or friends. To illustrate this category, I start with 
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the example of Zahra, who was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in 
Edinburgh for 5 years. She was from a Pakistani background and a practicing 
Muslim who wore a hijab. She was a housewife but she was also active in a few 
voluntary groups involving Scottish Muslims and non-Muslims. She stated that 
despite having no experience of discrimination, sheis aware of its existence in 
society and she wants to make sure that her children and other Muslims also do not 
experience it:  
Even though I personally had not any experience of discrimination, I know that 
discrimination happens, I know that racism and hate crimes happen because I know 
people; actually I have some friends and family memb rs who looked different and 
behaved different from what is considered as British and were discriminated. So, I 
have always been aware of that and I am very consciu  of that because of my 
children who are growing up in this country. The fact that I had no experience, it 
means that I feel responsible to make sure that everybody else do not experience that 
… So, I am not complacent at all, I do understand that people have obstacles in their 
life just purely because maybe the way they speak or maybe the way they look or 
because they do not do the same things as people around them do they get 
discriminated. You have several opportunities which were closed to you just because 
you did not integrate enough… I was mixed with peopl  who are different in Scotland 
and I am an activist working with different groups…  
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 45 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Zahra particularly highlights the importance of mixing and 
assimilation in the experience of Islamophobia. She highlights that some of her 
friends and family members have faced discrimination just due to their different way 
of life, but she felt that as she is integrated into society and is active in many 
voluntary groups (such as Scotland Against Criminalising Communities, Scottish 
Palestinian Solidarity Campaign, United Against Fascism) involving Muslims and 
non-Muslims, she has not encountered any Islamophobia r any other form of 
discrimination. To this extent, she perceived her example to be an exception to the 
majority of Muslims who might be targeted for Islamophobia on the basis of their 
cultural or religious differences (lack of mixing, assimilation and integration). This 
perception of being an exception to other Muslims who may experience 
Islamophobia was also evident in some other examples in this category. Other 
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examples, such as Kathryn and Hamid from the first ca egory, however, 
problematised the association between assimilation and lack of experience of 
Islamophobia in Scotland. These two participants are less practicing Muslims and 
have also assimilated into Scottish society by changing their way of life and adopting 
some Scottish norms such as ‘going to the pub’ and ‘ dopting a British name and not 
wearing hijab.’ Despite such efforts, both respondents have had daily experiences of 
Islamophobia. 
   The next example is Khairallah, who was a second generation Muslim man who 
has lived in Aberdeen and Dundee for 7 years. In terms of visibility, he was from an 
Iraqi (his father was an Iraqi) and a Scottish (his mother was a Scottish white) 
background and, like the example of Shakila, he perceived his skin colour to be 
white rather than brown like other Iraqis. In terms of religious visibility, he did not 
have any specific markers such as a long beard or going to the mosque everyday 
despite being a practicing Muslim. In terms of socio-economic status, he was a full 
time student. In parallel to the example of Zahra, Khairallah also perceived himself 
to be an exception to the majority of Muslims because he looked like a white Scottish 
person, thus, he did not experience Islamophobia or any other form of 
discrimination: 
I had no experience of racism or discrimination because my appearance is quite white 
so from that sense if I was walking down the street no one would actually think that I 
am Iraqi or Pakistani or something like that. They would not think that….  
[Second generation, Male, Aberdeen, 23 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Khairallah highlights the importance of racial visibility in the 
experience of Islamophobia as he implicitly associates the experience of 
Islamophobia with visible Pakistani or Iraqi Muslims. He felt that as he resembled 
Scottish white people, he did not experience any incidents. The next example is 
Akram, who was a second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up 
in Dundee. In terms of visibility, she was from a Pkistani background and had 
brown skin colour, but in terms of religious visibility, she did not have any specific 
marker such as wearing a hijab. In terms of socio-eonomic status, she was a self-
employed advisor. Commenting on her experience of Islamophobia, Akram pointed 
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out that she does not wear a hijab and probably this is why she was not targeted by 
any Islamophobic incidents:  
No, I did not have any experience of discrimination or racism. Dundee is fine. I have 
been integrating with people here and we get on very w ll with one another. I was born 
in Dundee and lived all my life here and I did not have any problem; I think people 
accept me and see me as a part of the community. Bu I just need to mention that I do 
not wear Hijab. I do not know if that is part of the reason I did not experience 
Islamophobia because I know Muslim women who wear sc f they are possibly more 
targeted but I do not wear it. Personally, I did not have any problem but I think if you 
ask some of my friends they would have some experiences of being called Paki or 
something like that but again it is just because they wear scarf and hijab. But again I 
had not any problem, even my friend whom I know andmy family members, whom 
some of them do wear hijab, had no issue at all. So, as I said I had not any problem but 
I can imagine some people would have some. I think Dundee is very good; I think 
maybe there is problem in other cities but Dundee is very good; we do not have any 
problem… There is obviously a lot of larger community in Glasgow and Edinburgh. I 
think they suffer more prejudice than we do … I think n places where there is larger 
community of Muslims; we tend to speak together andI do not think they integrate 
with the Scottish people and they keep to themselve and they tend to separate 
themselves. I think that cause a bit friction as well; not integrating with the whole 
community and just keeping to themselves and having their own little groups…  
[Second generation, Female, Dundee, 43 year-old] 
 
   In this quote, Akram associated religious visibility and integration with her lack of 
experience of Islamophobia. In the first level of cmparison; comparing herself with 
other Muslim women, she associated her lack of experience of Islamophobia with her 
religious invisibility (not wearing hijab) as she had this perception that Muslim 
women with hijab could be targeted more by Islamophobia. In this sense, she 
considered herself to be an exception to typical Muslim women. This perception was 
highlighted more when she stated that ‘if you ask some of my friends they would 
have’ some experience of Islamophobia as they wear th  hijab. In the second level of 
comparison; comparing some of her family members and a friend who also wear a 
hijab with other typical Muslims living in other cities, she stated that some of her 
family members and one of her friends who also wears a hijab did not experience 
Islamophobia. She then concludes that perhaps Dundee is an exception to other 
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larger cities with more Muslims. In this sense, she associated the experience of 
Islamophobia with a larger number of Muslims and the possibility of a lack of 
integration in those communities. However it is important to note that the trend of 
living in a segregated or isolated area was absent in the Scottish context (Hussain and 
Miller 2006). The examples of the third category with fully integrated participants 
challenge this perception as they had some experienc s of Islamophobia. Akram had 
a perception that Muslims, particularly Muslim women with hijab, struggle with 
Islamophobia but as her self-experience did not support this perception, she 
perceived herself to be an exception to the typical experience of Islamophobia. 
Therefore, the experience of other participants in this study suggests that the 
experience of Islamophobia is more sophisticated than e rather simplistic views put 
forward in the parallel lives discourse. 
   Discussing the importance of socio-economic factors in the experience of 
Islamophobia in this category, the data suggests that t ese participants (Zahra, 
Khairallah and Akram) in all the above quotes highli ted the importance of racial 
and religious visibility and segregation in the exprience of Islamophobia. The 
importance of visibility was also highlighted in other categories; however, examples 
in other categories suggested that socio-economic factors were more significant to 
the experience of Islamophobia than visibility alone. Pointing to the importance of 
segregation and separation in the experience of Islamophobia was new in comparison 
to the issues raised in other categories. The actual socio-economic status of these 
participants also suggests that they were integrated into the society; they were all 
second generation Muslims and linguistically, education lly and socially integrated 
to Scottish society. For example, in terms of economic integration Akram stated that 
even though she was self-employed, she had a successful business in Dundee and all 
of her clients were from a white Scottish background. Khairallah was a full time 
postgraduate student who also developed a good friendship with many white Scottish 
people. Zahra was also active in many voluntary groups involving Muslims as well 
as non-Muslims. The easy association between separation nd discrimination, 
however, is problematised by the second category since all participants in this 
category were second generation and integrated to the economic, educational and 
social aspect of Scottish society; however, they experienced some Islamophobic 
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incidents and also had the perception that there is a new form of subtle Islamophobia 
in Scotland. Similarly, there were some well-integrated second generation Muslims 
in the first category such as Ali, Kasim and Kathryn but had many or daily 
experience of Islamophobia. As I noted already, the association between integration 
and lack of experience of Islamophobia is particularly challenged by the example of 
Kathryn, Hamid and Sanaz who stated that their assimilatory attempts (such as 
changing their names and way of dress) did not stop them experiencing  
Islamophobia. This may imply that there should be another factor/ other factors in 
addition to integration that influenced the lack of experience of Islamophobia in the 
fourth category.         
   To discuss any possible relationship between experience and perception of 
Islamophobia in this category, these quotes highlight the importance of the 
perception and feeling of Islamophobia. These participants, based on their perception 
(general knowledge) of Islamophobia, highlighted different issues (such as racial or 
religious visibility and integration) that influenced the experience of Islamophobia, 
even though they themselves lacked these social chara teristics. Consequently, they 
perceived themselves to be exceptions. This may imply the importance of 
perceptions of Islamophobia in shaping attitudes and behaviours as well as 
experience itself. As illustrated, these participants tended to discount their own (lack 
of) experiences of Islamophobia from the perception and general knowledge that 
they had about Islamophobia. In this sense, they differed significantly from other 
categories. In the first category, for instance, th perception of daily Islamophobia 
was based on participants’ frequent experiences of Islamophobia. In the third 
category, the perception of Scotland free from Islamophobia or less Islamophobia in 
Scotland was based on rare and exceptional experienc s of Islamophobia. Even 
though the perception of Islamophobia (the persistence of a subtle and everyday 
Islamophobia) in the second category was also influe ced by general knowledge of 
Islamophobia, actual prior experience was essential to the creation of the perception 
of everyday Islamophobia in Scotland. This is not to discredit or downplay the 
feelings of those in this category, but to highlight t e importance of perceptions to 




Types of Islamophobia 
   Respondents reported two types of Islamophobia: personal/individual and 
institutional Islamophobia. This chapter suggested hat the dominant form of 
Islamophobia in Scottish major cities was personal/i dividual Islamophobia. As seen 
above, the most dominant form of experiencing individual Islamophobia was verbal 
abuse. Hate speech and verbal abuse has been experienced by interviewees in 
different social places such as on the street, busines  premises, and schools. This 
finding supports previous research (Lambert and Githens 2010; Kidd and Jamieson 
2011) that suggested that streets were the most common place where anti-Muslim 
racism and discrimination takes place generally in the UK, and in particular in 
Scotland. Considering other forms of individual Islamophobia, none of the 
participants had any self-experience of violent attack in Scottish major cities and 
only a couple of respondents had friends who had experienced violent attacks. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, only Kathryn had any experience of Islamophobic 
graffiti. The experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities, however, was not 
only limited to individual racism but was also evident in private institutions, mainly 
in relation to employment discrimination. It is to this that I now turn. 
 
Employment Discrimination  
   I should say that this is not a systematic study of labour discrimination and what is 
important here is the perception of discrimination amongst these participants, rather 
than the legal and objective facts. The data suggests that there were some perceptions 
of employment discrimination in private institutions in which some respondents 
experienced or felt discrimination in the work place during applications for jobs or 
promotion. To illustrate this, I start with the example of Zainab who occasionally 
experienced verbal and open Islamophobia; however, sh  had stronger feelings about 
employment discrimination. Zainab was a second generation Muslim woman and 
was born and brought up in Edinburgh. In terms of visibility she was from a 
Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim but she did not wear hijab. She, 
however, had some visible items of ethnic and cultural identity; for example she 
wore Shalwar Kameez. She had a postgraduate degree from Edinburgh University 
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and, in terms of occupation, she stated that she had applied for many jobs but was 
unsuccessful and had started doing some voluntary wo k. Pointing to her experience 
of employment discrimination, Zainab particularly asserted that her racial 
background and cultural appearance might affect her job applications:  
 
I have applied for many jobs and I have not been that successful, it is difficult to get 
job straight away… but it is more difficult as a non-white to get job. … I think if 
you are wearing hijab you will be discriminated against … the outer signs of your 
religion [such as hijab] will be a base for your discr mination … because employer 
or people in the interview panel want to see somebody who is like them. If you do 
not have the white skin colour or you are not dressed in a way that they are dressed, 
then you are less likely to get the job. 
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 44 years old] 
 
   She felt that her racialised identity might be influencing her job applications. This 
echoes research by El-Nakla et. al. (2007) that suggests that Scottish Muslim 
women’s religious identity and appearance affects their employability. This 
perception of being discriminated against on the grounds of racial and cultural 
appearance was also evident amongst other participants. The next example is Kasim, 
who worked in a bank. Commenting on his experience of discrimination, he 
explained how he thought that his job promotion hadbeen affected a few times just 
due to his racial and ethnic background. He also stated that such discriminatory 
actions were very hard to bring to court because they are very hard to prove:   
Another kind of discrimination is economic discrimination where for example I 
have been stopped from going for promotion. I know it as because of firstly my 
name and secondly my colour... these are hidden discriminations. The law protects 
us, but we cannot prove it … If you are doing your job well, and you are doing it to 
the best of your ability and better than anybody else and you put yourself forward to 
a promotion and you are not considered compared to other people who are one less 
qualified and have less ability even though you proved it, and then they get the job, 
then does not that give you a reason to think that t ey are discriminating against 
you? Not only once, maybe three times for the same thing, then it can be a difficult 
issue to bring up with your superior. So, it puts your name in a situation where you 
have to consider whether to move from the job or stick with the job. So it is difficult 
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to quantify and prove it … I mean there are employment laws but you cannot prove 
it easily.  
[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 41 years old] 
 
   This quote, just like Zainab’s example, highlights ow even well integrated and 
successful Muslims’ experiences are filtered through the lens of discrimination. 
Additionally, consistent with his perception of subtle racism in individual 
Islamophobia, Kasim highlights his perception of hidden and indirect employment 
discrimination in this quote, which also implies the perception of subtle institutional 
Islamophobia. As Modood (2005: 41) describes it, indirect racism as defined by the 
British Race Relations Act (1976), is ‘a practice or policy [that] may make no 
reference to race or ethnic groups but may nevertheless disproportiona ely 
disadvantage some groups more than others.’ Aligned with this definition; Kasim felt 
that he was subject to indirect disadvantage due to his racial and religious 
characteristics. 
   Another example of the perception of indirect or subtle employment discrimination 
is the suggestion that racial priorities affect job applications. For example, some 
participants mentioned that there was a form of unwritten employment policy that 
prioritises ‘white-British’ applicants over ethnic minority people. To illustrate this, I 
begin with the example of Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man and has 
lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. As I mentioned alre dy, he was a practicing Muslim 
and was from a Pakistani background. He was self-employed and had many 
experiences of verbal abuse. Despite such daily experiences of individual 
Islamophobia, he had a more positive attitude towards Scottish public institutions 
such as the legal system. Sajjad, however, particularly differentiated between 
employment discrimination and other forms of institutional racism or Islamophobia 
by saying that: 
Job discrimination is different; I think British people get the first priorities and then 
if there is any more position, others will get it. 




   The next example is Saed, who was also a first generation Muslim man and has 
lived in Edinburgh for 5 years. He was also from a Pakistani background and was a 
practicing Muslim with a beard. Saed was employed an working in the security 
industry, and had a couple of experiences of verbal abuse. Commenting on his 
experiences of employment discrimination, he stated that he felt that there is a kind 
of racial categorisation and human hierarchy that is based on people’s racial and 
ethnic background: 
There are some criteria for job applications for example if you are a British born, 
you have the first right, then maybe if you are EU citizen or work permit holder you 
are the second, I mean there are a lot of categories, so many levels of everybody. To 
apply for a job everybody is not the same, it makes you feel that there is 
discrimination there. 
[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 31 years old] 
 
   These last two quotes highlight the perception of racial prioritisation in the job 
market. Giving preference to local people in filling jobs may not be considered racist 
but, Modood (2005: 41) argues, ‘if the local population happens to be predominantly 
white, the policy disadvantages minority groups. If there are no countervailing 
justifiable reasons in favour of the policy…then this constitutes indirect 
discrimination.’ All these quotes suggest a perception of employment discrimination, 
which could also imply the existence of such indirect discrimination against Muslims 
in some private institutions over job application ad promotions. Given the 
unsystematic examination of employment discrimination n this study, confirming 
these associations requires further research. Previous research (Ansari 2002; Ameli 
et. al. 2004; Change Institute 2009), however, noted the high rate of unemployment 
amongst Muslims and suggested a high rate of employent discrimination amongst 
Muslims across the UK. The analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) 
in assessing discriminatory attitudes within the context of employment indirectly 
supports my analysis by pointing to the persistence of exclusive attitudes. This 
survey showed that 31% of its respondents1 believed that ‘ethnic minorities take jobs 
                                                                 
1 With a sample size of 1366 respondents.  
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away from other people in Scotland’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 37). With more focus on 
Muslims and considering the importance of different contexts, this survey also 
showed that 15% of its respondents believed that ‘a Muslim is very/fairly unsuitable 
to be a primary school teacher’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 30). 
   Jacobson (1997a: 191) argues that scientific notio s of race have been largely 
discredited in the late twentieth century, hence support for a racial definition of and 
boundaries for ‘Britishness, is most commonly manifest in private rather than public 
discourse and in covert rather than overt statements of views.’ Both the UK 
Government’s and the Scottish Government’s specific policies to promote cultural 
diversity, racial equality, and social inclusion (Penrose and Howard 2008; Ormston 
et al 2011) such as legislating equality Acts - The Race Relations Acts generally in 
the UK, and the launching of different programmes such as One Scotland Many 
Cultures in particular in Scotland - can also be effective in raising public awareness 
of racism. As the TNS System 3 (2005; 2006) evaluation of the Scottish 
Government’s anti-racism and multicultural programmes showed, there was an 
increase in the amount of campaign materials and thus in the awareness of racism. 
However, it could be suggested that such awareness of racism and its legal 
consequences could just play a part in changing the form and appearance of 
Islamophobia - turning that to a subtle and indirect form of Islamophobia - rather 
than eliminating it, at least in the private sector. That argument is particularly 
supported by the analysis of Scottish Attitudes Survey (2010). This survey suggests 
‘no significant change in discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims [in all contexts on 
question; personal relationship, employment, and cultural diversity] since 2006, 
which thus remain somewhat more prevalent than theyw re in 2003’ (Ormston et. 
al. 2011: 72). 
   Considering other forms of institutional Islamoph bia or racism, such as Crown 
Office and police racism, none of the participants i  Scottish major cities, even those 
who had daily experiences of individual Islamophobia, mentioned any experience of 
institutional Islamophobia. Interestingly some participants, even some of those who 
had experiences/perceptions of employment discriminatio , pointed to the contrary; 
they showed a general satisfaction with Scottish major institutions such as the legal 
system, police services, and the Scottish Government, especially pointing to Alex 
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Salmond’s1 positive position on the issue of diversity in general and in particular 
regarding Muslims. To illustrate this, I begin with t eir satisfaction with the legal 
system. Saed was among those participants who had only rare experiences of 
Islamophobia and a perception that there is employment discrimination, mainly 
racial/ethnic prioritising, in Scotland. Commenting on the experience of other 
institutional Islamophobia, he pointed to the importance of equality in the Scottish 
law that can protect ethnic/faith minority groups against racism and discrimination: 
Law wise there are some certain rules that make sur that other minority groups can 
keep themselves safe but when it comes to a person wh  got some authority but he 
is a racist person, he would be unwilling to follow the law, but unfortunately he 
know how to cheat the law as well. Like what I said about employment 
discrimination and human hierarchy in employing ethnic minorities and Muslims.  
[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 31 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Saed also highlights the importance of individuals within institutions 
who discriminate against people due to their racist or Islamophobic attitudes. Such 
attitudes, which may turn into behaviours and actions, exist despite the institution’s 
anti-racist policies. The next example is Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim 
man who has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. Sajjad, like Saed, had strong feelings 
about employment discrimination against Muslims, however he felt more positive 
about other Scottish institutions, particularly theScottish legal system:   
I have been in court a lot of times like as a witness but never had any problem. 
Everybody is equal in the court Pakistani or Christian or British or Hindus. 
[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, years 49 old] 
 
   In both above examples, participants especially differentiated between employment 
discrimination and any other institutional Islamophbia and particularly highlighted 
the significance of racial, ethnic, and religious equality in the Scottish law and the 
legal system. Such equality can be associated with the legislation of the Race 
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Relations Acts, which has been implemented across the UK. In contrast, other 
examples particularly highlight the importance of the Scottish context; their 
satisfaction with police services and the Scottish Government. Starting with the 
former, some participants highlighted their satisfaction with police services, 
especially about developing their relationship with Muslim communities. To 
illustrate this, I start with the example of Azadeh, who was a second generation 
Muslim woman and has lived in Edinburgh for 30 years. She was very positive about 
the police:   
The point that police occasionally come to mosques and Muslim community centres 
is very positive and important. You can ask your question and get more information 
about your rights and to know that you are protected in this country. This can help 
Muslims and communities to build a trust relationship with police which is very 
important in the functioning of these communities. It is also important in a sense that 
it gives you confidence to feel that you are safe and secure and if anything happens 
you will be protected. 
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 42 year-old] 
 
   Significantly here, the police were seen to be proactive in visiting mosques and 
engaging with Muslims. The next example is Zainab, who was a second generation 
Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. As I mentioned earlier, 
she has some experience and perception of employment discrimination in Scotland 
but she had more positive attitudes towards police forces and the Scottish law:  
I think Edinburgh and Lothian and Borders Police1 have done a lot of good work to 
make the Muslim community feel that they are safe, in other parts of the country it is 
not like that. That depends on the hierarchy. People that are making the laws and the 
senior police manager within the police or within the various institutions, how they 
value other communities and whether they value the div rsity or not [is a different 
story...]. 
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 44 year-old] 
 
   By pointing to the importance of local/geographical differences in this quote, 
Zainab highlights the fact that despite the law andpolicies in one place as well as 
even the senior officer - for example in a local police force - have a more 
                                                                 
1 The Lothian Borders Police became a part of ‘Police S otland’ recently in 2013 (McEwen 2013). 
 
172 
multicultural attitude, there are some individuals within these institutions, as Saed 
mentioned, who do not value cultural and racial diversity. This implies the 
significance of individual Islamophobia and also of geographical differences in 
experiences of Islamophobia. I discussed the former in the last section and illustrated 
that some participants particularly pointed to a new form of Islamophobia, the subtle 
and everyday (Essed 1991; 2002; Moosavi 2014), which can stigmatise and ‘other’ 
Muslims without being vocal or apparent. I will discuss the latter in the next chapter. 
   The last aspect of some participants’ general satisfaction with Scottish institutions 
is the Scottish Government, which relates more to the Scottish context rather than the 
British context. More specifically, some participants pointed to the SNP 
government’s more welcoming approaches towards cultural diversity, especially 
towards Muslims, and its effort to promote equality in Scotland. To illustrate this, I 
begin with the example of Nader, who was a second ge eration Muslim man and was 
born and brought up in Glasgow. He was from a Pakist ni background and a 
practicing Muslim. He was employed and had a post-graduate degree. He was among 
those participants who had some experience of Islamophobia and felt that there was 
an implicit and covert prejudice against Muslims. Commenting on the Scottish 
Government’s policies towards Muslims, Nader differentiated between the British 
government and the Scottish Government:     
I have to say that they are better than the most of the British ones; I think they are not 
bad actually; they are trying to do something [good f r ethnic minorities]. I do not 
know whether it is for gaining more votes, like what most of politicians do, or it is 
for a greater good. I think they have got some interesting things to put on the society, 
they are trying to promote the better understanding of Muslims and other minorities 
and certainly I have more confidence on the SNP than e Westminster government. 
So, certainly the Westminster government is going backward in terms of promoting 
the relationship between minorities from 1980s and 1990s up to 2011 that perhaps 
since September 11 they just totally gone in reverse and so if you see people go more 
alienated and non-educated, I would say one of the main reasons for that is the 
government policy. And they are pushing people further and further into the corners 
and I do not have any doubt about that. 




   In this quote, Nader highlights how the British government’s policies lead to the 
isolation of Muslims and implies that following differing multi-cultural policies of 
the Scottish Government resulted in more integration. These feelings and perceptions 
about the Scottish Government could have some bearing on the issue of national 
identity because it strengthens the affiliation with Scottishness rather than Britishness 
[this is discussed in Chapter five in more detail]. Indeed, Zahir, who was also a 
second generation Muslim man and had some experienc of Islamophobia, stated 
that the Scottish Government’s nationalism also includes Scottish-Muslim identity. t 
Zahir, who was employed and had an undergraduate degr e, also asserted that he was 
proud to have a Scottish-Muslim identity:  
I think the Scottish Government has been generally ver good and they recognise that 
part of Scottish identity is the Scottish Muslims. … I am quite proud to be a Scottish 
Muslim and I am happy to be here and enjoy staying here … 
[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 39 year-old] 
 
   Zahir highlights the importance of the political and national recognition of Muslim 
identity in this quote as a reason to advocate and approve the Scottish Government, 
which also had some bearing on his sense of national dentity. The importance of 
such political and institutional recognition and resp ct was also evident in other 
examples. Zainab for example, had some experiences of individual and employment 
discrimination in Scotland, but distinguished the SNP from the conservative party: 
The SNP is a socialist party … and is a much more div rse and much more open 
party than the conservative party, for example. For the conservatives, if you are a 
Muslim and you have lots of money and you are a hardwo king person then they will 
accept you. If you are an ordinary person strugglin to pay your bills then they are 
interested in you, but it does not matter you are Muslim or Christian or atheist, as 
long as you are standing on your feet you will be accepted by conservatives. For the 
socialist parties they are about common person so they will do what they can for you 
regardless of your ethnic or social background. 
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 44 years old] 
 
   Some other participants, mentioned Alex Salmond, the then Scottish First Minister, 
more specifically as a person who had a better understanding of diversity and 
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equality. Hassan was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Dundee for 28 
years. Hassan was from a Pakistani background and ws a self-employed shopkeeper 
and had no experience of Islamophobia. Distinguishing the Scottish Government 
from the British one, he said that:  
The Scottish Government is a bit softer than the actual British government. I would 
say Scottish politicians have a better relationship with Muslim community here and 
Alex Salmond is a good example of that.  
[First generation, Male, Dundee, 37 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Hassan highlights the importance of building a positive and 
supportive relationship with Muslim communities as n example of good policy. 
That indicated the institutional and political recognition of Muslims. The next 
example is Rafiqah, who was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in 
Edinburgh for 28 years. Rafiqah was from a Pakistan b ckground and a practicing 
Muslim woman who wore the hijab. She was unemployed but she was working as 
part of many Muslim women’s groups and organisations. She has had no experience 
of Islamophobia but knew some Muslims who had. She mentioned Salmond’s 
welcoming approach to Muslims and Muslim groups, such as Beyond The Veil, as an 
indication of his respect and promotion of cultural diversity, which can be a solution 
that will lead to the elimination of discrimination: 
I think we can meet up with Alex Salmond any time w ant. He is really good and 
he has very well understanding of our different minority communities, all minority 
communities. He is very welcoming to minorities and Muslims. If I want to meet him 
tomorrow in the parliament, he would not say no, which is good. One of the Beyond 
The Veil went there and he was very nice and very welcoming. That is what we need, 
are you welcoming to the minority groups and he is. I think that he understands that 
there is a bit of discrimination and there is a way of overcoming it. 
[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 36 years old] 
 
   One implication of all the above quotes is the dmonstrated importance of 
promoting equality and respecting cultural diversity in making a general satisfaction 
with, and to some extent admiration for, Scottish major institutions. This is despite 
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the fact that some of these participants have had some experiences of individual 
Islamophobia and employment discrimination. Their general satisfaction despite 
experiencing f Islamophobia also implies the importance of institutional and political 
recognition of Muslims, which was felt by many participants in Scottish major cities. 
It was highlighted by some participants (in the case of Saed and Zainab) that there 
might be some individuals who may violate the general policies but are able to 
differentiate between individual and institutional Is amophobia. I will argue in the 
later chapters that this institutional and political recognition of Muslims can also 
have important effects on Muslims’ national identity and integration.   
   Another implication of general satisfaction with Scottish major institutions, 
especially the Scottish Government, could be the success of the Scottish 
government’s institutionally-led anti-racism campaign (Clayton 2005; Penrose and 
Howard 2008) in the elimination of public institutional racism and Islamophobia. 
However, as I discussed earlier, the problem of employment discrimination in private 
institutions is a matter of debate as there was a strong feeling about it among many of 
the respondents. Employment discrimination might seem to be related to economic 
concerns and economic recession rather than social fa tors. However, my research’s 
findings of subtle Islamophobia (mainly reported by the second category), in 
studying individual racism suggest the significance of political and social factors, 
such as media representation, international events, a d Islamophobia. Additionally, 
the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) suggested that ‘despite the recession, 
concerns about identity [49% agreed with if more Muslims came here, Scotland 
would lose its identity (ibid: 15)] remain potentially a more important source of 
discriminatory attitudes than concerns about the economic consequences of 
immigration [31%]’ (Ormston et al 2011: 78). To the extent that Muslims are the 
most visible and the largest black and Asian minority group (Scottish Government 
2005b), it can be argued that employment discriminatio  against Muslims can have a 





   Whilst my sample was small, the qualitative nature of the data allows me to 
suggest that even though there was little experience of Islamophobia in Scottish 
major cities, the experience of verbal abuse was more prevalent and serious, 
especially amongst Muslims with lower socio-economic status and/or residing in 
deprived areas. This can imply the importance of individual and social aspects in the 
role and impact of Islamophobia. In contrast to the individual and social level of 
Islamophobia, many respondents showed a general satisfaction with Scottish public 
institutions such as government law and the police. This in turn implies the 
importance of the political and institutional recognition of Muslims, which can have 
some bearing on Muslims’ national identity (as discussed in Chapter 5) and 
institutional and political integration (which is discussed in Chapter 9). Less 
Islamophobia along with this political and institutonal recognition of Muslims can 
be associated with the absence of Islamophobia in the agenda of Scottish 
nationalism, while its counterpart in England fuelled Islamophobia (Hussain and 
Miller 2006). The analysis of those with experience of Islamophobia, however, 
suggests that Muslims’ identity and visibility, espcially racial and religious 
signifiers such as skin colour and having a beard or hijab, were crucial to the 
experience of Islamophobia. This can be explained by the racialisation process of 
Muslims in Islamophobic discourse (CBMI 2004; Modoo 2005; Meer and Noorani 
2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). As well as the importance 
of Muslims’ identity and visibility (either racial or religious), some social and 
economic factors were particularly important in the daily experience of 
Islamophobia. These factors included living in deprived areas and self-employment 
in low level occupations that involve daily contact wi h many people. This matches 
with the results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) that showed that those 
living in more deprived areas of Scotland and those with lower levels of educational 
attainment were more likely to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011). As well as the daily experience of Islamophobia 
that was more open and influenced by socio-economic factors, there were some 
experiences and perceptions of subtle Islamophobia that referred to more covert 
prejudice, and were mainly influenced by media and international events revolving 
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around Muslims and Islamophobia. Daily experiences of Islamophobia and 
perceptions of subtle Islamophobia can affect Muslims’ integration in Scotland, 
which is discussed in Chapter 8.  
   The findings of this chapter also suggest that deprived areas and Muslims’ socio-
economic status are more important factors than the density of Muslim population 
per se. Furthermore, less or no experience of Islamophobia in cities such as Dundee 
and Aberdeen with a smaller Muslim population - theformer with 3,875 and the 
latter with 4,293 people (National Record of Scotland 2013) as compared to cities 
like Edinburgh and Glasgow - can challenge the importance of the low density of 
Muslim populations in increasing Islamophobia. These issues are examined in the 
next chapter by studying Muslims’ experience of Islamophobia in Scottish towns, 
where they form less than one per cent of the local population. 
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Chapter 7: Islamophobia in Scottish Towns and Small Cities 
 
Introduction  
   In the last chapter, Muslims’ experiences and feelings of Islamophobia in Scottish 
major cities were detailed and discussed. In this capter, I focus on Scottish towns 
and small cities. Several researchers suggest that e nic minority people, including 
Muslims, are at greater risk of racism in rural and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 
2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Masud 2005; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 
2012). One possible explanation for this is that the low density of ethnic minority 
residents in such areas means that there is less community and police protection (de 
Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). This chapter 
discusses the importance of the low or high density of Muslim communities in 
experiencing Islamophobia by studying Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in 
Scottish towns and small cities, and then comparing this with those in Scottish major 
cities. To this end, 10 interviews were carried out in Scottish towns and small cities 
(Falkirk, Stirling, Dunfermline, and East Kilbride) where the number of Muslim 
residents was less than one per cent of the local population in each place. It is 
important to note that whilst the sample size is small, the rich qualitative interviews 
can offer deeper insight into Muslims who live in such areas.  
   This chapter first details and discusses different xperiences of Islamophobia 
among Muslims in Scottish towns and small cities. In parallel to Scottish major 
cities, the experiences in this chapter cover a spectrum of Islamophobia ranging from 
daily experience all the way to having no experience. This chapter will chart the key 
differences that relate to each participant and then compare individual and 





Complexity of Experiences and Feelings  
  Almost all of the participants1 (9 out of 10) in Scottish towns and small cities had 
some experience of Islamophobia. More specifically, three respondents had daily 
experiences or perceptions of Islamophobia whereas six other respondents only 
experienced Islamophobia rarely or occasionally. There was also one participant who 
had no self-experience of Islamophobia, but he was aware of his mother’s 
experiences. Given the small sample and the qualitative method used in this research, 
these figures cannot support any definitive associati n; however, they are able to 
suggest two different types of experience. In what follows, I discuss the importance 
of different factors in each of these experiences in turn. 
 
Daily Experiences and Pervasive Feelings of Islamophobia 
   To unpack the complexity of experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in 
Scottish small towns, I start with those who had daily experiences and pervasive 
feelings of Islamophobia. Three respondents fit into this category; Ehsan, Tariq, and 
Adil who were all from Falkirk. The first example is Ehsan, who was a first 
generation Muslim man who has lived in Falkirk for 12 years. He was of Pakistani 
background and was a less-practicing Muslim who did not have a beard and did not 
go to the mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, he was a self-
employed shop keeper. Ehsan stated that he had manyexperiences of Islamophobia 
in Falkirk:   
Firstly they pick up your colour and when you say I am Muslim they say bad things to 
you as a Muslim and when you say I am from Pakistan th t is the third bad thing…so, I 
did have many experiences of racism… I used to go out night times but I do not go that 
much out [pub] anymore; it was only a few years agothat I experienced some incidents 
and a physical attack. Since then I never go out anymore because I fear to go out… I 
know what is happening there anyway; for example whenever there is a fight or 
anything first of all they chose us to swear at. … It is not only about drunk people even 
sometimes ordinary people come to the shop and say bad things [such as Paki]. Most of 
the educated people are fine but maybe there is something inside them which they 
                                                                 
1 10 Muslim participants (from Dunfermline, Stirling, Falkirk and East Kilbride) had been recruited 
from rural and less-diverse areas.  
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cannot show it but they are nice to us and we are nice to them as well. But mostly they 
[racist people] are from deprived areas and they say th t you take our jobs and if you 
were not here we could have job. … Sometimes you can feel that they do not treat you 
as the same as others. I have been working here for years; I bought this shop from a 
local person [indigenous Scot]; when he was here, he was happy with the sale but when 
I take over the sale dropped. … I know that you cannot say that by 100%, but I feel the 
differences…  
[Falkirk, 42 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Ehsan highlights the high frequency and intense nature of his 
experiences and perception of Islamophobia, particularly when he asserted that he 
did not ‘feel safe to go out’ at night. Such fear of Islamophobic attack, which was 
also evident in the second category of Scottish major cities, could significantly 
impact on the integration of these Muslims [this will be discussed in the next 
chapter]. In this quote, he also highlighted several key issues that influenced his 
frequent experience and perception of Islamophobia such as the importance of 
visibility, drunks and alcohol, deprived people, and specific jobs – all of which I now 
deal with in turn. Starting with the first issue, Ehsan highlighted the importance of 
racial visibility (skin colour) when he stated that he has often been called Paki at the 
first look - most commonly due to his skin colour. This was consistent with the 
example of other less-practicing Muslims (namely Kathryn and Hamid) who 
experienced racism mainly on the basis of their racial attribution (skin colour) in 
Scottish major cities. However, it is important to n te that these participants have 
also suffered Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism. This was highlighted by the 
example of Ehsan, where he said that when he reveals his Muslim identity, he 
receives even more abuse. This shows that some Muslims experience discrimination 
on the grounds of both racial and religious/cultural characteristics. This reflects 
Modood’s (2005: 7) argument that Asians, including predominantly Muslims, ‘suffer 
a double racism.’ 
   As highlighted during the analysis of Scottish major cities, visibility was unlikely 
to be the only factor that influences the experience of Islamophobia. In parallel with 
such findings, this quote can also imply that Ehsan’s main experiences of 
Islamophobia were confined to his workplace and around pubs and bars or from 
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drunks and from deprived people. Ehsan, in the second part of his quote, stated that 
he used to go to pubs where he experienced some incidents (including a physical 
attack). Since then, he has stopped going out at nights because he has not felt safe 
enough to go out. Other experiences took place in his s op where for example, 
people come and call him a Paki. This implies t firstly that his experience of 
Islamophobia was limited to specific locations. Secondly, such experience of intense 
(physical attack) and pervasive incidents had a severe impact on his integration 
because he stopped going to pubs and feared going out at night. In other words, even 
when some less-practicing or non-practicing Muslims are willing to try to integrate, 
they may find obstacles in the way of their integration. Another distinctive issue 
highlighted here was the experience of physical attack by Ehsan, which was not 
reported in major cities but further research is required to find out whether this is a 
wider pattern or not due to the limited sample presented here. If it is a pattern, this 
might be associated with the lack of police protection in Scottish small towns where 
some respondents also highlighted police discriminatio  (I discuss this issue later 
under ‘institutional Islamophobia’). 
   Another highlighted issue in this quote was receiving Islamophobic abuse, mostly 
from impoverished people who live in deprived areas. This is consistent with the 
findings of my first category from Scottish major cities. The next highlighted factor 
in this quote is the importance of specific types of j bs in experiencing 
Islamophobia. As mentioned, some people mostly from deprived areas come to his 
shop and make Islamophobic comments. Ehsan was a self-employed shopkeeper and 
was in daily contact with many people. This echoes findings in the previous chapter 
that suggested the importance of self-employment in low level occupations and of 
being in daily contact with many people for daily exp riences of Islamophobia.  
   As Ehsan had experience of living in Glasgow andFalkirk, he made an interesting 
comparison between discrimination in these areas. He had a perception that there is 
less discrimination in larger areas due to the larger population of ethnic minority 
people and increased community support: 
I was living in Glasgow before coming here. Glasgow was a bit different because there 
is more community and it is not that bad in Glasgow t  be honest because there is more 
community and more coloured people. So Glasgow was not that bad but here in Falkirk, 
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there is not that many people that is why here is more discrimination. In Glasgow you 
can go with your own friends and you feel secure because you are in two or three people 
and when you are together they do not say anything to you and even when I am by 
myself and I am going to a pub or club they do not feel or they do treat me like as I am 
doing something bad. 
[Falkirk, 42 years old] 
 
   This quote particularly associated less or no experience of Islamophobia in 
Glasgow to the settlement of a large number of Muslims in the large cities. However, 
as noted in the last chapter, there were some Muslims living in larger cities who still 
experienced Islamophobia on a daily basis. The datasuggests that socio-economic 
and educational factors are more important than community size in the appearance of 
Islamophobia. Thus, Ehsan’s lack of experience of Islamophobia in Glasgow can be 
associated with other issues such as his job. Ehsan was not a self-employed 
shopkeeper when he was living in Glasgow, and none of the respondents in larger 
cities reported the importance of drinking establishments in their experiences of 
Islamophobia. The importance of specific workplaces, drinking establishments, 
drunks, and deprived people was also highlighted by the next example. Tariq was a 
first generation Muslim man who has lived in Falkirk for 7 years. Like Ehsan, he was 
of Pakistani background but, unlike Ehsan, he was a practicing Muslim with a long 
beard and went to the local mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, in 
parallel to Ehsan, he was also a self-employed shopkeeper. Tariq stated that he 
usually experienced verbal abuse [such as being called Paki or terrorist] from drunks 
and people who live in deprived areas: 
Yes, I had experiences of discrimination and racism and it is normal and common here. 
For example, when people are drunk; when they are in group and they are staying 
outside of the pub and they know that they have got only their own people inside the 
pub if I just pass the pub they will call me a P ki. … Some other people come to my 
shop and give me a weird look and then start to talk to me in a rude way or ask silly 
question about terrorism. …some of them are from coun il areas. In day time people 
are busy with their life. If you want to go outside into particular places [pubs and bars] 
especially in night time, you know that you will get trouble especially with my beard. 
You better not go outside. … A few years ago, when I was working in Glasgow I was 
no like this [a practicing Muslim with long beard]; I was just a normal person and I 
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used to wear nice dress and during the day no one said anything to me… but now [in 
Falkirk] that I build my identity as a Muslim; a proper Muslim [having long beard and 
wearing Pakistani dress] if I walk down the street, p ople who do not know me would 
look at me and understand who I am because I have got a new visible identity. Now 
people come to the shop and ask me silly questions about Islam and terrorism. Now it 
is a whole different life. 
[Falkirk, 28 years old] 
 
   Firstly in this quote, Tariq highlighted the importance of his religious identity as 
visualised by his long beard in his almost daily experience of Islamophobia. In 
contrast to the example of Ehsan who was a less-practicing and invisible Muslim, 
Tariq reported that his religious identity was a reson for abuse (such as being called 
a terrorist and a Paki). This reinforces the importance of religious visib lity in 
Islamophobic incidents. Previous research (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; 
Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) likewise associated having isibility as a Muslim with 
experiencing Islamophobia. In parallel to the example of Ehsan and the findings of 
the last chapter, the example of Tariq also highlighted the importance of his 
workplace, drinking establishments, drunks, and depriv d people in the experience of 
Islamophobia. This was highlighted in the above quote when Tariq reported that his 
experiences took place in his self-employed shop and involved mostly people from 
deprived areas. This aligns with the finding of thefirst category in Scottish major 
cities, which suggested the importance of self-employment in low level occupations 
in daily experiences of Islamophobia. Tariq stated that some of his experiences of 
Islamophobia happened around drinking establishments a d that some of them 
happened in his shop, which were caused mainly by drunks or deprived people 
respectively. The experience of Islamophobia caused by runks is consistent with the 
example of Ehsan and also other examples especially in the third category from the 
Scottish major cities. The casual Islamophobia in ad around drinking 
establishments, however, was not reported at all in the major cities. The last point 
that was highlighted by Tariq was the importance of deprivation when he pointed to 
‘people from council areas.’ This was also consistent with the example of Ehsan and 
the findings of the first category from Scottish major cities.  
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   The next example is Adil, who had a perception of a subtle and everyday 
Islamophobia (Moosavi 2014) while only having had rre experiences. Adil was a 
second generation Muslim man and was born and brought p in Falkirk. He was 
from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a long beard. In 
terms of socio-economic status, he was employed and h d an undergraduate degree. 
He stated that he only experienced once verbal abuse; however, he always suffered 
from more covert Islamophobia, especially in his workplace:  
Generally, you feel racism and discrimination all the time to be honest. You feel 
discriminated one way or another, it is not open as such but it is indirectly there. 
Openly, I had once in my life [being called as Paki] but generally when you go to 
your office and interact with different people and do your business and everything 
discrimination is there. You know it is there but you cannot do anything about it. … 
[For example in my workplace] They would talk to me but again having beard; this 
makes difference as well, because they do not want to know you if you got beard 
because they think you are backdated and stuff like that. … I think it is better in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh because Muslims there interact with the local people [the 
majority]. In such places there are more foreign people and thus the indigenous Scots 
are a bit more open or are more welcoming towards Mu lims. In big cities such as 
Edinburgh and Glasgow or any other big cities like Manchester or Birmingham where 
the indigenous people interact with Muslims or where there are a lot of Muslims there, 
there is more tolerance. Then, generally you have the more welcoming approach in 
big cities and they [indigenous people] treat you better.  
[Male, Falkirk, 24 year-old] 
 
   This quote highlights the perception of subtle Islamophobia (Moosavi 2014), 
which was understood through feelings of social avoidance due to religious 
appearance (namely having a long beard). Adil stated that he always felt a subtle 
Islamophobia in everyday interactions with indigenous Scottish people, who tended 
to be less welcoming towards him. This was consistent with the second category 
from Scottish major cities in which such subtle Islamophobia was understood as 
majority Scots’ ‘different looks’ or ‘stares’ to Muslims. Adil’s socio-economic status 
was also similar to those in the second category from Scottish major cities; second 
generation, employed, and educated. However, in contrast to the second category 
from Scottish major cities in which the general knowledge of Islamophobia being 
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influenced by media was important in the development of perceptions of everyday 
and subtle Islamophobia (see Essed 1991; 2002), such general knowledge was absent 
in the example of Adil. It might be due to this issue that his generalisation of 
everyday and subtle Islamophobia was limited to Falkirk rather than to the whole of 
Scotland, whereas the generalisation of the second ategory from Scottish major 
cities was at the national level (Scotland). All the above examples reported their 
perceptions of prevailing Islamophobia, even though their experiences were limited 
to one physical attack (in the case of Ehsan) and several cases of verbal abuse over 
many years. This problematises the association between smaller areas and 
Islamophobia. The rest of the examples who had very ra e or no experiences of 
Islamophobia also questioned the importance of smaller reas in the prevalence of 
Islamophobia. In the next section, I discuss other examples with rare or no 
experience of Islamophobia.  
 
Rare or No Experience of Islamophobia  
   Other respondents [7] had different experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia 
compared to the above. To unpack the experiences of these respondents, I start with 
the example of Ahad, who was a self-employed second ge eration Muslim man and 
has lived in Falkirk for 34 years. He was from a Pakist ni background and was a 
practicing Muslim with a beard. Unlike previous participants from Falkirk, he did not 
experience or feel more Islamophobia in Falkirk: 
I did not have that many experience of racism or discrimination; maybe once in the 
blue moon. In this age if they do not like you, they would just pass you and do not say 
hello to you. You probably can find one or two per c nt racist people. …So, I do not 
have any problem here. 
[Male, Falkirk, 41 year-old] 
 
   In parallel to the third category from Scottish major cities, this quote attributes rare 
experiences of Islamophobia to a small minority of racist people. I need to mention 
that even though Ahad was self-employed, he had rare experiences of Islamophobia. 
Unlike other self-employed participants, however, Ahad’s rare experiences of 
Islamophobia can be explained by the fact that he was a skilled worker and was not 
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in daily contact with many people, thus his job didnot match the criteria outlined in 
the other cases. This example and the examples of other self-employed respondents 
in Scottish major cities with rare experiences of Islamophobia (such as Arezo, Akram 
and Asghar) show that self-employment is not a homogen us category. The next 
example is Samad, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in 
Dunfermline for 30 years. He was from Pakistan and was a practicing Muslim with a 
beard. He was a retired professional and had an undergraduate degree. He 
highlighted that only a minority of people are racist in Dunfermline: 
I had some experiences of discrimination and racism. … In some areas you get more 
and in some areas you get less. For example you may go to areas with decent and 
educated people and you also may go to areas with people who always drink and read 
the Sun newspaper and have got a certain idea and they are not even good to each 
other to they are not going to be good to you, they would find any excuse to swear at 
me so you should be careful which areas you go. For example, if I go out at 12pm 
o’clock and some drunks come out of the pubs, they would not be friendly towards 
me. Or in some other places even in the day time hav these attitudes. …. Most people 
do not make bad comments as long as you obey the law and you are a decent person, 
the majority people would be decent back to you. There are only small minority 
people who are ignorant and abuse others; they may also abuse their own people. 
They are mostly working class people or the non-working class who are not working 
they say that you came here and took our jobs but that is a small minority. For 
example, when the 9/11 happened or the Iraq war happened and the British soldiers 
have been killed, I have got certain people who were swearing and shouting at me. So, 
in those times, those people became more aggressive but the majority people are 
good.  
[Dunfermline, 51 years old] 
 
   Consistent with the third category of Scottish major cities, Samad associated 
Islamophobia to a minority in this quote. That was al o in line with the earlier 
examples of Ehsan and Tariq. Samad also highlighted th  importance of drinking 
establishments (where Muslims may face drunks) and deprived areas (where 
uneducated, unemployed, and working class people are likely to live). The 
importance of the latter issue was also evident in the first category from Scottish 
major cities, but the significance of the former issue was not reported in the cities. 
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Even though the importance of drunks was also highlighted in Scottish major cities, 
there was no mention of drinking establishments such as pubs and bars. Samad also 
highlighted the importance of the years after 9/11 in the rise of Islamophobic 
incidents in this quote, which were the most aggressiv  incidents he had ever 
experienced. In this quote, Samad dismisses racists as marginal bigots who are 
aggressive not only to Muslims, but also to all peopl  including majority Scots. One 
possible explanation for this is his professional job and his sense of belonging to 
Scotland and Scottish identity. The next example is Asif, who was a first generation 
Muslim man who has lived in Dunfermline for 12 years. He was of Pakistani 
background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. Asif was employed and 
worked in the NHS as a nurse. Whilst having had some experiences of Islamophobia, 
he stated that majority of people are fine: 
Recently someone smashed my car and long time ago again somebody smashed my 
car. The first incident actually happened four years go when I move to a new place; 
the first welcome was smashing my car. I phone the police but law is very soft in this 
country and nothing happened and eventually they came to me and said that they are 
under age and we will keep eye on them. Furthermore, in another incident my tenant 
who was from Scottish army made some damage to my property. … Other than these 
incidents I did not have any problem in these years and other people were fine. 
[Male, Dunfermline, 39 years old] 
 
   This quote highlights Asif’s perception of racially motivated incidents. He speaks 
of racially motivated damage to property, which was not reported in Scottish major 
cities. There was only one respondent (Kathryn) whoreported the graffiti on her door 
that insulted her children (the importance of physical attack in Scottish towns is 
discussed in the next section). It is important to note that the experiences of Ahad, 
Samad, and Asif were not much different from the prvious category. However the 
difference was in their accounts of their experiences. In these examples, respondents 
dismissed Islamophobia as bigotry (in the case of Ahad and Samad) or associate it 
with a minority of people (in the case of Asif). As mentioned in the case of Samad, 
this can be associated with their socio-economic ties with Scotland being stronger 
than those in the previous category. For example, Ahad was a skilled self-employed 
worker who has completed his Standard Grade in Scotland, Samad was a retired 
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professional and has completed his undergraduate degree in Scotland, and finally, 
Asif was a NHS nurse. These ties can have some bearing on their strong sense of 
belonging to Scotland or Britain. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, all three 
respondents had some sense of belonging to Scottish r British identity as part of 
their multiple or hybrid identities on the basis of residential markers. Such positive 
attitudes and interpretation of Islamophobic incidents were also evident in the third 
category from Scottish major cities, where such incidents were interpreted as casual 
or unusual and associated with drunks. This positive attitude and interpretation was 
also evident in the next example. Hareb, who was from Stirling - which is a city1 in 
Central Scotland - has lived in Stirling for 22 years and was a first generation 
Muslim man. He was a practicing Muslim with a beard. He was self-employed and 
worked in a take away restaurant. He stated that his experience of Islamophobia has 
been limited to rare experiences of verbal abuse:  
It happened a couple of times in the shop; they were drunk and they were swearing at 
us but police helped. In 15 years only two incidents happened. … There are more 
problems in areas where too many Muslims are living. Where I am living, I am the 
only Muslim and the rest are white people but I do not have any problem. We are 
working very hard and everybody here is busy; working, studying, and taking care of 
their family. So, there is no problem… 
[Stirling, 45 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Hareb talks about a couple of incidents in his shop that were caused 
by some drunks. In line with the examples of Ehsan and Tariq, he points to the 
importance of specific self-employed jobs (namely in a low level occupation and in 
daily contact with many people) in experiences of Islamophobia. However, the 
example of Hareb suggests that such employment does not always result in frequent 
experiences of Islamophobia. Hareb’s rare experience of Islamophobia, rather, might 
be associated with the specific situation of Stirling, where other participants (Nadim 
and Hashim) also reported rare or no experience of Islamophobia. Consistent with 
                                                                 
1
 As the numbers of Muslims living in all other cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) 
were at least more than one percent of the local population, the city of Stirling, with 0.6 percent, is 




the main theme in the third category from Scottish major cities, this quote also links 
Islamophobia to drunkenness. Hareb also stated that he felt that Islamophobia exists 
in larger cities with more Muslims rather than smaller cities with a smaller number 
of Muslims. However it is important to note that this perception of more 
Islamophobia in larger cities runs counter to the perceptions of Ehsan and Adil, who 
earlier stated that they feel that larger cities with greater diversity are in general more 
tolerant. As noted in the last chapter, my qualitative data suggests that the 
importance of socio-economic factors may be more significant than the density of 
the Muslim population in experiencing Islamophobia.    
   The next example is Nadim, who has lived in Stirling for 20 years and, like Hareb, 
had rare experiences of Islamophobia. He was a first generation Muslim man and of 
Pakistani background. He was a practicing Muslim with a beard. He was a retired 
self-employed restaurant owner, who pointed to a change in people’s attitudes and 
behaviour since the Race Relation Acts: 
Some people did have problem with us; they sometimes call us Paki or said ‘go back 
home’… but here police control everything. In the past people did have problem; 
parliament passed a law, for example in 1990s we had a doctor, doctor Ahmed from 
Karachi, he was working for 15 years in Stirling hospital and applied to buy a house 
here but they refused his application because he was not white. These things went to 
the Parliament and they passed a law; now everybody is equal here. There is no 
racism here; if anybody is racist to you, you can cll the police right away. 
[Stirling, 73 years old] 
 
   Nadim here highlights the importance of equality Acts and police protection in 
Stirling. In parallel to the example of Hareb, Nadim was also self-employed in a low 
level occupation and in daily contact with many peol . Both respondents had rare 
experiences of Islamophobia, while other respondents with the same socio-economic 
status in Scottish major cities had daily experiences of Islamophobia. However it is 
important to note that these two respondents were restaurant owners who probably 
have a different clientele to those who run small shops. It can be argued that most 
people who go to these restaurants may already be tolerant or familiar with other 
cultures as they intend to eat the food that these r pondents would serve. This is in 
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contrast to other self-employed jobs such as running a grocery shop or being a taxi 
driver that serve a far greater range of people. This implies that in the former, some 
degree of toleration and respect is expected, however in the latter, all kinds of 
attitudes and behaviour can be expected. This also implies that the category of low 
level self-employment with daily contact with many people can be diverse. 
   As I mentioned above, Hareb’s and Nadim’s rare experiences of Islamophobia may 
also reflect the particular situation in Stirling. One of the issues that might make the 
example of Stirling stand out is the adequate police protection in Stirling because 
once an incident happened; both respondents highlighted their satisfaction with the 
police service. By contrast, in other towns such as F lkirk and Dunfermline, there 
was less or no satisfaction with police services (this is discussed later in this chapter 
in the section about ‘Institutional Islamophobia’). The next example is Saleh, who 
has lived in East Kilbride for 28 years. Saleh was a first generation Muslim man and 
was of Egyptian background. He was a practicing Muslim with a beard and was a 
retired university lecturer. He said: 
It happens occasionally, sometimes you can prove it, sometimes you cannot prove it, 
sometimes you ignore it and sometimes you respond t it… 
[East Kilbride, 65 years old] 
 
   One important point in this example is the fact that even though Saleh was living in 
a small town where there was a small number of Muslims to such an extent that there 
was not even one mosque or an Islamic centre, Saleh h d similar experiences to those 
who were living in towns like Falkirk and Dunfermline with longer established 
Muslim communities. This example again questions the significance of population 
density for the occurrence of Islamophobic experiences. Findings from the other 
categories support this argument. For example, the S irling council area, which has 
the lowest number of Muslims - 578 people constituting 0.6 per cent of the local 
population (National Record of Scotland 2013) - was reported (by Hareb, Nadim and 
Hashim) to be less Islamophobic. However the Falkirk council area, which has the 
largest number of Muslims - 1,415 people constituting 0.9 per cent of the local 
population (National Record of Scotland 2013) - was reported in contrast (by Ehsan, 
Tariq and Adil) to be more Islamophobic. One significant factor highlighted in these 
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towns and cities was police protection; respondents from Stirling had more 
satisfaction with the police forces whereas respondents from Falkirk and 
Dunfermline had lower satisfaction with the police forces, especially with the local 
officers. However, given the small sample size, making any solid association 
requires further research. 
   The last example is Hashim, who had no experience of Islamophobia at all and thus 
had a perception that there is no Islamophobia in his local area. Hashim was a second 
generation Muslim man and was born and brought up in Stirling. He was 17 years 
old, a student, and also employed. He stated that he is treated the same as others and 
that there is no Islamophobia in Stirling:  
I did not have any experience of racism or discrimination in Stirling. People here just 
treat me as well as everyone else; I have some quit good friends here, they are all 
British people… [but] I think in bigger areas where a large Muslim community lives 
situation would be different… for example, Muslims probably in Glasgow or maybe 
in Dundee may face more discrimination and racism. So it might be different just in 
large areas but Stirling is a quite small city so it is all right.  
[Stirling, 17 year-old] 
 
   This example lends support to the previous finding that the small size of a Muslim 
community in itself cannot be a significant factor. Consistent with other examples in 
the third category, Hashim’s generalisation of no Islamophobia was limited to his 
local area rather than to the whole of Scotland. Unlike the fourth category from 
Scottish major cities in which participants perceived themselves to be exceptions to 
the majority of Muslims due to their invisibility or integration, Hashim and other 
examples from the third category associated either no or less Islamophobia to their 
local areas. Thus, they had this perception that all other Muslims living in those 
towns have the same experience of less Islamophobia. Interestingly, they all felt that 
Islamophobia would be higher in areas with a large number of Muslims such as 
Glasgow, Edinburgh, or Dundee. This was despite the perception of those in the first 
and second categories of Scottish small towns (such as Ehsan, Tariq and Adil), who 
tended to think that there is less Islamophobia in such areas. My research thus 
suggests that merely the size of a Muslim community is not a significant factor in the 
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rate of Islamophobia because different range of experiences was reported in both 
cities and towns. 
 
Different Range of Islamophobia: Verbal and Physical Abuse 
   In parallel with Scottish major cities, respondets in Scottish towns and small cities 
reported two types of Islamophobia: individual and i stitutional Islamophobia. As I 
presented above, verbal abuse, such as being called Paki, was the most common 
form of individual Islamophobia in Scottish towns. This finding supports previous 
studies by de Lima (2001) and Plastow (2010), which showed that verbal abuse was 
the most common form of reported racism in Scottish rural areas. Verbal abuse took 
place in different locations, such as on the street and at business premises. The streets 
were considered to be the most common place where vrbal abuse was directed 
against Muslims. However while the importance of deprived areas was highlighted in 
Scottish major cities, the significance of drinking establishments was also 
emphasised in Scottish towns. The next common location where verbal abuse was 
experienced was at business premises such as local shops and take-away restaurants. 
This was evident in the examples of Ehsan, Tariq, Hareb, and Nazir. This finding 
supports previous research by Plastow (2010: 202), which revealed that business 
premises, with 67% of all police recorded incidents i  2007, were the most common 
location for racist incidents directed against visible ethnic minority group members 
in rural areas.  
   Unlike Scottish major cities where no physical abuse was reported (except a report 
of a graffiti on the door in the case of Kathryn which was caused by some children), 
experiences of physical attack and damage to property was reported in Scottish 
towns. This was mainly reported in Falkirk and Dunfermline; for example Ehsan, 
who was a shop keeper in Falkirk, had some experiences of physical attack. In 
another example, Asif, who was a nurse in Dunfermline, stated that his car was 
smashed two times and that his tenant once damaged his property. These examples 
support findings from previous research (Plastow 2010: 199), which revealed 
violence and damage to property to be the second and the third most common forms 
of reported racism (19.48% former and 10.38% latter) against visible ethnic 
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minorities in Scottish rural areas. It also supports findings that ‘relatively isolated 
and small Muslim communities are often at increased risk of anti-Muslim violence 
and abuse’ (Lambert and Githens 2010: 35). One possible explanation for such 
physical attacks in Scottish towns rather than Scottish major cities could be 
inadequate police protection in such areas. This waexplicitly mentioned in the 
examples of Ehsan, Samad, and Arif, who all asserted th ir dissatisfaction with 
police services at the local level (this is illustrated later in this chapter in 
‘Institutional Islamophobia’).  
   Physical abuse and violence can have serious implications for victims’ lives such 
as the perception of ‘loss of security and safety’ that can affect their integration 
(Kelly 1989: 195). This was particularly highlighted in the examples of Ehsan, Tariq, 
and Samad, who explicitly mentioned that they did not go out at night and especially 
not near to drinking establishments (Muslims’ integration is particularly discussed in 
the next chapter). Further to Individual Islamophobia, there was a perception of 
employment discrimination and police racism, which an be categorised under 
institutional Islamophobia in Scottish towns. It is o this that I now turn. 
 
Institutional Islamophobia; Employment and Police Discrimination  
   As noted earlier, this is not a systematic study of institutional Islamophobia, but it 
does present respondents’ perception of such Islamophobia in Scottish towns. The 
data suggests that there were some perceptions of employment discrimination in 
Scottish towns. Some participants particularly highlighted their feelings of covert 
and implicit discrimination in job application and promotion processes. Asif’s 
account highlights these issues:   
Sometimes there is problem in employment section because if the local [indigenous] 
people are available, they get the job even though they are less experienced. 
Sometimes they were preferred only because they are Scottish. Recently I experienced 
this; there was a post and I applied for that but I did not get it and it was disappointing 
because I was more capable to do that job than the ot r person who got the job 
eventually. I do not know what the bottom line reason for refusing me was but it made 
me really angry that time … it is against the law but in practice the first priority is for 
the local people. 
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[Dunfermline, 39 years old] 
 
   This quote highlights the perception of racial prioritisation in the job market, 
which was also reported in Scottish major cities. In another example, Adil, who 
used to work in a bank branch in Falkirk, felt that there was indirect discrimination 
in his everyday interaction with his colleagues:  
Generally, when you go to your office and interact with different people and do your 
business and everything discrimination is there. You know it is there but you cannot 
do anything about it. … [For example in my workplace] They would talk to me but 
again having beard; this makes difference as well, b cause they do not want to know 
you if you got beard because they think you are backd ted and stuff like that. 
[Falkirk, 24 year-old] 
 
   As I discussed earlier, Adil had a perception of everyday Islamophobia that 
affected all aspects of his life. In this quote, he particularly highlights the social 
aspect of discrimination in his workplace. He felt that his colleagues avoid 
socialising with him due to his Muslim identity and appearance. This can have 
important implication for his integration (which is discussed in the next chapters). 
The next example is Saleh, who has lived in East Kilbride and had rare experiences 
of Islamophobia. Saleh asserted that there is institutional racism in Scotland which 
discriminates against people of certain skin colour and faith by pointing to 
employment discrimination:  
You should make a distinction between abuse and insult in the street and institutional 
racism. We normally ignore the first one because it is not based on any fact or any real 
identification, but when you feel that there is discrimination in an institution or 
organisation this hurts and you feel that it is very bad… That exists because we feel 
that and there are some people from certain colour and certain faith who are not 
treated as the same as others. … Institutional racism or discrimination affects your 
whole life and your family's life as well. For example, it could affect your application 
for a job or your promotion process. But if anyone discriminates against you in street 
you can defend yourself as long as it does not leadto violence and if it leads to 
violence you can take your case to the court and law will support you. … The 
institutional racism not only affects people’s life but also it affects the whole country 
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as well, because maybe some institutions due to racism employ less qualified people 
instead of well qualified. 
[East Kilbride, 65 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Saleh particularly highlights the importance of institutional racism 
over individual racism. As Saleh was a representative of a social and political 
Muslim organisation in Scotland, his perception of institutional racism and 
Islamophobia draws on his contact with other Muslim rather than his personal 
experiences. However, other respondents also pointed to the importance of 
institutional Islamophobia in Scottish towns. Even though this study presents and 
highlights Muslims’ feelings and perceptions rather than doing a systematic 
examination of their experiences, these perceptions map onto de Lima’s (2001) work, 
which suggests the existence of a wide range of employ ent discrimination (such as 
difficulties accessing work despite having relevant qualifications, racial victimisation 
in the workplace, being ignored for promotion prospects, difficulties finding jobs 
outside the ethnic minority sector etc.) against ethnic minority people in Scottish 
rural areas. Perception of employment discrimination in Scottish towns was 
consistent with the findings in Scottish major cities that highlighted Muslims’ 
concerns over employment discrimination. 
   Some participants in Scottish towns reported less satisfaction with police services. 
The data suggests that there was some dissatisfaction with local police attitudes and 
services in some particular towns such as Falkirk and Dunfermline. There was a 
perception of police discrimination in these towns. Such dissatisfaction was 
especially attributed to the local police officers who were in direct contact with 
people. For example, Ehsan, who has lived in Falkirk and has had daily experiences 
of Islamophobia, expressed that his call for help was ignored in two incidents by 
local police officers:  
Here in two incidents I called police; once for attempted break in [burglary] to the 
shop and once for breaking my shop’s windows. They did not come for any of these 
calls … higher level police officers are okay but when you are dealing with lower 
level officers there are some problem … my wife used to work for the police and she 
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was part of the police; she told me that the high ranking officers, who are not coming 
to the street, do not know what is really happening in the street. 
[Falkirk, 42 years old] 
 
   In this quote, Ehsan particularly highlights discr mination by local police officers. 
He felt that the local police’s lack of response to his calls was a form of 
discrimination. This may imply that at the higher lvels of policy making, there can 
be supportive Acts, but that there is a problem with implementing these laws and 
policies in practice, especially at the local levels. In another example, Samad, who 
has lived in Dunfermline and has had rare experiences of Islamophobia, pointed to 
this dichotomy between policies and practices at the local level: 
The government itself is very supportive; after 9/11 they with some police officers 
came to the mosque and they said if you have any problem, we are here to help you. 
We want you to live in peace; we do not want you to be attacked. So, the government 
is very good … but there are some racist police forces especially in local and frontline 
levels who many not believe in such policies.  
[Dunfermline, 51 years old] 
 
   As I mentioned, Samad had no experience of police d scrimination, however he 
had a perception that there are some police officers who might be Islamophobic or 
racist. This perception might draw on his knowledge of others’ experiences such as 
his friend Asif’s1. Asif had two experiences of dealing with police officers and was 
dissatisfied with their services. For example, he explained that in one incident where 
his car window was smashed, police offers told him that it was done by some 
teenagers who were under age and nothing can be done except ‘keeping an eye on 
them.’ In his second experience, in which a retired army soldier who was his tenant 
damaged some of his property, after arresting the tenant and interviewing him, he 
was released without any charge because in a strange d doubtful way, police did 
not inform him about his right to consult with a lawyer before interviewing him:   
                                                                 
1 Both participants were from one mosque and they knw each other. 
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Police arrest him but a month later I received a latter which said sorry to disappoint 
you but he had a legal right to consult with a lawyer before we interview him which 
he did not have because we interviewed him first so we cannot do not anything about 
it; so that was a waste of time. It was very surprising and strange that when police 
called him, they have provided everything there lika studio with lights and recorders 
and everything but they did not know that he has right to consult a lawyer before 
police interviewing.  
[Dunfermline, 39 years old] 
 
   These quotes imply dissatisfaction with police services in Falkirk and Dunfermline 
amongst some Muslims. It is, however, important to note that in all the above 
incidents, the police was active (for example in locating the culprits, cautioning the 
youngsters and questioning the tenant) but they were p ceived by Asif as inadequate 
and discriminatory. These actions, however, may be regarded by some others as 
taking the necessary steps and thus not not discriminatory at all. Therefore, 
associating these perceptions with police discriminatio  requires further research. 
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with police services also plays an important part in the 
perception of Islamophobia. Those respondents who were dissatisfied with the police 
had stronger feelings about Islamophobia (such as Ehsan and Asif), whereas those 
who were more satisfied with the police services (such as Hareb, Nadim and 
Hashim) felt that Islamophobia was not a problem in their local areas. The 
importance of police protection was explicitly emphasised in the examples of Hareb 
and Nadim, who highlighted the key role of the ‘police’s help’ in their rare 
experience of Islamophobia. This can imply the importance of police protection in 
the experience and perception of Islamophobia, but given the size of my sample, 
more research on this is needed. 
  
Conclusion 
   In discussing and comparing the result of the findings in both Scottish cities and 
towns, the data suggests that the size of a Muslim co munity was not a key factor in 
the experience of Islamophobia because in both cities and towns, a different range of 
experiences were reported in both high and low density Muslim areas. Thus it can be 
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concluded that size is not necessarily correlated to Islamophobia. In contrast to the 
claimed importance of Muslim population density, the data suggests the importance 
of socio-economic factors in the experience of Islamophobia. Social and economic 
factors such as living in deprived areas, drunken pople, and self-employment in low 
level occupations with daily contact with many peopl  were identified, but it is 
important to note that the data also suggested that self-employment is not a 
homogenous category. Further to the importance of these factors, the importance of 
drinking establishment areas was specifically highlighted in Scottish towns and small 
cities. Even though in Scottish cities, the issue of drunks was highlighted, there was 
no mention of the areas near to pubs and bars. In Scottish towns by contrast, there 
was a common fear of being present in such areas becaus  it would result in verbal 
abuse. The importance of drinking establishments and some reports of physical abuse 
in Scottish towns can be explained by less police protection in these areas, which led 
to the next difference between cities and towns. While t ere was more satisfaction 
with police forces in Scottish major cities, there was less satisfaction with these 
services in some Scottish towns. For example in Falkirk and Dunfermline, there was 
a perception that the local police officers can be Islamophobic or racist towards 
Muslims. This may imply an association between police protection and the 
experience of physical abuse, especially in drinking establishment areas in Scottish 
towns. This supports previous research that suggested that inadequate police 
protection in Scottish rural areas may put the life and security of Muslims at risk 
(Lambert and Githens 2010; De Lima 2001; Plastow 2010). The confirmation of this 
association, however, requires further research to study police racism and police 
Islamophobia in Scottish towns and small cities. The final point that needs to be 
made is that even though the experience of Islamphobia was not pervasive in Scottish 
cities and towns, those who experienced high rates of I lamophobia may affect their 
integration in Scotland. This is what I will discuss and illustrate in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: ‘The cup of kindness’? Dominant Norms and Social 
Integration   
 
Introduction 
   Since the 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London Muslims’ 
integration in the UK has been under intense scrutiny. Muslim integration, however, 
has long been a matter of debate in Britain (Modood 2005, 2007; Parekh 2008; 
Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Hopkins 2011) which revolved around the 
maintenance of Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice. Recently, for instance, 
David Cameron (British Government 2011), Britain’s Prime Minister, announced at 
the Munich Security Conference that ‘state multiculuralism’ has encouraged 
‘different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream.’ In criticizing multiculturalism, most critics mainly refer to Muslims as 
being less integrated into the wider society than people from other minority groups 
and Muslims are shown to be disloyal (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Muslims’ 
distinctive identity and practice has sometimes even b en perceived as a national 
identity threat (Goodhart 2004; Chakraborti and Garland 2009: 45) or has been seen 
as potential enemies within (see Ahmad 2003). It ishowever important to note that 
Muslims’ practices and integration are complex and complicated and varied in 
relation to different factors (such as ethnicity, religion and nationality). For instance, 
as noted in previous chapters, Muslims’ identity and experience of Islamophobia 
could affect their integration. In this chapter, I discuss different barriers and 
pathways to Muslims’ integration.  
   Integration of ethnic minority people, particularly Muslims, has been studied from 
different perspectives and aspects. Much of what has been discussed about 
integration starts from the majority vantage point and little attention is paid to the 
views of minorities’ (Fekete 2008). Muslims’ integration, especially social 
integration, in Scotland has been even less studied. Most studies have paid less 
attention to this aspect of integration by focusing more on economic or educational 
integration (Hussain and Miller 2006; British Council Scotland Survey 2010; Kidd 
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and Jamieson 2011). As my data emphasised the importance and problematic nature 
of social integration for Muslims in the Scottish context, this chapter focuses on that 
specific aspect of Muslims’ integration. 
   The importance of integration lies in the fact that some minority groups, including 
Muslims, often sought to maintain their own ways of life and also to teach such ways 
of life to their children, while the host country sought to maintain a sense of common 
national identity and cultural continuity. The problem was seen as a matter of finding 
a way for a society to incorporate its minorities so that it could both satisfy their 
aspirations to maintain cherished ways of life and t the same time to maintain itself 
as a (historical) community of common belonging. Therefore, incorporation of these 
new members into society is a question of growing importance. Different scholars’ 
responses to this question have mainly revolved around the concepts of assimilation 
and integration. Assimilation refers to a process in which the newcomers become 
similar to their host society (Brubaker 2001) whereas the term integration, mainly 
proposed by multiculturalists, refers to a state of ‘recognition and respect’ (Kymlicka 
1995; Hall 2000; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007).  
   Multiculturalism in Britain was officially sanctioned by the New Labour 
Government in 1997, but prior to that time, this ideology emerged on 29 May 1966 
(Joppke 1999), when the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, distinguished sharply 
between integration and assimilation. Jenkins favored ‘integration’ but insisted that 
it should not mean ‘the loss, by immigrants of their own national characteristics and 
culture’ (Joppke 1999: 225). He defined integration ‘not as a flattening process of 
assimilation but as equal opportunity...cultural diversity...mutual tolerance’ (Banton 
1985: 71 quoted in Hussain and Miller 2006: 50). At the more social level, 
multiculturalism and integration became a politically and ideologically significant 
movement in the 1960s when South Asians and Afro-Caribbeans refused to 
assimilate into the wider society (Parekh 2006:5). 
   The term integration, however, is contested and there is no single definition or 
theory of immigrant integration (Castles t. al. 2002; Phillimore and Goodson 2008). 
One common theoretical approach to integration was through distinguishing 
integration from assimilation (Kymlicka 2001; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007; Pfeffer 
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2014) or through parallelising them (Brubaker 2001). Distinguishing assimilation 
from integration, Pfeffer (2014) proposes three main distinctions; first, ‘there is a 
fundamental normative difference between a host society that invokes laws to 
incorporate its immigrants in a way that is respectful of, and is willing to celebrate 
their diverse practices (which is indicative of integration) and a host society that 
seeks to attenuate differences between minorities and the host society’. Second, 
‘assimilation is often a unidirectional process insofar as it places most of the 
expectations on immigrants. … Conversely; integration ought to be viewed as a 
dialogical process meaning that it should be achieved through the cooperation and 
deliberation of both actors’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354). Finally, ‘integration can be defined 
on the basis of participation in, as opposed to degree of similarity with, the host 
society. … However, just because integration requires convergence on liberal 
democratic values does not mean that cultural groups need to give up traditional 
practices’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354). 
   Immigrants’ integration is also debated and theoriz d from more practical and 
functional perspectives, which highlights the interaction between the social and 
functional dimensions and the influence of the state (Korac 2003). In Britain, Ager 
and Strang (2008) argue that integration has been considered to be within the 
discussion of social inclusion/exclusion and race relations. From this perspective, 
the importance of social and structural barriers to in egration was highlighted. The 
importance of structural barriers to ethnic/faith minority groups was supported by 
empirical research (Berry 1997; Hale 2000; Hickman et. al. 2008). Different types of 
discriminatory practices and inequalities such as institutional and individual racism 
and Islamophobia can also affect Muslims’ integration (Fekete 2008; Trevor Phillips 
2011), however, there is a dearth of research on how t e perception of discrimination 
is related to immigrants’ overall adaptation (Berry 1997). Taking the importance of 
social and structural factors into consideration, Ager and Strang (2004: 9) define an 
integrated individual or group within a society as ‘when they achieve public 
outcomes within employment, housing, education, healt  etc.’ It is however 
important to note that Muslims’ integration is not limited to social and structural 
issues and relational and cultural barriers are also important. 
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   The importance of ‘relationships with the host community, the importance of 
retaining one’s own cultural connections, shared values and the need to ensure safety 
and security’ (Phillimore and Goodson 2008: 309) are lso important in affecting 
minorities’ integration strategies. From this perspctive, the importance of relational 
and cultural issues such as religious boundaries and cultural barriers is better 
highlighted. Religion and religious identity for many Muslims is central to their 
sense of who they are and how their behaviour in all spheres of life should be 
(Jacobson 1997b). Similarly, Modood (2005) argues that religion is central to many 
Muslims and any new ways of living in Britain and becoming a part of British 
society had to be ultimately justified in terms of c mpatibility with the Muslim faith 
and the welfare of Muslims. Joppke (2012) also argues that the religious identity of 
practicing Muslims creates boundaries for Muslims’ cultural and social integration. 
Muslims’ identity politics, however, has also been seen as an important trigger for 
increased civic integration (Choudhury 2007; Meer 2010). As Hussain and Miller 
(2006) argue, Muslims’ Scottish identity was adopted as a tool of integration rather 
than separation. 
   Taking the impact of social and cultural factors n immigrants’ or minorities’ 
integration into consideration, several diverse forms of integration such as partial, 
limited, or thin are possible (Parekh 2008) and no single sociological model for a 
multiethnic or multicultural society is possible (Modood 2007). In sum, no minority 
group can be a model for all others, so there is no right to insist that some minorities’ 
lifestyle, behaviour, and manner be the form of integration to which other groups 
should adapt themselves. ‘So, the ultimate meaning of multi is that specific policies, 
complexes of policies and multicultural institutional arrangements have to be 
customized to meet diverse (as well as common) vulnerabilities, needs and priorities’ 
(Modood 2007:46). This chapter, therefore, examines Muslims’ integrational 
strategies and discusses the importance of different barriers and pathways to 
Muslims’ integration in Scotland, including Muslims’ identity and Islamophobia. 
   This chapter will first detail and discuss the barriers to Muslims’ integration. Issues 
articulated here are those factors and concerns that were identified by participants as 
barriers. These mainly fall into structural/social and cultural barriers. The former 
included Islamophobia and unwelcoming attitudes, media and Islamophobic 
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representation of Muslims, language barriers, and Scottish dominant social norms 
and assimilation. The latter constitutes the discusion around how some Muslim 
religious practices such as not consuming alcohol and avoiding mixed-sex meetings 
can function as cultural barriers. Finally, this study discusses how issues of cultural 
understanding and respect, expressed as the main pathway to integration, could aid 
Muslims’ integration. In the next chapter, I discuss how Muslims manage these 
structural and cultural barriers to develop a form of Halal integration through 
alternative ways of social interaction. 
 
Structural/Social Barriers 
   Structural barriers were mainly the concerns that related to Muslims’ social 
integration rather than their economic or educationl i tegration. These concerns 
were; Islamophobia and social avoidance, media, langu ge, and dominant social 
norms.  
 
Islamophobia and Unwelcoming Attitudes  
   Unwelcoming attitudes were one of the main barriers to Muslims’ social 
integration, which was acknowledged by some participants. The data suggests that 
there was a perception among Muslim interviewees that some Scots have no interest 
in integrating and interacting with Muslims. For example, Adil was one of 4 
participants who asserted this view. He was a practicing Muslim man and was living 
in Falkirk. Adil had an undergraduate degree and was orking in a bank in Falkirk. 
He said that his neighbours and his colleagues did not show any interest in interact 
and socialise with him:  
I do not consider myself fully integrated … because my neighbours are racists and do 
not wish to interact with me so we have very limited relationship. Even in my 
workplace they would not talk to me but again having beard this makes difference as 
well, because they do not want to know you and thusey do not talk to you. If you 
have got beard, they will think that you are backward nd backdated and stuff like 
that… 




   Adil was economically and educationally integrated o Scottish society, however in 
this quote, he highlights that an unwelcoming approach in his neighbourhood and 
workplace against Muslims was the main explanation f r his limited social 
integration. Later in the interview, he asserted that e knew that Islam encourages 
Muslims to interact with others especially one’s neighbours but that others’ 
unwelcoming approach stopped him from achieving greater integration. This can 
imply that there might even be some religious aspirtions for greater social 
integration; however, the experience or perception of social avoidance can hinder 
such integration. This supports Modood’s (2007:48) argument that integration occurs 
‘where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of 
the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to 
do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing (or not trying) to 
integrate.’ Adil felt that his colleagues’ unwelcoming approach was associated with 
their stereotypical perception that Muslims are ‘backdated.’ Associating Muslims 
with backwardness or seeing them as ‘backdated’ canarise from having 
Islamophobic views about Muslims. This can be explained by the argument of the 
Runnymede Trust (1997: 6), which describes one facet of Islamophobia as seeing 
Islam or Muslims, as ‘them,’ inferior to non-Muslims or ‘us.’ Seeing Muslims as 
‘backdated’ and different can affect people’s social relationship with Muslims. 
Having such views about Muslims can make them less-favoured in the society. This 
argument is supported by quantitative research that suggests that Muslims are the 
least favoured religious minority in Scotland (British Council Scotland Survey 2010). 
The analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) also showed that 
‘Muslims attracted the most discriminatory response, with 23% saying they would be 
unhappy if a Muslim formed a relationship with a family member, falling to 18% for 
a Hindu, 9% for someone who is Jewish and just 2% for a Christian’ (Ormston et. al. 
2011: 22).  
   As Adil was living and working in a small town, Falkirk, with a small number of 
Muslims and a small ethnic minority population, this may suggest an association 
between small towns and Islamophobia, and thus more s cial avoidance in small 
towns rather than in larger cities. However, as I discussed in the previous chapter, 
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Islamophobia was evident in both small towns and larger cities, thus the role of 
geographical differences on having Islamophobic and unwelcoming attitudes towards 
Muslims is challenged by my data. Furthermore, other examples in this section 
suggest that some participants from larger cities such as Edinburgh also reported 
such unwelcoming approaches in their social integration with the majority Scots. For 
example, Kasim, who, like Adil, was a practicing Muslim man with an 
undergraduate degree and was working in a bank branch in Edinburgh, had the same 
perception of being socially avoided. In this example, Kasim especially highlights 
the importance of identity non-recognition as another reason for having an 
unwelcoming approach towards Muslims. Kasim stated that interaction with the 
majority Scottish people was so difficult because they did not accept him as being 
Scottish and as being one of themselves and, thus, do not wish to interact with him. 
He said that interaction with people from other ethnic/faith minority groups was 
much easier than with the indigenous people:  
You may want to integrate into the society but the society may not want to integrate 
with you because of your religion or your religious identity. … For example, I am 
friends with many people from different background but making friendship with the 
indigenous Scottish people is so difficult because they do not accept you as a Scottish 
person. I want to integrate and interact with them but their barrier stop me from 
integration. So those who are from other background or other faiths are easier to 
integrate with but the indigenous Scottish people ke p to themselves. So, it is very 
difficult to integrate with them because they do want to accept you as one of 
themselves; only a few of them accept you. 
[41 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This quote implies an association between unwelcoming approaches in social 
relationships towards Muslims and the non-recognitio  of Muslims’ national identity 
as fellow Scottish at the grassroots level. This supports Bond’s (2006) argument that 
‘even those who enjoy full formal citizenship may still, in the eyes of the majority, 
be excluded from belonging to the nation in which they reside.’ This can imply that 
Muslims can be seen as Others or outsiders at the grassroots level and thus be less 
favoured for socially integration or interaction. This supports my finding in the 
previous chapters, which suggested that the majority f participants, even the second 
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generation Muslims, felt that their Scottish or British identity claims were not 
accepted at the grassroots level and that they are often seen as outsiders or foreigners. 
Considering Adil’s and Kasim’s social status, as having been educated in Scottish 
universities and employed at public institutions, it can be suggested that even those 
Muslims with higher social status can be regarded as less favoured by some of the 
majority on the grounds of Islamophobic attitudes or identity non-recognition. 
   The examples of Adil and Kasim also imply that such unwelcoming approaches to 
greater social interaction can hinder Muslims’ social integration with majority Scots. 
As was evident in both quotes, Adil was not socialis ng with his neighbours and 
colleagues, and Kasim tended to interact with other minority people. Considering 
Kasim’s example, this implies that he finds socialis ng and interacting with the 
majority group members difficult, Muslims interact with other minority people who 
were found to be more welcoming than the majority. Such drifting away from the 
majority and leaning towards other minorities was also evident in other examples. 
For instance, Sanaz found other minorities to be more welcoming than majority 
Scots. She was a practicing Muslim woman with hijab and was a housewife, but was 
also working in some voluntary groups. Like Adil and Kasim, she was integrated into 
the Scottish educational system and had an undergraduate degree. She stated that she 
felt that she was avoided by Scottish majority group members in her children’s 
schools, while she found people from other minority e hnic groups to be more 
welcoming:  
To be honest I have never really found it quite easy to break to Scottish white 
people… In my daughter’s class all students and teach rs are white Scottish people. 
Children’s mothers are usually stuck to their little groups and did not want to interact 
with others that much, whereas in my son’s class mothers are much more friendly, 
they are from different background therefore it is much easier to relate to them. … 
Now that I am wearing Hijab, I think that might be a problem too… but for integration 
there are little things I can do; if they do not like you because you are coloured, there 
is not really so much you can do… I think it is up to other people as well to accept you 
and wish to integrate with you. I think they do not want to have us here, they do not 
feel comfortable having us here.  




   This quote, in parallel to the example of Adil, highlights the importance of 
Islamophobia in forming unwelcoming approaches towards Muslims. Sanaz 
particularly highlights her perception that people from the majority group may 
dislike Muslims on the ground of their racial or religious characteristics. This can 
imply that having such views about Muslims can make th  majority unwilling to 
integrate and interact. After experiencing unwelcoming approaches, like Kasim, 
Sanaz found people from other minority groups more welcoming and thus tended to 
interact with them rather than with the majority. Another possible implication of 
feeling unwelcome, even though not widespread, can be inter-community isolation. 
This was evident in two examples, Ghader and Ehsan. Ghader, who was an ex-self-
employed practicing Muslim man from Pakistan, by highlighting the negative impact 
of discrimination on his sense of belonging to Scotland, stated that the he felt more 
at home when he is in the Punjabi community:   
If people here discriminate against you, you would not feel at home there, you cannot 
have any sense of belonging. But there are some people who are not that severe; they 
do not say anything but they not encourage you either. … We have our big community 
here; Punjabis. So, we feel quite at home among our c mmunity because we have our 
Punjabi community here; we have our shops and our business but we interact with 
other people too.  
[63 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   This quote shows how Islamophobia and an unwelcoming approach can lead some 
Muslims towards inter-community isolation and having parallel lives. In another 
example, Ehsan, who was also a self-employed shopkeeper, pointed out that he is 
more comfortable either in the Pakistani community or in Pakistan: 
Wherever Asians are gathering some where, we feel saf r and better with them. They 
are saying that we are not mixing but there is no mixing from that side; for example if 
you go to the pub no one come to you or nobody shakes your hand, nobody joins you; 
even when you do that because I do not drink but even if you start drinking they would 
not come to you because you are different. They are s ying that we are not mixing but 
I do not know how we can mix. … Even I feel more comf rtable whenever I go to 
Pakistan. I go every year or every two years to Pakist n and over there you feel that 
you can do whatever you want, go wherever you want. I feel safer and more 
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comfortable over there than here. Here even when I walk outside and there is a drunk 
person, he will feel safe to say whatever they like to me.  
[42 year-old, Falkirk] 
 
   In this quote, Ehsan highlights his feeling that e did not feel safe and comfortable 
in gatherings of Scots. This is similar to de Lima’s (2004) finding that social 
exclusion could lead to social isolation and maintaining the cultural identities of 
ethnic minority groups in Scottish rural areas. However, it is important to note that 
the trend of having parallel lives was absent in the Scottish context (Hussain and 
Miller 2006). Furthermore, the comparison between the examples of Ghader and 
Ehsan with other participants suggests the specificity of their examples and thus 
cannot be generalised. For instance, the examples of Adil, Kasim, and Sanaz who also 
reported social avoidance, show that none of these participants tended to have 
separated or parallel lives. These participants were all integrated into the Scottish 
educational system and two of them (Adil and Kasim) were economically integrated. 
Social avoidance, thus, limited these participants’ social integration rather than 
leading them towards having separate lives. The actual integration of other 
participants in different aspects of Scottish society that is discussed in the next 
chapter, even though it points to limited integration in most cases, supports the 
absence of Muslims having parallel lives in Scotland. It is also discussed in the next 
chapter that even though Muslims’ social integration has been challenged by different 
barriers, Muslims in Scotland have tried to fit into the society by choosing alternative 
ways of socializing. 
   As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, Ghader and Ehsan had daily experiences of 
Islamophobia. Their limited integration may be associated with their high rate of 
experiencing Islamophobia. As I discussed earlier, Islamophobic attitudes such as 
seeing Muslims as inferior or being unhappy to have  social relationship with 
Muslims could lead to the isolation of Muslims from the majority Scots. Further to 
their daily experience of Islamophobia, Ghader and Ehsan’s social status was poor, 
which could have also affected their social integration. They were both first 
generation self-employed with English language difficulties and no Scottish 
education. I discuss in the next chapter that poor education and English language 
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difficulties were factors that some first generation Muslims acknowledged as 
important factors that led them to self-employment. It will also be discussed here that 
English language difficulties could also affect their social integration by prompting 
them to only socialise within their Punjabi community that uses the same language. 
   Investigating the importance of daily experience of Islamophobia and low-level 
self-employment in limiting Muslims’ social integration, the data suggests that other 
examples with the same social status such as Hamid nd Tariq had a more mixed life. 
The comparison between the example of Hamid/Tariq and Ghader/Ehsan shows that 
the former examples had some Scottish education. Hamid for example, had an 
undergraduate degree and Tariq had a college degree, whil  the latter examples had 
only a primary education from Pakistan. Another difference was English language; 
Hamid and Tariq were fluent while Ghader and Ehsan h d some English language 
difficulties. This may imply that even though the examples of Ghader and Ehsan were 
peculiar and could not be generalised to other Muslims, their examples may suggest 
the importance of low or no education and language difficulties alongside 
experiencing Islamphobia in leading to social exclusion. This could also imply the 
importance of generational differences. The second generation Muslim usually 
acquires the English language and enters into the Scottish educational system, while 
most first generation Muslims have no Scottish education and still struggle with 
English language difficulties. The different implications of generational differences 
are discussed later in the section on language barriers. 
   Some participants pointed to some of the Scottish Government’s policies or 
programmes that could also encourage Islamophobia and thus lead to the increased 
social isolation of Muslims. For example, Azadeh, who was a practicing Muslim 
woman, asserted that commemorating the 9/11 attack anniversaries can indirectly 
spread Islamophobia and lead to the dislike of Muslims. By referring to her 
experience, she explained how associating the 9/11 bombing with Muslims at school 
singled out her nephew and all students looked at him differently as a result: 
Last week it was the 10th anniversary of 9/11 and on Monday my nephew went to 
school and his teacher spoke to the class about 9/11 and she went to say that some 
Muslims do that, my nephew is only 9 years old and he felt that he was dying in that 
point because everybody in whole class turned around and looked at him, what kind of 
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integration is this, how is he going to feel? … They k ep reminding kids that Muslims 
did that and kids would look differently at my nephw now. This would only help 
isolation than integration. 
[42 year-old, Edinburgh]  
 
   This quote highlights the important role of public institutions such as schools and 
the government in spreading or fighting Islamophobia. Pointing to commemorating 
9/11 anniversaries and associating Muslims with terrorism, this quote supports my 
previous argument that considered Islamophobia to be ne of the main reasons for 
social avoidance. In another example, by supporting some of Scottish Government 
policies such as the ‘One Scotland’ campaign, Samad, who was a practicing Muslim 
man, stated that the government tries to promote div rsity and equality through 
different programmes, but that the media’s Islamophobic representation of Islam and 
Muslims halts that process:   
If you watch the news on the media, you will see that t ere are many Scottish people 
who do not like Islam ... The government like to prmote diversity and it is a nice idea 
but I do not think everybody is happy with Islam; a lot of people fear Islam because of 
ignorance or because of media. The issue of suicide bombers and terrorist attacks has 
affected Muslims’ image in the media; the propaganda was against Islam.  
[51 year-old, Dunfermline] 
 
   The last two quotes raise important questions about the effectiveness of some anti-
racist programmes such as the ‘One Scotland’ campaign because on the one hand, 
the government tries to promote diversity and integration, but on the other hand, 
other programmes can spread Islamophobia and hatred against Muslims. The 
important role of the media in hindering integration by spreading Islamophobia is the 
focus of the next section. 
 
Media: Islamophobic Representation of Muslims  
   In presenting an Islamophobic image of Muslims, the media was also identified by 
almost all interviewees as one of the main barriers to integration. It is important to 
note that most participants did not mention any specific form of media and mainly 
 
211 
referred to it in general, which could include different TV news channels, TV 
programmes, and newspapers. There were only one explicit mention of the Sun 
newspaper (in the case of Samad) and some general references such as British media, 
mainstream news, newspapers, and TV. They had the widespread perception that as a 
result of the media’s Islamophobic representation, many Scottish majority group 
members associate Muslims with terrorism, which makes them reluctant to interact 
with Muslims. For example, Akram, who was a less-practicing Muslim woman, 
stated that many Scottish people consider all Muslims to be the same based on media 
representations: 
The way that Islam is portrayed in the media is a big barrier. I find out that a lot of 
people judge all the Muslims as they are all the same. They do not understand the 
difference between what Islam is really and what some people do in the name of 
Islam. 
[43 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This quote referred to terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 bombings in New York and 
the 7/7 bombings in London, which were associated with Muslims and Islam by 
some mainstream media. This quote points to the first eature of Islamophobia 
itemised by Runnymede Trust (1997: 5), which is seeing Islam or Muslims as 
‘undifferentiated, static and monolithic and as intolerant of internal pluralism and 
deliberation.’ Akram highlights that spreading or having such views about Muslims 
cannot improve integration. It is important to note that all broadsheets or broadcast 
agencies do not present an Islamophobic image of Muslims, but nonetheless, the 
general term ‘media’ was used by respondents to refer to those who spear-headed 
Islamophobia that could result in hatred against Muslims. Further research, thus, is 
required to show which media spread Islamophobia and in what ways they do so. 
This study only concentrates on the implications of Islamophobic attitudes on 
Muslims’ integration. In another example, Nader, who was a practicing Muslim man, 
also mentioned that the media only represents the image of extremist and fanatic 
Muslims, which has distorted the image of Muslims and has caused many problems 
for them, especially after the 9/11 bombings:  
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The media keep showing only the extremist and fanatic Muslims who represent only 
very small percentage of Muslims. Majority Muslims’ life is very hard and they are 
trying to make a good life peacefully and try to be respected and also respect other 
people. Before September 11, there was very low level focus on Muslims and 
everyone was just getting on with that but then after 9/11 certainly Muslims were 
victimized and picked on which causes many problems ven for their social life. 
[38 year-old, Edinburgh]  
 
   These quotes support previous research that sugge ts t the significant role of media 
in reinforcing Islamophobia by presenting a distorted and negative image of Islam 
and Muslims (Runnymede Trust 1997; Masud 2005; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Instead 
Consultancy 2007; Meer et. al. 2010). By distinguishing between majority of 
Muslims as hardworking, peaceful and respected people from the extremists who 
caused 9/11, this quote particularly highlights that t e Islamophobic presentation of 
all Muslims affects Muslim social life and social integration. Giving an example of 
such social problems, Fatima, who was a practicing Muslim woman, expressed that 
as result of the media’s Islamophobic representation, s me Scottish majority group 
members are afraid to integrate and interact with Muslims: 
The way that media portray Muslims in this country is a barrier to integration. I think 
such representation isolated Muslims more; because of the way media portrays 
Muslims the indigenous people are afraid to integrate with Muslims.  
[32 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   All the quotes in this section suggest that the media spreads fear and phobia against 
Muslims, making it harder for the community to integrate with others. This finding 
suggests the need for positive alternatives to the existing presentation of Muslims 
that celebrate diversity and particularly Muslims. This was the main goal of the ‘One 
Scotland, Many Cultures’ initiative that was launched in September 2002 (Scottish 
Government 2005a; Penrose and Howard 2008). However, government evaluations 
of the ‘One Scotland’ campaign (TNS System 3 2005; 2006) suggest that there was a 
limited success in changing attitudes. Indeed, ethnic minorities in Scotland continue 
to report high levels of racially motivated crime, whether this is in self-report surveys 
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or police recorded statistics, and the analysis of the Scottish Attitudes Survey (2010) 
also suggests ‘no significant change in discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims 
since 2006, which thus remain somewhat more prevalent than they were in 2003’ 
(Ormston et. al. 2011: 72). 
 
Language: Old Barrier and New Identity Marker 
   Language had previously been identified as one of the main barriers to integration 
(Change Institute 2009), but this research suggests that language is no longer a 
barrier for all Muslims. My study shows that languae used to be a barrier only for 
the first generation Muslim immigrants who could not speak English at the time of 
their arrival. It was acknowledged by some of my participants that language was an 
issue, for instance in economic integration, but this was in relation to the first 
generation Muslims. Four participants, out of 43, mentioned that language was a 
barrier for new arrivals who could not speak English when they came to Scotland. To 
illustrate, Rafiqah, who was a second generation Muslim woman, stated that 
language used to be a barrier for her parents and new arrivals: 
Language was always a big problem for those who came here a generation ago, like 
our parents, and could not speak English. It can also be a barrier for those who come, 
even now, to this country but do not know how to speak English. Our generation has 
no language barrier though. 
[36 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Likewise, Zainab, who was a second generation Muslim woman, stated that 
language can be the biggest barrier for new arrivals, especially in the time of 
financial crisis and government budget cuts: 
I think the biggest barrier for those who come here as an adult is language; not 
knowing how to speak English. There was a time that English class was free and easily 
accessible, but now because of the state of the economy those classes have been cut. 




   These quotes imply that the issue of language was only a barrier for the first 
generation Muslims who could not speak English at the ime of their arrival. 
However, some respondents still struggled with English anguage despite living in 
Scotland for a long time. As I discussed earlier, Ghader and Ehsan were two 
examples who - in spite of having lived in Scotland for 50 and 20 years - still had 
English language difficulties. These two examples were self-employed and had no 
Scottish education. They only had a primary education from Pakistan. As discussed 
above, the language barrier could affect these participants’ social integration, and it 
is discussed in the next chapter that the language b rrier - alongside other factors 
such as having no Scottish education - plays a part in driving first generation 
Muslims towards self-employment. This implies the importance of language barriers 
for those who still cannot speak the language properly, and highlights the importance 
of free English classes for first generation migrants to improve their economic and 
social integration.  
   In relation to second generation Muslims’ integration, however, the English 
language or Scottish accent was not only considered not to be an issue, but was also 
utilised by some participants as a Scottish identity marker. Thus it functioned as a 
pathway rather than a barrier. For example Rafiqah, Adil, and Ahad, who were all 
second generation Muslims, used the English language and the Scottish accent in 
particular as an identity marker to support their Scottishness [this was illustrated in 
more detail in Chapter 5]. Even some of the first generation Muslims, who have lived 
in Scotland for a long time and were able to adopt the Scottish accent, used the 
language as an identity marker. For example, Tariq, who was a first generation 
Muslim and has lived in Scotland for 7 years, stated that his Scottish accent made 
him feel Scottish:  
I feel of myself Scottish … if they hear my language and my accent, they will 
understand I am from here [Scotland]. 
[28 year-old, Falkirk] 
 
   These findings suggest that the language issue need ot be a barrier for the second 
generation and for those first generation Muslims who have lived in Scotland for a 
long time and have entered Scottish educational system or learnt the English 
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language. However even well integrated and Scottish sounding individuals struggled 
to integrate socially and so I turn now to one of the principle barriers ncountered in 
the previous research. 
 
Dominant Social Norms and Assimilation 
   The data suggests that the prevalence of the dominant culture of alcohol 
consumption in Scotland’s social life (Bromley t. al. 2005; Scottish Government 
2008) served as the most important barrier to Muslims’ social integration. As alcohol 
consumption, sale, and purchase is prohibited in Islam (Esposito 2011), almost all 
participants identified the dominant practice of drinking culture as an important 
hindrance to Muslims’ greater integration into Scottish social life. Further to its 
communality, the significance of this issue was dueto the fact that many participants 
perceived social norms around drinking as exhibiting a  ‘assimilatory attitude and 
approach’ towards Muslims’ social integration. For example, Kasim, who was a 
practicing Muslim man, had a perception that integration for many Scottish majority 
people means assimilation into Scottish mainstream culture. He stated that if he did 
not integrate into that culture, he would not be considered ‘Scottish and as one of 
them.’ He expressed that such restricted views on integration that require Muslims to 
give up their religion and moral practices is a big barrier for further social 
integration:  
They see integration as being very much like them; for example going out for drink, 
going out for smoking; womanising, that is what they class as integration… If you are 
not like them, you are not one of them… the mainstream society as a whole view 
integration as that; if you are not at the office party, you are not one of them. If you do 
not take part in their group sessions, you are not part of them. If you do not go down to 
the pub, you are not part of them. So, this is the very restricted culture where you can 
only integrate if you break your own moral or religious views or conditions… We 
should give up what is our religion and culture for mainstream, to give up whatever 
our identity is and become what they are. 
[41 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This quote highlights the contradiction between the dominant practice of some 
social norms and Muslims’ religious identity and beliefs. Social integration, in that 
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sense, requires Muslims to give up their religious and moral beliefs. This quote also 
suggests that the dominant practice of alcohol consumption was perceived as an 
assimilatory approach to integration rather than what Muslims expected integration 
to be. As the most common views of integration amongst participants entailed the 
respect and recognition of Muslims’ identity, culture, and religion, such perception 
of assimilatory attitudes and practices could hinder Muslims’ integration. In another 
example, Ali, who was also a practicing Muslim man, said that being asked to take 
part in the dominant culture of alcohol consumption f r Muslims means a total 
change in their identity and is a clear assimilatory demand. He also felt that some of 
the Scottish majority group members consider alcohol consumption to be a yardstick 
of integration:  
Asking to participate in drinking or not wearing Hijab in women case is forcing your 
views to somebody and asking them to completely change what they are. This is 
assimilation to whatever they want. Then you have to follow their culture, their way of 
life. The biggest obstacle, the biggest difference between us and Britishness is alcohol. 
We do not drink alcohol they drink alcohol and this is something that I think is 
sometimes used as a meter to measure somebody, to see how integrated they are. Do 
they drink alcohol with us? If yes, they are okay, if no, so something is wrong with 
them.  
[38 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   These two quotes, as was also evident in other examples, can imply the importance 
of alcohol in Scottish culture and social events. This supports previous research by 
Hopkins (2004), which suggested the importance of alcohol and pub and club culture 
in Scottish culture in which Muslims could not take part. This finding is supported by 
the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2004), which shows that ‘alcohol is seen as a 
central part of Scottish culture, with 64% agreeing with drinking is a major part of 
Scottish way of life’ (Bromley et. al. 2005: 1). This survey also showed that around 
half of men (47%) view alcohol as a social lubricant, agreeing that ‘it is easier to 
enjoy a social event if you’ve had a drink’ (Bromley t. al. 2005: 1). It has also been 
argued that offering alcohol for some Scots can represent generosity (The Social 
Issues Research Centre 1998: 23) and it might be for this reason t that alcohol is 
served at many social events, and so all guests are invit d to participate in drinking 
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‘the cup of kindness.’ However, it is important to n te that such dominant cultural 
and social practices are perceived as an assimilatory demand for some Muslims. 
Thus, objections to alcohol at social events can have a negative effect on Muslims’ 
integration, such as avoiding being present at any event where alcohol is involved. 
This is more evident in the next example. Zahra, who was a practicing Muslim 
woman, explained how assimilatory expectations, particularly of Muslim women in 
the workplace, make integration too difficult for them:  
One very simple thing that people do not understand is that Muslims do not drink 
alcohol, so if you do not drink alcohol, you do not go to places where they serve 
alcohol. In work environment there is a big pressure to socialise and especially 
socialise with your boss so if you are not going to o for drink after work then you are 
not going to go ahead in your job. And it is in every level, for example if you are 
working in a supermarket check out, you see that all the girls go together for drink, if 
you do not go you might get comment such as ‘you are not integrating’ or ‘you do not 
hang out with us’ or ‘why you do not do this or that’.  So, there are some limitations 
because of our morals and ethics but it does not annoy us to socialise and also because 
of our commitment to the family.  
[45 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Zahra stated in this quote that because she does not consume alcohol, she would 
not go to places where alcohol is served. This refers to another Islamic code that 
prohibits being present or working in places where alcohol is served; even though 
this prohibition is a matter of religious and cultural debate amongst Muslims living in 
western countries (Esposito 2011), many Muslims such as Zahra, Kasim, Ali, and 
other participants practice it. The above quote could also highlight the fact that the 
majority’s lack of knowledge about these norms could f nction as a big barrier to 
integration. Inviting Muslims to parties and social events that mainly involve alcohol 
consumption, might be intended to show respect and kindness, but was considered to 
be an assimilatory attitude by some respondents. The perception of the majority’s 
assimilatory approach to integration may make Muslim  think that they want to 
change Muslims’ religion and culture. This may result in taking a more defensive 
position on the issue of attending any event where alcohol is served. It can also make 
them think that Scots want Muslim to change their rligious identity, which was the 
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most important identity for some respondents (as I di cussed in Chapter 5). This can 
make them think that social integration may end up changing Muslims’ identity. 
Raising awareness about the limits of social integration for Muslims can reduce 
misunderstandings and help increase integration. This was particularly mentioned by 
some participants. For example, Sanaz, who was a practicing Muslim woman, stated 
that lack of knowledge about Muslim culture makes social integration harder:     
 
When I was studying at university in my final year there was a Christmas party and all 
students were in laboratory. My classmates were going for a drink afterwards. I said to 
my teacher that I would be busy and I would not be a l  to make it, but I knew that he 
did not like it. My friends also did not like it and they did perceive me as being outside 
of the group and influenced their further relations with me… They did not really 
understand that I could not do it. For that reason s cial interaction is so difficult. Even 
now in the primary school they have events such as wine tasting day. I think they 
should not have wine or at least should say for example wine and non-alcoholic 
drinks. Then that would include us as well. When they say wine and cheese only, so 
obviously it is not going to be for Muslims, is it? So, there are lots of things in the 
society which is still western cultural perception f who they want to bring along and 
maybe it is us as British Muslims, maybe we should be at the top of the parents 
evening as well saying all these and organise this and organise that, we do not tend to 
kind of help make that influence here.  
[41 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In this quote, Sanaz suggested that by becoming ore engaged and involved in 
such shared events, Muslims can raise awareness about Muslims’ limits and thus 
promote their social integration. To sum up, this section suggests that some Muslim 
participants saw the ‘drink[ing] and going out’ culture as effectively demanding 
assimilation. These findings support previous research in Scotland and England that 
suggested that there was a feeling amongst longer established Muslim communities 
that they still are not accepted or valued in society, and that the rhetoric of 
integration is often underpinned by an expectation f r minority communities to 
assimilate (Fekete 2008; Change Institute 2009; British Council Scotland Survey 
2010). It was also evident from discussions carried out by Masud (2005) with 
Scottish Muslim women that they felt that they were being forced to change their 
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behaviour as a consequence of the London bombings to avoid being labelled as 
‘terrorists’ (Masud 2005). Previous research by the British Council Scotland Survey 
(2010:30) showed that such perceptions amongst Muslims were not unfounded 
because there was a view among non-Muslim Scots - particularly those who were 
older and from a lower socio-economic status - thatMuslims should completely 
adopt Scottish customs. My study, however, suggests that this perception of the 
majority’s assimilatory attitude was not common amongst all participants. Some 
participants saw offering alcohol as an assimilatory attitude whereas some others saw 
it as a lack of knowledge. For instance, Kasim and Ali, who also reported daily 
experiences of Islamophobia, felt that asking Muslim  to participate in drinking 
culture was an assimilatory demand. It can also be argued that these participants’ 
experiences and perceptions of the prevalence of Islamophobia could affect their 
perception of the majority’s assimilatory attitudes. In contrast, Sanaz and Zahra, with 
rare or no experience of Islamophobia, associated ‘b ing asked for participating in 
drinking culture’ with a lack of knowledge about Muslims’ moral and religious codes 
of practice rather than assimilatory attitudes. These participants, therefore, felt that if 
the majority’s knowledge increases, they would respect and accommodate Muslims’ 
religious needs. In other words, my research suggests that the expectation of 
assimilation could sometimes be unwitting and arise from well-intended efforts to 
show respect and kindness; so the lack of knowledge from both sides can cause 
misunderstanding. Raising awareness about Muslims’ limits and the majority’s 
actual intentions could promote interaction [this is discussed latter in this chapter in 
‘pathways to integration’]. Muslims’ objections to Scottish dominant social norms, 
such as taking part in ‘drink[ing] and going out culture’, lead us to the second type of 
barriers, which relate to Muslims’ moral and cultural practices. 
 
Cultural Barriers  
Cultural and Religious Codes of Practice 
   Cultural barriers, by and large, were related to some moral and religious practices 
which Muslims tended to preserve when socially integrating into society. Based upon 
Muslims’ religious identity and commitment to their religion, any social interaction 
had to be within the framework of Islamic rules and laws in order to be considered as 
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permissible - Halal - integration. Practicing some of these rules - such as wearing 
Hijab, avoiding mixed-sex meetings, and alcohol consumption - are the most 
common factors that limit Muslims’ social integration in the Scottish context, where 
the contrary was the social norm. As mentioned in the last section, the lack of alcohol 
consumption by far was the most important issue that was raised by the participants. 
Illustrating the importance of this issue, the data showed that almost all of the 
participants stated that they avoided alcohol consumption. The lack of alcohol 
consumption can limit Muslims’ social integration because many social events in 
Scotland revolve around drink. However, the more important issue here was being 
present in places where alcohol was served, which can have a greater impact on 
Muslims social integration. Believing the former may result in attending and 
participating in social events but not drinking alcohol, but however, believing the 
latter would mean not attending any social events or parties where alcohol is served. 
Despite the common opinion on the avoidance of alcohol consumption among 
practicing and less practicing participants, there was some division on the issue of 
being present in places were alcohol was served. My data suggested that practicing 
Muslims tended to avoid such places, but some less-practicing Muslims did not mind 
attending events where alcohol was served. Considering the debate on the prohibition 
of being present in places where alcohol is served (Esposito 2011), such a difference 
could be related to the interpretation of those Muslims who also include its serving 
areas (bars) inside the prohibition of alcohol consumption. In the context of the 
Scottish culture in which alcohol consumption is a dominant social norm, 
commitment to this belief can greatly limit Muslims’ ocialisation and social 
integration. Illustrating the position of practicing Muslims on attending social events 
where alcohol was served, Jafar, who was a practicing Muslim man, said that he 
avoided places where alcohol was served. He said tht despite the dominance of 
alcohol consumption in Scottish mainstream social culture, being a Muslim meant he 
could not participate in such culture: 
Majority of Scottish and British people go out and have drink in certain days. … But 
that really discourages me to integrate in such culture and events because alcohol is 
my restriction. I am a Muslim and I cannot drink or go to the pub.  




   In this quote, Jafar relates the lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding its serving 
areas to his religious identity as a Muslim. Jafar also highlights that despite the 
dominance of this practice in the Scottish context, he would not attend such places as 
a Muslim. In another example, Hakim voiced similar sentiments:  
I guess integration in Islam always has some certain stops. You cannot just have a 
Muslim who drinks and goes to club. For example, as a Muslim I cannot say ‘yes I am 
Scottish , so I go to club or I am Irish all I do is go to club’.  
[20 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This quote also highlights the importance of Muslim ’ religious identity in 
avoiding places where alcohol is served. In this quote, Hakim also highlights that his 
Scottish identity does not override his religious beliefs. These last two quotes 
particularly imply that Muslims’ religious identity has a more important role than 
their civic or territorial identities in shaping and forming their social integration. 
Avoiding places where alcohol is served was not only limited to drinking 
establishments such as pubs and bars, but it can also include work and school parties 
or events. This implies that this is the greater limit to Muslims’ social integration, 
thus making it more difficult for those who really want to integrate and want to 
maintain their religious and moral beliefs at the same time. An example illustrating 
this was Batool She was a practicing Muslim woman, who highlighted the 
importance of alcohol in work parties and its impact on her integration:  
I do find integration sometimes difficult for example in my work; when there is a 
drink party or a night out because I am a Muslim obvi usly I cannot attend such 
events where alcohol is involved …  
[28 year-old, Glasgow]  
 
   In parallel with the examples of Jafar and Hakim, Batool also stated that her 
religious identity as a Muslim makes her avoid such events that can make social 
integration in her workplace difficult. The example of Sanaz, who was a practicing 
Muslim woman and referred to her student days in a lab environment and to her 
experience as a parent, was quoted above and she similarly highlights the avoidance 
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of social events and places where alcohol is served. In another example, Fatima, who 
was a practicing Muslim woman, expressed her willingness for full integration but 
asserted that alcohol consumption was the main challenge: 
As s Muslim I do integrate and I really try to integrate but there are some challenges. 
Sometimes even cultural challenges, for example one of the challenges is drink. As a 
Muslim I do not drink and go to places alcohol is served but drinking is like a social 
thing in this country. 
[32 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   All these quotes suggest that Muslims’ religious identity, their commitment to their 
religion, and the dominance of drinking culture in different aspects of Scottish 
society can all limit practicing Muslims’ social integration to a great extent and make 
it too difficult for those who really want to integrate into Scottish society. Turning to 
the views of less-practicing Muslims on the lack of alcohol consumption and 
avoiding its serving places, the data suggests that despite their lack of alcohol 
consumption, they were less likely to avoid places where alcohol was served. As 
discussed above, the main intention behind the lackof alcohol consumption and 
avoiding its serving places amongst practicing Muslim  is religious identity and 
commitment to their religion. Even though some less-practicing participants such as 
Shakila and Zainab also avoided alcohol consumption, here were two less-practicing 
participants, Hamid and Kathryn, who mentioned different reasons for their lack of 
alcohol consumption. For example, Hamid, who was a first generation less-practicing 
Muslim man, expressed that abstinence was mainly a matter of choice rather than a 
religious obligation:  
I do not choose to drink alcohol; even if I was nota Muslim probably I still would not 
do these things... I do not choose to do things like; drinking, gambling, going out and 
doing all those stuffs.  
[28 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In this quote, Hamid highlights that his lack of alcohol consumption and other 
prohibited actions such as gambling were for him a atter of choice and related to 
other reasons, e.g. perhaps seeing them as anti-social behaviour, rather than 
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religiosity. It is however important to note that it is likely that Hamid’s view was 
shaped or affected by socialisation with his family and community, who were all 
Muslims. In another example, Kathryn, who was a less-practicing Muslim woman, 
also asserted that lack of alcohol consumption was for her just a matter of choice: 
I do not do things which I believe are wrong … I could do it, but it is just like 
something that we feel we do not need to do; like drinking alcohol. 
[27 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   These two quotes might be associated with both the stronger religious identity 
amongst practicing Muslims and the weaker religious identity amongst these two 
less-practicing Muslims, Hamid and Kathryn. As I discussed in Chapter 5, these two 
respondents reported more affiliation with their ethnic (Pakistani) and national 
identities (British) than their religious identity as Muslims. Such commitment to 
abstinence amongst these less-practicing participants might be due to family and/or 
community pressure. Apart from seeing alcohol consumption to be wrong, a fear of 
being isolated from the family or the community can be another possible explanation 
for such commitment. These examples support previous research (Runnymede Trust 
1997; Murji 2011), which suggested the importance of the family and community in 
affecting Muslims’ - especially young and second generation Muslims’ - integration 
and identity in the UK. The association between being a less-practicing Muslim and 
having a weaker religious identity, however, is problematised by the example of 
Shakila and Zainab. These two participants were both less-practicing Muslim 
women, but they also had a strong religious identity. The lack of alcohol 
consumption by these participants was associated more with following the religion of 
Islam rather than with any other intentions. These xamples may thus imply that 
even though religiosity and religious identity is sgnificant on the whole in the lack 
of alcohol consumption amongst practicing Muslims, other factors such as family 
and community pressure can also play a part, especially amongst less-practicing 
Muslims.  
   Turning to the issue of avoiding places where alcohol was served, the data suggests 
that even though some less-practicing Muslims report d abstinence, they did not 
avoid being present in its serving areas and consequently did not mention alcohol 
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consumption as being a barrier to their social integration. These participants did not 
mind attending places where alcohol was served and they used to attend drinking 
establishments such as pubs and bars. Ehsan and Hami , for example, reported that 
they used to attend pubs, bars, and night clubs. For example in one quote in which he 
highlighted the importance of Islamophobia and racism, Hamid also stated that he 
used to go to pubs and bars. This was despite the fact that he already mentioned that 
he did not consume alcohol: 
I used to go to the pub but it does not matter what we do, we could be drinking with 
them in the pub, we could go out with them and having fun and everything, but we are 
still [a foreigner/Paki], for example if we have a fight, the first thing they would say is 
"you are a Paki".  
[28 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Although some less-practicing Muslims attend drinking establishments, the above 
quotes show their ambiguity about this subject. The example of Ehsan, a less-
practicing Muslim man, was quoted above when he refr d to the times that he used 
to go to pubs and bars and thus similarly highlighted drinking establishments. The 
examples of Ehsan and Hamid highlight the fact thatdespite the lack of alcohol 
consumption, these participants went to drinking establishment areas to gain a 
greater social integration. This supports previous research by Hopkins (2004) that 
showed that some of his respondents tended to go clubbing together in their spare 
time or at the weekend but did not drink alcohol. These participants have a specific 
interpretation of prohibition of alcohol consumption; believing that even though 
consumption is prohibited, being present in places where alcohol is served is not 
prohibited (Esposito 2011) or is at least not considered to be as important. Thus, the 
lack of alcohol consumption did not stop these participants from socialising and 
taking part in events where alcohol was served. As I illustrated in previous chapters, 
however, several respondents stopped going to such places due to the fear of 
Islamophobic or racist attacks. In contrast to other practicing and less-practicing 
Muslims (such as Shakila and Zainab) whose religious identity was the main reason 
for the lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding its serving places, for Ehsan and 
Hamid (who had no strong Muslim identity), it was Islamophobia and racism that 
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stopped them from socialising in this way. This canimply that while Muslim identity 
- commitment to the religion - was a barrier to social integration, for those who had 
no such strong religious identity, other issues such as Islamophobia and racism had a 
larger role to play than religiosity in hindering their social integration. 
 
Mixed Sex Interactions: Another Cultural Barrier  
  The next cultural limit for Muslims’ social integration was mixed-sex interactions 
and meetings. Some interviewees mentioned that based on their Islamic rules, free 
mixing with opposite sexes is not permitted for Muslim . This can be traced to an 
interpretation of Islam that posits that after puberty, boys and girls should be 
separated (Hashmi 2002; Esposito 2011) However, thee are different practices and 
interpretations of this separation. In some cases, interaction between men and women 
was practiced but only to a limited extent. For example, Shadi, who was a practicing 
Muslim woman and a full time undergraduate student, stated that despite feeling 
Scottish or British, she would not have ‘too much one-to-one conversation with a 
man’ due to her religious identity:  
I put my religion first … for example if there is too much one to one interaction and 
conversation with a man, I would refuse that because whoever you are Scottish or 
British normally Islam comes first, even before your nationality but other than that any 
kind of integration like going to university, going out with your friends as long as they 
are good friends, working with charities and volunteering I think all these are okay.  
[25 year-old, Aberdeen] 
 
   For Shadi, ‘too much one-to-one interaction and conversation’ with opposite sex 
was considered to be unacceptable behaviour. Whilst thi  allows for everyday 
interaction in the university and workplace, however, what could limit her social 
interaction is the judgement of what is perceived as ‘too much.’ ‘Too much’ 
engagement here could mean a long one-to-one conversation with the opposite sex, 
which could make interactions with course lecturers difficult. What the quote 
underscores is that some practicing Muslims do initiate or engage in a conversation 
with the opposite sex, but however, such conversation and interaction would be 
limited to a certain extent in order for it not to be considered as ‘too much’ or in 
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other words, inappropriate behaviour. Even though the boundaries of the separation 
or avoiding of free mixing with the opposite sex were not clear, some respondents 
clarified a little more on the boundaries of such interaction. In some examples, the 
term ‘inappropriate manner’ was used by participants to explain the extent to which a 
mixed sex meeting or interaction could be identified as being prohibited. For 
example, Fazel, who was a practicing Muslim man, stated that he avoided 
conversation with the opposite sex in his workplace when there is an inappropriate 
subject such as sexual joking:  
Especially at work when some girls try to joke or speak about something which is not 
appropriate, such as sexual jokes and issues, for a Muslim to engage I avoid 
conversation with them or I just change the subject. So this is just an example of limits 
which a Muslim might have regarding his social integration.  
[23 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   This quote implies that conversations with the opposite sex involving sexual 
content can be considered as an ‘inappropriate’ manner by some Muslims. These two 
quotes could also imply that some practicing Muslim nitially take part in events or 
places where the opposite sex are present and they may engage in a conversation 
with them, but the ‘inappropriate’ extent or content of a conversation or interaction 
is what can result in the ending of such an interaction. In another example, it was 
highlighted that if the extent and content of a social event is thought to be 
inappropriate, some practicing Muslims may not attend such events from the outset. 
Illustrating this, Samad, who was also a practicing Muslim man, expressed that he 
would not feel comfortable as a Muslim in attending certain social events:  
As being Muslim, there are some limits for social integration and interaction. For 
example, if there is a social evening or a dance evening and people get drunk and 
women dance with inappropriate dress, such as half naked dressing, then I would not 
feel comfortable attending such events.  
[30 year-old, Dunfermline] 
 
   Samad’s quote highlights how avoiding inappropriate interactions and 
inappropriate meetings with the opposite sex can limit practicing Muslims’ social 
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integration in the Scottish context, wherein many social events and activities are held 
in a mixed way and with alcohol consumption. This echoes Hopkins’ (2004) 
research, which suggested the importance of behaving and dressing modestly for 
both Muslim men and women, and highlighted that ‘the lack of modesty present in 
Scottish society works to exclude young Muslim men and women.’ Further to social 
integration, this can have some bearing on other aspect  of Muslims’ integration in 
Scotland. For example, it can be discussed that the low employment rate or higher 
educational attainment for Muslim women might be associated with the practice of 
this rule [this was discussed in more detail in the previous chapter]. These quotes can 
also suggest that the definition of ‘inappropriate manner’ even amongst practicing 
Muslim participants was not concrete enough to provide the same boundaries for 
everyone, and thus could change from person to person. As was illustrated above, the 
term ‘inappropriate manner’ could include too much conversation, sexual joking, 
dancing, and drinking with the opposite sex. Even though these last three quotes 
suggest the importance of religious identity as a driving force in directing Muslims’ 
social integration, they also highlight that Muslims’ approaches to mixed-sex 
meetings is a matter of difference that is based on their religiosity and their 
interpretation of separation between men and women. This implies that less-
practicing Muslims or non-practicing Muslims would have different attitudes in 
meetings and interactions with the opposite sex. For example, none of the less-
practicing Muslims pointed to mixed-sex meetings as a barrier to integration. This 
finding is consistent with the finding of the previous discussion of being present in 
alcohol serving areas that suggested that some less-practicing Muslims did not mind 
going to such places. Despite structural/social and cultural barriers, Muslims made 
efforts to integrate into Scottish society through alternative means. These alternative 
methods of social integration are discussed in the next chapter. In contrast to the 
cultural and social barriers, participants identified some other issues such as cultural 
understanding and respect as pathways towards integration that could help them to 




Pathways to Integration 
Cultural Understanding and Respect  
   For most participants, cultural understanding and respect were the main pathways 
to Muslims’ integration. It was highlighted that an i creased understanding of 
Muslim culture and religion by the majority group members could facilitate 
Muslims’ religious considerations and their special needs for social interaction. 
Participants felt that familiarity with Muslims’ cult ral and religious limits could 
help the majority group members to facilitate their intended social interaction by 
accommodating Muslims’ religious needs; e.g. providing Halal foods and drinks or 
holding events in non-alcoholic places such as cafés. Interviewees particularly 
articulated the fact that if their moral and religious limits were acknowledged and 
respected, they would feel more comfortable in developing a committed and close 
friendship with majority group members. Sanaz, for instance, who was a practicing 
Muslim woman, felt that if the majority group members received enough knowledge 
about Muslims’ social integration limits, they would make an effort to facilitate such 
considerations: 
Pathway, maybe making people more aware of point; like I do not drink, you can go 
somewhere like coffee place, you integrate differently or eating vegetarian or 
something, just making people more aware of that; this is something that you do not 
do and this is the way around it. If they are accommodating enough, understanding 
enough then they would do that for you and there would not be any problem for 
further social integration. 
[41 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This implies that some Muslims had a hope that if the majority Scots had more 
knowledge about Muslims, they would try to accommodate such needs in everyday 
interactions with Muslim fellow citizens or friends. This perception that familiarity 
with Muslims’ religious needs could lead to increasd accommodation of such needs 
differs from the perception of some participants such as Kasim and Ali, who felt that 
the majority Scots have an assimilatory approach to Muslims’ integration (this was 
discussed in the barrier section). They had a percetion that the majority Scots expect 
Muslims to abandon their moral codes of practice and dopt to the Scottish dominant 
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culture of ‘drink[ing] and going out.’ This and other quotes in this section, however, 
suggest that some other Muslims felt that more knowledge about Muslims could lead 
to increased accommodation of Muslims’ religious needs. The hope and perception 
that the majority would accommodate Muslims’ religious needs by in everyday 
social interaction may have been created and affected by these participants’ 
experience of such respect and accommodative practices. Further to the example of 
Sanaz who suggested that Muslims should make more of an effort to take part in 
various public events and raise the awareness of the majority about Muslims’ limits, 
Sadiq pointed to his own experience of organising a university conference in a non-
alcoholic restaurant. Sadiq, who was a practicing Muslim who was studying at 
Glasgow University, highlighted the importance of raising the awareness of people 
and asserted that if Muslims speak about their conditi , then the majority would 
accommodate Muslims’ conditions:  
If we speak about our needs they will accommodate that. I will give you an example, I 
organised a conference four years ago in my university in Glasgow. 150 people from 
all over the world; India, South Africa, Russia, Canada all these people were invited to 
come and speak. One of the things which I raised in the committee was the issue of 
meal and restaurant. They already assumed that they are going to go to a bar-restaurant 
or something like that but as I was in the committee I said and insisted that if we have 
our event in a bar-restaurant, this may exclude 5% of the guests who are Muslims. 
This will turn them off because they do not drink alcohol and probably would not sit 
in a table where alcohol is served. Instead, I suggested that it is better to book a place 
where it serves Halal food and a place where have not alcohol in certain tables and so 
on. Only because I was there and raised the issue they understand the issue and agreed 
to arrange a restaurant with Halal food. If I was not there or did not raise the issue, 
they would never think of that and arrange such place. So, again it is up to us to show 
and speak our conditions. In that case I think they will accommodate our conditions as 
much as they can. 
[25 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   These quotes reinforce the point made above about the unintentional nature of 
assimilatory behaviour. This was also highlighted in the next example, where Wahed 
stated that awareness about Muslims’ limits for social integration can result in 
respecting such limits and thus not pushing Muslims to do what is prohibited for 
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them. Wahed, who was a practicing Muslim man and was studying at Glasgow 
University like Sadiq, highlighted that his university friends who were familiar with 
Muslims’ religious limits for social integration nev r pushed him to do prohibited 
things: 
I am studying in Glasgow University. I think my friends in Glasgow University know 
Muslims, so they understand what I can do and what I am not allowed to do. So I have 
never been pressured to drink or go to the pub. I think now in some ways educated 
indigenous Scottish people know how much Muslims can be integrated, they also 
know how much they [Muslims] cannot do these things and stuff. 
[20 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Further to highlighting the importance of familiarity with Muslims’ religious needs 
for the possibility social integration, the example of Sadiq and Wahed also 
highlighted the importance of the academic environme t and education. These quotes 
suggest that educated people who have more knowledge about Muslims or become 
familiar with Muslims’ religious needs can be more accommodative towards 
Muslims. It also emphasises the importance of education in respecting and 
accommodating Muslims’ religious needs and thus in developing their social 
integration. Such accommodation and respect may result in the greater integration of 
Muslims in Scotland. The next chapter, thus, focuses on how Muslims, especially the 
new generation, try to fit into Scottish society bytaking alternative ways of 
socialising such as meeting in cafés and doing voluntary work. 
   Further to the practical aspect of raising awareness about Muslims’ religious needs 
and conditions for social integration, the psychological aspect of raising awareness 
about Muslims’ religion was also highlighted by one of the participants. Raising 
awareness about Muslims’ religion, it was suggested, could result in more confidence 
and thus in more comfort to develop social integration for Muslims. For example, 
Nader, who was a practicing Muslim man, stated thatfamiliarity with Muslims’ 
culture could make both sides - the majority and minority groups - feel more 
comfortable and thus more easily able to integrate. Nader himself was trying to 





What we try to do is telling people why we do pray and how many times we do that. 
This would help them to understand us better and if they understand then they would 
be comfortable with it and then it would be easier for us to practice our religion and 
integrate with others… integration will only happen when people respect our belief 
and culture. If they are not going to accept that, we will not change our religion only 
because somebody wants us to integrate. I think I will probably get on a lot better with 
people who respect my culture and religion.  
[38 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   In this quote, Nader highlights the importance of respect and recognition of 
Muslims’ religion and culture by the majority. This is exactly the opposite of 
Islamophobia, which could eventually make Muslims the most unfavoured minority 
group. As I discussed in the above section, Islamophobia can lead to less socialising 
and interaction on both sides by making Muslims an unfavoured group. Another 
implication for such familiarity with Muslims’ culture could be decreasing 
Islamophobic views amongst the majority group members. This can also help 
Muslims’ integration by removing such barriers and may result in more welcoming 
approaches from majority group members towards Muslims. For example, Hassan 
and Hamid pointed to the possibility of decreasing Islamophobia through increasing 
awareness about Muslims’ culture and religion in speaking about pathways to greater 
social integration. Hassan, who was a practicing Muslim man, had a perception that 
people gaining more knowledge about Muslims’ culture and religion, especially 
through interfaith dialogue, could result in the elimination of distorted images of 
Muslims and thus make their integration easier:   
The best way to promote integration is to have more understanding, to share and have 
a dialogue; interfaith and inter-cultural dialogue. Best thing from Muslims and people 
from other nationalities is inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue because they can 
understand you, they can understand your culture and they can understand Islam. In 
the past there used to be bad and negative things about our culture so when they 
understand they realise that a lot of it was distorted about Islam or about other culture, 
a lot of these propaganda. If they understand Muslims then Muslims can have at least 
easier life from their fathers who came here long times ago.  




   Hassan asserts that raising awareness about Muslims can decrease Islamophobia 
and lead to an easier life and to interaction with ot ers. In another example, Hamid, 
who was also a less-practicing Muslim man, had a perception that having knowledge 
about Muslims or any other minority groups through education - especially from an 
early age - could lead people to have increased respect for their cultural and religious 
practices: 
Racism and Islamophobia are very important. If there was not any racism, integration 
would be much easier. For example, if people become more educated about Muslims 
and their culture and religion it may make to have less racial and Islamophobic views 
about them. If kids in this country are taught about ther religions and other cultures 
from the beginning I think there might be a differenc  because they will know what 
they are growing up with, if they get taught about ther religions and other cultures 
they would respect it. 
[28 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In parallel to the examples of Nader and Hassan, H mid highlights the importance 
of education in giving more knowledge about Muslims, which can lead to more 
respect for Muslims, and thus more toleration of Muslims. As illustrated so far, 
familiarity with Muslims’ culture and religion can be achieved through inter-faith 
dialogue and education. In the next example, the importance of mixing with the 
majority as another way of becoming more familiar with Muslim ’ culture and 
religion was highlighted. Zainab, who was also a less-practicing Muslim, asserted 
that familiarity with Muslims could be gained through working and mixing with the 
majority group members: 
Those Muslims who are working in state sector or private sector could help integration 
process because they are mixing with others and that is one way to bring down barriers 
by working together, talking together, sitting together … that would bring down the 
barriers... once we start working as equals, sitting down and building friendship, 
getting to know each other the barriers will come down.  




   To sum up, all quotes in this section imply the importance of familiarity in recently 
decline of Islamophobia. These quotes also highlight the importance of the lack of 
Islamophobia in normalising Muslims’ interaction with others. As I discussed in the 
barriers section, barriers to Muslims’ integration were both cultural and social. This 
can suggest that key barriers that revolved around assimilatory practices could be 
removed by making people more familiar with Muslims’ culture and religion. These 
findings support previous research by Hussain and Miller (2006: 59), which showed 
that those Scottish people who said they know at least ‘quite a lot’ about Muslims 
were 25 per cent less Islamophobic compared to those who said they ‘know nothing 
at all.’ It also supports the results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010), 
which considered the importance of familiarity with Muslims in the context of 
personal relationships and showed that the percentag  of people who would be 
unhappy with a Muslim forming a long-term relationship with a close relative (29%) 
dropped almost by half (16%) just because they knew a Muslim person (Ormston et. 
al. 2011: 27). 
 
Conclusion 
   Discussing the importance of Muslims’ identity and experience of Islamophobia 
and also that of other factors such as media and language, the data suggests that one 
significant barrier to integration was the majority’s unwelcoming attitudes towards 
Muslims as the most unfavoured minority, which were attributed to Islamophobia. 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Islamophobia was not a big issue in 
Scotland and was, therefore, a less significant facor in hindering Muslims’ 
integration. Scottish social norms such as drinking alcohol and mixed-sex meetings 
were by far the most significant issues raised by respondents, in particular the fact 
that so much of Scottish social life revolved around alcohol. The significance of this 
issue was due to the dominant practice of alcohol consumption in Scottish social life 
and its prohibition in Islam. Thus, it can be argued that the most important issue that 
limited g Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious 
identity and the dominance of alcohol. Even the Scottish identity could not build a 
bridge between these two issues due to the importance of religion amongst the 
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practicing Muslims. Less-practicing Muslims, however, due to their lesser 
commitment to their religion, had a more flexible approach on this issue. For 
example, some less-practicing Muslims used to drink alcohol and/or, crucially, did 
not mind attending drinking establishments, whereas pr cticing Muslims never drink 
alcohol and usually do not tend to go to any place wh re alcohol is served. In other 
words, religious identity was the most important consideration for practicing 
Muslims for managing their social integration, while for the less-practicing Muslims, 
the issue of Islamophobia and unwelcoming attitudes wa  more important. This may 
imply interestingly that non-practicing Muslims would have different strategies for 
their social integration, but this requires further r search.  
   The recognition and respect of Muslims’ religious needs was identified as the main 
pathway to social integration. The demonstrated importance of the familiarity with 
Muslim culture in Muslims’ views could reflect that the majority’s inclusionary 
attitudes and practices towards Muslims are central to Muslims’ social integration 
and that on the contrary, exclusionary attitudes and practices can cause social 
isolation. This leads to the next chapter, where I discuss how Muslims integrate into 
Scottish economic, education, and society by managing these barriers.  
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Chapter 9: Muslims’ Integration in Scotland: Halal Integration 
 
Introduction 
   In the last chapter, I discussed how Muslims’ religious identity, experience of 
Islamophobia, and social norms such as drinking alcohol can limit their social 
integration in Scotland. In this chapter, I discuss Muslims’ main strategy to 
overcome such barriers, namely Halal integration, in order to socialise and interact 
with the mainstream society while maintaining their r ligious identity. Other aspects 
of Muslims’ integration - economic and educational integration - are also discussed 
in this chapter.  
   As mentioned in the last chapter, religion plays  central role in Muslims’ identity 
(Modood 2005; Esposito 2011) and how their behaviour in all spheres of life should 
be (Jacobson 1997b). The significance of Islam in practicing Muslims’ life is related 
to the crucial emphasis of teachings of Islam upon right and correct action (Jacobson 
1997b; Esposito 2011). Islamic law, which constitutes ‘the ideal social blueprint for 
the believer who asks, what should I do?’, has remained important to Muslims’ 
identity and practice (Esposito 2011: 158). These teachings include ‘regulations 
ranging from religious rituals to marriage, divorce and inheritance to setting 
standards for penal and international law’ (Esposito 2011: 158). These pervasive 
religious boundaries can affect Muslims’ social integration because it affects their 
wider social relation with non-Muslims - the majority - and their daily life (Jacobson 
1997b; Joppke 2012). The practice of some Islamic rituals such as reading daily 
prayers and avoiding alcohol consumption, especially by devoted Muslims, can make 
Islam a significant element of Muslims’ daily life and thus directly impinge upon 
their relationships with non-Muslims (Jacobson 1997b). The necessity of eating a 
Halal diet and abstinence from alcohol are the religious prescriptions that inevitably 
have an effect upon a large number of Muslims in Britain (Jacobson 1997b). 
Illustrating this, Jacobson (1997b) highlights the differences in socialising patterns 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and suggests that the dominance of drinking 
alcohol in the social lives of most young Britons can result in the isolation of 
Muslims (Jacobson 1997b). Therefore, Muslims’ religious identity and practices can 
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function as a cultural boundary (Joppke 2012), a trigger for increased civic 
integration (Choudhury 2007; Meer 2010), or a tool of integration (Hussain and 
Miller 2006). As I discussed in Chapter 5, the strength of Muslims’ affiliation with 
religious identity can vary on the basis of their commitment to their religion. Thus, 
this chapter discusses the importance of religious identity for integration amongst 
practicing and less-practicing Muslims.  
   It has also been argued that integration, or acculturation, can differ ‘among 
generations, as indicated by the differences that can be observed between immigrants 
and their children and grandchildren’ (Phinney 2003). Jacobson (1997b) also points 
to the complex ways in which young Muslims negotiate their identities in different 
contexts. The differing values that are associated with the private and public spheres 
may require the second generation Muslims to develop different identity strategies 
and to switch cultural ‘codes’ (Ballard 1994: 33). Studying migrants’ integration by 
analysing political trust and satisfaction in 24 European countries, Maxwell (2010) 
also found that first generation immigrants have th most positive attitudes while 
second generations have a similar level of politica trust and satisfaction to the 
native-origin individuals. These findings may suggest that as the second generations 
adopt linguistic, educational, and social aptitudes over time, the process of 
integration would only concern the first generations. However, others by highlighting 
the long-term and intergenerational nature of integration argue that in some areas 
integration of second generations still remains problematic (Modood 2007; Pfeffer 
2014). The result of McVie and Wiltshire’s (2010) survey - on Muslim and non-
Muslim youths’ experiences of racism, discrimination, and social marginalisation in 
England and Scotland - showed that generational dynamics can lead to inter-
generational conflicts. For example, the significance of the birthplace marker to 
everyday understandings of Scottishness may make second generation respondents 
more likely to claim a Scottish identity. However, other factors that are relevant to 
both the first and second generations, such as one’s length of residence and 
commitment to place, have also been identified as le ding people towards feeling 
Scottish (Bond 2006, McCrone and Bechhofer 2008). By taking generational 
dynamics into consideration, I will discuss the importance of generational difference 
in Muslims’ integration.  
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   Previous research pointed to a gendered process of exclusion in observing that 
Muslim women are less likely to be employed or to have higher educational 
qualifications (Scottish Government report 2005). A more recent report (Poverty by 
Ethnicity and Country 1999-2008) by Netto et. al. (2011) also found that 
employment rates are particularly low among Pakistan  and Bangladeshi women who 
are predominantly Muslim. Both structural factors (such as discrimination and 
racism) and cultural pressures (Qureshi and Moores 1999; Masud 2005; Cassidy et. 
al. 2006; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Lewis 2007) affect Muslim women’s economic and 
social integration. In terms of external pressure, p vious research that reported the 
voices of Scottish Muslim women (Masud 2005; El-Nakla et. al. 2007) showed that 
Muslim women have experienced an increase in Islamophobia since 9/11, the Iraq 
war, and the London bombings. El-Nakla et. al. (2007) found that many Muslim 
women experienced discrimination as a factor that affected their employability. 
These women felt that their Muslim identity and appearance played a part in being 
discriminated against in both employment and education (El-Nakla et. al. 2007). 
Concerning cultural pressures, Lewis (2007), for example, suggests that young 
Muslims - particularly young women - are often overprotected by their anxious 
families. More specifically, Lewis reports that a recurring feeling expressed by 
young Muslims was the ‘suffocating impact of community pressure exercised by the 
extended family embedded in clans’ (Lewis 2007: 41). Qureshi and Moores (1999) 
also suggested that young British Asians live betwen two sets of cultural values: on 
the one hand, the social world of family, community, and religion; and on the other, 
the western world as experienced through education and media. They suggest that 
‘the Islamic tradition make[s] any translation betwen those value systems especially 
difficult for second generation girls’ (Qureshi and Moores 1999: 318). Lewis (2007) 
argues that cultural and religious practices play a p rt in educational 
underachievement among Muslims women. This chapter reflects on these gendered 
processes and highlighted the importance of gender dynamics in Muslims’ socio-
economic integration in Scotland by addressing the experiences of both men and 
women.  
   This chapter begins by exploring participants’ economic and employment 
integration in Scotland. Due to the high rate of first generation Muslims’ self-
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employment and the lesser participation of Muslim women in paid work, the 
importance of generational and gendered processes are discussed here. Second, this 
chapter details participants’ educational achievements. In this section, the importance 
of second generation Muslim women’s religious identity in challenging cultural 
barriers to achieving greater educational integration is highlighted. Finally, 
participants’ social integration through friendship and shared and sporting activities 
is outlined. In this section, the importance of religious practice for participants’ 
strategy of Halal integration is discussed. 
 
Economic Integration 
   The first point to note is that there was considerable economic and employment 
integration amongst participants: more than a third [16 out 43] were employed, more 
than a third [15 out 43] were self-employed, and less than a third [12] were either 
students or working as volunteers or looking for a job. Taking gender differences 
into consideration, however, the data suggested considerable female participation in 
employment. Amongst Muslim men - who were the majority of the interviewees - 25 
out of 31 participants were working either as employed [12] or self-employed [13], 5 
participants were full time students, and one remaining participant was looking for a 
job. This was slightly different amongst Muslim women because about half of them 
were working; 4 [out 12] were employed, 2 were self-employed, and one was a full 
time student. Given the small sample size, this numerical distribution together cannot 
fully represent the diversity of Muslim experiences. However it can firstly suggest a 
high tendency towards self-employment and secondly suggest the participation of 
Muslim women in paid employment. In the following sections, I discuss different 
explanations for these two findings with regards to participants’ experiences and 
views. 
 
Self-Employment; The First Generation Issue 
   Starting with the former finding, the data suggests a significant tendency towards 
self-employment; consisting of more than a third of male participants [13 out 31] and 
2 female participants [2 of 12]. This rate is consistent with the national trend of 
 
239 
Muslims’ involvement in self-employment in the country, which the highest rate of 
self-employment after Sikhs (29%) (Scottish Governme t 2005). The analysis of 
self-employed interviewees’ experiences and accounts suggests that some structural 
barriers contributed significantly to this trend. The following factors were cited by 
participants as the main reasons for self-employment; 1) discrimination; 2) financial 
rewards; 3) insufficient qualifications; 4) language barriers; and 5) lack of familiarity 
with the job application process. It is, however, important to note that reason 2 - 
financial rewards - was not a barrier and functioned rather as an encouraging factor 
to self-employment. The data also suggested that it was mainly the first generation 
Muslims who tended to build up self-employment jobs such as small businesses and 
shops in Scotland for these reasons. I will now discus  and illustrate the importance 
of these issues alongside generational differences. 
   The first example is Ehsan, who was a first-generation Muslim man, was self-
employed, and has lived in Falkirk for 20 years. Ehsan had no Scottish academic 
qualifications and had only a primary education certificate from Pakistan. He had 
owned a grocery shop in Falkirk for 10 years. In an interesting comparison, he 
compared his previous job as an employed labourer fo  a Scottish company with his 
current self-employed job as a shop keeper. He stated that due to the push of 
discriminatory behaviour and the pull of financial rewards and a more convenient 
situation, he had decided to start up a self-employed job: 
When I came here I used to work for a Scottish company and they expected me to do 
everything and I always did whatever they said because I was not confident enough 
and could not do anything against that. I feared that ey would fire me if I made any 
complaint against that. So, I just tried to save money to buy this shop. Now I am more 
confident in my new self-employed job. Now I know tha  there are many things you 
can do and money wise it is better as well because people from Asia can work longer 
hours and they need more money to build house and fulfil their other basic needs.... we 
think that you will be more respectful if you earn your life yourself that is why we go 
for our own business. At the end of the day if you are working for somebody you 
should be responsible to him but if I am working for myself I am happier and I have 
no boss.  




   This quote highlights how the perception of discrimination and lack of information 
about employment and labour rights led Ehsan towards  self-employed job. It also 
highlights his fear of losing his job were he to complain against the unjust situation. 
In addition to those negative factors, two positive factors were also highlighted. 
Having no boss and making more profits - due to longer working hours - were also 
identified as reasons for self-employment in this ca e. He insists that Asian people 
work longer hours than the majority, a point that is supported by survey research 
(Scottish Government 2005). This could mean that the Asian minority group would 
be more effective in terms of greater economic integration, albeit at the expense of 
working longer hours. Another issue about this quote was the fact that Ehsan was 
living in a small town, where the experience of racial and religious discrimination 
has been said to be more likely than in the larger cities (de Lima 2001). De Lima 
(2001) suggested that there is a wide range of employment discrimination in Scottish 
rural areas that made self-employment the main form of employment. Self-
employment amongst Muslims, however, was not limited to the smaller towns. This 
is consistent with my findings in the previous chapter that suggested a significant 
perception of employment discrimination in both Scottish large cities and small 
towns. To compare the example of Ehsan with one from the larger cities, I turn to 
Emran. Emran was a first generation Muslim man, whoas self-employed in buying 
and selling cars in Glasgow. He has lived in Glasgow for 10 years. Emran also used 
to have an employed job which, like Ehsan, he later left due to perceived 
discrimination. By making a comparison between his last and current job, he stated 
that his experience of indirect discrimination was the main reason why he quit his 
employed position and became self-employed:  
I used to work for a company. Its manager was discriminating against me. They never 
do that directly because it is against the law but they do it indirectly. So you cannot 
prove it. For example, if someone like your supervisor does not like you, for any 
reason, no matter how hard and nice you work, he would always criticize you and 
would try to find something wrong with your work. That would make other team 
members to do the same thing to you in order to support the supervisor’s view. That 
made me frustrated and depressed which was affecting my family too. So, I left the job 
and became self-employed. Now I have been in this job for a while and deal with my 
customers who are often white people and they talk to me nicely too. … Being self-
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employed is an advantage because you are your own bss. You have got your own 
business and you do not answer to anyone, you work your own hours. 
[39 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   This quote highlights the indirect and hidden nature of discrimination that could 
affect Muslims’ employment choices. The importance of this kind of discrimination 
is in its hidden nature, which means that Muslims are unable to deal with it legally 
because it is impossible or hard to prove. This is certainly one factor that explains 
why some first generation Muslims, such as Ehsan and Emran, tended to decide to 
open up a small business and become self-employed. Another advantage of self-
employed jobs as recognized by these two interviewees was having no boss who 
might discriminate against them. As seen in the case of Emran, having a 
discriminatory supervisor or boss can cause distress and trouble in someone’s 
economic and even family life. Although self-employment could reduce experiences 
of discrimination and racism from a boss or from any other managerial position, it 
was not necessarily effective in reducing experiences of racism or any other form of 
abuse from customers. As highlighted in Chapters 6 and 7, some self-employed 
participants reported experiences of racism and Islamophobia. The previous research 
by Ameli et. al.(2004: 31) revealed that the difference in reported discrimination 
between employed (85%) and self-employed (82.2%) Muslims was insignificant. It 
is important to note that discrimination by an employer can mean not getting a job or 
promotion, but discrimination or racism by customers can mean verbal or physical 
abuse or them not buying goods. The former may imply an effect on people’s 
economic and financial wellbeing, whereas the latter may affect people’s mental and 
social wellbeing. For those first generation Muslim who were struggling with 
financial difficulties, the financial loss was more important than the psychological 
effects. The example of Saleh, who was another first generation Muslim man who 
referred to his experiences of street and individual racism (as quoted in Chapter 7) 
highlighted the more severe implications of employment discrimination that can also 
affect their family. He stated that Muslims usually take employment discrimination 
seriously, for example by taking their cases to court, while they usually ignore verbal 
abuse. The examples of Ehsan, Emran and Saleh implythat for the first generation 
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Muslims, the discrimination received from employers was more important than the 
discrimination that might be received from customers. The example of Ehsan and 
Emran can also imply the significance of a cultural mentality that prefers a man to be 
‘his own boss’ amongst some first generation Muslim.  
   Insufficient qualifications, language barriers, and lack of familiarity with job 
application processes were other factors that were acknowledged to affect first 
generation Muslims’ tendency towards self-employment. For example, Tariq 
mentioned that finding a job in which to be employed was difficult for him. Tariq 
was a first-generation Muslim man of Pakistani background who was born in the 
Netherlands. He has lived in Scotland for 7 years and has worked in a shop in Falkirk 
for 3 years. Tariq’s knowledge of the English langua e was at an intermediate level 
and was good enough to communicate with his customers. He stated that the easier 
process of setting up a self-employed job was the main reason that he chose to be 
self-employed:  
We always try to work hard to get to the stage. Self-employment is easier than looking 
for a job; you do not have to give your CV to someon ; you can build on your own 
skills. If I wanted to have job, to be honest first I would go to my Asian friends 
because that is an easier option for me. If I do not get accepted there, I will go to a job 
centre and through them take the procedure. But the first thing I do is ask a friend. 
[28 year-old, Falkirk] 
  
   This quote reflects that the lack of information a d unfamiliarity with the job 
application process made setting up a self-employed job easier for some Muslims. 
This was in addition to the fact that, on arrival to Scotland or Britain as a whole, 
many first generation Muslims lacked sufficient qualifications and English language 
capability. These findings support the previous research by the Change Institute 
(2009), which suggested that the language barrier was a key barrier to accessing the 
job market and that it could lead those without fluency towards jobs that have 
unsociable hours, such as taxi services. The importance of the language barrier and 
insufficient qualifications is also highlighted in the next example. Ghader was a first 
generation Muslim man who has lived in Glasgow for 49 years. He was self-
employed and owned a grocery shop. He highlighted the importance of language 
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difficulties and insufficient qualifications in rendering him an unsuccessful 
employee. By contrast, in becoming self-employed, he could himself become an 
employer:  
Basically we were not very skilled for example in my case; I came here when I was 15; 
I could not speak the language; I did not have any professional skill, so what could I 
do? I was a manual labourer, so that was what I had done then I realised if I am going 
to staying in this country I have to learn the langua e then I taught myself to read and 
write English by myself. … So, I have been in this business for long time now and I 
have become an employer myself, I have employed non-Muslims in my shop but I 
treated them and interact with them as the same as wh t I do with Muslims. 
[63 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   This quote shows how setting up a self-employed business could bring more 
success for first generation Muslims who lack other opportunities. It was seen in all 
of the above examples that these participants were happy with their self-employed 
business. This could be associated with their preference to be ‘their own boss,’ and 
also the increased level of financial success that ey could gain from self-
employment. This is also highlighted in the person in the next example, who owned 
two shops in Stirling. Hareb, like other examples in this section, was a first 
generation Muslim man, was of Pakistani background, and has lived in Stirling for 
22 years. Hareb considered himself to be a successful elf-employed person who 
owned two shops. He had no Scottish academic qualification and his English spoken 
language was of an intermediate level. He expressed that he is happy and successful 
with his job while having no Scottish qualifications:  
One main reason was my education. See most of people from my class came here and 
immediately started opening up a business. Some who had good qualification and 
education went for good jobs but we had not good qualification so we went for 
business and I am happy with that. I have one grocery shop and one cash and carry 
shop, so they do not require any qualification and it was easy to run those businesses. 
[45 year-old, Stirling]  
 
   This may imply that setting up a self-employed business was further seen asan easy 
start that could also bring more prosperity for first generation Muslims. To reflect on 
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the importance of sociological factors in the tendency to choose self-employment, 
the data suggests the importance of generational differences. Of the 15 self-employed 
participants, only 4 were second generation and the rest were first generation. As 
well as to the greater number of self-employed first generation Muslims, a recurring 
theme in all of the interviews was the existence of a generational dynamic as 
expressed by the high rate of Muslim self-employment. In particular, the significant 
role of structural barriers - such as experience of discrimination, lack of information 
about labour rights, insufficient qualifications, and language barriers - were 
highlighted as being factors that drive first generation participants to self-
employment. The absence of such barriers amongst the second generation Muslims 
could mean that they have no interest in self-employment. Analysis of the first 
generation participants’ accounts of their children’s (the second generation’s) 
employment priorities and of the second generation Muslims’ actual employment 
preferences supports this argument.  
   Looking at the employment status of the second generation, only 4 out of 27 
second generation participants were self-employed. Of the 17 employed participants, 
12 were from the second generation and only 5 were from the first generation. This 
numerical distribution indicates that the first generation participants had more 
tendencies towards self-employment than the second generation participants, and 
also suggests that second generation Muslims are bett r integrated into Scotland than 
their parents. I In order to seek a deeper explanatio  for such a generational shift in 
Muslims’ employment preferences, the first generation participants were asked to 
comment on their children’s employment preferences and explain their actual 
reasons for taking self-employed jobs. They indicated hat the second generation 
Muslims had no significant interest in self-employment due to the absence of 
structural barriers. For example, the second generation Muslims had more successful 
educational integration than the first generation participants, and in many cases, their 
first generation parents had a strong intention to educate their children up to higher 
degrees in order to be able to get a professional job. For example, Ehsan, who was 
living with his Scottish born son and daughter in Falkirk, stated that his children are 
currently studying. He had decided to send his son to a private secondary school to 
receive a better education in order to increase his c ances of entering a prestigious 
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university such as Oxford or Cambridge. Despite his own employment status as a 
self-employed businessman, Ehsan had helped his children to study to increase their 
chances to gain better job opportunities:  
My son and my daughter were born here and they are studying hard and I have sent 
my son to a private school to get a better education. I think the second generation can 
find better jobs and there are more options for them than what has been for us because 
they are more educated. Most people who are working like me as a self-employed 
businessman do not have any qualification.  
[42 year-old, Falkirk]  
 
   This quote highlights the relationship between having good and sufficient 
qualifications and the increased chance of getting a better job. Education had a 
significant status among Muslims. For example, Muslim  in Scotland were more 
likely than others to be university graduated (Scottish Government 2005); but this 
focus on higher education could be only connected to the second generation Muslims 
because Muslims were also more likely than others to have no educational 
qualification at all. One reason for the desire to receive better education can be 
explained by the fact that better education could help Muslims and especially their 
children to find better jobs (Change Institute 2009). In another example, Hareb, who 
was another self-employed first-generation businessman, stated that being given the 
choice to choose between studying or working for their father, his children chose 
studying: 
I want them to study too. So I send my son and daughters to study and my daughter 
now is studying at Edinburgh University for her undergraduate degree. So, they will 
go to the jobs and they are studying very well. Actually it was up to them, working 
with me or studying, but they went for education.  
[45 year-old, Stirling] 
 
   These two last quotes imply that the second generation children did not have a 
significant interest in self-employed jobs even though such opportunities were ready 
for them. It can also suggest that their decision to continue studying in order to get 
more professional jobs was supported by their parents. It can be asserted that having 
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sufficient qualifications, knowing the language, and being familiar with the job 
application processes meant less interest amongst second generation Muslims to do 
self-employed jobs, even though such jobs are more available and accessible for 
them. This is further highlighted in the next example. Arezo, who was herself a self-
employed second generation Muslim woman, was working in her parents’ shop. She 
identified the availability and accessibility of her current job as the main reason to be 
self-employed. However, she stated that her other siblings and her own children had 
no interest in such work: 
What is happening now is that some of my siblings and my own children do not want 
to go to the businesses that their fathers started because they are more educated and 
they do not want to have a job that they are stuck o and take the bill home. They just 
want to go to a job, do the job, go home, and have nothing about job to think about; so 
that is changing now. I suppose society is a little bit more open now [less 
discrimination in employment] and more people can get the job they want, they 
struggle but eventually they manage to get a job.  
[50 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Arezo suggests that working for longer hours andthus making more profit, which 
was identified mainly as a positive factor and an advantage for first generation 
Muslims, could be seen as a disadvantage by the second generation Muslims. As 
already mentioned in earlier quotes, most first generation Muslims were newly 
arrived and unskilled workers who were also main providers of a usually extended 
family. Thus they were in a difficult situation because they had to work very hard 
and even took on two shifts in some cases to make a acceptable life for themselves 
and their families. The second generation Muslims who mainly had educational 
qualifications, English fluency, and parental support did not feel the necessity for 
such hard work that was more a part of self-employment. In another example, Wahed 
highlighted the lack of familiarity with the job application process that was identified 
by some first generation Muslims as an issue that led them to self-employment. 
Wahed, who was a full-time student and a young second generation Muslim man, 
mentioned that the familiarity of second generation Muslims with institutional 
processes makes it no problem for them to enter the process and apply for any job:  
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We as new generation have no problem go to the workplaces and finding job and 
handing over our applications… I think the older generation because of language 
barrier, because they came from country which this system of applying for job did not 
exist, they tend to open up a business. 
[20 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   It can be argued that familiarity with job application processes among the second 
generation Muslims is due to their successful education l integration and English 
language fluency. This can imply that being familiar with the process and having 
sufficient qualifications can make the second generation Muslims feel confident 
enough to enter and complete such a process. Another possible factor in leading the 
second generation Muslims towards employed jobs is having less experience and 
perceptions of job discrimination. This was highligted by the next example. Hakim, 
who was a full-time student and a second generation Muslim man, stated that the 
absence of fear of employment discrimination meant tha new generation Muslims 
had no fear when applying for any job, particularly in big companies:  
We as younger generations are pretty fine for applying for any job particularly in big 
companies, like Asda or any other big company. If they discriminate against us then 
the Scottish law will go higher than them, they won’t give way against discrimination. 
None of us have any fear of being discriminated against in those jobs. 
[Male, second generation, Edinburgh, 20 year-old] 
 
    In this quote, Hakim explicitly states that the law would protect them against any 
employment discrimination, thus second generation Muslims have no fear of such 
discrimination. This could also imply the second generation’s awareness of 
employment and labour law as well as their confidence i  its protection of Muslims 
against any discrimination. As discussed above in the examples of Ehsan and Emran, 
there were some first generation Muslims who had insufficient confidence and 
information about labour rights to legally deal with employment discrimination, thus 
they preferred to quit their employed jobs and to instead set up self-employed 
businesses. In contrast, the better integrated and networked second generation have 
no fear of such discrimination. Despite this, the emphasis on the ‘big firms’ suggests 
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that Hakim is less confident about the absence of racism in smaller firms. To sum up 
about the first key finding about interviewees’ economic integration, it can be 
concluded that the high rate of self-employment amongst the first generation 
Muslims was mainly due to structural barriers. The absence of such barriers among 
the second generation Muslims, therefore, helps to explain why there was no 
significant trend towards self-employment amongst them. 
 
Female Employment: Challenging Cultural Barriers 
   Turning to the second finding and taking the gender difference into consideration, 
the data suggests that there was considerable female p rticipation in paid 
employment. Previously, analysis of religion in the 2001 Census showed that 
economic activity was particularly low amongst Muslim women (Scottish 
Government 2005b), and previous research also suggeted that female Muslims are 
nine times as likely as other females to have never worked (in paid employment) or 
to be unemployed (Hussain and Miller 2006). It has been said that Scotland’s 
Muslim women’s reduced participation in the labour market was due to various 
barriers that included limited appropriate childcare, a lack of understanding of 
Islamic requirements by employers, poor English language skills, and their lack of 
confidence (El-Nakla et. al. 2007; see also Netto et. al. 2011). However, by 
highlighting the diversity of economic participation amongst female Muslims, the 
results of my research s also suggest that such structural (such as low qualification 
and language issues) and cultural issues (such as patriarchal practices) have been 
challenged by some second generation Muslim women. Looking again at the 
numerical distribution of the participants, it suggests that amongst Muslim men who 
were the majority of the interviewees, 25 out of 31 were working either as employed 
or self-employed, 5 participants were full-time students, and one man was looking 
for a job. In contrast amongst Muslim women; a third of them were employed [4 out 
12], a sixth was self-employed [2], more than a third of them were volunteers [5], 
and one interviewee was a full-time student. The first point that needs to be made 
here is the importance of the second generation; almost all of the female interviewees 
[6] who were participating in the economic aspects of ociety as employed or self-
employed, were part of the second generation who were educated and brought up in 
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Scotland. There was only one interviewee who was from the first generation and she 
was a full-time student. This may imply the considerable participation of second 
generation Muslim women in the economic aspects of society. As this research could 
only access one first generation female participant, y conclusions concerning 
change amongst first generation Muslim women requirs further research. In the next 
section, I discuss how Muslim women challenge and deal with structural and cultural 
barriers to their economic integration.  
   The data suggests that the ability of some second generation female Muslims to 
achieve greater economic integration points to the absence or decline of structural 
barriers (such as low qualifications, the language barrier, and discrimination) and 
their increasing ability to challenge cultural barriers. For example, Azadeh was one 
of those 5 participants who were engaged in voluntary work almost every day. She 
was a second generation Muslim woman and she used to work in a health 
educational centre for 7 years. She expressed how se pushed her family to let her go 
to work: 
As I grew up, it was very hard to have a job. For example, when I wanted to apply for 
a job, my dad [a first generation Muslim] was not very keen on it and I said to my 
mum ‘you speak to dad’, as mums always do, so she said to my dad if she (me) wants 
to work let her to do. Then I worked for 7 years in health education and then I decided 
to settle down and start a family. I have not worked since then but I have been busy 
with certain voluntary work which is like a full time work.  
[42 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In this quote, Azadeh highlights that she was able to challenge the cultural barrier 
that was put forward by her father and was thus able to secure paid work. This 
implies that the second generation Muslim women were becoming more able to 
challenge cultural barriers and enter paid or voluntary work. It can also be argued 
that structural barriers such as low qualification and language barriers faded as the 
second generation become more integrated into the Scottish educational system [this 
is discussed more in the next section]. This finding supports previous research that 
showed that different Muslim women, especially young women, were willing to 
work (El-Nakla et. al. 2007) and were becoming more integrated into the economic 
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life of society by challenging cultural and structural barriers (Ansari 2002; Change 
Institute 2009). The last part of Azadeh’s quote, when she highlights that she had 
quit her paid work and shifted to voluntary work after starting a family, could imply 
the importance of family issues such as childcare in the employment choices of 
Muslim women. Azadeh highlights that shifting from paid work to voluntary work 
was her own decision and was mainly due to entering marriage and starting a family. 
This may imply the persistence of patriarchal identities amongst some Muslim 
families. It is however important to note that the endency to take up voluntary work, 
especially at those places that were run by Muslims, can also be influenced by some 
religious considerations, such as lack of alcohol consumption or the avoidance of 
mixed-sex meetings (which was discussed in the last chapter). The example of 
Azadeh supports previous research by Hopkins (2009) that suggested the persistence 
of patriarchal identities amongst some young Muslim in Scotland. This research 
also suggested that amongst some other young Muslims, there were Muslim families 
who were ‘being more open to equal, accepting and less dominant forms of gendered 
identities’ (Hopkins 2009: 309). This heterogeneity s highlighted in the next 
example. Sanaz, who was a second generation Muslim wo an who was also active 
in voluntary work, explained how her mother’s attitude towards female integration 
was different from her first generation husband, who as from Pakistan: 
My husband is from Pakistan; he was brought up there and he has got some values 
from there but we have got slightly different values. For example, my mother was 
working outside the house in a shop and had no objection to my work if I wanted to 
work. So, our perception of woman’s role is different from his perception of woman’s 
role. 
[41 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In this quote, Sanaz highlights two different attitudes regarding Muslim women’s 
employment: her own mother who was working outside the house and her husband 
who was against her working outside. Even though they were all from a Pakistani 
background, Sanaz differentiates between her mother’s attitude that has come from 
living in Scotland for more than 40 years, and thatof her husband who has just came 
to Scotland from Pakistan recently. This firstly implies the diversity and 
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heterogeneity of Muslim women and families, and secondly, the impact of Scottish 
or British culture in challenging patriarchal ideology. 
   Another example of the economic participation of Muslim women in Scotland was 
participation in family businesses. This type of participation was mainly related to 
the economic activity of Muslim women in small businesses (such as shops, 
pharmacies and post offices) that the first generation Muslims set up. Different 
members of a family, including mothers and daughters, were participating in such 
activities either as a part time activity or in a shift rota. As family support was a key 
issue in such businesses, the barriers which limited the first generation Muslim 
women’s economic participation in other sectors was ab ent or less important in 
family businesses. As mentioned above, the language issue and inadequate 
qualifications were some of the most important barriers to first generation Muslims’ 
employment. The data suggests that the participation of Muslim women in family 
businesses helped to overcome these barriers. For example, Zahir was one of the six 
participants who pointed to such family businesses. He was a second generation 
Muslim man and used to work in a family shop alongside his parents. He stated that 
his mother was working everyday in their family shop, where they sold western 
clothing:  
When the first generation Muslims came here; they bought shops and they were quite 
happy working in like in grocery shops and nothing was wrong with that. For 
example, we had a family shop where we sold western clothes in Dundee. My mother 
was working in that shop beside my father and for wking there she did not need any 
academic qualification or a CV. There was only language problem. As we were selling 
western clothes different customers, including white Scottish people, used to come to 
our shop. At the beginning my mother had some languge difficulties but working 
there and my father’s help could help her to improve her English language soon. 
[39 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   This highlights how language barriers faded in such participation because the 
family helped each other. This can also imply that economic integration can lead to 
greater social integration. Even in another example, Hashim, who was a second 
generation Muslim man from Stirling, asserted that t e white Scottish people from 
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the neighbourhood used to help his mother, who was working in their family shop to 
improve her English language:    
My parents came over and my mum did not know how to speak English but she was 
working in our family shop. So, she was always talking to customers. Then, they just 
help her along because they understood that she was not able to speak the language 
and my Dad helped her as well. My Dad already knew p ople from here before he 
come form Pakistan. 
[17 year-old, Stirling] 
 
   These two quotes can imply that in the context of family business, language and 
inadequate qualifications were not a big problem for Muslim women’s participation. 
Considering the cultural barrier and the persistence of patriarchal ideology that saw 
housework and childcare as the main role of women (Brah 1996), these quotes can 
also suggest that Muslim women’s participation in family business was another 
example of Muslim women’s economic integration. It is, however, important to note 
that these women did not get paid for such work and thus it can be argued that family 
businesses perhaps acted as an extension of housework and their contribution to the 
family. Muslim women’s participation in paid work and family businesses implies a 
challenge to the persistence of patriarchal identiti s amongst some Muslims families, 
which led to them keeping women at home. This can suggest the greater economic 
integration of Muslim women, - especially those of the second generation - in the 
future. These examples can also imply by highlighting the heterogeneity of Muslim 
women that the economic participation of female Muslim  in Scotland was diverse, 
and that we can no longer speak about the small or no participation of Muslim 
women in the Scottish economy. As I discussed above, n  important difference was 
generational. This research suggests that the second generation Muslims were more 
likely to participate either in paid or voluntary work because they lacked structural 
barriers and also challenged cultural barriers. Thesecond generation Muslim men’s 
and women’s involvement in paid or voluntary work owed much to their higher 




Educational Integration; Growing Achievements 
   The second aspect of participants’ integration into Scotland was integrating into 
Scottish education. Interviewees’ educational statu showed that a majority of the 
participants [36 out 43] had integrated into the Scottish educational system by 
completing either Standard Grade [14] or higher education degrees [22] in Scotland. 
In parallel to employment integration, educational achievement was more significant 
amongst the second generation; all 27 second generation participants had studied in 
Scotland or elsewhere in Britain; out of these, 16 participants had higher education 
degrees and 11 had a Standard Grade or a College diploma. Even though numerical 
distribution is not the focus of this study, these figures illustrate the educational 
achievements of second generation Muslims in Scotland. This is despite the fact that 
more than a decade ago, Muslims were the most likely to have no qualifications 
between the ages of 16 and 29 out of all of the religious groups (Scottish 
Government 2005). At the same time, Asian Pakistani - predominantly Muslims - 
had the second highest number of full time students amongst the ethnic/faith 
minority groups in the Pupil Census in 2012 (Scottish Government 2013b). It can be 
suggested that this has resulted in second generation Muslims’ increased educational 
achievements. This study can make no definitive claims given the qualitative form of 
this research and its limited sample size, but it does suggest a greater interest by them 
in Scottish education. One possible explanation for the growing interest in attaining 
an educational is related to maximising the chance of getting more professional jobs. 
As was illustrated earlier with employment integration, the first generation Muslims 
had a significant intention to help their children achieve a better educational 
qualification tin order for them to be able to gain a more professional job. For 
example, as quoted earlier by Ehsan, who was a first generation Muslim, he sent his 
son to a private secondary school despite his financial difficulties in order for him to 
receive a better education and thus to be able to en er Oxford or Cambridge 
University. In this example, Ehsan highlights the first generation Muslims’ intention 
to support their children’s higher education achievements in the hopes of improving 
their employment prospects. As this argument was discussed with employment 
integration, I do not discuss it here again. Ehsan’s example also raises the issue of the 
education attainment amongst Muslims in separated schools such as faith schools. 
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The high trend of Muslims attending state-funded faith schools or private Muslim 
schools was an issue in England (Meer 2010), but was absent in the Scottish context. 
Although there were more than 370 state-funded faith schools in Scotland, Muslims 
did not run any themselves (Scottish Government 2013a) because most Scottish 
Muslims supported the teaching of all major religions in state schools (Hussain and 
Miller 2006). It was reported, however, that there w re some private Muslims 
schools in Glasgow and Dundee that provided primary education for Muslim 
children (Scottish Government 2010). These schools and the idea of separate schools 
were generally not so popular amongst Scotland’s Mulims because there was not 
enough support for establishing a stated-funded school. (MacLeod 2008) and an 
attempt to set up a secondary private Muslim school failed (Cowing 2013). By 
supporting such trends, the findings of this research showed that all participants, 
except two, studied or sent their children to public schools. These two exceptions 
were related to a shift from public schools to a private and to a Catholic school. The 
change from public schools to those schools was related more to the quality of 
education and class/behaviour rather than parents preferring a separate or segregated 
educational setting for their children. For example, Ehsan stated that reduced anti-
social behaviour was the main reason to send his son to a private school: 
When my son was 14 years old [now is 18 years old] I sent him to private school 
because in that age people here start smoking and his friends in school were saying to 
him that you should join us but he was not smoking or drinking and they were always 
frightening him because he does not join them. Whenev r they go out for break time 
no body hanged out with my son and they just frightened him. He was scared and he 
could not concentrate on his studies. I told him if you want, I can send you to a private 
school and he said ‘yes and I would do my best’ and he went and he did well. We are 
happy with that even though we are spending much more oney but now he applied 
for Oxford University and next month he is going for an interview. We just felt that 
parents in the private school look after their children better … they never teach them 
bad things and they accept us and our children … but [in public schools] even with 
under age children, more parents do not care what their children do. Parents in private 
school are more educated and they are very nice; they never say anything bad to us 
and to our children.   




   In this quote, Ehsan highlights that the shift from a public school to a private 
school was done to receive better education and treatment rather than to segregate 
from the mainstream society. Furthermore, studying in private schools cannot be 
regarded as segregation because what is taught in tese schools complies with the 
national curriculum, and those who are studying in these schools are mainly from 
majority Scot families. The next example is about shifting from a public school to a 
Catholic school. Tariq’s example, however, suggests that this change was also not on 
the grounds of separation. Tariq, who was also living in Falkirk, highlighted the 
better quality of education and the more inclusive environment -especially amongst 
the parents and pupils - as the reason for changing his children’s school to a Catholic 
school: 
My children used to go to normal nurseries … but honestly, people who go to these 
ordinary schools do not like us. In Catholic school they put extra pressure and effort to 
prevent any discrimination against people but in the ordinary schools, I am not saying 
that schools have problem but the parents are very bad with us. They do not want to 
integrate with you. … I do not want to put my children in a place that they end up 
hating other children … I do not even see that as aCatholic school; I just see it as a 
better school. Catholic or Muslim or any other it does not really matter; the education 
they are receiving is the main concern for me. For example, if you go to Islamic 
schools which are good but you only get Islamic education. My children insha-Allah 
[God willing] will always know that they are Muslims but they need to know who 
other people are and how they think because they will live with them. The Catholic 
schools are good, other children who are going there are good people; the parents are 
good; I have seen them. The programmes they have in school are good … You always 
want the best for your children and in my opinion these schools are better than the 
public school they used to go.  
[28 year-old, Falkirk] 
 
   Both quotes indicated that the main intention for shifting away from public schools 
had no relationship to isolation from mainstream educational settings, but was rather 
to gain a better education and thus being able to achieve greater integration by being 
able to enter universities and high professional jobs. These two examples also 
suggested the importance of geographical differences in Muslims’ school choices. 
Both of the above cases were from Falkirk, which was a small town with a small 
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number of Muslim residents. As I discussed in a previous chapter, these two 
participants particularly had daily experiences of Islamophobia and Ehsan even had 
an experience of physical attack. Both respondents were dissatisfied with the police 
services and even had a perception that some local police officers were racist. 
Alongside acknowledged explanations, another possible explanation for the change 
from a public school to a private or Catholic school c uld be the lack of other 
choices. As Falkirk was a small town, the number of primary schools (in the case of 
Tariq) and secondary schools (in the case of Ehsan) w s limited and thus they did not 
have any other choice except to apply for private or Catholic schools.      
   Detailing Muslim women’s educational integration, participants’ educational status 
showed that all of the female participants [12 participants] had some education in 
Scotland; out of whom 5 participants had higher education degrees and 7 had a 
Standard Grade or a College diploma. It is important to note that all of these 
participants, except one, were second generation Muslims. This may suggest changes 
in second generation Muslim women’s educational attainment that had previously 
been constrained by structural and cultural barriers (Cassidy et. al. 2006; Lewis 
2007). As was also evident from some second generation Muslim women’s 
economic integration, the second generation Muslims overcome the major structural 
barrier for further education, such as the language barrier, and were better able to 
challenge cultural barriers to their educational attainment. In what follows, I discuss 
these barriers and how they were changing.  
   As school attendance up until the standard grade is mandatory in Scotland and 
elsewhere in the UK, there was no problem in terms of attending school. Problems 
arise when it comes to Muslim girls attending universities. Based on patriarchal 
ideology, the modesty and sanctity of Muslim women ca be best preserved if they 
stay at home. This is highlighted in the example of Azadeh, who mentioned these 
barriers and explained how such attitudes are changing. Azadeh asserted as a second 
generation Muslim woman that her children are free to study for higher education 
degrees;   
Education is so important … there was a time, when I was younger and I was at 
school, Muslim girls were supposed to educate to certain level and that is it. But now 
that attitude is changing, education whether university level or whatever is so 
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important. So, my children, no matter boys or girls, are free to study up to the level 
they want. Our parents used religion [Islam] to stop our further education but those 
who knew Islam never stopped people from education. … My parents came from 
completely different environment; but I have grown up completely in a different 
environment; when it comes to my children’s education, I want them to try the best of 
what they possibly can. 
[42 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In this quote, Azadeh highlights the importance of Scotland as a different 
environment that she was brought up in compared to the one in which her parents 
grew up. In this new environment, education was valued to a great extent and gender 
equality was practiced in many aspects of social life. This was the opposite of the 
context where many first generation Muslims had come from - i.e. countries such as 
Pakistan - where the dominant culture encouraged female Muslims to stay at home 
even though this culture has also been changing in those countries. It is important to 
note that mandatory education, which all second generation Muslims have benefited 
from, could have a significant part in forming this new attitude of appreciation for 
education amongst some second generation Muslim women. The example of Azadeh 
can imply the importance of up-bringing in a different environment because it is an 
important factor in challenging patriarchal ideology and changing second generation 
Muslim women’s attitudes towards higher education. 
   In this quote, Azadeh also implicitly highlights the role of Islam in challenging the 
ideology of ‘keeping women at home’ when she asserted that the real and true 
interpretation of Islam never stops people from education. The important role of 
religion is highlighted more in the next example. Rafiqah, who was also a second 
generation Muslim woman, expressed by referring to the cultural barriers she 
encountered in the past that her children are even ncouraged to do higher education 
degrees: 
There were some cultural barriers in the past … for example our mum did not push us 
to do university education; she did not put pressure on us to go to university and get 
degree. But now I feel that Islam really encourages us to go out and get education. 
Now I am putting a lot of pressure on my daughter to do university degrees. She is 
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doing a lot of Islamic courses here and I want alsosend her to a secular education too. 
I tell her go out and get your degrees and I am pushing her into that. 
[36 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Rafiqah highlights that Islam encourages education and that it is not limited only to 
boys, thus she encouraged her children to gain more knowledge and education; both 
secular and Islamic. This can suggest an emerging shift in second generation 
Muslims’ attitudes towards educational attainment, which was precisely against the 
previous culture that used religion to keep women at home. These last two quotes 
implies that the second generation Muslims who were aff cted by Scottish culture 
used a new interpretation of Islamic teachings to challenge the idea of ‘keeping 
women at home’ and moved one step further towards greater educational integration 
in Scotland. This finding supports a previous study by Lewis (2007) that revealed a 
growing number of young Muslims who are challenging their parents’ cultural 
tradition by appealing to the teachings of Islam. The second generation female 
Muslims’ ability to challenge cultural barriers can be explained by Ballard’s (1994: 
30-33) description of ‘cultural navigators.’ He argues using this description that as 
the second generation, for example South Asian migrants, are exposed to both their 
family traditions and the British educational system, they should be thought of as 
‘cultural navigators’ who are able to contextually switch between several ‘cultural 
codes.’  
   The emergence of such change in second generation Muslims’ attitudes can imply 
further female educational attainments. These can support previous research that 
showed growing numbers of young Muslim women going into higher education and 
thus into professional jobs (Change Institute 2009). The data suggests that such 
change in attitudes was not only limited to the second generation Muslims, but that 
there were also some first generation Muslims who supported their female children’s 
higher education. As mentioned above, the main inspiration for sending children to 
universities amongst the first generation Muslims was increasing their chances of 
getting a more professional job. For example as quoted earlier, Hareb, who was a 
first generation Muslim man of Pakistani background, ot only did not object to his 
daughter’s study at a higher educational level, but also sent her to another city to 
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complete her higher education degree at Edinburgh University. He had a perception 
that such achievement could help her to find a more professional job. This implies 
parental support for greater educational integration of females amongst some Muslim 
families. This can suggest that not only attitudes about Muslim women’s higher 
education were changing, but via change in patriarchal ideology, attitudes about their 
employment integration could also be changing. Some f these emerging changes 
were discussed above. Second generation Muslims’ educational integration - both 
male and female - can suggest that although many Scottish Muslims seek to maintain 
their religion, they preferred a mixed educational setting rather than separate schools 
as seen in England and Wales. This can imply the importance of mixing with the 
majority in Muslims’ integration strategy in the Scottish context, and it is to this that 
I now turn. 
 
Social Integration: Fitting in; Alternative Ways ofSocialising   
   The third aspect of participants’ integration was social integration. As discussed in 
the last chapter, there were different social and cultural barriers such as the dominant 
culture of alcohol consumption and mixed-sex meetings that impeded Muslims’ 
social integration. I also discuss how participants, especially the practicing Muslims, 
had a significant concern that their social integration should be within the boundaries 
of their religious codes of practice. For example, the data suggested that both 
practicing and less practicing Muslim participants did not drink alcohol. It also 
suggested that some less-practicing interviewees did not mind being present in places 
that serve alcohol, while the practicing and other less-practicing interviewees tended 
to avoid being present in such areas. I discussed that this religious observation can 
significantly limit Muslims’ social integration in the Scottish context where drinking 
alcohol is a dominant social norm (Bromley t. al. 2005; Scottish Government 2008). 
In this section, I discuss how Muslims integrate into Scottish society by dealing with 
these barriers.  
   Analysis of interviewees’ experiences suggests that participants tried to fit into the 
society by adopting alternative ways of socialising that could also fit with their 
religious code of practice. These included friendship  with majority group members 
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and taking part in shared activities such as charity, in erfaith, and voluntary work and 
sport. Participants were most explicit that effective social integration depends on 
making social relationships with different people in society, particularly with the 
majority group members, thus mixing and socialising with the majority was crucial 
to their social integration. In all of the above activities, they tried to show that they 
made a great deal of effort to mix with the majority. At the same time, they showed a 
widespread concern that such social connections and engagement with the majority 
group members should occur within the boundaries of Muslims’ religious codes of 
practice. 
 
Social Friendship: Daytime and Non-Alcoholic Environment  
   The first aspect of Muslims’ social integration was making friends and socialising 
with majority group members (white Scottish non-Muslim people). Some 
participants stated that they had white Scottish non-Muslim friends as well as 
Muslim friends. Educational settings such as school and university were the most 
common places in which participants set up or developed friendships and social 
relationships with majority group members. For example, Akram was one of 10 
participants who mentioned the importance of school in the development of their first 
social relationships with the majority. Akram, who was a less-practicing second 
generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Dundee, stated that she 
had a good relationship with English and Scottish people and that this started in 
school:  
I have English and Scottish friends as well as Muslim friends and most of my clients 
are white Scottish people. Actually, this was started from school. Throughout my 
education there was a lot of integration with the Scottish people and I did not have any 
problem with them and they did not have problem with me either. 
[43 year-old, Dundee] 
 
   This can imply the importance of public schools in developing some Muslim 
children’s social friendships with the majority. In another example, Batool, who was 
a young second generation Muslim woman, expressed that in her school time she 
intentionally tried to make close relationships with Scottish girls even though there 
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were also some Asian girls in her class: 
In primary school there were a few Asian girls in my school but I did try not to hang 
out only with them. So, I did try to make friendship with Scottish girls. I started up my 
social relationships with a Scottish girl but after a while my friends were from both 
Scottish and Asian girls.  
[28 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   These two quotes highlight that these participants’ first contact with white Scottish 
people - the majority - started from their time in public school. This shows the 
importance of schools and childhood in the development of Muslims’ social 
integration with the majority. The possibility of developing friendships with the 
majority in school results from the absence of barriers, e.g. Islamophobia and 
prohibited actions such as including drinking alcohol and mixed-sex meetings. It is 
important to note that these two participants had no experience of Islamophobia at 
all, thus such an experience could also affect their social integration. All of the other 
8 participants who also reported school to be the first and most important place in 
starting close friendships with the majority had no or very rare experience of 
Islamophobia in their schools. However, such easy as ociation between children and 
the lack of Islamophobia/any other prejudice was challenged by the findings of 
Chapter 6, in which some participants highlighted their experiences of Islamophobia 
in their schools or reported receiving verbal abuse from children. It was discussed 
that the assertion and display of such attitudes amongst children can be associated 
with the fact that children can be more vocal about the prejudiced and Islamophobic 
attitudes that they may have. Therefore, this can suggest that those Muslims with no 
experience of Islamophobia were more likely to start and develop their social 
relationship with the majority children from their schools during their childhood. 
   Another important issue about school is that the higher possibility of gaining 
familiarity with Muslims can affect white Scottish pupils’ welcoming attitudes and, 
thus, facilitate Muslims’ friendship with the majority. It can be argued that if children 
at school are in close contact with Muslim pupils, they can become more familiar 
with them and thus remove prejudice and develop social friendships. As was 
illustrated in the last chapter, familiarity with Muslims could decrease Islamophobia 
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and prejudiced attitudes. This supports previous research that found that more 
contact with Muslims and knowledge about Muslims plays an important part in 
decreasing Islamophobia (Hussain and Miller 2006; Ormston et. al. 2011). 
Decreasing Islamophobia and being in daily contact with Muslim pupils can 
therefore make the process of setting up a social friendship much easier for both 
Muslim pupils and the majority children.  
   The next issue regarding the importance of schools was the absence of cultural 
barriers in the development of friendship with the majority. It can be argued that 
because there is not much alcohol consumption (except at special events such as 
school wine tasting events) and Muslim pupils are not old enough for the practice of  
prohibiting mixed-sex meetings, social relationship and friendships can be easily 
started and developed. This was evident in the examples of both Akram and Batool, 
who asserted that there was no problem in starting social friendships with the white 
Scottish pupils. However, the data suggests that when t ese social relationships were 
developing in later ages, more cultural and social b rriers came into play. For 
example, if these relationships were to also develop outside of school and in each 
others’ houses, they would face certain limits. For instance Wahed, who was a 
second generation Muslim man studying at Glasgow University, stated that he tended 
to interact with his Pakistani friends most of the time, even though he had some 
white Scottish friends: 
 
In the university, right now, we are in our group; we are eight Pakistanis. We are all 
actually Scottish but we hang out only to each other. We have no problem to talk to 
other Scottish white friends, colleges or students; we are very friendly but we keep 
together. I think the reason is religion; I mean, for example, you can talk to them for 
half an hour but eventually they are going to talk bout going out, partying and drink 
but you cannot really relate to that.  
[20 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Wahed highlights that the issue of drinking and going out is so dominant in 
Scotland and is usually the subject and content that normal conversations revolve 
around. Even though he self-identified as being Scottish, he could not relate to such 
issues because he did not drink alcohol, thus he preferred to interact with Muslims 
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with whom he had much more in common culturally and religiously. This can 
suggest that in social relationships in which alcohol becomes central and friendly 
events often take place in pubs and bars, Muslims li it their social relationships to a 
certain extent. One of these limits was avoiding places where alcohol was served. It 
was for this reason that some practicing and less practicing Muslims tried to have 
their social meetings in places such as cafés and coffee shops. The first example is 
Akram, who was a less-practicing second generation Muslim woman. As mentioned 
earlier, she was born and brought up in Dundee and was a skilled self-employed 
worker with a college degree. Akram expressed that she managed to have her 
meetings with her Scottish friends in places such as coffee shops, where alcohol was 
not involved:     
I have got some Scottish girls as well ... We meet out for a coffee; sometimes I go to 
my friends’ houses but they are Muslims too. But for meeting up with white Scottish 
girls in the towns we usually go to places such as cafés. 
[43 year-old, Dundee] 
 
   This quote highlights how even skilled second generation Muslims are limiting 
their social integration due to religious observations. This quote could also imply that 
firstly, Akram’s social friendships with white Scottish people was limited to girls, 
and that secondly, her social meetings with Scottish girls was limited to outside of 
the house, and thirdly, meeting outside was also limited to non-alcoholic 
environments such as cafés. This quote illustrates how avoiding alcohol consumption 
and mixed-sex meetings can affect Muslim women’s social integration. Akram was a 
less practicing Muslim; however she highlighted that she did not prefer to arrange 
her social meeting in places where alcohol is served. This statement can imply that 
even some less practicing Muslims do not prefer goin  to places where alcohol was 
served. Considering that my finding in the last chapter pointed to some less-
practicing participants such as Ehsan and Hamid whodid not mind such places, it 
can be argued that being present in places where alcohol is served is a matter of 
difference, even amongst less-practicing Muslims. 
   The next example is Azadeh, who was a second generation practicing Muslim 
woman with a college degree. As mentioned earlier, she was a housewife but was 
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also very active in many Muslim and non-Muslim groups. She also stated that she 
does not drink alcohol and prefers not to go to places where it is served. However she 
also asserted that she managed her social integration by leaving events only when the 
alcohol is about to be served: 
When I was working we used to go to office parties where alcohol was but I went and 
had the dinner and socialise and them came out becaus  I knew that afterwards they 
are going to drink. If you explain to people let them know the reason it makes 
difference. … whenever we meet anybody we say to brothe s that sorry I am a Muslim 
and we do not shake hand with opposite sex and it is the same for the men. 
[42 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In this quote, Azadeh highlights that although practicing her religion has limited 
her to some extent, such as having to leave parties at drinking time, it did not lead her 
towards isolation or lack of socialisation. It is, however, important to note that 
alcohol is served from the outset at some social events, thus there would be 
nonattendance at such events rather than deciding to leave earlier. The decision to 
leave events in drinking time was also evident in the example of Sanaz, who was 
another second generation Muslim woman with a bachelor degree. As quoted in the 
previous chapter, she asserted that she attended a Christmas party in her school but 
did not go for drinks afterwards. This can imply that approaches to how to avoid 
being present in alcohol serving places can be diffrent even amongst practicing and 
less-practicing Muslims. Some do not attend from the outset and some attend but 
leave the event at the time of drinking alcohol. Taking different strategies to avoid 
being present in alcohol serving places can be context dependent. For example, none 
of the practicing Muslims or even some less-practicing Muslims (such as Akram and 
Zainab) would attend pubs and bars, however they ma attend some academic or 
work parties where there would be alcohol consumption either during the event or at 
the end. In the former situation, it was discussed in the last chapter that a majority of 
the respondents (except Hamid and Ehsan who used to attend) did not attend any pub 
or bar. However, it was in the latter form that the matter of difference was most 
evident. Some, such as Batool, Fatima, and Fazel (quoted in the last chapter), avoid 
such events from the outset whilst some such as Akram, Sanaz and Sadiq just leave 
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the event at the time of drinking or going out for a drink. This can imply greater 
integration for those with more a open interpretation of avoiding being present in 
alcohol serving places than those with restricted interpretation.  
   In other contexts such as community or family events, where Muslims are the main 
organisers or are in the decision making committee, hey make sure those events are 
held in places where alcohol is not involved, thus removing a barrier for the greater 
social integration of Muslims. Running voluntary and charitable groups could enable 
Muslims to keep religious considerations in mind whilst increasing their social 
integration. For example, there was no alcohol consumption or mixed-sex meetings 
at events run by these groups. The collective effort of some female Muslims to 
arrange such Halal social meetings is highlighted in the next example. Arezo, who 
was also a second generation Muslim woman and was involved in arranging many 
events for Muslim women at Edinburgh Central Mosque, stated that they arranged 
their events with non-Muslims at the mosque or any other place where alcohol is not 
involved: 
We have had get together with non-Muslims at gatherings we have arranged ourselves; 
we cannot go to their gathering because of the drinking culture etc. When they come to 
our gathering which we have had at the mosque or atvarious venues such as schools 
and churches, we always have it as a family event, so it would not be right to have 
drink there. Most people understand our issue with alcohol and those who do not 
understand we explain it to them. Actually we have found that many non-Muslims with 
families don't like to drink much anyway. 
[50 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Arezo highlights that due to Scottish drinking culture, Muslims cannot attend 
majority social events and therefore sought to organise their own. As quoted already 
in the last chapter, another example of such efforts to reserve special spaces as non-
alcoholic places was Sadiq, who tried to arrange his un versity conference to be in a 
restaurant where Halal food was served and alcohol was not served. These examples 
imply the importance of space in the development of practicing and some less-
practicing Muslims’ social integration. They can also suggest that efforts for Halal 
integration were not only limited to Muslim individuals, but also involved some 
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Muslim groups or Muslims in some public institutions, who suggested or negotiated 
for alternative spaces in order to facilitate their greater social integration. 
   Muslims’ alternative path to integration was notlimited to spatial changes; the data 
suggests that it was also concerned with the issue of timing. Particularly, 6 
participants (Jafar, Fazel, Sadiq, Hareb, Azim and Zahra) reported their concerns 
about night time socialising. For example Azim, who was another second generation 
practicing Muslim man, stated that he does not takepart in Scottish night life culture:  
Obviously we cannot take part in drinking and night clubbing culture. These things are 
not allowed in Islam. So, I do not go out night times. So those times I come to the 
mosque and I prefer to spend my time with my Muslim friends or with my family. 
Because Scottish people those times, especially at weekends, definitely go out for 
drink and if you are with your non-Muslim friends they might be drinking and 
clubbing and they might push you to do what they do. 
[24 year-old, Dundee] 
 
   In this quote, Azim highlights that the main reason for avoiding Scottish ‘night life’ 
was the dominance of alcohol consumption and the possibility of being pushed by 
friends to take part in such culture. Similarly in a other example, Sadiq, who was a 
second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that he did not take part in the 
‘night life’ of Scottish dominant social culture: 
My social integration is limited. I try to integrate academically and outside of the 
university and on social level it is limited too. For example, I manage my social 
meetings in a coffee shop, so it is limited. Night time and socialising in pubs and bars 
is zero percent; it is out of the question. 
[25 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   The examples of Azim and Sadiq highlight that the dominant form of socialising at 
night times is involved with alcohol consumption, ad thus they as Muslims could 
not participate in the night life. This implies tha for some Muslims, social 
integration with the majority can be limited only to the daytime and mostly in non-
alcoholic environments as was earlier discussed. Socialising at night time might be 
more difficult for Muslim women due to the practice of patriarchal ideology or the 
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moral values of the family. For example, Hareb - who was a first generation 
practicing Muslim - allowed his son to stay in his Scottish friends’ house for a night 
but did not let his daughters socialise in the same way:   
My younger children have many white Scottish friends. For example my son plays 
football and he had some Scottish friends from there. Sometime his friends come to 
our house and sometimes they stay in our house at weekends. Sometimes he goes to 
their house and stay with them… they study or play together. Whenever he goes to 
their house he only eats Halal meat and when they come to our house they eat our 
food and they do not say we want another food and actually they like our food. So, he 
keeps his religion and there is no alcohol issue as well. So, there is no problem in 
socialising with them. My daughters have also some Scottish girl friends and they 
come to our house and sometimes my daughters go to their house but they never stay 
for night times. I do not allow them to stay nights but their friends come to our home 
during the day and they just stay together. 
[45 year-old, Stirling] 
 
   This quote suggests that boys in Scotland have a full nd active social life because 
concerns about alcohol and mixed sex interaction do ot arise at this age. However, 
such participation was not allowed for girls and so their socialising was limited to 
day time meetings. The more parental control over Muslim women as compared to 
Muslim men was also highlighted in the example of Akram: 
The social integration is more difficult for female Muslims. It has a lot to do with the 
peer pressure and the parents as well and how they see things. A lot of first generation 
Muslims like my parents were not happy with their children’s integration with the 
Scottish people. Such objection was more about female because they tended to self 
control female Muslims a lot more than men. For example, they wanted to know what 
female Muslims were up to rather than what male Muslims were up to.  
[43 year-old, Dundee] 
 
   The examples of Akram and Hareb’s girls can suggest that some Muslim women 
can be under parental or peer pressure to manage their social integration in certain 
ways, such as interacting only with girls and in the daytime. The parental control on 
female Muslims may be associated with controlling female Muslims’ sexuality (Brah 
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1996). Muslim women’s lack of participation in ‘night life culture’ can also be 
associated with the observation of patriarchal family values in which females are 
considered to be ‘culture-bearers’ (Esposito 2011: 98). The latter was highlighted 
more in the example of Zahra, who was a second generation practicing Muslim 
woman. She stated that some Muslim women would not participate in ‘night life’ 
culture for a range of reasons: 
For example, if you are working in a supermarket checkout, you see that after work 
and in night time all the girls go together for drink, but we cannot go with them 
because we would not drink, we actually do not want to be in a environment where 
people are drinking either. You also do not want to be out alone at nights. So, there are 
some limitations because of our morals and ethics because of our commitment and 
love to the family. For example, we may need to go back home after work and be with 
the kids and with the family. Other people may not have such commitment or such 
family. But these limitations do not stop us from socialising. For example instead of 
going out for drink and night life, we take part in voluntary works and family events.  
[45 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This quote can highlight that even those Muslim women who work, which is 
already a challenge to the practice of patriarchal ideology, still observe other values 
such as devotion to the family. It is, however, important to note that if it was only the 
women who were expected to be so devoted, such practice ould be seen as 
patriarchal. It is also important to note that those women who participate in dominant 
socialising culture can also be devoted to their families with time management; in 
other words, it is a question of priorities. This example, however, can imply that 
staying with family and taking care of children can limit some Muslim women’s 
socialising at ‘night.’ This quote also highlights that instead of taking part in such 
culture, Zahra prefers to participate in voluntary works and family events. It can be 
argued that as the former is usually done at daytime with either little or no 
involvement of alcohol and the latter is done with the involvement of children and 
family members, there would not be any barrier for Zahra and Muslim females like 
her to participate in voluntary works and family events (this form of integration is 
discussed in this chapter in the next section).  
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   Social friendships with the majority can be even more limited than daytime meetings 
in cafés for some other Muslims. For example, Wahed and Azim (as quoted earlier this 
section) preferred to socialise with their Muslim friends rather than with their white 
Scottish friends. This was also highlighted in the example of Jafar, who was a second 
generation practicing Muslim man. He stated that while is white Scottish friends are 
clubbing or going for drink, he attends his community programmes:  
Because the majority of Scottish people have the culture of going out for drink this 
make us really discouraged to integrate with them in such issues. This in itself has a 
restriction on me because I am a Muslim. However we do other Halal things together 
such as charity works or university tasks. So, the time my white Scottish friends do 
their socialising and clubbing, I would be with Iraqis or Lebanese who do the same 
things I will do. For example, we go to our Mosque and read some supplications or 
read some prayers. In Ramadan we have programmes every single night. In some 
other occasions we have programme every single night, so at the time white Scottish 
people have their programmes like going for drink or clubbing and whatever they find 
interesting but would have some restriction on me, I would be with Muslim friends in 
that time. 
[20 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   In this quote, Jafar highlights that issues such as drinking and clubbing restricted 
his social relationships with his white Scottish friends to doing charity and academic 
work. He also highlights that sharing more commonalities with other Muslims in his 
community leads him to communicate with his Muslim friends at night times when 
his Scottish friends are out drinking. Such time management in socialising with 
Muslim and non-Muslim friends was also evident in the example of Wahed and 
Akram, who asserted that due to the dominance of drinking in Scottish social culture, 
they limited their social friendships with white Scottish people to a certain extent. All 
these quotes can suggest that some Muslims’ social friendship with white Scottish 
people is often limited by religious or cultural considerations as well as Muslim 
identity. This could imply that such restrictions would apply less to less-practicing 
Muslims, but the example of Akram, who was a less-practicing Muslim woman, 
suggests that even some less-practicing Muslims may commit to such restrictions. 
This is consistent with my finding in the last chapter that suggested that some less-
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practicing Muslims prefer not to attend such places (such as Akram and Zainab), but 
some others did not mind attending drinking establishments (such as Ehsan and 
Hamid). In other words, even the category of ‘less-practicing Muslims’1, which was 
added to the dichotomy of ‘practicing’ and ‘non-practicing’ Muslims, does not 
represent a homogenous category. For example, Hamid, who was a first generation 
and a less-practicing Muslim man, stated that he has some white Scottish friends 
with whom he has developed a mutual close social rel tionship: 
I have got some white friends, I play cricket with w ite folks, they are very good 
friends. They come to my house and we go to their house and we have got a very good 
interaction between each other.  
[28 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Hamid is unusual amongst my participants since none of the others reported such 
close personal relationships with their white Scottish friends; this was mainly related 
to the dominance of alcohol consumption in such relationships. There was only one 
example, Hareb’s son, in which it was mentioned that alcohol was not served when 
he was in his Scottish friends’ house. In contrast, in he example of Hamid, alcohol 
was served when he was in his Scottish friends’ house but it was not considered to be 
a barrier by Hamid. As I mentioned in the last chapter, Hamid used to go to pubs and 
bars and was one of those less-practicing Muslims who did not mind being present in 
places that serve alcohol. It might be for this reason that he could develop such close 
relationships with some of his white Scottish friends. The example of Hamid can 
suggest the importance of flexibility about being present in alcohol serving places in 
improving some less-practicing Muslims’ social integration. It may also imply that 
those who have no commitment to the religion at all, such as non-practicing 
Muslims, will not have such cultural barriers in developing their social friendships 
with white Scottish people. However it can be argued that other barriers such as 
racism and Islamophobia can affect their social integration. Given the importance of 
commitment to the religion, further research on non-Muslims’ attitudes towards 
social integration would be welcome. 
                                                                 
1 As mentioned in the methodology chapter, participants in this chapter in terms of commitment to 




Social and Shared Activities 
   Another form of social integration preferred by Muslims was participation in, or 
organising, shared and social activities such as voluntary activities, and interfaith and 
charity events. As already mentioned in the examples of Arezo, Sadiq, Zahra, and 
Jafar, some Muslims preferred to develop or maintain their social relationships with 
majority Scots through voluntary work. As discussed b fore, the importance of this 
form of social integration stemmed from Muslims’ active role in organising and 
running such activities, which can also imply their civil integration. The popularity 
of these activities, especially amongst the second generation Muslims, can be 
explained by the absence of alcohol and accommodation of Muslims religious needs. 
Running voluntary and charitable groups could enable Muslims to observe their 
religious considerations because in events run by these groups, there was no alcohol 
consumption or mixed-sex meetings. For example, Jafar, who was one of 13 
participants who were active in social and charitable organisations, highlighted his 
involvement in charitable works as a good example of Halal integration: 
I do a lot of charities… and this is the way we integrate with different Scottish people. 
We talk to them and we tell them what this charity is about and what events would 
take place in the future. I do not just target Muslim  to come; we target all types of 
religious people and even atheists. This is a very good way of integration because we 
integrate with different white Scottish people and there is no issue of alcohol. I am 
very successful in this form of socialising if I am not that successful in some other 
aspect of integration such as drinking and clubbing. 
[20 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   This quote demonstrates how respondents were keen to integrate and sought 
innovative and acceptable means of doing so. Jafar was a second generation 
practicing Muslim man and a full-time student at Glasgow University; this may 
imply that those Muslims with a Scottish education could be more active in such 
activities. This is supported by the educational background of other examples in this 
section. The data suggests that all 13 participants who were active in social and 
charitable works had at least obtained Scottish standard grades or a British General 
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Certificate of Secondary Education. This can imply the importance of education in 
Muslims’ social integration. Although Halal integration remained important for these 
individuals, mixing and interacting with the Scottish majority group members was 
crucial in these activities. Many participants asserted that their activities were in 
cooperation with Scottish majority group members as well as Muslims and were thus 
beneficial for both. For example Arezo, who was self-employed and a second 
generation Muslim woman, said that her current voluntary work was in relation to 
Scottish children included non-Muslims: 
I used to volunteer a lot, I started to volunteer with Muslim groups and then I just 
thought why I am volunteering only with Muslim groups; it is not just the Muslim 
groups need help, everybody needs help, then I started volunteering with a group that 
teaches English to people with learning disabilities and they are all Scottish people. 
[50 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   This quote shows how skilled people within the community could have a wider 
impact in the society. However, educated Muslims’ voluntary work and civil 
participation was not limited to social and charitable work, , since such work 
required them to be in contact with public institutions such as councils or police in 
order to facilitate or license their activities in the public sphere. Muslims’ 
participation in public institutions was not limited to such civil integration, and there 
were some indications of their political integration in Scotland. There were 
particularly three participants who reported their political participation in Scotland. 
For example, Zahra, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman with a 
college degree, stated that she was active in some groups that strove for racial 
equality and justice in Scotland: 
Question of integration for me as a second generation Muslim is quite irrelevant 
because I am already and in fact naturally integratd into the society where I live. For 
example, I work with two Muslim groups (Radio Ramadan Edinburgh and Edinburgh 
Muslim Women Association) but I work with non- Muslims as well because I arrange 
some shared events with them. For example, I work with Scotland Against 
Criminalising Communities, I work with Scottish Palestinian Solidarity Campaign, I 
work with United Against Fascism, I work with Edinburgh Interfaith Group, I also 
work with libraries and schools which are all non-Muslim. So, although the main 
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committees in our group are Muslim people, we work outside with non-Muslim people 
all the time. Whenever we have an event, we invite non-Muslims as well. 
[45 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Later in the interview, she also stated that Muslims in cooperation with other 
groups such as United Against Fascism, organise a big demonstration every year in 
response to the EDL (English Defence League) and its new branch, the SDL 
(Scottish Defence League). This suggests the political integration of some Muslims, 
especially the more educated Muslims. The second partici nt who was active in 
political issues was Saleh. He was a first generation practicing Muslim man who was 
politically active in many Muslim and non-Muslim groups such as the Muslim 
Council of Scotland. He was a retired professor andhas lived for 28 years in East 
Kilbride. Saleh stated that he was working with theScottish parliament to improve 
racial equality in Scotland:  
I participate in different activities here which are not related to Muslims only. I was a 
member of different groups which were not related to any specific nationality, religion 
or ethnicity such as Scotland Interfaith. I am also cooperating with the Scottish 
Parliament in a wide variety of issues regarding all minority group members in 
Scotland. For example one of the issues we cooperate with the Scottish Parliament is 
how to improve racial and religious equality in Scotland.   
[65 year-old, East Kilbride East] 
 
   The last example in this section is Samad, who was a first generation practicing 
Muslim man with an undergraduate degree from Bristol University. He was working 
with some local and national organisations such as Fife Council to improve 
community services for ethnic minorities: 
I was the chair of the a task group in Fife where th National Health Service, the 
police, the council all these bodies were looking at 4 or 5 ethnic minority 
organizations to look after them and accommodate their needs. All these bodies were 
working together on how to build the capacity of the organizations and how to make 
sure that they are were giving ethnic minorities’ rights to them, how they are 
communicating with them, how they are dealing with them. I was active in this group 
 
274 
and also encouraged my Muslim friends to take part in these programmes and other 
community programmes which are run by them.  
[51 year-old, Dunfermline] 
 
   In parallel with the examples of Zahra and Saleh, this quote demonstrates some 
Muslims’ civil and political participation in Scotland. Considering the socio-
economic status of the participants in this section, the data suggests that many of the 
participants - 11 out of 13 - were second generation. This can suggest the importance 
of generational dynamics in Muslims’ social and political participation, however, the 
examples of Saleh and Samad, as two first generation Muslims, challenge such 
association. These two examples can suggest that first generation Muslims can also 
be active in such civil and political participation. It is important to note that both 
Saleh and Samad had British higher education degrees. The fact that all 13 
participants in this section had some British education suggests the importance of 
having British education in Muslims’ social and political participation. The issue of 
class could also be a factor here, but making any association to this issue requires 
further research. It can be argued that the importance of having British education can 
be attributed to some of its implications, such as being more familiar with Scottish 
cultural, social, and political systems – this could make the educated Muslims more 
confident and more capable in taking part in social and political activities. This was 
also highlighted in the examples of Zahra and Nader (this example is illustrated 
below), who asserted that the second generation Muslims naturally integrate into 
society. The lesser participation of the first generation participants in such activities 
can also be explained by this argument, suggesting that most of the first generation 
participants had no British education and struggled with language barriers that 
diminished their participation in civil and political issues. This is consistent with my 
finding in previous sections, which suggested greater integration of the second 
generation participants in economic and educational aspects compared to the first 
generation participants. As well as the significance of education and language, it is 
important to note that other issues such as the poor ec nomic status of most of the 
first generation participants could also limit the participation of first generation 
Muslims in social integration. For example, as I discussed earlier about economic 
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integration, many of the first generation Muslims were unskilled workers and the 
main providers for a usually extended family, thus they had to work very hard, and in 
some cases, took on two shifts to make an acceptabl life for themselves and their 
families. Therefore, they lacked time to take part in voluntary activities. In contrast, 
the second generation Muslims, as discussed in the self-employment section, were 
not interested in two shifts and having long hours of work. They also had their 
parents’ financial support for attaining higher education. This therefore suggests the 
importance of second generation Muslims’ increased capability, education, language 
fluency, and having time (the most important), in facilitating their further integration 
in social and political activities. 
 
Sporting Activities 
   Participating in sporting activities was another form of Muslim social integration in 
Scotland. Consistent with earlier forms of social integration, interacting and mixing 
with white Scottish people was also highlighted in sporting activities. Playing 
football with white Scottish people was one of these sporting activities. For example 
Nader, who was a second generation Muslim man, stated that he participated in a 
football team in which he was the only Asian:  
I used to play a lot of sport and all that kind of stuff and I played football in a 
predominantly white team and I was the only Asian or Muslim and that is a kind of 
integration as well. So if you born here it just natur lly happens [integration] in 
anyway.  
[38 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   Nader highlights here that for him, as a second generation Scottish Muslim, 
integration is inevitable. This supports my earlier argument, which suggested that 
social integration for the second generation Muslim was normal due to the similarity 
of their educational, cultural, and linguistic characteristics with the majority Scots. 
However, as I discussed in the last chapter, the dominance of alcohol consumption 
and the prohibition of it in Muslim religion was the main barrier for second 
generation Muslims’ greater social integration. Muslim ’ participation in sporting 
activities points to the absence of such barriers in port. This was highlighted in the 
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example of Fazel. He was a second generation practicing Muslim man and stated that 
even though he could not take part in the going out and drinking culture; he could 
play football with white Scottish people: 
My social integration is limited because if a Scottish person generally wants to go out 
for a drink, I don’t go with them because I do not want to be in that environment. 
However, if there is football game I will go. Sometimes we play football with some 
white Scottish people and that is fine. So, you canll that social integration if you 
wish. But if certain people at your work, say, want to smoke drugs, I would not go 
with them because it is against my morals; it is the same about other things too. 
[23 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   Fazel highlights that due to the absence - or lesser - involvement of alcohol in 
football matches, he could enjoy such activities. In another example, Azim, who was 
another second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that instead of taking part 
in drinking and night clubbing, he plays football with white Scottish people: 
Obviously drink and night clubs and stuff like that which are not allowed in Islam are 
barriers to integration. For example, if I make a friend with a non-Muslim, they might 
be drinking, and clubbing and they might push me to do what they do. But I cannot do 
such things. What I can do is doing sport, going out and playing football with my 
Scottish friends. 
[17 year-old, Stirling] 
 
   The examples of Nader, Fazel, and Azim emphasise playing football versus 
drinking or clubbing, which may imply the absence of alcohol in football games. It 
is, however, important to note that many football teams have a culture of going out 
for a drink afterwards, which would limit the exten to which Muslims can take part 
in this. Participants’ participation in sporting activities was not limited to football. 
Zahir, for example, who was a second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that 
he used to do many sporting activities such as hockey and rugby with white Scottish 
people: 
I do not take part in drinking and clubbing culture … but I remember I used to do 
sport, so if I have played hockey or if I have played rugby or if I have played any of 
these things majority of people were non-Muslims. So, I build a relationship with a lot 
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of people through sport. We also send our kids to some classes for sport. My son does 
athletics with non-Muslims; he was doing Judo for a few years with non-Muslims as 
well. My daughter is doing swimming. All of those activities are in mixing with non-
Muslims and are outside of school. 
[39 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   All the above examples (Nader, Fazel, Azim and Zahir) can suggest the importance 
of the absence of alcohol in the development of second generation Muslims’ social 
integration in sporting activities. However, there were two first generation 
participants (Hamid and Samad) who highlighted different issues, rather than 
alcohol, in their social integration. It is also important to note that engagement in 
sporting activities can extend beyond the pitch. Hamid, for example – as we saw 
above - socialises with friends with whom he plays cricket. Unlike other participants 
who highlighted the absence of alcohol consumption in sporting activities, Hamid 
highlighted that through sport, he has developed closer friendships (e.g. going to 
each others’ houses) with some white Scottish people. He also highlighted that if 
such close relationships lead to alcohol involvement or going to places where it is 
served, he could accompany them but just avoid drinking alcohol. It is important to 
note that this approach was very rare amongst participants. As I mentioned in the last 
chapter, Hamid used to go to pubs and bars and so did not mind being present in 
alcohol serving areas. Therefore this may have helped him to develop such close 
relationships with some of his white Scottish friends. The next example is Samad, 
who was a first generation practicing Muslim man. He explained how he and his 
Muslim friends in a Scottish cricket club split from a white majority Scottish team 
and made a Muslim majority team:  
About 25 years ago I and some of my Muslim friends joined to a cricket club here. We 
used to play in a Scottish club but we end up to make our own cricket team; a Muslim 
team. … Why we did that; we did not feel 100% comfortable or because you have the 
batting order and they used to choose a specific person because he was white rather 
than being selected because he is better. So, there were a lot issues and I am not quite 
sure what was the exact issue to do that but I know that we did not feel 100% happy in 
that situation and once we got the chance and there were enough Pakistanis or 
Muslims we made our own team. The other reason might be because most people in 
our team did know each other and they spoke Punjabi. Now we have two teams; one 
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plays in higher league and one plays in lower leagu. So, there was something which 
was not quite as it should be or we might felt that we are more comfortable with 
Muslims players so we made our own team; but our team plays with all other white 
teams. I think it was more because of cultural things because you are more 
comfortable doing things that you do together for example you can speak your own 
language or have your foods and your jokes afterwards. Whatever the reason we just 
felt that that we are more comfortable together.  
[51 year-old, Dunfermline] 
 
   In this quote, Samad highlighted that issues such as the language barrier and 
cultural issues (such as feeling more comfortable with other Muslims) led them to 
make a Muslim team in a Scottish club. This can imply the importance of ethnic and 
religious homophily and suggests that it can limit some Muslims’ social integration 
to people from a different ethnic and religious background (c.f. Wimmer and Lewis 
2010; Platt 2012). Unlike those who stressed the barrier of alcohol, especially at 
night time, Samad suggests that the main reason for their split was the perception of 
racism as well as cultural and language issues. Given the strong association between 
sporting teams and alcohol, this may also have played a role. Considering the second 
generation Muslims’ socio-economic status as being advantaged by having a Scottish 
education, knowing the English language, and being better linked to Scottish culture, 
it can be argued that their attitudes and perspectives to social integration or social 
isolation would be different from that of first generation Muslims who mostly lacked 
such characteristics. Considering the importance of sociological variables in the 
participants’ participation in sporting activities, the data suggests that a majority of 
those who reported their participation in sporting activities were second generation 
Muslims [16 out of 18]. This may imply the importance of a generational dynamic in 
Muslims’ participation in sporting activities. Howev r, the examples of two first 
generation Muslims, Hamid and Samad, challenge this.  
   Participants’ involvement in sporting activities was not limited to male 
interviewees. There were 5 female interviewees who rep rted that they take part in 
sporting activities. Muslim women’s participation isporting activities, however, 
was confronted by different barriers to those that Muslim men reported. Muslim 
women’s participation was more interlinked with their religious concerns; more 
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specifically the prohibition of mixed-sex meetings. The data suggests that all 5 
Muslim women took part only in single-sex or women-only-sessions. Muslim 
women’s tendency to go to women-only-sessions was minly due to an Islamic code 
of practice which prohibits the free mixing of gendrs (Hashmi 2002; Esposito 
2011). It is important to note that observing this code, like any other code such as 
being present in alcohol serving places, was a matter of difference and debate. 
However, it was evident that all practicing female participants in this research tended 
to respect some gender segregation in sporting activities. For example, Sanaz, who 
was also a second generation Muslim woman, stated that she preferred women-only-
sessions: 
Previously I attended fitness classes for women-only as well as playing badminton. … 
I always attend ladies-only classes; firstly, because of hijab reasons and secondly, I 
found it to be more comfortable. 
[41 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   In another example, Shakila, who was a second generation practicing Muslim 
woman, stated that MWAE (Muslim Women Association of Edinburgh) organised 
several women-only-session sporting activities for teenage girls for religious reasons 
and because they feel more comfortable:  
MWAE run a teenage girls group where the girls can enjoy a female-only-environment 
to do badminton, aerobics, yoga, football, and mountain biking and now we will start 
swimming classes … because of the Muslim culture and our religion it would not be 
right for girls to be doing physical fitness activities with males. They would not feel 
comfortable or enjoy themselves.  
[30 year-old, Glasgow] 
 
   These two quotes imply the importance of the prohibition of mixed-sex meetings, 
hijab, and Muslims’ preference for attending women-only-session sporting activities. 
Participation in women-only-sessions was not only limited to practicing Muslim 
women. There were three less-practicing Muslim women (Kathryn, Zainab and 
Akram) who also only attended women-only-sessions. For example, Kathryn who 
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was a second generation less-practicing Muslim woman, stated that she did not like 
or feel comfortable attending mixed-sex-sessions because it is prohibited in Islam: 
There are many mixed-sex sessions in Edinburgh but I do not like to attend any of 
those because it is inappropriate for us as Muslims. I do not feel comfortable in such 
environment plus it is not allowed in Islam. There ar  some women-only-sessions in 
Edinburgh which are more appropriate and comfortable for us to attend. For example, 
I often go to Leith Victoria Swim Centre on Saturdays, and Portobello Swim Centre or 
Jack Kane Sport Centre on weekdays. It is more comfortable in these sessions and it is 
more Islamic. 
[27 year-old, Edinburgh]  
 
   Even though Kathryn was a less-practicing Muslim woman, she along with the 
examples of Sanaz and Shakila emphasises that religious concerns and feeling more 
comfortable were the main reasons for attending women-only-sessions. Other less-
practicing Muslim women also attended women-only-sessions. This can imply that 
observing the prohibition of mixed-sex meetings could be common amongst some 
less-practicing and practicing Muslim women. As I discussed in the last chapter, 
such communality was also evident on the issue of no alcohol consumption because 
all the above less-practicing Muslim women did not drink alcohol. This can imply 
that even though some less-practicing Muslim women ay not observe hijab, daily 
prayer, or Ramadan fasting, they may observe the prohibition of alcohol and mixed-
sex meetings in sport activities. As the majority of sport centres in Scotland held 
mixed-sex-sessions, arranging women-only-sessions required Muslim women’s civic 
integration. To arrange women-only-sessions, Muslim women or any group 
associated with Muslims had to take many measures and get into touch with the local 
authorities to arrange any women-only-session sporting activities. Such civic 
involvement was again highlighted by Arezo, who was a econd generation Muslim 
woman and was involved in arranging many sporting activities for Muslim women. 
She stated that booking any women-only-session requires a greater engagement of 
Muslim women with public institutions:  
It is a long process of applying for funding, looking for suitable female tutors (there 
are many more male tutors in the sports and exercise field than female), finding 
suitable venues, advertising to get a suitable number of girls attending, getting 
 
281 
disclosures for all the tutors and helpers and alsothe insurance. The local authorities 
help whenever they can but usually there is a lack of venues which are suitable, i.e. the 
swimming has taken a long time. The Leith swimming center is so busy there is no 
chance of actually learning any survival skills so we have had to find somewhere else 
along with a female life guard, which are difficult to find and a female tutor to teach 
lifesaving.  
[50 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   The examples of Shakila and Arezo, who were active in arranging women-only-
session sporting activities for Muslim women, can imply the civic integration of 
some Muslim women in Scotland. These examples can also suggest that there was 
such a high demand for women-only-sessions amongst Mu lim women that some 
Muslim women organisations’ civic engagement to accommodate such demand was 
fulfilled by the local authorities. It is, however, important to note that these sessions 
were inclusive to all women regardless of their ethnic and religious background and 
thus white Scottish women could also take part in these sessions. This was pointed 
out in the next example. Rafiqah, who was a second generation practicing Muslim 
woman, stated that women-only-sessions were highly welcomed and well attended 
by Muslim and some non-Muslim women and therefore they became a permanent 
feature of Muslim female’s social life in Scotland:  
I was just a participant in the women only sessions. Even non-Muslims and some white 
Scottish girls take part in these sessions....all the activities they gave us were well 
attended each week....instead of keeping up with demand they have made sessions 
shorter and split the time....I do believe that a colleague of mine who works with 
council started this off and it was supposed to be a trial but now is a permanent feature. 
[27 year-old, Edinburgh] 
 
   These quotes suggest that reservation of such venues in response to Muslim 
women’s demand was a form of civic integration that Muslim women engaged in, 
which has led to greater engagement in civic participation. This finding supports 
previous research that suggested that Muslim’s identity politics can be an important 
trigger for greater civic integration (Choudhury 2007; Meer 2010). To conclude this 
section, sport can offer a safe arena for both Muslim men and Muslim women to 
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interact separately because it does not involve alcohol. Muslim women’s 
engagement, can however be more constrained, but the search for gender segregated 




   This research suggests that even though Muslims in Scotland deal with different 
social (discrimination and Islamophobia) and cultural barriers (such as dominance of 
alcohol consumption and its prohibition in Islam); they try to fit into different aspects 
of society. The most common strategy was Halal integration, which means fitting 
into the society while maintaining their religious identity. Even though the adoption 
of this strategy implies the importance of Muslims’ religious identity, the strategy of 
fitting in and integration can be varied based upon Muslims’ gender differences, 
generational dynamics, and religious practice. Considering the importance of 
generational dynamics, the data suggests that the in egration of second generation 
Muslims in all economic, educational, and social aspects can be greater than the first 
generation Muslims. The second generation Muslims’ greater integration seems to 
flow from them having British education and knowing the English language, thus 
being more confident in applying for jobs or socialising and communicating with the 
white Scottish people. Such greater integration was evident in their interest in 
employment rather than self-employment, in higher education achievements, and 
increased engagement in social and civil participation. This may imply an increasing 
interest in integration into Scottish society and can also suggest that the third 
generation Muslims’ economic, educational, and social integration could be even 
greater than what is happening now. Confirming thisas ociation, however, requires 
further research on third generation Muslims. I also found none of the segregation 
and separation that was said to characterise Muslim and non-Muslim groups in 
northern England. 
   Consistent with other research (Scottish Governmnt report 2005; Qureshi and 
Moores 1999; Cassidy et. al. 2006; Lewis 2007), this research also suggests the 
importance of gendered processes in Muslims’ integration. However, it also suggests 
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that the second generation Muslim women challenged both social and cultural 
barriers. It was highlighted that the second generation Muslim women’s religious 
identity played an important role in challenging cultural barriers such as the practice 
of patriarchal ideology in some Muslim families. The capability to challenge cultural 
barriers is evident in the considerable interest of some second generation Muslim 
women in voluntary work and in gaining higher education qualifications to benefit 
their children. This could also suggest a growing trend of Muslim women’s social, 
educational, and economic integration in the future. 
   Another important issue that can affect Muslims’ integration is religious practice 
and moral observation. The importance of religious b ervation (such as lack of 
alcohol consumption and avoiding being present in places where it is served) can be 
highlighted by Muslims’ social integration than by economic or educational 
integration. For example, it was suggested that some less-practicing Muslims who do 
not mind being present in places where alcohol is served may be able to develop 
closer social relationships with the mainstream white Scottish people. In contrast, the 
practicing Muslims’ social integration is limited to daytime and non-alcoholic 
environments. This can imply that the social integration of non-practicing Muslims is 
different, and perhaps more developed, from practicing or less-practicing Muslims’ 
integration.  
   Putting these findings together adds to the general argument that even though 
Muslims’ religious identity and some cultural practices have limited their integration, 
there is the possibility of increased participation by second generation Muslims, who 
use new interpretations of religious codes to seek further integration into society. It is 
important to note that new interpretations can also be used to put more limits on 
Muslims’ integration. However, the interpretations that were used by respondents in 
this study acted more to facilitate their fitting and integration process. This can imply 
Muslims’ intention for greater integration in Scotland. For example, socialising in 
alternative ways such as meeting at cafés, running family and social events in non-
alcoholic environments, and taking part in voluntary nd charitable work are some of 
their strategies for greater integration. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion; Halal Scots and Halal Integration 
 
   This research in Chapter Five discussed the importance, meaning, and strength of 
nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity negotiation and argued 
that religion and nationality (mainly their country of residence) appears to be more 
significant amongst second generation Muslims than other factors like ethnicity. In 
contrast, it was argued that ethnic background (mainly their country of origin) was 
more important amongst the first generation Muslims than other factors. Chapters 
Six and Seven studied Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities 
and compared them with those in towns and small cities; his comparison suggested 
that those living in less-segregated areas (with the highest number of Muslim 
residents) felt that there might be more Islamophobia in the more-segregated areas, 
and those living in the more-segregated areas (with fewer number of Muslim 
residents) felt that there might be more Islamophobia in places with a higher density 
of Muslim residents. However, the findings of these two chapters suggested that the 
density of Muslims is not necessarily correlated to Islamophobia, and that social and 
economic factors such as living in deprived areas, drunks, and self-employment in 
low level occupations that involve daily contact with many people are more 
important than numbers per se. Chapter Eight argued that the most important issue in 
limiting Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious identity 
and the dominance of alcohol consumption in Scottish social life. The prohibition on 
attending places where alcohol is served in Islam, limits the number and type of 
events that strictly-practicing Muslims can attend. This chapter also discussed the 
importance of cultural understandings and respect as the main pathway to Muslims’ 
integration. Finally, I discussed in Chapter Nine how Muslims adopt the strategy of 
Halal integration in order to socialise and interact with mainstream society while 
maintaining their religious identity. 
Research Aims 
   The main aim of this research was to explore andexplain the importance of 
different factors - with a focus on religion - in Muslims’ identity negotiation, 
experiences of Islamophobia, and integration. Considering the first part of this 
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objective, this thesis aimed to explore the importance of different factors such as 
nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity construction. It 
examined how the above factors affected Muslims’ social exclusion or inclusion into 
Scottish society. To meet this aim, participants’ sense of belonging was firstly 
examined by asking them to describe their identity as they wished to be identified. 
Then, they were asked to clarify what made them choose those identities in order to 
explore the identity markers that they used to support their social identities. Second, 
to explore different meanings and the strength of Muslims’ different social self-
identifications, participants were asked to comment o  the importance of their 
religion, ethnicity, and nationality in their identity and how these elements could 
relate to or co-exist with each other. This was an attempt to understand the strength 
of one particular identity marker over the others.  
   This study also aimed to explore Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia or racism 
in Scotland and to explain the importance of different factors in these experiences. 
This aim was met by asking an open ended question to see whether participants had 
any experience of racism or Islamophobia in Scotland. After that, they were probed 
for deeper explanations with questions like what, where, when, and why to elaborate 
the underlying foundations of their experiences of racism and/or Islamophobia. It is 
important to note that the analysis of participants’ re ponses showed that they had 
experienced both racism and Islamophobia, thus both of t em were studied. 
   To deal with the final research aim, this study explored respondents’ development 
of integration and explained the importance of different barriers and path-ways to 
their socio-economic participation in Scottish society. To meet this aim, respondents, 
were firstly asked to clarify/offer their views on the term ‘integration.’ This was 
mainly to find a common ground on which to discuss Muslims’ integration in 
Scotland. Then, they were asked to comment on the path-ways and barriers to 
Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Given the importance of Muslims’ religious 
identity (especially amongst practicing Muslims) in their social life, they were 
probed further on how they, as Muslims, might integrate and interact with majority 
Scots. Finally, with regards to their actual socio-ec nomic integration, they were 
asked to comment on challenging issues such as unemploy ent and self-




Main Arguments and Contributions 
   This thesis - as a piece of qualitative research - was able to highlight the diversity 
of Muslims and the complexity of their social identity construction and integration in 
Scotland. This research could particularly highlight the importance of religion and 
religiosity on Muslims’ identity and practice. It also highlighted the important role of 
other sociological factors such as gender and generation. This thesis also accessed 
some Muslim participants (16 out of 43) outside of Edinburgh and Glasgow, who 
offer valuable insights into the understanding of those who live in smaller parts of 
Scotland. This thesis particularly offers more insight into Muslims’ social integration 
in Scotland, which has been less often studied. By examining barriers and path-ways 
to their integration, this research explained the importance of some untypical issues 
such as alcohol consumption and gender segregation, which can shed more light on 
the development of Muslims’ social integration in Scotland. Overall, these findings 
offer some new and deep accounts on different aspects of Muslims’ lived 
experiences in Scotland. 
   This research, which drew on different Muslim participants’ identity negotiation 
processes, suggests that religion plays a central role in practicing Muslims’ identity 
and integration. It also highlights that practicing Muslims’ identification with 
religious identity can be stronger than their identification with nationality or 
ethnicity. The significance of religion was previously associated with the public 
devaluation of Islam, Islamophobia, (Saeed et. al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 
2007) or particular social functions of Islamic law as complete, and of course 
distinctive, ways of life (Jacobson 1997b; see alsoY seldyk et. al. 2010; Park 2007). 
This research suggests that both of the proposed explanations can contribute to 
strong identification with Islam. Further to these proposed explanations, this research 
particularly suggests that strong identification with religion, especially in the case of 
practicing second generation Muslims, is reinforced as they have no connection to 
their parents’ country of origin and find their full belonging to Scottishness denied at 
the grassroots. Religion could become the most important source of identity in this 
case. This particularly highlights the importance of disassociation with ethnic 
identities and the significance of identity non-recognition. It is, however, important 
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to note that such strong identification with religion contributed to the distinctive 
identity and integration of practicing Muslims, but did not lead to their isolation from 
mainstream society. It is for this reason that thisre earch suggests the term ‘Halal 
Scots’ or ‘Halal integration’ to explain the position of many Scottish Muslims who 
have integrated into many aspects of Scottish society while maintaining their 
distinctive religious identity and practice. This was heavily highlighted in their sense 
of belonging to Scotland and their attempt to fit into society through permitted/Halal 
ways of integration. I start with the former.    
   As Hussain and Miller (2006) argue, Muslims’ Scottish identity was adopted as a 
tool of integration rather than of separation. The hyphenated or multiple identities of 
Scottish-Muslims are a good example of such integraion. This thesis also suggests 
that Muslims’ social self-identification is not only affected by religion because 
nationality also plays an important part. The importance of nationality - mainly their 
country of residence in this research - was based on residential and citizenship 
markers, particularly amongst the first generation. Amongst the second generation 
Muslims, this was based on a range of markers such as birthplace, education, English 
language, and Scottish accent and culture. It is, however, important to note that the 
‘continuing salience of race’ (Hopkins 2007; Jacobson 1997a; 1997b) and 
persistence of cultural boundaries (Jacobson 1997a; 1997b; Virdee et. al. 2006) 
means that the experience of national identity non-recognition played an important 
part in weakening these participants’ sense of belonging to Scotland or Britain. For 
example, this meant that in the case of first generation Muslims, some wanted to 
keep open an option of return. This leads to the importance of ethnicity, which was 
mainly based on maintaining social/cultural ties with their country of origin in the 
case of the first generation1, and their parents’ country of origin in the case of the 
second generation. Social imposition and labelling behaviour also played an 
important part in associations with ethnic background. 
                                                                 
1
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, in this research respondents’ identification with their country of origin 
has been regarded as ethnic identity rather than national identity because respondents distinguished 
between their national identity which was based on their country of residence and their ethnic identity 
which was based on their country of origin. 
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   Turning to the second body of evidence that relates to Muslim’s Halal integration 
into Scottish society, this study suggests that religion and religious identity also play 
an important role in Muslims’ integration. The importance of religion and religious 
identity for Muslims lay in its function as a complete way of life, with which 
everything else should be in line. The most important issue in limiting Muslims’ 
social integration was the interplay between their religious identity and the 
dominance of some Scottish social norms such as drinking alcohol and mixed-sex 
meetings that are prohibited in Islam. To fit into Scottish society and circumvent 
these limits, Muslims have adopted alternative ways of socialising such as meeting in 
cafés, running family and social events in non-alcoholic environments, and taking 
part in voluntary and charitable works to try to fit into the society. Considering the 
importance of some cultural barriers such as patriarchal ideas in the lack of economic 
and educational integration of Muslim women, this re earch also suggests that there 
is a possibility of the increasing participation of second generation Muslims who, by 
using new interpretations of religious codes, seek further integration into the society. 
   This research also suggests that Muslims’ religious identity, symbolised by 
growing a beard in the case of men and wearing a hijab in the case of women, was 
crucial to their experiences of Islamophobia. Whilst the prominent use of the term 
‘Paki’ in verbal abuse might suggest that many respondents xperienced racism 
rather than necessarily Islamophobia, it is important to note that such abuse was 
directed at those displaying markers of Muslim identity including white 
British/Scottish converts. This can be explained by the racialisation process at the 
heart of Islamophobic discourse that marks all Muslim  with an ‘inherent difference 
that leaves them vulnerable to being targeted with a specific prejudice’ (Moosavi 
2014: 3). The terms of abuse do, however, point to the continuing importance of 
‘race’, especially in the case of less-practicing Muslims, in which their racial 
signifier (mainly skin colour) was highlighted during their experiences of racism. 
This can be explained by the persistence of racial markers. Further to the importance 
of Muslims’ identity and visibility (either racial or religious), some social and 
economic factors were particularly important in the daily experience of 
Islamophobia. These factors included living in deprived areas and self-employment 
in low level occupations that involve daily contact with many people. The 
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importance of these factors can be explained by the results of the Scottish Social 
Attitudes Survey (2010), which showed that those living in more deprived areas of 
Scotland and those with lower levels of educational attainment were more likely to 
have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011). 
   The research also highlighted the importance of the fact that the category of 
‘Muslim’ is as internally diverse as any other category (Modood 2003; Meer 2012). 
This was evident in different Muslims’ varying attitudes and approaches to identity, 
Islamophobia, and integration. In that sense, this re earch suggested that key 
differences were based on different Muslims’ level of religiosity and degree of 
commitment to religion. This research also highlighted the importance of some 
sociological factors; particularly generational differences, gender dynamics, and 
geographical differences in varying Muslims’ attitudes and experiences. In the next 
section, I summarise the main findings on the importance of these issues in turn. 
 
Commitment to Religion 
   This research suggests that different levels of religiosity and observation affect the 
impact of practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ attitudes to identity and 
integration. For practicing Muslims, religion can be the most important identity 
marker. For these Muslims, identification with religion can be stronger than 
identifying with ethnicity and nationality. For less-practicing Muslims on the other 
hand, identifying with national or ethnic identities can be stronger, with religious 
identity not even reported as being a part of their multiple or hybrid identities. Such 
variation can also have some bearing on practicing a d less-practicing Muslims’ 
integration. For practicing Muslims, religion can be a complete way of life that 
everything else should be in line with, while less-practicing Muslims do not have 
such commitment. The importance of religious observation (such as lack of alcohol 
consumption and avoiding being present in its serving places) can be again 
highlighted in Muslims’ social integration. The most important issue that limited 
practicing Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious 
identity and the dominance of alcohol in Scotland. Even the Scottish identity could 
not create a bridge between these two issues due to the importance of religion 
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amongst practicing Muslims. Less-practicing Muslims, however, due to their lesser 
commitment to their religion had a more flexible approach on this issue. For 
example, some less-practicing Muslims used to drink alcohol and/or, crucially, did 
not mind attending drinking establishments, while practicing Muslims never drank 
alcohol and usually did not attend any place where alcohol is served. In other words, 
religious identity was the most important consideration for practicing Muslims in 
managing their social integration, while for less-practicing Muslims, the issue of 
Islamophobia and unwelcoming attitudes was more important. This may imply that 
non-practicing Muslims would have different strategies for their social integration, 
but this implication requires further research. The level of religiosity, however, was 
not the only factor that varied in Muslims’ identities and integration. Generational 
differences also played an important part in differentiating first and second 
generation Muslims’ identity negotiation and integration. 
 
Generational Dynamics 
   The importance of generational differences was highlighted more in participants’ 
different senses of belonging to Scotland and identfication with their ethnic 
backgrounds. The importance of generational dynamics was evident in most second 
generation Muslims’ stronger ties with their country of residence than their parents’ 
country of origin. First generation participants’ identification with Scotland was 
mainly based on residential and citizenship markers, and identification with their 
country of origin was mainly based on the salience of birthplace and maintaining 
social and financial ties with their country of origin. However, the strength of 
identification with national (e.g. Scottish) and ethnic identities (e.g. Pakistani) varied 
based on the idea or myth of return. Those participants who set up their new home 
and life in Scotland and did not consider going back to their country of origin had a 
stronger affiliation with their national identities than their ethnic identities. On the 
other hand, those who kept the possibility of return open and maintained strong 
cultural and financial ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with 
their ethnic identities than their national identities. In contrast, the importance of 
ethnicity and ethnic identity amongst the second generation was mainly related to 
social imposition (labelling behaviour) or family education. The strength and 
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meaning of their identification with national and ethnic identities varied based on 
family education and ethnic culture. Those respondents who maintained strong 
cultural ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic 
identities than their national identities. In contrast, those respondents who had closer 
bonds with Scottish culture had a stronger affiliation with their national identities 
than their ethnic identities.  
   The importance of generational dynamics was alsohighlighted in participants’ 
intergenerational strategies. Second generation Muslims, significantly, had more 
structural and social abilities for integration. For example, the data suggests that the 
integration of second generation Muslims in all economic, educational, and social 
aspects can be greater than the first generation Muslims. The second generation 
Muslims’ greater integration seems to flow from having British education and 
knowing the English language, thus being more confide t in applying for jobs or 
socialising and communicating with majority Scots. Such greater integration was 
evident in their interest in employment rather than self-employment, more interest in 
higher education achievements, and greater engagement in social and civil activities. 
This may imply an increasing interest in integration into Scottish society and can also 
suggest that the third generation Muslims’ economic, educational, and social 
integration could be even greater than what is happening now. Confirming this 
association, however, requires further research about third generation Muslims. 
 
Gender Differences 
   The importance of gendered processes was particul ly highlighted in Muslims’ 
integration. Consistent with other research (Scottish Government report 2005; 
Qureshi and Moores 1999; Cassidy et. al. 2006; Lewis 2007), this research suggested 
the importance of a gendered process that underlies th  participation of Muslim 
women in economic, educational, and social integration. However, it also suggests 
the importance of religion and generation in some second generation Muslim 
women’s challenges to both social and cultural barriers for greater integration. For 
example, it was highlighted that some second generation Muslim women’s religious 
identities played an important role in challenging cultural barriers such as the 
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practice of patriarchal ideology in some Muslims families. The importance of such 
capability to challenge cultural barriers is evident in the interest of some second 
generation Muslim women to engage in voluntary work and to seek higher education 
for the benefit of their children. This could also uggest a growing trend of Muslim 
women’s social, educational, and economic integration increasing in the future. 
Factors which made second generation Muslim women’s integration greater than the 
first generation were having Scottish/British education, being familiar with the 
Scottish culture, and speaking the language.  
 
Location 
   Finally this thesis departed from most of the research on Muslims in Scotland, by 
interviewing people living outside the metropolitan centres of Glasgow and 
Edinburgh. In so doing, this thesis suggested that the number of Muslim residents in 
a place is not necessary correlated to Islamophobia. This research suggests that a 
different range of experiences of Islamophobia took place both in major cities such 
as Edinburgh and Glasgow – which have the highest number of Muslim residents - 
and small cities/towns such as Dunfermline or Falkirk. For instance, participant’s 
accounts of experiencing less or no Islamophobia in cities such as Dundee and 
Aberdeen as compared to cities like Edinburgh and Glasgow can challenge the 
importance of the high density of Muslim populations in the high rate of 
Islamophobia. The data highlighted instead the importance of other socio-economic 
factors such as deprivation. For example, the data suggests that in daily experiences 
of Islamophobia living in deprived areas, drunks, and self-employment in low level 
occupations that involve daily contact with many peo l  are important. Interviewees 
emphasised the importance of police protection in small towns and suggested that 
inadequate police protection in such areas due to the smaller number of ethnic 
minority residents may affect the role and impact of Islamophobia. However given 




Future Studies and Policy Recommendation 
   In reaching out beyond urban centres and interviewing men and women the thesis 
not only offering insights into Muslim experiences but also highlighted numerous 
avenues in which further research is required. Firstly, future studies can build on this 
research which highlights the importance of young Muslim women’s integration in 
Scotland. My data highlighted a change in some second generation Muslim women’s 
participation in the society, so more concentration on the first and second generation 
Muslim women’s integration would be helpful in verifying an emerging shift in the 
second generation Muslim women’s integration. The next area that this research 
suggests for further study is non-practicing Muslim’ integration and identity 
negotiation. The findings of this research suggested that less-practicing Muslims can 
have different strategies of integration as compared to practicing Muslims. This can 
be the case between non-practicing Muslims as well due to their varying 
commitment to any Islamic rules or guidelines. Furthe  research about these people 
can make a significant contribution to understanding the importance of religion in 
Muslims’ identity and practice. 
   One of the other areas that could contribute to the study of Muslims is the 
examination of the second and third generation Muslims’ identity negotiation and 
integration. By studying the first and second generation Muslims’ integration 
strategies, this research suggested that in some aspects such as employment and 
educational achievement, generational dynamics were important. Examining the 
integration of later generations can confirm the grater integration of new generation 
Muslims in some specific aspect of society. Further studies about younger 
generations can also examine whether the religion of Islam is still central to the third 
generation Muslims’ identity and practice or whether the importance of religion is 
fading as they integrate more into the society. Last but not least is arranged marriage 
or intercommunity marriage. It was highlighted by some participants in this research 
that second generation Muslims are not interested in arranged marriages, especially 
in marrying someone who is not born inside the UK. For example, there were a 
couple of second generation respondents who married someone outside of their 
ethnic community. This may suggest a change in younger generations’ marriage 
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preferences, which further research about generational dynamics and marriage 
preferences can verify. 
   The final point that needs to be made is that, as mentioned earlier, the importance 
of ‘race’ (mainly with reference to skin colour) was lso highlighted by some first 
and second generation participants, which could imply the persistence of ‘race’ as a 
marker of social difference. Muslims’ sense of being part of Scottish/British society 
or of being outside that society is not only a Muslim issue, but is also related to their 
perceptions and experiences of how others see them. This is where Muslims learn 
whether their claims to Scottishness are accepted or refused. Interestingly, despite 
having a widespread experience of identity non-recognition at the grassroots level, 
both first and second generation Muslims still had some sense of belonging to 
Scottish/British identity. This can be associated with the Scottish elite nationalism 
that is still promoting and propagating a civic sens  of Scottish identity (Hussain and 
Miller 2006; Hopkins 2008), or it can be associated with the relative lack of racism 
and Islamophobia in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). This research suggests that 
even though Muslims in Scotland deal with different social (discrimination and 
Islamophobia) and cultural barriers (such as the dominance of alcohol consumption 
and its prohibition in Islam); they still try to fit into different aspects of that society. 
The most commonly adopted strategy of practicing Muslims is what I have termed 
Halal integration, which suggests fitting into society while maintaining religious 
identity. The final implication of this chapter is a practical recommendation for those 
policy makers who work towards the greater integration and participation of Muslims 
in Scotland. Due to the importance of alcohol consumption in hindering Muslims’ 
integration, it is suggested that, as one of my participants pointed out, in public 
events where Muslims’ participation is expected, non-alcoholic places and Halal 
food should be considered. Alternatively, if non-alcoholic places are unavailable, 
then some tables with Halal drink and food should be reserved for Muslims. Such 
simple steps would send out a strong symbolic messag  that majority Scots are keen 
to interact and engage with Muslims and that integration is not a one-way street. In 
so doing, they could reinforce the sense of belonging to Scotland that many of my 





Appendix 01: Invitation Letter for Interview Participation 
 
Dear Brother/Sister …. 
Hi/ Asalaam Alikoum, 
   I am a postgraduate student at the University of Edinburgh. I am doing a study on 
‘Multiculturalism and Muslims’ Social Identity Negotiation and Integration in 
Scotland’. As you may know, Muslims are portrayed as being a non-integrated and 
disloyal group in Britain. However, there has been little research on this issue, 
especially from the perspective of Muslims in Scotland. Accordingly, this research 
will examine how Muslims, as an ethnic/faith group who have experienced a degree 
of stigmatisation, negotiate their national belonging and integrate into a multi-
cultural society.  
 
   I need to do some interviews with Scotland’s Muslim  (specifically those who were 
born in Scotland or have live in Scotland for more than 10 years). I’d be immensely 
grateful if you or any of your members/friends could take part in this study. I should 
also mention that in interviews with Muslim women, my wife who is also a Muslim 
woman too will accompany us. The interviews will usually take around 30-40 
minutes and it can take place at wherever best suits respondents (e.g. Mosque, 
University meeting rooms, library meeting room etc.). 
 
   Should any further information be required, I would be happy to discuss it with 





Appendix 02: Interview Schedule 
 
Personal Question  
Name, age, origin, birthplace, location, length of residence, employment status, gender, education  
 
Research Question  
Identification and Social Identity Negotiation 
1. How do you describe yourself (in terms of national identity)? 
2. Would this change in different settings? 
3. What do you think it means to be Scottish/British?  
4. Do you feel that your self-categorisation is widely accepted?  
5. How do you find indigenous Scots’ attitudes towards yourself/Muslims? 
6. What do indigenous Scots consider a Muslim in Scotland to be? 
7. How important are the attitudes of others to your national self-definition? 
8. Has your self-identification changed over time? 
9. How important is your religion to how you see yourself? How easy is it for your 
religious and national identities to co-exist? 
10. How important is your family origin/ethnicity to how you see yourself? How easy is it 
for your ethnic and national identities to co-exist? 
11. If you had children, do you think that they would be S/B or they would feel that they 
belong to another nationality? How would you prefer to bring them up?  
 
Racism and Discrimination 
1. Do you think that there is much religious and/or racial prejudice in Scotland? Has 
this changed over time? Have you personally ever experienced religious or racial 
discrimination? 
2. How important do you think your geographical location/gender/generation is in your 
experience of social inclusion or exclusion? 
3. Do you think that the way you think about your national identity is affected by 
perceptions or experiences of discrimination, or are these two issues quite separate 
for you? 
 
Integration and Social Interaction 
1. Do you feel that you are integrated into wider society? In what ways? 
2. In terms of primary social relationships, would you consider/be happy to marry a 
British/Scottish person? Social cliques, child playgroups? Why/why not? 
3. Do you have any non-Muslim close friends whom you invite to your home often? 
Why/why not? 
4. Are you a member of/ a participant in any non-Muslims/denominational interest 
organization, voluntary groups, or public centre? Why/why not? 
 
297 
5. Do you feel comfortable referring to any public institutions for the purpose of gaining 
any social services? (Overcoming language barriers, complaining about discriminatory 
reception etc.)- Social in/exclusion - Do you have any problems in terms of gaining 
social services? 
6. Do you think that you can apply for any job and be successful?   
7. 28% of Muslims are self-employed, why do you think this is? 





Appendix 03: Consent Form 
 
I understand that (please initial the appropriate boxes): 
My participation is entirely voluntary                                                               □ 
I am free to refuse to answer any question asked                                                      □ 
I can choose to withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice with the 
knowledge that the provided data will be destroyed accordingly                               □
 
And I confirm that : 
I have read and understood the research participant information sheet                      □
I fully understand that any information disclosed during the research interview will 
be treated as confidential and that my anonymity will be respected at all times unless 
I give consent in this form for my name to be used                                                   □ 
I agree □ /object □ to give consent for my real name to be used in this t esis, 
research reports, subsequent conference papers, and ac demic articles. 
 
I consent to be interviewed                                                                             □ 
I consent for the interview to be recorded                                                            □ 
 
Signed …………………………………………………………….……….. 






Appendix 04: Participant Information Sheet 
Before deciding to take part in this research study (a PhD research in Sociology), which is titled: 
‘Multiculturalism and Muslims’ Social Identity Negotiation and Integration in Scotland’, please 
read the following sections carefully because it isimportant for you to understand why this study is 
being conducted and what your participation will involve. 
Purposes and Aims of the Study  
   Most of the time, Muslims are portrayed to be a less loyal and less integrated 
community in multicultural societies. However, the important fact that minority 
groups’ national belonging and integration is highly affected by and through 
interactions between different factors and actors (e.g. government, media, majority 
and minorities themselves) is often forgotten. Accordingly, this research is set to 
examine how Muslims as a stigmatised ethnic/faith minority group negotiate their 
national belonging and integration in Scotland. It is designed to look at identity 
construction and the integration process from the perspective of Muslims and to 
explore the barriers and path ways that they face in this process.  
Reasons for being invited to participate in the research interview  
   You have been asked to participate because your views, perceptions, and attitudes on Muslims’ 
identification are the focus of this study (rather than exploring how the majority people view 
Muslims’ national identity in Scotland). The research interview that you are considering participating 
in forms a part of a larger doctoral research study.     
Your decision about participation 
   It is entirely up to you whether you participate. If you do decide to participate, the interview will be 
recorded; however, any information disclosed during the research interview will be treated as 
confidential, and your privacy and anonymity will be respected at all times. All data drawn upon in 
my study or for other academic articles and conferece papers will also abide by strict confidentiality. 
Pseudonyms will be used for all participants and it is proposed that any other names or places of 
reference that would jeopardise the anonymity of the participant will also be changed or removed. 
You can also withdraw from participation at any time you like. The data will be only accessed by me, 
the researcher, and the two academic supervisors identified at the bottom of the page. This procedure 
is in line with the ethical guidelines of the University of Edinburgh and the British Sociological 
Association.  
If you have any further queries please contact:  
Reza Bagheri (researcher), University of Edinburgh, Social and Political School, Sociology 
Department, Chrystal Macmillan Building (Room 6.13)  
15A George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD, email: r.bagheri@sms.ed.ac.uk or tel: +44 (0)753 342 8008. 
Or alternatively: 
Dr. Hugo Gorringe (supervisor),  University of Edinburgh, Social and Political School, Sociology 
Department, Chrystal Macmillan Building (Room 6.30)  
15A George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD, email: h.gorringe@ed.ac.uk or tel: +44 (0)131 650 3940. 
Dr. James Kennedy (supervisor), University of Edinburgh, Social and Political School, Sociology 
Department, Chrystal Macmillan Building (Room 6.28)  
15A George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD, email: J.Kennedy@ed.ac.uk or tel: +44 (0)131 650 4250.
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Appendix 05: Coding Framework (A Sample of Codes and Categories) 
 
Category 01: Social Identity Negotiation (First Generation Participants) 
Sub-category 01: Type of Identity 
Code: National and ethnic: ‘British-Pakistani’; 
Code: Sub-National and Ethnic: ‘Scottish-Asian/Kenya ’; 
Code: British and Scottish together; 
Code: Mixed of national, ethnic and religious 
 
Sub-category 02: Identity markers 
Code: Citizenship and passport; 
Code: Residence 
 
Sub-category 03: Experience of Islamophobia or racism 
Code: rarely: ‘Sometimes’; 
Code: many time: ‘Quite a lot’; 
Code: never: No experience at all; 
Code: Self-employment: ‘Self-employed Muslims get more’  
 
Category 02: Experience of Islamophobia or Racism (First Generation 
Participants) 
Sub-category 01: Different type of discrimination 
Code: Street-racism; 
Code: Islamophobia; 
Code: Verbal abuse; 
Code: Institutional racism 
 
Sub-category 02: Implication of Identity Mis-recognition 
Code: Isolation: ‘Stick to your own identity’ 
 
Sub-category 03: Why is there discrimination? 
Code: Skin colour; 
Code: Economic Resentment; 
Code: Media and Islamophobia; 
Code: Lack of education 
 
Category 03: Social Identity Negotiation (Second Generation Participants) 
Sub-category 01: Type of Identity 
Code: Multiple: Scottish Pakistani (sub-National-ethnic); 
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Code: Multiple: Scottish Muslim (sub-National-religious); 
Code: Multiple: British Pakistani (National-ethnic); 
Code: Multiple: British Muslim (National-religious); 
Code: Only Scottish (only sub-National); 
Code: Only Muslim (only religious); 
Code: Only British (only National); 
Code: Only Iraqi/Lebanese (only ethnic); 
Code: British and Scottish together; 
Code: Not ethnic: ‘I do not see myself Pakistani’; 
Code: Mixed identities: British-Muslim-Pakistani 
 
Sub-category 02: Identity markers 
Code: Birthplace and Residence: Born and bred, live and love the country; 
Code: Adopting Scottish and British culture: characteristics and values; 
Code: Scottish/British Education; 
Code: English Language; 
Code: Scottish accent; 
Code: Citizenship, living, passport, here is home 
 
Sub-category 03: Cultural Identity 
Code: Culturally Scottish: ‘I am culturally Scottish’; 
Code: Not Pakistani: ‘I can not live in Pakistan’; 
Code: Being selective: ‘I take the best from both cultures’ 
 
Sub-category 04: Identity acceptance 
Code: They Accept; 
Code: They do not accept; 
Code: ‘not at first look but after knowing you‘ 
Code: ‘they should accept’ 
 




Sub-category 06: ‘Truly’ Scottish/British 
Code: Assimilation: ‘Certain way of thinking’; 
Code: Whiteness: ‘skin colour’, ‘appearance’;  
Code: Ancestry: ‘Should have Scottish parents’ 
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Appendix 06: Summary of 43 Interviewees 
1. Kasim: Edinburgh; Male, Second Generation, Brought up in Scotland, 41 
Year-old, Shia, Employed, Interviewed on 02/11/2010 
2. Bohlol: Edinburgh; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 20 Year-old, Sunni, Standard Grade, Interviwed on 04/07/2011 
3. Sajjad: Edinburgh; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, 49 Year-old, 
Sunni, Self-employed, Interviewed on 08/07/2011 
4. Hamid: Edinburgh; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, 28 Year-old, 
Sunni, Self-employed, Bachelor, Interviewed on 25/07/2 11 
5. Kathryn: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, Birmingham Born, 
Pakistani Origin, 27 Year-old, Sunni, Standard Grade, Interviewed on 
25/07/2011 
6. Shakila: Glasgow; Female, Second Generation, Scottish Mother and Iranian 
Father, Scottish Born, 30 year-old, Sunni, Standard Grade, Employed, 
Interviewed on 26/07/2011 
7. Hakim: Edinburgh; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 20 Year-old, Sunni, Bachelor, Interviewed on 27/07/2011 
8. Wahed: Edinburgh; Male, Second generation, Scottish born, Pakistani origin, 
20 year-old, Sunni, Bachelor, [doing voluntary activities], Interviewed on 
27/07/2011 
9. Arezo: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, Kenyan Born (Living in 
Scotland for 30y), 50 Year-old, Sunni, Self-employed, College, Interviewed 
on 03/08/2011 
10. Zainab: Edinburgh, Female, Second Generation, Scottish Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 44 Year-old, Housewife, Doing Voluntary Activi ies, Sunni, 
Interviewed on 08/08/2011 
11. Sanaz: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, Scottish Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 41 Year-old, Sunni, Housewife,  Doing Voluntary Activities, 
Interviewed on 10/08/2011 
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12. Saed: Edinburgh; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, 31 Year-old, Shia, 
Employed, Postgraduate, Interviewed on 21/08/2011 
13. Ali: Edinburgh; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Edinburgh), 
Pakistani Origin, 38 Year-old, Shia, Employed, Intervi wed on 27/08/2011 
14. Akbar: Edinburgh; Male, First Generation, Kenyan Born, 28 Year-old, Shia, 
Self-employed, College, Interviewed on 28/08/2011 
15. Asghar: Edinburgh; Male, First Generation, Kenyan Born, 56 Year-old, Shia, 
Self-employed, Interviewed on 29/08/2011 
16. Rafiqah: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, British Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 36 Year-old, Sunni, Housewife, Doing Voluntary Activities, British 
General Certificate of Secondary Education, Interviewed on 17/09/2011 
17. Azadeh: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, British Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 42 Year-old, Sunni, Housewife, Doing Voluntary Activities, British 
General Certificate of Secondary Education, Interviewed on 20/09/2011 
18. Zahra: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, British Born, Pakistani 
Origin, 45 Year-old, Sunni, Housewife, Doing Voluntary Activities, College, 
Interviewed on 22/09/2011 
19. Emran: Glasgow; Male, First Generation, Kenyan Born, 39 Year-old, Sunni, 
Self-employed, Diploma on Computing, Interviewed on 14/09/2011 
20. Saleh: East Kilbride; Male, First Generation, Egyptian Born, 65 Year-old, 
Living in Glasgow for 28 Years, Sunni, Postgraduate, R tired, Interviewed on 
19/09/2011 
21. Zahir: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Scottish born, Pakistani parents, 
Brought up in Dundee (lived there for18yrs), 39 Year-old, Sunni, Employed, 
Undergraduate, Interviewed on 08/10/2011 
22. Nader: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Scottish born, Pakistani origin, 
Sunni, 38 Year-old, PhD, Employed, Interviewed on 21/09/2011 
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23. Fatima: Glasgow; Female, Second Generation, Brought p in Glasgow, Iraqi 
Origin, 32 Year-old, Shia, Employed, Master Degree, Interviewed on 
09/10/2011 
24. Batool: Glasgow; Female, Second Generation, Brought p in Glasgow, Iraqi 
Origin, 28 Year-old, Shia, Employed, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 
09/10/2011 
25. Ghader: Glasgow; Male, First Generation, Pakistani born, 63 Year-old, 
Sunni, Secondary Education, Retired (ex self-employed), Interviewed on 
10/09/2011 
26. Sadiq: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Brought up in Edinburgh, Iraqi 
Origin, 25 year-old, Shia, Undergraduate Student, Interviewed on 11/09/2011 
27. Jafar: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Scottish born, Iraqi Origin, 20 
Year-old, Shia, Undergraduate Student, Interviewed on 11/09/2011 
28. Fazel: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Lebanon Origin, 23 year-old, 
Shia, Self-employed, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 11/09/2011 
29. Amir: Dundee; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Dundee), Pakistani 
origin, 21 Year-old, Sunni, Student, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 
10/11/2011 
30. Azim: Dundee; Male, Second Generation, English Born (Living in Dundee 
for 20y), Malawi origin (Africa), 24 Year-old, Sunni, Employed, College, 
Interviewed on 10/11/2011 
31. Hassan: Dundee; Male, First Generation, Born in Malawi, Living in Dundee 
28y, 37 year-old, Self-employed, Secondary School, Sunni, Interviewed on 
10/11/2011 
32. Akram: Dundee; Female, Second Generation, Born in Du dee, Pakistani 




33. Hashim: Stirling; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Stirling), 
Pakistani Origin, 17 Year-old, Sunni, College, Student (and part time 
employed), Interviewed on 11/11/2011 
34. Hareb: Stirling; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born (Living in Stirling for 
22y), 45 Year-old, Self-employed, Sunni, Bachelor, Interviewed on 
11/11/2011 
35. Nadim: Stirling; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born (living in Stirling for 
20y), 73 Year-old, Retired, Sunni, Primary Education, Interviewed on 
27/12/2011 
36. Khabir: Aberdeen; Male, Second Generation, Iraqi Origin, Scottish Mother, 
23 Year-old, Shia, Student, postgraduate, Interviewed on 12/11/2011 
37. Shadi: Aberdeen; Female, First Generation, Kenyan Bor , Brought up in UK, 
Living in Scotland for 4 Years, Marring a white Scottish Muslim), 25 Year-
old, Under graduate, Sunni, Interviewed on 23/11/201 
38. Ehsan: Falkirk; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, Living in Scotland for 
20y, 42 Year-old, Self-employed, Sunni, Primary Education, Interviewed on 
17/11/2011 
39. Tariq: Falkirk; Male, First Generation, Born in Neth r land, Living in 
Scotland for 7y, Pakistani Origin, 28 Year-old, Sunni, Self-employed, 
College, Interviewed on 17/11/2011 
40. Adil: Falkirk; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Falkirk), Pakistani 
Origin, 24 Year-old, Employed, Sunni, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 
17/11/2011 
41. Ahad: Falkirk; Male, Second Generation, English Born, Living in Falkirk for 
34y, Pakistani Origin, 41 Year-old, Self-employed, Sunni, British General 
Certificate of Secondary Education, Interviewed on 17/11/2011 
42. Samad: Dunfermline; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, Living in 




43. Asif: Dunfermline; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, Living in 
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